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Abstract
The issue o f  national integration and unity has occupied the apex o f national discourse 
in Nigeria since it secured political independence from Britain in 1960. The Nigerian 
state’s solution to this fundamental issue is rooted in its basic constitutional principle 
which espouses “unity within diversity”. As the Nigerian nation is made up o f over 
250 ethnic and nationality groups, the issue has always been how to make a “Nigeria” 
out o f  these Nigerians. This study seeks to examine the way that Nigeria’s 
constitutional aspirations are reflected (or not) in the Nigerian press.
The narrative is told against the backdrop o f the Nigerian context, which is a major 
factor in the press’ activities, starting from the historical emancipatory role they 
played during the colonial period. The study employs qualitative content analysis to 
examine how newspapers promote any sense o f collective Nigerian national identity 
amongst N igeria’s constituent nationality groups and sectional interests. The period 
under scrutiny is 1983-1993, a period that saw both civilian and military rule, and 
press coverage from a wide spectrum o f newspapers is analysed -  particularly in 
terms o f  the variety o f newspaper ownership. This is augmented by intensive/in-depth 
interviews with experts on the Nigerian press, who reflect on how and why the press 
behave in the way they do. The intensive interv iews expose that the success o f any 
press is often dependent on its ability to promote nationality interests as a basis for 
ensuring a pan-Nigerian national cohesion, though there are issues or interests that 
unite the Nigerian state which become clearly delineated, articulated and promoted. 
The major findings from this examination o f the press confirm that, within the 
Nigerian context, these are international issues that are essentially non-contentious 
and therefore do not contradict the interests o f each o f the groups within the state.
The study finds clear evidence o f problems confronting the press in Nigeria, primarily 
in terms o f ownership, control, and lack o f professionalism among journalists, 
reinforced by the Lagos-Ibadan axis (which sees a concentration o f the press in the 
South-west) that supports a specific ‘worldview’.
This study nonetheless concludes by contending that, firstly, the Nigerian press that 
promotes nationality and sectional interests can still contribute to national integration, 
and secondly, the press’ success in instilling any sense o f collective Nigerian national 
identity in N igeria’s multi-cultural entities is directly related to how it employs 
momentous events involving Nigeria to ‘flag’ the state.
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction
1.1 Nigerian integration and the Nigerian press
My choice o f this topic has everything to do with my experience as a print journalist. 
For about ten years (1986-1996), I witnessed from the inside the intrigues and politics 
o f  the press vis-a-vis the delicate nature o f  the Nigerian state. But it was clear to me 
that such a powerful medium o f communication could do much to help resolve the 
Nigerian crisis, depending on the way it goes about exercising its power. One way it 
could do this successfully, given the socio-economic and political realities o f Nigeria, 
would be by recognising such and also appreciating why the realities exist and how 
they came about and within that context promote a Nigerian national identity amongst 
the various groups that constitute the Nigerian state.
This research is therefore about the role o f the Nigerian press in promoting a 
collective Nigerian national identity and how that impacts on the whole question o f 
national integration and unity’ in Nigeria. It examines the history and context o f the 
press, the content o f  the press and, how the press uses its coverage o f specific issues 
and events to foster a collective Nigerian national identity. For instance, it raises the 
question: What do we know about the relationship between press and issues o f 
national integration in Nigeria on the one hand and the ways that the press promotes 
national identity in a multi-cultural society like Nigeria on the other? The press' role 
in these endeavours can be questioned with regard to: the cultural variables embedded 
in the Nigerian society which threaten national integration; the way the owners o f the 
press manipulate these issues and how such manipulations impact on national 
integration and unity; and, how the press, through its activities, is able to mobilise the 
culturally diverse Nigerian society towards identifying with Nigeria. For instance, Dr. 
Rod Brookes (1999: 250), using as his case study, the British press’ coverage o f the 
BSE/CJD 1 crisis o f  1996 in the UK, analysed “how the textual organisation o f 
newspapers assumes identification with the nation as the naturalized form o f
1 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy/Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
1
collective identity.”
Significantly, the Nigerian constitution has a role spelt out for the media in general, o f 
which the press is a major part. The obligation o f the mass media, as spelt out in 
Chapter II, reads:
The press, radio, television and other agencies o f the mass media shall at all 
times be free to uphold the fundamental objectives contained in this Chapter 
and uphold the responsibility and accountability o f the Government to the 
people (Constitution o f the Federal Republic o f Nigeria, 1999: Chapter II, no. 
22).
The ultimate objective in this endeavour is the promotion o f a united Nigeria.2 The 
press is expected to fulfil these roles within the Nigerian context which is post­
colonial (see Chapter two, below), with all the consequences o f political and socio­
economic instability that have been created as a result. Studies on the African media 
show that its nature is directly linked with the colonial heritage o f the African states 
(see, for instance, Williams 1963: 243).
This research seeks to determine the way the nature and character o f the Nigerian 
state have shaped the press and the role that it is now playing within it. Grosberg et al 
(1998) have argued that the study o f mass media must be done together with other 
institutions and other dimensions o f social life as each shape and define the other. In 
effect, to understand media, there is the need to relate them to their institutional, 
economic, social, cultural and historical contexts. Consequently, recognising that the 
character o f the Nigerian press is a direct consequence o f colonialism, in general, and 
the nature o f the Nigerian state, in particular, is crucial to understanding and 
appreciating the way that the press conducts its activities within the state. To look at 
the press this way is to be informed by its history which is closely linked with the 
evolution o f the Nigerian state and the fact o f its heroic involvement in that struggle. 
In effect the strand o f arguments that runs through the entire thesis point to the legacy 
o f colonialism, which undoubtedly created the Nigerian state’s linkage to the global 
context3.
2 See Kirk-Greene (1988: 158-172)
3 Nigeria is a post-colonial state and when it secured political independence from Britain in 1960, it 
inherited the state institutions vacated by the colonialists. These are usually referred to as neo-colonial
2
The crux o f the argument here is that such a linkage and the susceptibility o f the 
Nigerian state to the events within it have continued to define the direction and 
activities o f all institutions o f the Nigerian state, including the Nigerian press.4. But it 
would seem that the literature on the Nigerian press has ignored this as they are 
replete with such concepts and epithets as “tribalistic”, “regionalism”, “sectional”, 
“divisive”, “harbinger o f crisis”, “destructive”, “irresponsible” and, “parochial”, in 
describing the role and activities o f the press. More importantly, they also contend 
that there is no Nigerian press5 and what exists instead is a press6 that represents 
'sectional', 'nationality' and 'parochial' interests and is therefore incapable o f playing a 
unifying and an integrative role in a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society like 
Nigeria.
The history o f the Nigerian press shows that it has been used and has continued to be 
used to promote regional, ethnic or sectional interests (Uche, 1989). But to say that its 
ability to play a unifying or an integrative role is diminished as a result, is simply 
ignoring the Nigerian context within which the press operates. The issue o f unifying 
and integrating all the different nationalities that constitute the Nigerian state is a 
rather complex one. For instance, does unity and integration mean making all the 
different ethnic or nationality groups become one? Or does it mean recognising 
diversity within the context o f one Nigerian state .7 The latter is what the Nigerian 
constitution is based on. In such a context, what role should the press play and what 
effect would such a role have on national integration and unity in Nigeria?
The aim is to understand how the press, within a multi-cultural context, can represent 
nationality, regional or sectional interests and at the same time promote a collective 
national identity. In other words, how can the press promote and reinforce a hybrid of
structures and are the links through which western values and ideals are sustained and perpetuated 
within such a state as Nigeria.
4 See also Smith, A. 1991: 111-112; Smith, A. 1980:; Segal, A. 1968: 13-15; O ’Connell, J. 1967: 186; 
Ayandele, E.A. 1966.
5 Read views o f  interviewees on pp. 162-163
6For the purpose o f this research, the Nigerian press refers to the presses in Nigeria, privately and 
government owned, local and national, as well as those owned by political parties or business concerns 
which record and cover the day to day events within and outside Nigeria. Also see Adebanwi, W., 
2002: 207
7 See Newsweek, LXXIV, 1969:52-53.
3
cultures and interests without necessarily promoting disintegration within a multi­
cultural state like Nigeria and consequently promote a Nigerian national identity?
These are the major aspects that are discussed and which are also identified as 
contentious. And necessarily some o f these will be raised under a different section of 
this thesis and therefore may appear repetitive because they are complex and cannot 
always be neatly dealt with in one go.
In the remaining part o f  this chapter, I will set out how this task is going to be 
undertaken. This delineates the scope o f this research and the fundamental issues 
within the Nigerian nation which have made the question o f a Nigerian national 
identity imperative. This will be followed by a discussion o f the theoretical 
framework. The Literature Review is dealt with in Chapter Two, as I engage with the 
mass media in the African context. Additionally, a detailed analysis o f the context 
within which the Nigerian press operates is given. In Chapter Three, the focus is on 
the social context and mission statements o f the newspapers sampled for this research. 
A discussion o f the research methodology follows in Chapter Four, while the 
explanations and ideas arising from the interviews are offered in Chapter Five. 
Chapters Six, Seven, Eight, Nine and Ten chronologically examine the coverage of 
the Nigerian press. The aim o f this part o f the research is not only to analyse the 
disparate editorial positions that the newspapers adopted over the periods examined 
(1983; 1985; 1987; 1989; 1991; and 1993), spanning both civilian and military 
administrations, but also to assess how such positions impacted on the press’ 
constitutional role vis-a-vis its ability to promote a Nigerian national identity. Chapter 
Eleven is the concluding chapter w'hich seeks to evaluate the findings o f the research.
1.2 Scope of the research
To fully understand the scope o f this research, it is vital that we focus on some 
pertinent questions such as: What is the historical development o f the Nigerian mass 
media in general and the press, in particular; Does this have any significance for the 
press’ ability to promote national integration and unity?; Do the characteristics o f the 
Nigerian press negate or promote the press' performance vis-a-vis its expected role in
society?; What are the peculiar characteristics o f  the Nigerian society that are likely to 
affect the press in the task o f promoting national integration and unity?; Is the press in 
a position to promote national integration and therefore a Nigerian national identity 
amongst the different nationalities that form the Nigerian state?; What was the pattern 
o f press ownership in Nigeria before independence? Have there been changes since? 
If  yes, why the changes? In what ways have the changes impacted on the press’ role 
in national integration and unity?; What role did the public and private press play in 
the pre- and post-independence era till 1983?; Does the ethnic origin o f the owner 
affect the way a newspaper attends to issues that would have either positive or 
negative implications for national integration and unity?
Additionally, other questions that would make the scope o f this research clearer 
relates to the following: Have government policies in any way impeded or hindered 
the press' ability to promote national integration and unity? What are these policies? 
What role does the constitution assign to the press? Has this always been adhered to? 
If not, what have been the obstacles and consequences?; Do changes in the socio­
economic and political milieu affect the way the press react to the question o f national 
integration?; What are the issues that make the question o f national integration such a 
cause for concern in Nigeria and how' have the press responded to these?; How does 
the press promote Nigerian national identity and therefore national integration and 
unity?
To provide adequate answers to these issues, our point o f departure traces the history 
o f the mass media in general (radio, television and newspaper) in Nigeria. Such an 
exercise would make it possible to understand how individuals and regional and 
federal governments used the mass media institution and the consequences o f such 
usage for national integration and unity. However, because the press is the main 
focus, given the heroic role it played in the Nationalists’ fight for independence and 
the impact it has continued to have on the Nigerian society, a comprehensive analysis 
o f  the mass media will not be attempted here as this has been effectively dealt with by 
others.8
8 See Duyile, 1979; Igbarumah, 1990; Ladele et al., 1979; Mackay, 1964; Omu, 1978; Uche, 1989.
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But it suffices to say that when, for instance, immediately before and after 
independence, there emerged regional broadcasting systems in Nigeria, some notable 
experts on the mass media institutions in Nigeria noted that this development dealt a 
serious blow to the concept o f national integration and unity, as each region used their 
respective stations to promote sectional interests (Enwenwa, 1989: 76-77).9 Although 
there was a national radio station established by the Ministry o f Information and 
Culture, 10 they added that this was not enough to discourage regional stations as 
regional governments saw the stations as powerful political instruments (Ibid, 85).
Indeed, according to Professor Luke Uka Uche:
The reason given for the emergence o f regional media that were independent 
o f any Federal Government control was dissatisfaction with the NBC. Each 
region felt that its own views were not being properly represented by the NBC. 
Some accused the NBC of partiality and partisanship. Some o f these 
allegations were real and [others] imagined. But still we cannot deny the fact 
that it was the regional integration o f the media with state politics that 
triggered off a chain o f political crisis in Nigeria. (1989: 41)
Ian MacKay, another respected authority on the development of the mass media in 
Nigeria, aptly corroborates Uche’s submission. In his book, Broadcasting in Nigeria, 
he states:
The sole responsibility o f regional broadcasting is to radiate a regional image 
and that cannot encourage the artistic endeavours of Nigeria as a nation. The 
setting up o f regional corporations does not bring about true competition. 
That can only be achieved by setting up a number o f corporations having 
national coverage and offering a range o f programmes, which would benefit 
the whole country. There is no sign o f that in Nigeria. Whatever the benefits - 
and there are benefits - the cost is too high and the danger exists that divided 
control in a developing society may promote regional feeling instead o f 
encouraging the desire to live together and act together (1964: 2) .11
And according to Dr Ikechukwu Enwenwa (1989: 85-93), the establishment of 
television also followed a similar pattern and was used for the same purpose.
But this research challenges these views as expressed above because none has taken
9 See also (Uche, 1989).
10 The Ministry o f  Communication Acts o f  1956 and 1961 established the Nigerian Broadcasting 
Corporation (NBC),
11 Also see Ladele, O. et al, 1979.
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into account how the Nigerian context impacts on the overall behaviour o f the media 
institution. Such would have sought to know in what ways the press, a product o f its 
environment, can contribute to national cohesion. Such an inquiry would have raised a 
question such as: Do the mass media that promote regional or ethnic tendencies 
necessarily breed national disintegration and disunity? The practice o f promoting 
nationality / sectional interests and ethnic loyalty was the hallmark o f the press prior 
to N igeria’s political independence in 1960 and between 1960 and 1966. Curiously 
enough, it was after that period in 1966 that the Nigerian civil war, which lasted three 
years, erupted. But there is a school o f thought which supports the role played by the 
Nigerian press prior to that period. Basically, the argument is that the way forward for 
the Nigerian state towards the fundamental objective o f national integration and unity 
is the promotion o f federalism/regionalism to cater for the needs o f nationality 
groups. 12 This is the reasoning behind the recent calls for the convening o f a 
sovereign national conference in N igeria.13. These are some o f the issues that are put 
to the test in this research.
1.3 The research period and its significance
This research covers only the activities o f the Nigerian press during the period 1983- 
1993. The aim is to use this period as a case study to determine what role the press 
played in promoting a collective Nigerian national identity. The question then is why 
is this period important? I have chosen this period because it is also unique in 
N igeria 's history. During most o f this period, for instance, 1984-1993, Nigeria was 
under a military administration. The civilian administration which was democratically 
elected to office in 1979 to usher in Nigeria's second republic was still in office until 
December 31, 1983. The military regime that terminated the civilian administration 
was itself overthrown on August 27, 1985 by the General Ibrahim Babangida-led 
military coup. The resultant military administration subjected Nigerians to more than 
eight years o f political engineering (Olagunju et al: 1993);14 to create an atmosphere 
to ensure that theirs “will be the last military coup in Nigeria” .
12 See Saro-Wiwa, 1994: 527-534.
13 See Madunagu, 2000b; Sklar, 2004.
14 See Oyovbaire and Olagunju, 1990.
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This created a unique situation on December 8 , 1990 when political elections were 
held at the state levels. So, while the military still controlled the central government, 
the civilians ruled at the state government level, subject, o f course, to the control of 
the military-controlled central government. However, the Presidential elections of 
June 12, 1993, which was supposed to disengage the military from power, ended in a 
debacle, as the election, widely believed15 to have been won by the late Chief Abiola 
was annulled and Nigeria was plunged into a political crisis, with all the implications 
that that had and has continued to have on Nigeria.
More importantly, it was an era that so affected Nigerians that many now question the 
rationale for the continued existence o f the Nigerian state. Professor Peter. Ekeh, in 
his paper titled: "Urhobo and the Nigerian federation: Whither Nigeria?” touched on 
this issue when he stated:
It is an indication o f the stress and turbulence o f our times that Nigerians are 
everywhere re-examining the purpose o f the Nigerian state and the
relationship between their groups and the Nigerian federation. There has been
no other occasion in our history when men and women, otherwise engaged in 
professions far removed from politics and public affairs, have been so 
concerned about the future o f their ethnic groupings and about the purpose of 
their country's political arrangements. (2 0 0 1 : l ) .16.
This was the atmosphere within which the private and public press operated. 
Although, going by the mass media narratives relating to the history of the media 
(radio, television, newspapers), there is nothing that recommends the press as far as its 
role in promoting national cohesion is concerned, there were some noticeable changes 
towards the notion o f a Nigerian state during the period that followed after the civil 
war in 1970 (Onoh 1991: 3 1).17 The pivotal role that the press could play in
mobilising the state for national development was duly acknowledged in Nigeria’s 
second national development plan (1970-1974), which set out the media objectives, 
after the civil war ended in 1970, to include the provision o f “viable media of 
information to achieve the ends o f fostering reconciliation after the civil war and 
mobilising support for effective national development and presenting balanced
15 Representatives o f  main international bodies like the United Nations (UN) and the Commonwealth 
who monitored the elections agreed that the election was free and fair and was therefore opposed to its 
annulment by the military.
16 Also see Falae, 2000; Garba, 2000.
17 See also, for instance, Dare 1985; Momoh 1985
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information about the conditions o f the country" (Mailafiya, 1989: 134).
Coincidentally, the period between 1970 and 1983 witnessed a new era in Nigerian 
journalism, when every Nigerian, despite some occasional hiccups in the socio­
political landscape, still felt a sense o f Nigerian-ness as the Nigerian state attained 
some modest economic prosperity although this was largely brought about by sales 
from oil (Omu, 1996: 10-11).18
But this has not stopped the disquiet about the effectiveness o f the current socio­
economic and political structures that are in place in Nigeria to propel the Nigerian 
state towards national integration and unity. This concern is well outlined by Emeritus 
Professor Ade Ajayi who has categorised the Nigerian crises into the political, the 
constitutional and the civil/military. Accordingly, there is for instance, to put it in his own words:
... the failure to find an equitable manner o f allocating power and resources 
among the different Nigerian peoples and interest groups; the failure to evolve 
a machinery to regulate the allocation o f power and resources in such a way as 
to produce legitimacy in a government which could be renewed or replaced by 
the electoral process, peacefully and voluntarily; and the hijacking of 
government by the military and keeping it by force for 30 years out o f 40 
years o f  independence, thus establishing a culture o f authoritarian rule and 
preventing the political class from maturing in the art o f government and 
politics (Ajayi 1996: p. I ) .19
These are basically the issues that have left Nigerians highly politicised. 
Consequently, there has been a phenomenal growth in the expression o f ethnic 
nationalism in Nigeria today and the question being asked is: What is the best way to 
resolve the issue and which institution in society is best suited to carry out this 
objective? This is one fundamental issue that has pre-occupied the various entities that 
make up the Nigerian state. Indeed, after a new civilian administration was 
inaugurated in May 1999, Nigeria witnessed an unprecedented growth in the number 
o f nationalist ethnic groupings calling for a fundamental restructuring o f the 
nation.(Madunagu, 2000a&b).
18 See also Lukman, 1994: 191-197; Hussain, 1987: 1
19 These points were made by Professor J.F. Ade Ajayi, Emeritus Professor, University o f Ibadan, 
Nigeria, in a paper titled: “The Nigerian Crisis and Higher Education” at the Workshop on Britain’s 
Role in Contemporary Nigeria, organised by the Nigerian Society, Cambridge University, in 
collaboration with the African Studies Centre, Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK, in May, 1996.
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The role that the Nigerian press played to promote Nigerian integration and unity 
under such a context, within the research period, is what this thesis is about. But first 
the analysis o f  the core issues that need to be known in order to aid the understanding 
o f the fundamental Nigerian question o f integration and unity.
1.4 National integration in Nigeria: Some fundamental issues
Almost every issue in Nigeria has been politicised since 1983. This has, in effect, 
vitiated the activities o f the press in relation to its constitutional role, as spelt out in 
Chapter Two o f the Nigerian constitution (Constitution o f the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 1999). So more than ever before in Nigeria’s history, some issues have 
become so sensitive that they have made the question of national integration a major 
cause for concern. For the purposes o f this research, some o f the issues are listed as 
follows:
The national question - What is Nigeria? This is a fundamental question that many 
Nigerians have asked (Mahadi et al, 1994: 219-253).20 .In responding to this, Ekeh 
(2 0 0 1 : 1- 10) alluded to the purpose o f the nation-state which, according to him, in its 
ideal form exists to adequately perform its responsibilities to its component 
communities. He then noted that when there are problems in these areas, the citizens 
always tend to raise questions about the purpose and meaning o f the state. As a result 
there have been consistent calls for the convening o f a sovereign national conference 
(SNC) to decide the future o f Nigeria .21
Religion / Organisation o f Islamic Conference (OIC) -  Religious issues have tended 
over the years to create tension within the Nigerian state. Indeed, questions have been 
raised as to whether Nigeria is still a secular state since Nigeria allegedly became a 
member o f the OIC in 1986 (Kukah 1994: 445-458).22
Ethnicity - Nigeria is made up o f over 250 ethnic groups, but the concern has always
20 See Mustapha, 1986: 81-96.
21 Also see: Momoh and Adejumobi (eds), 2001; The Guardian [Nigerian] 21/06/01; Madunagu 2000a: 
27/01/00; Madunagu 2000b: 16/03/00.
22 See also Williams and Falola 1995; Ilesanmi 1970; Adegbesan 1987; Agi 1987
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-
been what best arrangement would ensure that every group identifies with the 
Nigerian state (Nnoli, O., 1995).23
Colonial legacy - More than forty-six years after gaining political independence from 
Britain, the devastating effects o f  the colonial enterprise have endured (O’Connell, 
1967: 186).24
Military administration - Until they handed over power to a democratically elected 
civilian government on May 29, 1999, the military have ruled Nigeria for 29 years out 
o f 42 years after the nation's political independence. There is a general feeling among 
Nigerians that the military’s incursion into the nation's body politic has done 
irreparable damage (Oyedele, E., 1994: 514-526).25
The civil war - Has there been full reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation? 
For instance, the Ibos, one o f the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria and who fought 
and lost a war to secede from Nigeria between 1967 and 1970, have always felt that 
since then, they have continued to be marginalised in almost all affairs o f  the Nigerian 
state (Achebe, 1983: 56-64).26
Government policies - What impact do they have on all the groups and institutions in 
Nigeria? This issue became more pronounced during the era o f military 
administration because its policy o f  centralisation caused alienation among the 
component parts that make up Nigeria (Ezomon 2001).
Revenue Allocation formula -  This is another very contentious issue, particularly as it 
relates to the share that should be given to the areas that produce the wealth o f the 
Nigerian state. This has left the oil producing Niger-Delta area o f Nigeria, politically,
27economically and socially volatile.
23 Also see Nnoli, 1989 & 1978; Amuzuo, C., 2002; Vanguard newspapers, 8/12/02; Primila I., 1968: 
46-47
24 Segal, A., 1968: 13-15; Rothchild, D.S., 1966: 292; Sale, J.K., 1969).
23 Adekanye, J.J., 1987; Lloyd, P.C., 1970: 1-13; Nwabueze, B.O., 1992.
26 See also The Guardian, 26/07/01; Ekwe-Ekwe, 1991; Nzimiro 1982; Awolowo 1981
27 See Na’allah, ed., 1998
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Politicisation o f the census - This is an issue that has always been alleged to have 
been manipulated for political reasons. The result has been a lack o f credible census 
figures for Nigeria, particularly as many believe that because some degree of revenue 
allocation is tied to population, some parts o f Nigeria have tended to inflate their 
numbers. The latest census conducted in Nigeria in 2006 also ended in controversy for 
the same reason (Abati, 2006).28.
Absence o f the rule o f law - Blatant disregard for constitutional provisions by the 
leadership and therefore the negative effects that these have engendered on the psyche 
o f  Nigerians. For instance, The Guardian newspaper29 in an editorial titled “That 
Warning By The Army” notes as follows:
The concept o f the rule o f law, implying the exclusion o f the arbitrary exercise 
o f power by the government and deriving from individuals’ rights as declared 
by the Constitution, the existing laws o f the land and the courts, as well as the 
concept o f  the due process o f the law, implying the basic rights o f a defendant 
in criminal proceedings and the requisites for a fair trial, all o f which are 
indispensable to the practice o f democracy, have in the past six years, been 
honoured more in the breach, than in the observance.30.
Political leadership - An analysis o f Nigeria’s history clearly shows that political 
leadership has been dominated by what most Nigerians refer to as the "Northern 
oligarchy." This has predictably created tension and acrimony. But it should be added 
that many Northerners regard this assertion as a myth rather than the true situation 
(Tukur 1994: 249-250).31.
The June 12, 1993 presidential election - This was annulled by the military and the
32
Nigerian state has yet to recover from the debilitating ripples it generated. ).
These are some o f the issues that threaten the corporate existence o f the Nigerian 
state. It is not an exaggeration to say that its survival would depend on the extent to
28 Also see Bamiduro, 1985.
29 See the online edition o f The Guardian (Nigerian) on 29/01/06.
30 See also : “Soyinka, Odumegwu-Ojukwu, others insist on rule o f law”, The Guardian (Nigerian) 
newspaper published in the online edition on 14/04/07
31 See also Adeniyi, The Guardian (Nigerian) newspaper online edition on 24/03/00
32 See “Democracy in Nigeria: the June 12 mandate”: public meetings organised by the Nigeria 
Research and Information Bureau and the New Nigeria Forum, in London on 14 August 1993, edited 
by Olu Oguibe
which some o f these, if  not all, are resolved. The way the media in general and the 
press in particular, handle these issues is crucial given its unique position in the 
Nigerian set-up. Indeed, it could be said that the current situation in Nigeria is largely 
attributable to the fact that the press’ constitutional role has remained unfulfilled 
within a non-conducive Nigeria’s socio-political and economic terrain.
1.5 Nigerian media in national integration
Some studies on the role o f the Nigerian media and their contribution to national 
integration have been carried out. However, none has specifically focussed on the role 
o f  the press in the promotion o f a collective Nigerian national identity.
For instance, Ademola Ogunade (1982: 22-32) focussed on how relevant the press 
would be in the pursuit o f the goal o f national integration in Nigeria. In his article 
titled: “Mass Media and National Integration in Nigeria", Ogunade argued that “any 
understanding o f the utilisation o f the mass media to promote national integration in a 
multi-ethnic nation such as Nigeria, must be founded on an understanding o f the 
ideological orientation o f that country’s political culture”33. Although Ogunade also 
touched on the role o f newspapers in the Nigerian crisis o f 1967-70, he did not 
delineate how the press helps to "promote identification within the nation as the
34dominant form o f cultural identity" (Tomlinson, 1991: 83).
In his article, titled: “The Nigerian Press and National Integration”, John Chick (1971: 
1 15-133)35 focused on “the influence o f the Nigerian press on internal divisiveness”. 
According to him, 4tthe press tends to be virulent in expression, but regional and 
socio-political limitations modify its national influence and effectiveness", adding that 
“Nigerian newspapers are further limited by a shortage o f funds and by transportation 
difficulties” . Although this article is useful for highlighting the limitations o f the 
press, it again does not touch on the role o f the press in the promotion o f Nigerian 
national identity.
33 See Ogbondah, 1990: 76
34 Quoted in Brookes, 1999: 250
35 See Ibid, 34
In an article published in the West Africa magazine, (1980, no.3305: 2357-2359), and 
titled: “What the Papers Say”, a correspondent o f the weekly magazine reported on 
how the press in Nigeria covered the country’s twentieth independence anniversary 
and the first anniversary o f the second republic. It noted that the “press editorials on 
the anniversary reflected [the] party loyalties o f newspapers”.36 This highlights the 
partisan nature o f the Nigerian press, but it tends to suggest that such a press would do 
damage to the national goal o f  unity and integration. One o f the aims o f this research 
is to challenge that assertion.
David’s Edeani's article, "Ownership and Control o f the Press in Africa” (1970: 55-
7
66), examines “ownership and control patterns o f the Press in Africa”, and “provides 
some background on the Nigerian press both from historical and philosophical points 
o f  view”. He believes that “mass media in private hands in Africa, including Nigeria, 
could fail to serve the public interest, especially in a developing society unfamiliar 
with the intricacies o f modem democracy” (ibid).
Marcia Grant (1971: 95-114) writes that Nigerian newspaper’s effectiveness “is 
limited by geographical, economic, social and political parochialism” in an article 
titled: “Nigerian Newspaper Types”, he also identifies “tribal loyalties” as providing 
“the most difficult obstacle to overcome in the establishment o f a truly national 
newspaper.” in Nigeria. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that “despite these problems, 
the press has generally survived internal disruptions, including the civil war as well as 
regional and political pressures” (in Ogbonda, 1990: 51).
As acknowledged above, what is common to most o f the narratives on the Nigerian 
press is a focus on how handicapped it is when it comes to issues relating to Nigeria’s 
constitutional aim for national integration and unity. But the question facing the 
Nigerian state today is how to mould a Nigerian out o f a multiplicity o f ethnic 
identities within the state (Kirk-Greene, 1988: 158-172).39 What is needed is a critical 
and comprehensive evaluation o f the press’ role vis-a-vis the multi-cultural and multi­
36 See Ibid, 26
37 See Gazette, Vol. 16. no. 1, 1970: 55-66
38 Journal o f  Commonwealth Political Studies, vol. 9, no. 2.
39 See also Newsweek, LXXIV, Nov. 3, 1969; Carter (ed.) 1966; Ijomah, 1973; Segal, 1968: 13-15; 
Nigeria, Eastern, 1966; World Today, XXII, 1966; Lewis, 1968; Historical Society o f Nigeria: 1-36; 
Otite, 1990; Telia, 1989; Ezenwa, 1987: 87-98; Nnamdi, 1964: 1-37.
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nationality context within which it operates and try to establish whether or not such 
roles can promote a collective Nigerian national identity.
However, what is the role o f the press in promoting a sense o f collective Nigerian 
national identity? How does the press do it? Is national identity the same thing as 
national integration? Is the press that promotes sectionalism, or nationality interests 
capable o f promoting national integration? How does national identity compare, for 
instance, with other forms o f identity-religious, ethnic, linguistic, etc?
In doing this research, I recognise the fact that there are other forms o f identity within 
the Nigerian context, which, as noted above, is the legacy o f colonialism. The crucial 
question is how can these other forms o f identity flourish within the Nigerian context, 
without jeopardising the concept o f a collective Nigerian national identity or one 
Nigerian state? (Lewis, 1968: 46-47).40 My theoretical position here, informed by the 
study done by Fitzgerald (1991: 2 1 1),41, is that a collective national identity 
supersedes other forms o f identity at that level where those other forms o f identities 
recognise that they are allowed to flourish within the context o f a state or a 
community that accords them that recognition.. This is the point at which integration 
and unity would flourish.
How does the press influence that process? The task here then is to find out how the 
press has, through its activities, contributed to the realisation o f the Nigerian state’s 
fundamental objective o f national integration and unity (as propounded in the 
Constitution o f the Federal Republic o f Nigeria, 1999). Therefore, beyond expert 
witnesses, the research will be focussed on the content o f the press and the issues 
raised there related to this integration and unity. In order to do this, I will employ 
intensive/in-depth interviews and qualitative content analysis o f the coverage which 
are argued as an appropriate combination to unearth the problems explored in a socio­
political context like Nigeria’s.42 While analysis o f the coverage seeks to uncover how 
the nation is promoted or reproduced (whether seen as a sub-group or as a pan- 
Nigerian entity), the interviews bring out information not available elsewhere,
40 Okere (ed.) 1996; Jibrin 1994: 459-466; Telia 1989; Kirk-Green 1988: 158-172; Newsweek, 1969; 
Akiwowo 1972.
41 Also see Schlessinger, 1991a: 191.
42 See Nnaemeka et al. (eds) 1989a: 408; Hansen et al 1998: 260; Robertson 1985.
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it
particularly addressing why the coverage is as it is.
Four questions are then central to this work:
(1) What is the overarching need for Nigerian unity?
(2) What is national identity?
(3) How feasible will the theoretical debate about national identity be, when applied 
to the Nigerian context? And,
(4) What is the role o f the media, or the press in particular, in the promotion of 
national identity?
But why are Nigerian unity and a collective Nigerian national identity necessary? The 
answers are w hat form part o f the basis o f the next chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO
Literature Review 1
2.1 The imperatives of Nigerian unity and Nigerian national identity
Since the birth o f the Nigerian state in 1914 (Kirk-Greene, 1968), the question of 
forging a national identity amongst the multi-cultural groups that make up the state 
has engaged Nigerians. With over 250 ethnic groups, the task o f building a nation­
state has been daunting (Ayida 199043), more so as the British objective in bringing 
together these multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-cultural groups that lived around 
the Niger area,44 was not to promote socio-cultural cohesion and political unity among 
them but for an administrative union to solve administrative problems (Sale, 1967: 
12-14).45 The consequences soon manifested themselves after the country gained 
political independence in 1960.
Although the nationalists that fought for independence envisioned a united, stable and 
prosperous Nigeria, they hardly envisaged the fissiparous tendencies that have 
continued to overwhelm and threaten the corporate existence o f Nigeria. The result 
has been more ethnic cleavages, a 30 month civil war and intermittent military 
interventions in governance. In order to redress these issues, Nigerian leadership has 
always given recognition to Nigeria's diversity. However, although the Nigerian 
constitution aims to promote unity in diversity, the reality o f contemporary Nigerian 
society betrays the tendency o f the various entities to go in the opposite direction, 
thereby jeopardising that constitutional aim.46.
The issue now then is how to achieve national integration in Nigeria, and therefore 
create a sense o f national identity amongst the various groups that make up the 
Nigerian state. Various ideas, ranging from federalism/regionalism (see Sklar, 2004), 
the federal character principle, and a rotational presidency, etc. (Ajayi, 1984)47 have at
43 See also Ogunsakin, 2001; Okeke et al (eds) 1998.
44 See Usman, Y.B., 1994: 39.
45 See also Crowther, 1966.
46 See Ogunsakin, 2001; Ojo-Ade, 2001; Okeke et al, (eds) 1998.
47 See Amuwo et al. (eds.) 1998; Obasanjo 1989; Okere 1996; Osaghae 1987: 63-73; Ekeh & Osaghae
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different times been suggested and also implemented. Given the problems this issue 
has generated, many Nigerians have now come to the conclusion that in order to 
promote Nigerian integration/unity, there is the need to convene a sovereign national 
conference, where all groups in Nigeria will be represented to discuss the issues, 
create a just and humane social order, a sound economic management, distributional 
justice and guaranteed minimum economic support, as well as to redress existing 
imbalances in the national distribution o f political, economic, educational and 
employment opportunities in the Nigerian state (Coomasie, A. 1994: 263-269).48
But the issue o f how best to resolve the question o f unity in Nigeria was first raised in 
1957 when the W illink’s Commission was set up to address the fears o f minorities as 
N igeria’s nationalist leaders were engaged in negotiations for independence. There 
was the fear that unless measures were put in place to protect the minority groups in 
Nigeria, their welfare could be decided within an independent Nigeria by the whims 
and caprices o f the majority groups. The Commission’s report was published in 
195849 and it provided the basis for all the subsequent measures to address the 
Nigerian question after the state gained political independence in 1960.
For instance, starting from 1954, the Lyttleton constitution50 created the federal
1989; Otite 1990; Ezenwa 1987: 87-98; Telia 1989: 1-30; Carter (ed.) 1966.
48 See also Nkom, S. 1994: 430-443; Mahadi, A. et al. 1994: 538-540.
49 See Sklar, 1983: 138-140, 349, 354.
50 For a comprehensive analysis o f Nigeria’s constitutional developments, under colonial rule, read 
Ezera, 1964 and Sklar, 1983. The British administration in the area that is now called Nigeria, 
effectively commenced in 1861 when the British colonialist set up one in Lagos. But before Nigeria’s 
political independence in 1960, the British led the colony through various phases o f constitutional and 
political developments. In 1914, Lord Lugard was appointed the Governor-General after the southern 
and northern protectorates o f the Niger area was amalgamated to form Nigeria. From then on a system 
o f democracy was gradually introduced into the area through a series o f  constitutional conferences that 
culminated in the federal election o f 1959 which preceded the granting o f political independence to 
Nigeria in 1960. The first constitution that came into effect in 1923 made provisions for a legislative 
council in the Lagos area. After the second world war, the British saw the need to accommodate the 
nationalists’ agitation for self-determination. So about twenty-three years after the first constitution, 
three more constitutions were ratified between 1946 and 1954. The 1946 constitution created the first 
all-Nigerian legislative council. The 1951 constitution made provisions for the appointment o f “African 
Ministers in both the regional and central governments”. The 1954 constitution made provisions for the 
introduction o f  the federal system o f  government in Nigeria with the creation o f three regions: east; 
west and north. In 1957, following another constitutional conference to revise the 1954 constitution, a 
new constitution was introduced. This brought about self-government for the eastern and western 
regions with the northern region’s coming into effect in 1959. The 1957 constitution was unique in the 
sense that it created the office o f  the Prime-Minister o f the Nigerian federation. The leader o f the 
majority party in federal house o f  representative became Prime-Minister after he formed a national 
government involving all the major parties “which lasted until the federal election o f 1959”. And this 
happened after the constitutional conference o f 1958 which saw the colonial government announcing
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system o f government in colonial Nigeria and was made up o f three regions: western, 
eastern and northern. This arrangement lasted until 1963, when the Midwest region 
was created, three years after Nigeria gained political independence in 1960. 
However, the failure to address the nationality questions and therefore Nigerian unity 
by the civilian administrations that were in place afterwards, led to the first military 
coup in 1966. Several steps have been taken by subsequent military governments to 
address the nationality question within the Nigerian federation (see Sklar, 200451). 
Sklar has identified three distinct components o f this question, which are “(1) How 
shall the constituent units o f  the federation be demarcated and how many of them 
shall be there? (2) What shall be the relationship between the government o f the 
federation and the government o f its constituent parts? (3) What shall be the 
relationship between Nigerian citizens and the national government?” (Ibid).
Some o f these issues were dealt with, for instance, by the military government headed 
by General Yakubu Gowon (1966-1975). It was the grievances held by the Ibo 
nationality group that led them to attempt seceding from Nigeria in 196652. But in 
order to keep Nigeria a united entity, the Gowon’s administration needed to put in 
place, measures that would make such attempt worthless. One o f the steps it took in 
1966, was to create 12 states, six each in the southern and northern parts o f Nigeria. 
This was done not only to protect the minorities who craved local autonomy, for 
instance, in the eastern region that attempted secession, but also minorities in other 
parts o f the Nigerian federation. Other Nigerian military governments have since 
responded to more demands for local autonomy by increasing the number o f states to 
19 in 1976, 21 in 1987, 30 in 1991, and 36 in 199653.
Despite these arrangements, the debate about how to meet the needs o f the various 
Nigerian nationality groups has continued. This was particularly intensified after the 
military government’s annulment o f the presidential election o f June 12, 1993, 
deemed to have been won by the late Chief Abiola. The aftermath o f that annulment 
was the explosion in the growth o f ethnic minority groups and ethnic nationality
that if Nigeria’s next federal parliament push through a resolution for independence, the British 
government would approve and grant independence on October 1st 1960 (See Sklar 1983: 16-19).
Under the title: “The Federal Question”.
52 See Smith, 1991: 133
53 See Sklar, 2004
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leaders as well as prominent Nigerians, calling for the convening o f a sovereign 
national conference to chart a cause for the Nigerian state. This position has its roots 
in the Nigerian realities, which are aptly described by Chief Otitoju,54 thus:
The truth o f the Nigerian situation is that we have been from the beginning, 
and we still are, a divided people ... divided along ethnic lines, divided along 
regional lines, divided along the North / South line and divided along the East 
/ West line ... (2000: 1).
It is such a concern that has triggered the questions: Is there an overarching need to 
maintain the Nigerian state as one single entity? Why does Nigeria have to remain 
one? If there are so many problems created as a result o f the fact o f the different 
nationality groups living together, why can’t each o f them go their separate ways?
At the heart o f this debate are two arguments namely (1) Those that believe in 
maintaining the current federal structure, with the central government playing a major 
role, and (2) Those that advocate a confederation o f loose states where the central 
government will have very minimal impact.
But how could the Nigerian realities, as expressed by Chief Otitoju, be addressed? 
Would Nigerian unity be guaranteed through a federal or a confederal structure? On 
these issues, Sklar’s argument about the Nigerian question is apposite. To him:
A change from federation to confederation...(would imply) growing weakness 
o f ties that bind the regions and might foreshadow an eventual dissolution o f 
the Nigerian union, a perilous prospect that would be very difficult, if  not 
impossible to accomplish peaceably. Military intervention and civil warfare 
w ould result in the displacement o f populations and the creation o f a multitude 
o f external as well as internal refugees. In short, a break-up o f the union could 
produce a humanitarian disaster on a massive scale.55
But there are those that believe that the debate about the break-up o f Nigeria will not 
be as a result o f the non-workability o f the state as now constituted. That, rather, it 
would be because some political forces within the nation would exploit the grievances 
o f the masses caused by the failure o f government’s political and economic policies
54 Chief Otitoju is the leader o f  the Okun Development Association (ODA), a pan-Okun Yoruba socio­
political group.
See Sklar, 2004, under the title: “The Federal Question”
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with devastating consequences on the masses. This is the position o f Nigerian social 
commentator, Madunagu. He reasons that Nigeria could remain a single entity 
through popular democratic means which will improve the plight o f the Nigerian 
masses and therefore forestall the diabolical intentions o f selfish forces capable of 
dismembering the nation. As Madunagu put it::
The fundamental internal threat to the unity and corporate existence o f Nigeria 
is the suffering and deprivation which the Nigerian masses across the land 
actually see, feel and experience...(and although) there exists a national (or 
rather, ethnic nationality ) question in N igeria...the solution cannot be found 
along ethnic lines...(because) ethnic nationality boundaries have disappeared 
in most parts o f the country; and ethnically speaking, Nigeria’s population 
distribution is, today...m ixed...(so) the ethnic nationality question which is 
real in Nigeria has to be resolved within a popular democratic 
context...(otherwise it) could be opportunistically seized upon by the ruling 
classes to seek ethno-religious solutions in their own selfish interest.56
This argument is echoed by the likes o f Chief Anthony Enahoro, one of Nigeria's 
foremost nationalists, who believes that:
It is not enough to keep repeating that we do not want to be like Yugoslavia. 
We must ask ourselves why did Yugoslavia broke up, why the Tamils and 
Kashmiris have once again become so active, why the Scots and the Welsh 
want their separate national assemblies when they have been united with 
England for centuries, why the Irish problem persists, why Czechoslovakia is 
now two separate countries, why the Kurds want their own homeland, why 
the...U SSR  has disintegrated, why Sudan cannot be united. The answer is of 
course that there is a revolution o f ethnic nationalism sweeping across the 
globe and it could arrive at our shores at anytime. We can anticipate it and 
provide systems and structures to contain it or we can foolishly ignore the 
threat, trusting not in reason and negotiation and accommodation, but in the 
blood and thunder, to keep the danger at bay.57
What Chief Enahoro seems to be suggesting is that within the present Nigerian state 
structure, unity can be achieved. What should be emphasised then is that all the
.  • • • 58grievances should be debated and addressed. This point is echoed by Sklar (Ibid )
56 Dr Madunagu’s views are expressed in the article: “The politics o f Nigerian history”, published in 
the online edition o f  The Guardian (Nigerian) online edition o f 20/05/05 
(http://www.guardiannewsngr.com/editorial_opinion/article02).
57 This quote was taken from the paper titled: “Once more unto the Breach...!” which, Chief Anthony 
Enahoro delivered at the Conference on Nigeria, organised by the National Democratic Coalition 
(NADECO), in London on Saturday, June 15th, 1996.
58 Under the title: “Conclusion”
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who has noted that in Nigeria “for the time being, nationality questions are ...debated 
in relation to the aim o f comprehensive multinational inclusion within common 
institutions rather than proposals for regional separatism or a more explicitly ethnic 
form o f federation.”59
This trend is being encouraged because there are Nigerians who have always believed 
that there is much to be gained from Nigeria remaining as one entity. This they reckon 
will not be to Nigerians only but also to the entire West African sub-region in
particular and the African continent in general. Among them is the late Dr. Usman
(1994: 49-50), who reasoned that Nigeria should take steps to strengthen the 
ECOWAS60 and work towards the unity of the Nigerian state as a prelude to the 
unification o f the sub-regional group. Usman’s analysis also indicate that the 
argument to maintain Nigeria as a single entity is closely aligned with the economic 
basis that led the British colonialists to create the Nigerian state in 1914 by 
amalgamating the entities around the Niger area.. As he explained it:
The British w'ere driven into these series o f amalgamation which produced the 
Nigerian colonial entity by the simple logic o f why they wanted to colonise 
this part o f  the world in the first place. They wanted cheap and secure raw
materials for their industries; a market for their manufactured goods; a source
for generating capital resources for investing in Britain and strengthening the 
sterling against other currencies; a manpower reserve for economic and 
military purposes; port, waterways, roads, railways, airports, and airspaces for 
their transport and imperial communication systems. They found that the logic 
o f economic, political, military, cultural and ideological networks which had 
developed in this comer o f West Africa made it more efficient and secure for 
them to amalgamate the various colonial entities than to leave them separate.” 
(Ibid, 39)
This is what Nigeria, as an entity secures for the people o f the area. And given the fact 
that current global trends encourage moves towards particularly regional or 
continental economic unions, which might subsequently lead to political unions,61 
what then is the point dismembering a Nigerian state that could be the precursor o f a 
West African Union and possibly an African Union that would enhance global peace 
and stability?
59 This is along the line o f the conclusions reached by Schlessinger, 1991a, on the study he did on the 
European Union project.
60 Economic Community o f West African States
61 Typical example is the European Union
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The New York Times could not agree more as its editorial opinion o f 27/02/06 titled: 
“Danger signs in Nigeria”, argued along this line and part o f it reads:
But the world needs a stable Nigeria  Nigeria is crucial to all o f West
Africa, having often provided the military troops and negotiating forums to 
quell civil war and related violence in neighbouring countries. Nigeria is also 
important to counter terrorism efforts, both as it tries to monitor and defuse an 
encroaching fundamentalism among its own Moslems and in cooperating with 
international efforts to secure the strategically vital Gulf o f Guinea.
In reference to the different views held by Nigerians on this question o f unity, Sklar62 
opined that:
Whether or not a regionalist constitution would endanger the unity o f Nigeria, 
it would almost certainly ensure a diminution o f the nation’s role in both West 
African and continental politics. Nigerians might then be happier, and the 
regional entities, each in its own way, could become more democratic than the 
existing centralized federation. But Nigeria would be less likely to evolve as a 
continental power, comparable to South Africa, where a big tent political party 
presides over the effort to mobilize human resources for national development. 
One may wonder whether Nigerian intellectuals in general are prepared to 
abandon the idea o f  high politics in the form o f continental power for the sake 
o f low politics in the form of regional autonomy (original emphasis).
Based on the foregoing arguments, one o f the best ways to ensure Nigerian unity is 
through institutions that have the capacity to instil a sense o f collective national 
identity in Nigerians. This would necessarily involve how to harness and nurture the 
diverse groups within Nigeria to feel being part o f the Nigerian State. It is therefore 
relevant that we know what constitutes that State in order to understand the ways and 
methods by which it can be perpetrated by drawing on the theories o f the State.
2.2 Theoretical framework
2.2a The State/Nation
Writers have applied various interpretations to the concept o f the state and o f its 
nature. In his discussion o f the state, Tony Barnett (1997: 27) sees it as “the existence
62 See Sklar, 2004, under the heading: “Conclusion”
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o f a system o f permanent administration and finance, demarcated territory, control of 
military and civil power through a social and cultural apparatus” and as “a cultural 
concept describing a political idea, a myth within which people live their lives as 
though it were 4natural’.”
While it could be said that there is no unanimity as to what constitutes a state, it 
suffices to say that many writers hold the traditional model view o f the sovereign 
state. Characteristically therefore, they see the state as an institutional form of 
governance within a defined boundary over which it exercises monopoly over the 
means o f violence.. Although one could hardly devalue the significance of this 
model, particularly as it applies to western societies o f Europe and the United States 
o f America, its relevance diminishes when applied against the backdrop of how states 
in non-western societies came about. For instance, the main characteristics o f the state 
in Western societies are quite different from those o f their counterparts’ in developing 
or less developed areas mostly in Africa, Asia, Latin-America and the Middle East. 
But even then, within these areas there are differences due to different historical 
experiences.
Anthony Smith (1983: 122-123) has however, identified four patterns o f state 
formation on a global scale. Significantly, the corpus o f his argument brings into 
sharper relief what accounts for the differences between states in the less developed 
areas and their European counterparts. Whereas European states evolved over a period 
o f centuries, most o f the states in the less developed areas particularly in Africa, only 
came into being through the deliberate policies o f  the European colonialists in the last 
century.
On a general level, though, Smith (2000: 3)64 defines a nation as “a named human 
population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a 
mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all 
members.” Although his position does not completely deviate from that older tradition 
of the thinking about the nation, he nevertheless acknowledges its modem phenomena 
in so far as they (a) Require a unified legal code o f common rights and duties, with
63 See Anthony Giddens, 1985: 120; Max Weber, 1948: 78.
64 See also 1991: 14.
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citizenship rights where the nation is independent (b) Are based on a unified economy 
with a single division o f labour, and mobility o f goods and persons throughout the 
national territory; they need a fairly compact territory, preferably with ‘natural’ 
defensible frontiers, in a world o f similar compact nations (c) They require a single 
‘political culture’ and public, mass education and media systems, to socialise future 
generations to be citizens o f the new nation (1991: 69).
Apart from distinguishing the growth o f what he called the “old, continuous nations of 
the West from the more deliberate creations o f nations in Eastern Europe, Asia, Latin 
America and Africa” (ibid); Smith also identifies the characteristics o f the entities that 
initiated the processes o f  forming nations as (a) Those that were formed from their 
aristocratic base and in this instance “the state is suffused by an aristocratic culture 
and traditions, often permeated with religious and priestly influences (b) Those that 
were formed through the inclusion o f significant ethnic minorities. Some empires like 
Russia, Ethiopia, Ottoman Turkey, for example, included many large minorities (c) 
That others also came into being as a result o f “the modernising character o f their 
bureaucratic states” in which case “a dominant ethnic core and ruling class” 
consolidates “over subordinate ethnies and classes” (d) Another process was through 
the use o f ‘official’ and institutional nationalism. That is “in order to consolidate their 
hold and homogenize the population into a compact nation, the ruling class seeks to 
assimilate ethnic minorities through an educational programme o f nationalism, backed 
by major institutions. To this end, they promote official, establishment ideas and 
images o f the nation, to which everyone must conform and which preclude the rise of 
any other ideas, symbols or imagery (Ibid, 101-102).
But how do the former colonies o f Western European powers fit into these categories? 
This has been the dilemma o f most o f these non-Westem states as they lack the 
identities to form coherent and stable polities - and the groups that constitute these 
nations have little or nothing in common. Indeed if  there is anything common among 
them at all, it is the fact o f their association with the former colonialists, yet they have 
to carry out the task o f nation-building. Smith put this point poignantly in his thesis 
on “constructing the nation” when he stated::
In the African and Asian cases however, the time span is quite different, and
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so is the ideological context. Given the geopolitical situation, regimes in the 
new states are under considerable and immediate pressure to create nations 
such as exist in Europe and America, if  only to be able to compete in the 
international arena. Besides, ideologically, they are committed to ‘nation- 
building’, which in practice means state-building combined with national 
integration and mobilisation; this too requires the formation o f a national, 
cultural and political identity that clearly differentiates it from its neighbours 
(Ibid, 111-112).
Indeed developments within the contemporary global society reveal three social 
entities that could also provide the basis for explaining the crisis within it today. 
These are the state, the nation and the nation-state. Anthony Giddens (1981: 13) 
makes a distinction between the ‘nation’, the ‘nation-state’ and ‘nationalism’ and in 
essence provides us with a useful tool in explaining the differences that exist in 
different areas o f the globe. An important aspect o f his analysis is that there are less 
schisms in societies that have attained the status o f a ‘nation-state’, as opposed to the 
new emergent nations o f non-western societies. As he put it:
What makes the ‘nation’ a necessary element o f the ‘nation-state’... is not the 
existence o f sentiments o f nationalism (however strong these may be) but the 
unification o f an administrative apparatus whose power stretches over 
precisely territorial bounds. ‘Nationalism’ by contrast may be understood as 
symbols or beliefs which attribute a communality o f experience to the 
members o f a particular regional, ethnic or linguistic category - which may or 
may not be convergent with the demarcation o f a nation-state (Ibid,).65
Indeed, most o f the nations in crisis today are comparatively recently formed 
phenomena which were created in the last century and are mainly found in Africa, 
Asia, Latin America, Middle East and in the former socialist Eastern Europe. 
Arguably, the crises in every area o f the world today have a pattern which may be 
traceable to how these entities came into being and how they are being sustained. So 
whereas the nations in the more advanced societies o f the West have been able to put 
structures in place to deal with any nationalistic fervour of the diverse groups that 
make up those societies, this is hardly the case in the less developed areas o f the 
world.
Tony Barnett’s idea o f the state gives us a hint as to why this disparity in the 
management o f disaffection exists between these two societies. According to him,
65 Cited in Schlesinger, 1985: 116
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“for most o f  the world’s people in the last decade o f the twentieth century”, the state 
assumed a commitment to “national identity” and provided “the main base o f identity 
. . .” (1997: 27-28). But then he also notes that in many o f the states o f Africa, Asia, 
the Middle East, and to a lesser extent Latin America, the state does not constitute the 
main base o f identity. Yet in the same breath he acknowledges that the idea o f the 
‘natural’ state is crumbling in European states. For instance, when the Soviet Union 
and its satellite states and Yugoslavia disintegrated, it became clear that these states 
no longer always form firm bases for identity. Events in the Caucasus, in Canada, and 
in the United Kingdom are clear indications that there are no stable entities in the 
world today because o f the aspiration for self-determination by ethnic groups. Barnett 
said this should not surprise us because, he believes, following Bourdieu and 
Passerons’ submission (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977)66 that states are not ‘natural’ as 
“we live in a wrorld o f social invention” (Barnett,, 1997: 27-28).
Nowhere else in the world does this description become more relevant than in most of 
the states in the less developed areas, which were the creations o f the Western 
European states. In effect they cannot fit into the classical theories o f the state and
67those theories cannot also be employed to properly explain events wdthin them. 
Though as has already been indicated, no country in the world today is free from 
ethnic minority problems, this global reality became very apparent following the 
collapse o f Communism and the fervour with which the promotion o f the free market 
economy on a global scale has been pursued. All these have implications for the non- 
European contemporary states in general and the former European colonies o f Africa 
in particular, who are faced with, among other issues, the daunting task o f creating a 
united entity out o f  the structures the nationalists inherited from the colonial 
administrators (Smith, 1991: Ch. 5). The overriding ambition in a state like Nigeria 
has been how to rectify this anomalous situation brought about by the colonial 
enterprise.
2.2b Nationalism
The rise in nationalists' agitation for rights and recognition in Nigeria cannot be
66 Cited in Barnett, T., 1997: 28
67 See Golden and Harris (eds), 1997
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adequately explained without reference to the general and theoretical debate about 
nationalism worldwide. Nationalism shot into the forefront o f contemporary global 
discourse particularly in the wake o f the collapse o f  the Soviet Union and the Socialist 
system it represented. Since then the world has witnessed cataclysmic eruptions that 
have shaken and continued to shake the very foundations o f once stable polities. 
Although, this was usually the characteristic associated with non-western societies, 
events in the last two decades have shown that no society today is immune from 
nationalist sentiments. But it is also clear that there is no uniformity in the way that 
these sentiments are being expressed worldwide, which, itself, is a reflection of how 
developments within the contexts in which such sentiments take place affect the 
course o f nationalism.
However, there is the view that the concept has both a political and a cultural 
dimension (Smith 1971: Ch. 7). This tallies with the contentions o f those that have 
been described as the "founding fathers" o f nationalism, like Rousseau, Herder, 
Fichte, Korais, and Mazzini. From their perspectives, three themes and ideals 
underpin the notion o f nationalism and which nationalists, irrespective o f their 
contexts, have often associated with. They are autonomy, unity, and identity 
(Hutchinson and Smith [eds.] 1994a: 3-13).
What seems to also separate nationalists the world over is that their level of 
achievement is defined by the contexts in which they operate.69 But more importantly, 
there are also others, who see nationalism as a positive force, particularly at the 
international level (Horowitz, 1985;70 Mayall, 1990).71 In this respect reference is 
often made to the benefits brought about by post-modernity, which emphasises a 
world not defined by sovereign nation-states, each pursuing selfish national interests, 
but one linked together by common interests and values and therefore a diminution of 
nationalism (see, for instance, Billig, M., 1995: 128-153). But a counterpoint is that 
the world is still wreaked by sometimes disruptive and violent nationalism and that 
nationalists are continuing to use the effects generated by post-modernity (new
68 See, for instance, Billig, 1995
69 For instance, read Hutchinson and Smith (1994: 5 and 70-76), where they cited the views o f  
Miroslav Hroch and Tom Naim.
70 See Ibid, 261-269
71 See Ibid, 269-280
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channels o f mass communication and indeed the ever persistent inter-state rivalries) to 
legitimise their cause (Richmond, 1984;72 Hobsbawn, 199073).
Elie Kedourie, in his treatment o f the issue, premised his thoughts on Renan’s idea 
that “the nation is a daily plebiscite” which in effect means that in the conduct of its 
affairs it is susceptible to all kinds o f argument that could have a beneficial or a 
deleterious effect on it. He hinges his thought on the significance o f ideas and the 
effect that they could bring to bear on societies. In his own words:
Renan’s ... metaphor is felicitous, if  only because it indicates so well that 
nationalism is ultimately based on will, and shows how inadequate the 
doctrine is in describing the political process, for a political community which 
conducts daily plebiscites must soon fall into querulous anarchy, or hypnotic 
obedience (1960: 81).
Yet Kedourie’s concern is that, for such a society to maintain stability, it must be 
amenable to new learning and ideas. To him then:
National self-determination is, in the final analysis, a determination o f the 
will; and nationalism is, in the first place, a method o f teaching the right
determination o f the will ... and it is no accident that nationalism was at its
most intense where and when institutions had little resilience and were ill- 
prepared to withstand the powerful attacks to which they became exposed 
(Ibid, 101)..
Kedourie's submission is that nationalism is a product o f  its social milieu and 
therefore a response to the issues generated therein (Ibid).
Smith (1991: 73, 80) also touches on the three themes o f nationalism in his analysis. 
He defines it as “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, 
unity and identity on behalf o f a population deemed by some o f its members to
constitute an actual or potential nation”. He supports the ‘contextualist’ approach to
nationalism which argues that “nationalism exhibits a diversity within unity ... [that 
pinpoints] the main kind o f ideology and movement in terms o f historical period, 
geographical area, level o f  economic development, philosophical assumptions, class 
context, cultural milieu or political aspirations.”
72 See Ibid, 289-300
73 See Ibid, 101-111
Smith (1991: 82) then proceeds to identify two main types of nationalism: territorial 
and ethnic further subdividing each into pre-independence and post-independence 
nationalism. Basically the aim of the nationalists in these endeavours is to first o f all 
eject outside rulers from their territories and then forge unity among their people. To 
achieve these objectives, Smith discusses the levels at which nationalism operates. At 
the political level, he says:
Nationalism as an ideology is a doctrine o f the units o f political power and a 
set o f  prescriptions about the nature o f power holders. It is also a doctrine o f 
the legitimate global relations o f such units ... [and at an economic level] 
nationalism ideally prescribes a self-sufficiency of resources and purity o f 
lifestyle in line with its commitment to autonomy and authenticity; failing that, 
nationalists strive for maximum control over their homeland and its resources. 
Beyond that, nationalism operates at the social level by prescribing the 
mobilisation o f the people, their legal equality as citizens and their 
participation in public life for the national good. Seeing the nation as a family 
writ large, it seeks to inspire a spirit o f national solidarity and brotherhood in 
the members o f the nation; hence it preaches the social unity of each nation. 
At the broadest level, nationalism must be seen as a form o f historicist culture 
and civic education, one that overlays or replaces the older mode o f religious 
culture and familial education (1991: 91-92).
But Smith is also aware o f what he calls ‘separatist ethno-nationalisnT, which as 
current cases show; “whatever their origins, seek autonomy or secession from 
relatively new states whose boundaries and raison d’etre are part of the colonial 
legacy. The primary source o f their disaffection lies in the plural nature and fragile 
legitimacy o f the post-colonial state itself.” He then sees economic grievances as 
more often providing the ‘catalyst o f rebellion’, since these new states generally fail 
to bring about their promises or because they favour “certain ethnic communities or 
categories at the expense o f others, it is the very nature o f the post-colonial state that 
creates the underlying conditions for the possibility o f a resort to secession” (1991: 
133).
What then is the solution? How do we avoid the resultant debilitating ethnic 
cleavages, especially in the newly created states o f Africa in particular and the less 
developed areas in general? Smith offers an insight into the causes and then the 
solutions when he states:
Because social classes are less developed and ethnic ties more pronounced,
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especially in conditions o f urban competition, the political constituencies of 
leaders and parties are much more likely to be composed o f one or more ethnic 
community or category, distinguished as such in the parties slogans and 
programmes. [In effect] fierce political competition between ethnically 
defined constituencies tends to harden the boundaries and promote the self- 
awareness o f  ethnies and ethnic categories; moreover, failure in that 
competition, particularly if repeated, may drive the defeated community to 
contemplate secession, especially where its leaders have internalised negative 
stereotypes or where, as in the Biafran case, such stereotypes help to create 
conditions o f terror and massacre (Ibid: 1).
The only way to avoid this, according to Smith, is for leaders o f new states to “take 
active measures to defuse ethnic cleavages through economic and administrative 
measures . . .” (Ibid).
Although nationalism is often associated with groups striving to express their 
distinctiveness and therefore prepared to fight for autonomy in order to achieve that 
objective (Smith, 2000: 1-26), Michael Billig, in his contribution to the debate, 
introduces a socio-psychological angle to the concept, with emphasis on how it is 
helping to reproduce the already developed Western nations. Linking nationalism 
therefore to the nation-state, he sees a certain ‘naturalness’ in the way nationalism is 
being expressed in these societies. This is the ‘banal’ variety o f nationalism. He 
rationalises his position thus:
The term banal nationalism is introduced to cover the ideological habits which 
enable the established nations o f the West to be reproduced ... these are not 
removed from everyday life, as some observers have supposed. Daily the 
nation is indicated, or ‘flagged’, in the lives o f its citizenry. Nationalism, far 
from being an intermittent mood in established nations, is the endemic 
condition (1995: 6)
There is a reason for this, as Billig suggests:
Nation-states are not founded upon ‘objective’ criteria, such as the possession 
o f a discrete language. Instead, nations have to be ‘imagined’ as communities. 
Because of this imaginary element, nationalism contains a strong social 
psychological dimension...The imagining o f the nation is part o f a wider 
ideological, discursive consciousness (adding that) Nationalism is ... a way of 
thinking or ideological consciousness. In this consciousness, nations, national 
identities and national homelands appear as ‘natural’. Most crucially the 
‘world o f nations’ is represented as a ‘natural’ moral order (1995: 10).
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Arguably, the reality o f  the Nigerian situation requires that the nation needs to define 
itself, taking into consideration contemporary realities. The aim o f such a project will 
necessarily mean to ensure that Nigerians put behind them the colonial legacy and 
consequently build a strong and prosperous nation. What is important to know here is 
not so much the creation o f a Nigeria where all the various nationalities are coerced to 
conform to a certain Nigerian-ness, but to follow a process that will ensure that the 
various entities are allowed to express themselves within the context o f a strong and 
united Nigerian state.
This, in effect, raises the issue o f how a collective national identity will be promoted 
in an environment such as Nigeria’s. Or put differently, are there circumstances or 
historical moments whereby every group in Nigeria is made to feel a sense o f 
collective national identity for Nigeria? But before we embark on an examination o f 
such moments in the Nigerian history, it is first imperative to familiarise ourselves 
with the general debate about national identity and every other issue related to it 
which will aid our understanding, when they are applied to the Nigerian situation.
2.2c National identity
The term "national identity", has been analysed in various ways. Whether it is 
Mackenzie's notion (1978: 109)74 that "common purpose" instead o f  identities exist; 
La Pierre's understanding (1984: 197-198),75 that it is "collective memory o f common 
past" or Paolo Pistoi's exposition (1983: 82),76 which states that "identity is the social 
boundary which defines the group with respect to other groups o f the same order, not 
the cultural reality within those borders", it could be said to be that a common theme 
runs through them all. This is basically that 'national identity' has often been seen as 
coterminous with national character, describing a state as distinct from others in terms 
o f its history, values, events, rituals, etc. In effect, national identity is seen as only 
synonymous with a situation where the national character o f a state is explicitly 
represented and reproduced in such a way as to reflect its nation-ness (Brookes, 1999: 
247-248).
74 Cited in Schlesinger, 1991a: 156
75 Ibid, 153
76 Ibid, 153
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Similarly, Gellner provides us with a definition, which suggests that the state is the 
provider o f national identity. Using the formation o f nation-states in industrial society 
as his point o f departure, he said that those states are maintained through “a universal, 
standardised system o f education”. In effect, what Gellner is saying is that, through 
the employment o f education, a state can ‘transmit cultural uniformity’ (Gellner, 
1983: 35-36).77 In the same vein, Hobsbawm and Ranger's (1983: 11-12) idea o f the 
state also suggests a form o f cultural practice. In other words, Gellner, Hobsbawm and 
Ranger believe that one form o f identity o f the state to be sustained is through the 
celebration o f its history, in the form o f such ceremonies like those involving flags 
and other images o f the state which are to be consumed by all. Indeed, the thrust of 
their argument seems to be that the state is a static and natural phenomenon to be 
reproduced and continued in a particular manner depicted in a national character that 
is historically associated with it (see Brookes, 1999: 247-9).
Nevertheless, some writers such as Schlesinger (1991a) and Hall (1992a) disagree 
with the basic premise o f the foregoing submissions. Schlesinger argues that this is 
just one way o f conceiving identity, because objective factors within and outside a 
state mean that identity is constantly changing and being reconstituted. Schlesinger 
believes that there are other “sources of differentiation inside industrial cultures and 
(therefore), the new creation o f various collective identities ... may be in opposition 
to official national culture” (1991a: 160). This aligns with the theory o f cultural 
identity as put forward by Hall, which is that peoples’ cultural identities are not fixed 
and unified and therefore “all o f  us are composed o f multiple social identities, not of 
one ...(because) we are all complexly constructed through different categories, of
different antagonisms”78 (Hall, 1991b: 57),79), and given the historical context of
80world politics, what we now have is “hybrid” and “diasporic” identities (Hall, 
1991a). What this therefore means is that, in contemporary states today, there are 
differences based on religion, ethnicity, region, locality and diaspora.
National identity understood from this standpoint is o f more relevance to us in this
77 See Schlesinger: 1991a: 160;deSwaan, 1985: 125.
78 Quoted in Brookes 1999: 248.
79 Also see Hall, 1992
80 Ibid.
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study. In which case, it could be seen simply as a "process o f  identifying (original 
emphasis) with the nation" (Brookes, 1999: 248). O f particular importance is Billig's 
(1995: 4-8) notion o f national identity. According to him, "to have a national identity 
is to possess ways o f talking about nationhood", adding that national identity is also to 
be found in "the embodied habits o f social life" (Ibid: 8). But more importantly, 
Billig,81 believes:
An investigation o f national identity should aim to disperse the concept o f 
'identity' into different elements ...[in  which case] an 'identity' is not a thing; it 
is a short-hand description for ways o f talking about the self and community 
... [because] they are related to forms o f life. In this respect, 'identity1, if  it is 
to be understood as a form o f talking, is also to be understood as a form o f life. 
The saluted and unsaluted flags are not stimuli that evoke 'identity-reactions'; 
they belong to the forms o f life which constitute what could be called national 
identities (1995: 60).
What this in effect means is that national identity rather than being seen as a synonym 
for the expression o f a fixed and eternal character o f the nation-state is continually in 
the process o f changing. In this respect, as stated earlier, Schlesinger (1991: 153) 
argues that "national identity is best understood as a form of collective identity". His 
concern is mainly with the "general sociological problem of what collective identity is 
and how it is constituted". As he put it: "collective identities are constituted in action 
and are continually reconstituted in line with both an internal dynamic and external 
balances o f force" (original emphasis). In concluding his study, which was about the 
difficult issue o f a European identity, Schlesinger then stated:
If we are to navigate our way with success through the whirlpool o f collective 
identity, there is no alternative to developing a thoroughgoing pluralism o f 
structures ... in the Europe o f the future, one that recognises multi-ethnicity, 
multi-culturalism and the multi-faith society as indispensable elements in a 
new order (1991: 191).
2.2d National identity and the Nigerian context
How can such submissions about the term ‘national identity’ be related to the 
Nigerian situation? Is it possible to use theories developed out of the experiences o f
In reference to the works o f  (Bhavnani and Phoenix, Shotter and Gergen, 1989).
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European and other industrialised states o f the world, to analyse the Nigerian 
situation? Some writers are o f the opinion that the theories and approaches developed 
in the metropoles are not irrelevant for Africa, more so as these African nations are 
part o f the global system and are also under enormous pressure to meet the 
requirements that go with that.82 Indeed the kernel o f their position is that
Western conceptual exploration has obvious intellectual (and sometimes 
imperialist) benefits, even for Africa, (although they also maintain that) 
serious problems occur, when such unreconstituted models, theories and 
paradigms to answer problems and offer explanations o f processes elsewhere, 
are applied to Africa irrespective o f local ways o f making sense and doing 
things (Tomaselli, 1998: 145).
This is the crux o f the matter. That is, if  we are to apply western developed theories to 
analyse the African situation, for them to be relevant, it will be worthwhile to know 
first what constitutes the states in Africa. In respect o f this study, by so doing we learn 
what it will take to promote national identity for each o f the states that make up 
Africa. In the case o f Nigeria, we need to understand how the complex and pluralistic 
Nigerian state came about. This is where Smith’s argument (see p.25, above) about 
nationalism in a post-colonial state becomes very relevant, because not only will it 
enable us know the make-up o f these states but also what it will take to create a sense 
o f a collective national identity for the various groups within them.
2.2e The post-colonial state
The literature on the post-colonial state is replete with the effects that colonialism has had 
on the colonised. On the African continent, some have argued that this has had particularly 
adverse effects as the Western educated elite who championed the course o f independence, 
employed models o f cultural studies imported from the developed nations o f Western 
Europe and uncritically applied them to the African situation. Indeed many post-colonial 
writers have attacked the claim to universality o f human nature as the works o f some 
western theorists wdttingly or unwittingly show. Here the works o f such notable western 
writers as Shakespeare, Dante or Goethe come to mind. As remarked by Ashcroft et al, 
"we are often told what makes [these writers] 'great' is their ability to reveal something of 
'the universal human condition' (Ashcroft et al, 1995: 55).
82 See Muller and Tomaselli, 1990: 302; Ssmith, 1991:111.
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However, post-colonial writers like Chinua Achebe, George Lamming, Gauri 
Viswanathan, Alan Bishop, Frederic Jameson and Aijaz Ahmad etc, are at odds with 
this concept o f universalism. They basically see this as a 'myth' by which the 
metropolis maintains imperial control over the periphery (Ashcroft et al, 1995: 12- 
77). Additionally, any criticism o f the concept o f universalism is seen as an 
acknowledgement o f the fact that post-colonial societies have distinctive 
characteristics and are able to respond adequately to whatever effects, whether 
cultural, economic, or political, are generated in such societies. As succinctly put by 
Ashcroft et al:
The value o f post colonial discourse is that it provides a methodology o f 
considering the dialogue o f similarity and difference; the similarity o f 
colonialism’s political and historical pressure upon non-European societies, 
alongside the plurality o f specific cultural effects and responses those societies 
have produced (Ibid: 56).
It is this development that has generated such discussions as the 'decolonisation o f 
African Literature' (see Chinweizu et al, 1985). But in response to that the question 
has always been asked as to whether this is possible in the contemporary world. That 
is, can the rest o f the world that have had the experience o f colonialism and 
imperialism, be free o f  all colonial taint in whatever they do? The reality of the 
relationship between the colonised and the coloniser, even after decolonisation, 
suggests that this is hardly possible. Tiffin (1995: 95) in her thesis opines that "it is 
not possible to create or recreate national or regional formations wholly independent 
o f their historical implication in the European colonial enterprise".
Nevertheless Simon During (1995: 125) contends that for those who have been the 
victims o f colonialism and imperialism, post-colonialism is the need in nations or 
groups to achieve an identity uncontaminated by Universalist or Eurocentric concepts 
and images. On the other hand, Linda Hutcheon, (1995: 135) disagrees, arguing that 
"the entire post-colonial project usually posits precisely the impossibility o f that 
identity ever being 'uncontaminated': just as the word post-colonialism holds within it 
its own 'contamination' by colonialism ...". And still there is a belief that it is possible 
for both the 'local' and 'global' to exist side by side. This is what Diana Brydon (1995: 
141), calls "a new globalism that is neither the old universalism nor the Disney
simulacrum which simultaneously asserts local independence and global 
interdependencies and then seeks a way to cooperate without co-option, a way to 
define differences that do not depend on myths o f cultural purity or authenticity but 
that thrive on an interaction that 'contaminates' without homogenising".
No doubt, contemporary African cultural life has been affected by colonialism. That 
influence has persisted, even after decolonisation, as neo-colonialist and imperialist 
theories attest. This lies at the heart o f  those who believe that post-colonialism does 
not mean a call for autochthonous culture. Kwame Appiah (1995: 119; 124) belongs 
to this category, arguing that "if there is a lesson in the broad shape o f this circulation 
o f cultures, it is surely that we are all already contaminated by each other, that there is 
no longer a fully autochthonous pure African culture awaiting salvage by our artists 
(just as there is, o f course, no American culture without African roots)." According to 
him "there is a clear sense in some post-colonial writing that the postulation o f a 
unitary Africa over against a monolithic West - the binarism o f Self and Other - is the 
last o f the shibboleths o f the modernisers that we must learn to live without" (Ibid: 
124).
But whether or not the reality o f the post-colonial situation is accepted, the fact is that 
these states are today grappling with the destruction o f their link to tradition or 
identity which colonialism has brought about. Referring to “the post-colonial 
situation’*, for instance, Lundby and Dayan (1999: 399-400) note that it "can be seen 
as a moment o f reformulation o f identities. It has inherited the deep restructuring of 
identities undertaken during colonial times: hardening o f existing identities: 
destruction o f  the flux o f interactions." They note that, as a result, the post-colonial 
states have "witnessed the creation o f new and hybrid identities" as "individuals and 
groups can no longer define themselves only in terms o f their past". National 
identities for such states then are not fixed or permanent but contingent upon time and 
the issues that the states are confronted with from time to time.
Therefore, what is it that will form the basis for the expression o f a national identity in 
a post-colonial African state like Nigeria? Through which o f its agencies or 
institutions can this be achieved? Many experts on the Nigerian media believe that, in 
terms o f promoting a collective Nigerian national identity and therefore contributing
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to the national integration o f Nigeria, it is the media that is best suited to carry out this 
task. They believe that this is the case because o f the media’s role in the historical 
development o f Nigeria.83. Nevertheless, before we know how effective the Nigerian 
press would be in this respect, it is necessary to go through some o f the general 
submissions that have been made regarding the role o f the press in the promotion o f 
national identity.
2.2f The Press and National Identity
The debates about ‘national identity’ recognise the role that the media, in general and 
the press in particular, can play in the promotion, construction, articulation and 
maintenance o f all kinds o f national or collective identities. For instance, as noted by 
Schlesinger (1991b: 303-304), the intention o f the UNESCO’S New World 
Information and Communication Order (NWICO) was to protect weaker nation states 
o f  the Third World from “cultural imperialism from the West”. He also noted in his 
book that “one European Commission study emphasises the importance o f 
information in European unification, just as Anthony Pragnell (1985: 8)), recognises 
public television service as an integrative force.84
In his contribution, Billig (1995: 11) emphasises the roles played by not just the 
politicians but also the newspapers in the promotion o f national identity. He noted, for 
instance, that politicians are able to do this because "democratic politics is founded on 
the institutions o f nationhood; [and so] in pursuing their public trade, [politicians seek 
to address the nation ... [and because they] have become celebrities in contemporary 
age, their words, which typically reproduce the cliches o f the nationhood, are 
continually reported in the mass media." But Billig also acknowledges that politicians 
"do not provide the only conduit by which the nation is banally flagged" as his case 
study, using British newspapers, shows. In it he discovers that:
All the papers, whether tabloid or quality, and left- or right-wing, address their 
readers as members o f the nation. They present news that take for granted the
83 For instance, read the views o f one o f the interviewees, Prince Tony Momoh, on pp. 135-136 under 
the headline: “The press and independence struggle in Nigeria”. Also see Nwuneli, 1986; Agbaje, 
1992; Dare and Uyo eds, 1996; Bitrus, 1996; Anamaleze, 1979, Duyile, 1987; Omu, 1978; Amatokwu, 
1989
84 See Schlesinger 1991a: 142
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existence o f the world o f nations. They employ a routine 'deixis', which is 
continually pointing to the homeland as the home o f the readers. The little 
words - mostly overlooked - are the crucial components in this routine deixis 
o f  the homeland ... The crucial words o f banal nationalism are often the 
smallest: 'we', 'this' and 'here', which are the words o f linguistic 'deixis' (Ibid, 
11 & 94).
What is very important in the way that the newspapers ‘flag’ the nation, as Billig’s 
example o f  the British newspapers show, is their use o f ‘sports’ to “invite ‘us’, the 
readers to support the national cause (p. 11). This stresses the role o f newspapers in 
the promotion o f national identity through their coverage o f sporting activities 
involving their individual nation-state. Based on Hall and Held’s analysis, Billig notes 
that is banal nationalism which has kept the democratic nation-states at the heart o f 
the people. His argument is that such nationalistic feeling becomes ingrained in the 
people’s psyche making them support the nation as they become aware that their 
ambition could only be realised within their own state which leaves in a world of 
different nations that “has institutionalized ‘them ’ and ‘us’.” The intriguing thing 
about Billig’s study is the revelation that, through their content, the press “daily 
brings the flag home to the citizenry...(or) banally points out ‘the’ homeland...(using) 
familiar habits o f language...such as ‘people’ (or ‘society’) . . . ’we’, ‘this’, and ‘here’. 
(94).
Meyrowitz (1986: 71), in his study o f the electronic media, also emphasises the role 
the media play in constructing national identities because they have the capability to 
bring together people that are not physically in the same place. He calls this a 
'placeless culture'85. Thomas Fitzgerald (1991: 193) explores this further when he 
talks about the ability o f the media to bring about 'diffusion o f group identities'.
While it is important to note at this juncture that the media is not the ultimate or sole 
creator o f national identities, given the fact that such researchers as Schlesinger 
(1993; 1991a & b) and Srebemy-Mohammadi (1991) have discussed the role o f the 
nation-state, in this respect, nevertheless, the media’s role, as homogenizer is an 
important aspect o f the project of inculcating a sense o f national identity in the 
populace. For instance, Fitzgerald (1991), in his work, discovered that the media can
85 Quoted in Fitzgerald, T.K., 1991: 193
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play an effective role in nurturing a strong national identity. He said that the media 
could do this successfully in a society where there is no opposition to 'cultural 
aspirations'. In his own words:
A vibrant and peaceful ethnic identity is possible in a multicultural society. 
Ethnic identity would seem to have important psychological functions, hence 
should be nurtured without falling into the trap o f assuming there must be a 
corresponding, separate culture. The challenge is how to nurture a strong 
national identity, yet still recognise a variety o f different interest groups, 
ethnic sty les and the persistent need for minority identities which carry with 
them a degree o f self-esteem, dignity and pride (1991: 211).
Although Meyrowitz' findings (1986), as earlier noted, were based on his study o f the 
electronic media, its significance could be related to what Benedict Anderson (1991) 
said about the habit o f newspaper reading which enables individuals to 'imagine' their 
communities, even though they could never physically meet all the members o f the 
community. He delineates this, stating:
We know that particular morning and evening editions will overwhelmingly 
be consumed between this hour and that, only on this day, not that ...The 
significance o f this mass ceremony ... is paradoxical. It is performed in silent 
privacy, in the lair o f the skull. Yet each communicant is well aware that the 
ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or 
millions) o f others o f whose existence he is confident, yet o f whose identity he 
has not the slightest notion (Ibid, 35).
Anderson's submission only goes to show how the habit o f reading newspapers 
socialises the citizenry to identify with the nation on a continuous basis. But all these, 
predictably, do not in any way diminish the reservations that some writers have 
expressed about the ability o f the press to promote cultural identities given the effect 
o f “ ‘global culture’ which underlines the general problem o f constructing full-proof 
cultural defences” (de Moragas Spa: 1988)86. But others like Richard Collins (1990: 
199-213),87 nevertheless, have also argued that the so-called “global culture” could 
indeed be a source o f unity within nation-states. Arguing along the same line, 
Schlesinger stated that this is inevitable, adding that what is therefore needed is for us 
to “think in terms o f the simultaneous interaction and parallelism o f different cultural 
levels within given social formations” (1991b: 305).
96 See Schlesinger, 1991b, 304-5 
*7 Ibid
However, despite these contentions, it is also apparent that not much research has 
been conducted to establish the role o f the media in the promotion of national 
identities.88 Brookes (1999: 251) used textual analysis to assess the British popular 
press' role in the promotion o f British national identity. What he discovered was that 
"whether the BSE/CJD crisis was reported as primarily a health crisis or an industrial 
crisis, the representation o f the BSE issue was structured around national identity".
What he then found was that:
The British press encourages common-sense identification with the nation as 
the dominant form o f identity ... [and] occasionally this has been through the 
evocation o f images and representations o f explicit nationalism. But mostly, in 
the coverage o f the threat to health and the economy posed by BSE, it is 
through the construction o f an abstract nation at risk through constant 
evocation o f  the 'natural' boundaries o f the national community (1999: 261).
Additionally, one o f the conclusions reached by Brookes (Ibid) is that "in the case of 
media operating within an established nation-state (original emphasis) the press can 
be effective in reinforcing national identity in a context in which its naturalness might 
otherwise be challenged."
This, arguably, is true o f the Nigerian press. Even though it is generally believed that 
it is partisan and divisive89, no one can also deny the fact that the Nigerian press has 
more often than not used some specific developments and events within the Nigerian 
state to bring the diverse Nigerian peoples together, thereby instilling in them a sense 
o f collective national identity. Two such issues which will be examined in this study 
are:
(1) N igeria’s triumph at the FIFA-organised under-17s world cup tournament in 
China in August 1985; and
(2) Nigeria’s hosting o f the 27th Summit o f Heads o f State and Governments o f the 
Organisation o f African Unity (OAU) in June 1991.
88 In research titled: “Newspapers and national identity: the BSE/CJD crisis and the British press
89 See pp. 61, 65, 158 & 162-164 below
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However, although Brookes' article is useful in understanding the role o f the British 
popular press in the promotion o f British national identity, not much has been done in 
the area o f the press' role in the promotion o f national identity in a post-colonial state 
like Nigeria. This study will show that the Nigerian press is one o f the institutions in 
society that has, in spite o f its history, been engaged in the process o f promoting and 
reinforcing a collective Nigerian national identity, within the context o f a 
multicultural environment.
Therefore, drawing on Smith's analysis o f nationalism and Billig's notion o f the ‘daily 
flagging’ o f the nation (see pp. 29 & 31 respectively), this study proposes that it is 
possible to nurture a strong national identity within the context o f a multi-ethnic 
society like Nigeria. I do agree that Nigeria is a nation that is divided along ethnic, 
religious and regional lines each with its own identity, but I contend that the 
expression o f ethnic identities is not a hindrance to the promotion o f national identity. 
While the Nigerian constitution explicitly spells out how the various nationalities can 
be fully integrated (Constitution o f the Federal Republic o f Nigeria, 1999), in this 
endeavour, it could be said that to promote a Nigerian national identity is to promote 
an integrated Nigerian State, which conforms to a certain "national character 
describing a particular set o f phenomena (representations, events, values, experiences, 
rituals etc)". But I argue that given the historical development o f a nation like Nigeria, 
what will form the basis for an enduring national integration and therefore a collective 
Nigerian national identity, is a situation where there is no opposition to, as Fitzgerald 
(1991: 203) puts it, ‘cultural aspirations’. The implication is that in such an 
environment, diversity will not necessarily be a hindrance to integration as people are 
able to recognise and accept the national perspectives to issues. Therefore it is safe to 
say that the promotion o f national identity cannot be understood only in terms 
conforming to a national character embodying a certain nation-ness. We should also 
be interested in how 'identification within the nation' is promoted 'as the dominant 
form o f cultural identity' (Tomlinson, J., 1991: 83).
For example, in accepting Anderson’s analysis, which talks about the important role 
that the habit o f reading newspaper plays in the promotion o f national identity, at the 
same time, what is emphasised as important to this study is what the content o f the 
newspaper is, which is what is significant in the process o f identifying with the nation.
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This is in agreement with those who believe that the relevance o f the media in the 
promotion o f national identity lies in the manner in which it addresses and reports the 
news to its audience. As the evidence from the study o f British newspapers shows, 
Mthe content o f a newspaper does not just reflect the ritual conditions under which it is 
read, but reinforces and reproduces it" (Brookes, 1999: 249).
In this study therefore, I will investigate the role that the Nigerian newspapers play in 
the promotion o f a collective Nigerian national identity using the evidence from: first, 
the opinions garnered from interviewing the experts on the Nigerian mass media and 
second, the analysis o f  what the newspapers actually publish. I challenge the literature 
that asserts that the historical development o f  Nigeria, which accounts for the general 
nature and character o f  the press (Nnaemeka et al, 1989: Vols. 1 & 2),90 is a hindrance 
to the press’ ability to promote Nigeria’s national integration and unity. It is possible, 
in contemporary societies, to aim to tolerate a hybrid o f cultures with the press 
serving to reinforce this without necessarily promoting disintegration (Civil Liberties 
Organisation, 1996; Nigerian Press Council, 2000: 132-133).
The main issue in analysing the role of the Nigerian press in the promotion of a 
collective Nigerian national identity is not so much what the press does today but the 
major characteristics o f what informs what it is now doing. And to make that 
connection from its past to the present is to emphasise the impact o f the colonial 
enterprise on the nature o f the African media in general and the Nigerian media in 
particular. This is what is going to form the basis o f  the next section. It begins with an 
account o f the evolution o f  the mass media in Africa, the purpose o f which is to 
provide the premise for an understanding o f the history and context o f the Nigerian 
press.
Literature Review II
2.3 Mass media in the African context
90 See also Enwenwa, I., 1989: 76-7; Uche, L.U., 1989: xvii).
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The literature on the African continent usually divides the continent into two 
geographically distinct regions, namely North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. But 
whatever the differences that are immanent in these two regions, there is something 
common to their media audiences which is the extensive historical and cultural 
contacts they have had with each other as well as the fact that they have been subject 
(sic) to external influences (Jeter et al. 1996: xi). Indeed, Africa had powerful 
kingdoms "for nearly 6500 years" and what could be tagged 'racial purity' before their 
conquerors, ranging from the Greeks to the Persians, the Arabs, the Romans and the 
Europeans, brought upon it a variety o f cultural influences (Ibid), that have stunted its 
advancement in almost all fields o f human endeavour in the contemporary world 
order. And one institution in contemporary African states that has been a direct 
consequence o f such external influences is the mass media o f communication. There 
is nowhere else on the African continent that this is truer than in sub-Saharan Africa, 
which is the focus here. The evolution of the media in this region is worth exploring 
so we can understand the basis o f  its peculiar nature.
Jeter et al (Ibid, xi-xii), noted in their work that "the early presses in a number of 
African colonies were established and run by missionaries ...[who] also set up 
schools and agricultural facilities through which they engendered their own set of 
moral values, work ethic and political institutions"91. They also found that although 
"these European religions and political values were sometimes at cross-purposes with 
those o f indigenous religions and governments, these values left traditions that
q*\
influenced the media systems in independent African nation-states" Indeed, as Jeter, 
et al, note, (Ibid, 9), the African mass media continue to be subject to Western 
influences, such as those regarding the concept o f news and the use of communication 
technologies in social and economic development. Consequently, this "clash o f media 
values puts Africa's modem mass media at loggerheads with African governments 
which have resorted to adopting stricter media policies to cow the media" (Ibid). 
Malinowski (1966: 11) explained this phenomenon as a legacy o f colonialism when 
he stated that "the whole range o f European influences, interests, good intentions and 
predatory drives must become an essential part o f the study o f African cultural 
change." Further, as also put by one writer on the African media, John N. Williams
91 Also see Ayandele, 1966.
92 See also Wilcox, 1975: 1.
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(1963: 243), the only way to understand the nature and role o f the media in Africa 
generally is to consider the continent's colonial past.93
The result o f  all this is that when one looks at the evolution o f the African media, one 
discovers that a common strand runs through them. This is what Jeter et al (1996: 11) 
referred to as the philosophical contexts o f  Africa's mass media. For instance, before 
independence, newspapers were first "instruments for establishing indigenous forms 
o f government, tools o f political parties or o f nationalist movements." Second, they 
were instruments for legitimizing the indigenous governments wherever they were in 
place." Third, “they were instruments for demonstrating the disapproval of 
indigenous, repressive political systems that departed from the broad-based 
expectations o f a nation" (Ibid: 11). Whatever the approach adopted in defining the 
region's media role, what seems certain is that in order for the media to perform its 
role successfully, it would need the government to first o f all recognise its unique role 
in society and thereafter support it towards the attainment o f societal goals (Ibid: 22).
Poignantly, Ruijter (1989) identifies four characteristics o f govemment-media 
relations in Africa: they are: "manipulative" because "official communiques from 
government sources constitute the bulk o f the news on the continent; "collaborative", 
because it brings about inter-dependency between the state and the media; 
"supportive" o f the legal and underpinnings o f the state, and, lastly, they are 
"preventive", in that the media face stumbling blocks in their attempts to play the 
watchdog role and to uphold the social norms o f the state machinery.94
Exploring this further, Pratt (1991) noted that although in Africa there are privately- 
owned and state-owned media, their role is blurred because both have similar editorial 
content. To explain this phenomenon, Jeter et al (1996: 30-3) stated that it is because 
the press play a unifying role as African governments have often emphasised the need 
for the integration o f all ethnic loyalties in the task o f nation-building and so 
journalists are likely to feel the pressure to promote homogeneous rather than 
heterogeneous perceptions o f their national roles.95
93 See also Mazrui, 1972: 122.
94 See Jeter, J.P., et al, 1996: 27-28
95 see also Tusa: 1992: 15; Paul Ansah: 1981; Index on Censorship, cited in Tusa, 1992: 17; Arikpo,
45
In the same vein, Hamelink (1983: 22) talked about the homogenizing effects of 
"cultural synchronization" perpetrated by the small, urban foreign-orientated elite, 
who, as a result o f the far greater influence they have on the cultural environment than 
the other members of the population, demonstrate perceptions that tend toward 
homogeneity. The result is that the "decisions regarding the cultural environment in a 
given country are made in accordance with the interests o f a powerful central nation 
and imposed with subtle but devastating effectiveness without regard for the adaptive 
necessities of the dependent nation"96. Schwartz (1978), came up with the criteria of 
"inner-directed high professional" and "other-directed" journalists in analysing the 
role o f the media in Africa. Employing those criteria, Jeter et al (1996: 31) contended 
that African journalists are "other-directed." Consequently, they asked whether the 
African journalists in the conduct o f their duties operate within the strict confines of 
the interests o f  the urban elite or o f their publishers. The conclusion they reached was 
that because the media depend so much on government policy as regards their 
instruments o f trade, such as newsprint and other materials for printing, "journalists 
may emphasise a careerist attribute - job security - rather than a professional attribute:
07independent thought and action based on the ideals o f professionalism." .
However, the similarity in the editorial contents of both the public and private media 
only serve to limit the media's ability to make an independent and effective impact on 
development. This, indeed, is the rationale behind the call for private ownership o f the
QO
media in Africa, although there have also been a clamour for a shift ffom the 
colonial model o f journalism training, which reflects Africa's colonial history, to the 
development model which emphasises the need for African journalists to be trained in
QQ •order to be equipped to carry out national development. Nevertheless, the African
1967: 165; Wilcox, 1975: 31.
96 Quoted in Jeter et al, 1996: 30; see also Roser and Brown, 1986, on how government’s intervention 
in every sphere o f  media operations affect African newspaper editors.
97 See also Breed, 1955; Sobowale, 1979)
98 See Jeter, et al, 1996: 32.
99 This is the major objective o f the African Council for Communication Education (ACCE), which 
was established in 1976. Its functions are as follows: to assess the training needs o f communication 
training institutions in Africa; to assist in curriculum design and development for journalism education; 
to facilitate the exchange o f resources among training institutions in Africa; to develop research 
programmes for various communications projects; to promote awareness, among African governments, 
o f the role o f  the media in national development; and to advocate the accreditation or certification of 
journalism training centres in Africa (Jeter, J.P., et al, 1996: 40). Also see Jimada, 1987; Hachten,
media have other peculiarities which limit the way they function.. Part o f the problem 
for the press in Africa is the disparity between the urban areas and the rural areas. The 
newspapers are located in the cities and with poor transportation links with the rural
areas, not many newspapers are read in the deprived rural settings. The findings by
100Wilcox (1975: vi), is typical in Africa. In his study o f the mass media in Africa, he 
discovered that:
In terms o f the mass media, the paucity o f the press is only exceeded by the 
mammoth contrast between the urban and rural areas. In Dakar or Abidjan, 
today's Paris editions are displayed on well-supplied news-stands that often 
reach 50 feet in length. Yet it takes a newspaper two or three days to travel 
from Abidjan to towns in the northern part o f  the country, 350 miles away. In 
Dakar thousands watch television while a village 75 miles away is lucky to 
have a radio receiver or a newspaper among 350 people.101
Here other issues affecting the press which will aid our understanding o f the Nigerian 
press will be focussed on. A major task in this project is the dissection and analysis o f 
what really constitutes and influences the way that the Nigerian press has conducted 
and continues to conduct its activities.
Given Nigeria's socio-political context, the Nigerian press is often faced with some 
daunting issues o f fundamental importance to the Nigerian state What plays a 
significant role in what the press does, in this respect, is Nigeria’s cultural diversity. 
To a large extent many o f the newspapers in Nigeria today were established in 
recognition o f the need to take care o f the various interests engendered by Nigeria’s 
cultural differences and the various interests within them .102 This is why the role o f 
the ownership is crucial in understanding the direction that each o f  the newspapers 
follows in the coverage o f some vital issues necessary to the unity and survival o f the 
Nigerian State. Indeed, the Nigerian press has been described as being susceptible to 
the manipulation o f their respective owners because they regard the newspaper as a 
tool for fighting political opponents (Dare, 1997: 545). Against this background, two
1968..
100 Although Wilcox did his studies over thirty- two years ago, there have not been remarkable changes 
in the situation as he found them then. See for instance, communique from Workshop on Media and 
Democracy, NPC, 2000: 131-133; also see Adesonoye, 1989: 96-98; Egbochukwu, 1996: 212-217; the 
views o f  fieldwork interviewee, Mohammed Ibrahim, p. 170-171
101 Also see Chick, J.D., 1971.
102 See the mission statement o f New Nigerian, for example, in chapter 3, below; Dare, O. 1997: 543- 
544
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questions will be raised and employed as our point of departure for analysing and 
understanding the nature o f the press coverage of some o f the aforementioned issues 
in Nigeria: To what extent does the coverage by the press reflect public opinion? 
Secondly, through their editorial policies, do they construct public opinion? To help 
enable an answer to such questions it is necessary to explore the background issues 
relating to the Nigerian press.
2.4 Nigerian unity and press: The socio-political and economic setting 
2.4a The socio-political setting
What is now simply known as Nigeria was a group o f nations, nationalities and 
religious groupings in West Africa just over a century ago. European expansionism 
and colonisation brought them together. The Europeans named the territories the 
“Protectorates o f Southern and Northern Nigeria and the Colony o f Lagos.” In 1914, 
they were all amalgamated into one country as the “Colony and Protectorate o f 
Nigeria” (Kirk-Greene, 1968). On 1st October 1960, Nigeria gained independence, 
but, just as before independence, the country is still dogged by a series o f  problems 
that continue to threaten its corporate existence.
This is hardly a surprise for a people who were brought together purely to meet the 
needs o f  the European colonialists. According to Crowther (1966), the reason for the 
amalgamation was primarily economic expediency. Although the people that make up 
the area that is now known as Nigeria had interacted with each other before the advent 
o f colonialism, they also had some fundamental differences in terms of their culture, 
religion and history generally.103
Today in Nigeria there are about 250 autonomous ethnic groups. O f all these, it is the 
three majority ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani, Ibo and Yoruba, that dominate 
Nigeria’s socio-economic and political environment. Their mutual suspiciousness and 
inability to work together have cost Nigeria dearly (Obasanjo, 1989: 55; Aguolu, 
1973: vii). But it should be emphasised that their relationship with one another is 
rooted in and informed by a history that far precedes Colonialism (Nnoli, 1981: 192-
103 See for instance, Garba, J., 2000
216).104
The Hausa-Fulanis are Muslims and inhabit the northern part o f Nigeria.105. As a 
people they were highly organised and had a well structured system o f government 
before the colonisation o f the area by Europeans. Indeed after the amalgamation in 
1914, Lord Lugard found in the North a convenient system o f administration which he 
exploited for his indirect rule policy.106 It suffices to state that they had maintained 
powerful empires and are very proud o f their past. This explains their resistance to 
Western influence, particularly in the area o f education. Overall, this particular point 
accounts for the imbalance in the educational development between the North and the 
South, with all the consequences that this has continued to have on the Nigerian state.
The Yorubas, on the other hand, occupy the south-western part o f Nigeria (Lloyd, 
1967: 267-292).107 They are Christians and Muslims, highly educated, wealthy, 
middle class and urbanised. They formed the bulk o f the population o f the then 
Western region which, in 1963, had the Mid-west state carved out o f it to cater for the 
interest o f  the minority groups that used to be part o f that Western region. The 
Yorubas also maintained powerful empires, but their traditional rulers (obas) did not 
wield the amount o f power and influence that the emirs (Islamic authority figures) had 
in the north. They were not resistant to Western education and were the first group in 
Nigeria to come in contact with the Europeans.
The Ibos, unlike the Hausas and Yorubas, had no prior form of “political hierarchical 
kingdom” 108. They occupy the south-eastern part o f Nigeria. One o f their 
characteristics is their individualism, which as remarked by renowned Nigerian 
academic, Professor Chinua Achebe (an Iboman), have earned them the hatred of 
other groups in Nigeria (1983: 56-64). They had a later contact with the outside 
world, probably because o f the thick forest in the area they occupy. Once they made 
contact with European explorers and missionaries, they took advantage o f it and
104 See also Onimode, 1981: 166-191; Andreski, 1968; Diamond, 1967; Africa Today, 1963; Sale, 
1969: 12-14; Anise, 1970; Nigerian Civil War, 1973).
105 See, for instance, South Atlantic Quarterly, 1968: 591-602.
106 For more on the Indirect Rule Policy o f the British Colonial Government in Nigeria, see Ezera, 
Kalu, 1964.
107 See also Adedeji, 1966; Bascom, 1969; Ferguson, 1970.
108 See Njaka, 1970; Basden, 1966; Offonry, 1951; Uchendu, 1965; Ibo State Union, 1958.
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became Christians and highly educated (Uche, 1989: 7-23).
Perhaps the issue that has had the most effect on Nigeria and Nigerians today is 
politics. It is the one that has given Nigeria its shape and character. It could be said 
that politics in Nigeria started on the very day that the Europeans came into contact 
with the peoples that inhabit the area that is now called Nigeria. But for the purpose o f 
this study, we would start from the period that the nationalist struggle for 
independence commenced (Coleman, 1963; Sklar, 1983; Ezera, 1964). That was the 
period that the press, for instance, started making effective contributions to Nigeria. 
This came about in the 1920s when Herbert Macaulay emerged as the father o f 
Nigerian nationalism and used his Lagos Daily News to attack the British. Later in 
1936 he formed the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) (Ibid).
However, the enthusiasm to free Nigerians from the yoke of colonialism gathered 
momentum within the parties (NCNC and AG,) particularly after WWII. It could be 
stated that it was the WWII that spurred the cause o f Nigerian nationalism and set in 
motion the realities o f  contemporary Nigerian society. Those who fought alongside 
their European counterparts returned home to claim equal status with the Europeans. 
Besides, the educated elite who graduated from American and British universities also 
returned home to tell tales o f discrimination and intensified the fight to achieve self - 
determination.109
But basically, what is important for this study is how Nigeria’s socio-political setting 
has informed the Nigerian reality today. For instance, when discussing Nigeria’s 
struggle for political independence, it should be noted that political parties provided 
leadership. This is important because the shape that developments in the new post­
colonial Nigeria subsequently took has all its roots in the way that these political 
parties originated. Simply put, they all grew out o f a host o f associations which were 
committed to the improvement o f their respective communities, reforming and 
democratising the political processes and also ensuring the freedom of the populace 
from the burden o f colonialism (Sklar, 1983: xiii-xxi).
109 See Coleman, 1963; Sklar, 1983; Ezera, 191964.
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In 1944 Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Iboman, together with Herbert Macaulay, a Yorubaman, 
formed the first political party, the National Council o f Nigeria and Camerouns 
(NCNC). It was not a tribal party but truly a national party. But unfortunately, rivalry 
between the Ibos and the Yorubas saw Azikiwe breaking away from the NYM, the 
parent body o f the NCNC, thus dealing a blow to national unity.
In 1951, the Action Group (AG) was formed by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, a 
Yorubaman, from Egbe Omo Oduduwa.I10 It became the first exclusively ethnic 
political party in Nigeria. It should also be noted that the NCNC was also backed up 
by the Pan Ibo Union and began to represent the sectional interests o f the East, 
dominated by the Ibos. In 1949 the Northerners formed the cultural organisation 
known as “Jam 'yyar Mutanem Arewa” 111 (NPC)). Alhaji Aminu Kano, a Hausa- 
Fulani, broke away from the Jam ’yyar to form the Northern Elements Progressive 
Union (NEPU) (Sklar, 1983: 143-365).
Although four political parties, namely: the National Council o f Nigeria and the 
Camerouns (NCNC), the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC), the Action Group (AG) 
and the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), became the established parties 
at the time Nigeria attained political independence in 1960, they all had very different 
ideas as to the direction that Nigeria should follow. Professor Sklar, in his classic 
study o f Nigeria’s political parties in the First Republic, gave credence to this point 
when he stated:
The NCNC stood for political democracy in its classical, individualistic form. 
The Action Group o f Nigeria stood for federalist democracy to safeguard the 
rights o f cultural communities. The Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) 
exemplified the modernisation o f traditional political authority (the party’s 
regionalist motto was” One North: One People, Irrespective o f Religion, Rank 
or Tribe); its radical opponent, the Northern Elements Progressive Union 
(NEPU), espoused egalitarian democracy (Ibid, xiii).
When the McPherson constitution was introduced following a series o f constitutional 
talks for self-government with the British, elections were held between 1951 and 
1952. But what became crucial for the welfare o f Nigerian politics was how the
110 The English translation o f this Yoruba group is ‘Society o f  the Children o f  Oduduwa’.
1,1 The English translation o f this Hausa/Fulani group is ‘the Northern Peoples’ Congress’.
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political map o f Nigeria turned out in the period from 1951-1962. For instance, during 
this period, the electoral victories that the NPC, the AG and the NCNC, recorded in 
the North (Hausa), West (Yoruba) and East (Ibo) respectively, meant that they were 
now ‘commonly identified with “ethnic” group interests’. However, as Sklar noted 
this was misleading, because although each o f these three major political parties 
controlled their respective areas, none o f them ever ‘intended to promote a 
specifically ethnic interest’. Indeed, in the North, though ‘rooted in Muslim emirates’, 
Sklar reiterated the point that “the NPC endeavoured to reconcile traditional authority 
in all parts o f  that culturally diverse region with the requirements o f modem 
government.” In the same vein, even though the NCNC commanded a large following 
in the mainly Ibo-speaking Eastern Nigeria, it had a very significant support from the 
Edo-speaking people in the nearby Midwest (which, became a region in 1963), as 
well as attaining some electoral and parliamentary strength in the mainly Yoruba- 
speaking Western region until, at least, 1963. For its own part, the AG, according to 
Sklar, though ‘rooted in its Yoruba origin’, yet in 1956, it emerged ‘as the fore-most 
party o f “minority” group interests in the Eastern and Northern Regions’ (Ibid: xiii- 
xv).
However, it should be stressed here that a clearer picture o f the shape o f what was to 
come, in Nigeria’s socio-political landscape, emerged in 1954 when Nigeria became a 
federation o f three regions, namely North, East and W est.112. Just prior to 
independence, elections were held all over the country in 1959. The three parties won 
in their respective region as they did in 1952. Although the NPC got the most votes 
cast all over the country, it did not have the necessary majority to form the 
government and therefore had to form a coalition government after forming an 
alliance with the NCNC.
Given the fact that the three major political parties professed different political ideas, 
the formation o f political alliances in a bid to control the Federal government became 
a very delicate and potentially divisive possibility. In the first place, the issue became 
how a politically conservative party like the NPC, based on its regionalist principles, 
which was in control o f  the Northern Region, and that had a majority o f the
1,2 For a comprehensive analysis o f  power and conflict in Nigeria before and immediately it attained 
political independence in 1960, see Sklar, 1983.
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population o f Nigeria, would work with the other two trans-regional parties based in 
the South (AG and NCNC), whose principles were not conservative in nature because 
o f their ‘strong libertarian and egalitarian traditions’ (Ibid: xiv). In effect, neither of 
them could conveniently form an alliance with the NPC, which rather sought to ally 
with other conservative elements in the Southern regions, thus adhering to their 
political beliefs.
The consequences o f all this came to a head, beginning from 1960, the year that 
Nigeria attained political independence. At independence the Prime-Minister was 
Alhaji Tafawa Balewa (NPC), and Nnamdi Azikiwe the Governor-General (NCNC), 
later titular president when Nigeria became a republic in 1963. The parliamentary 
leader o f the opposition in parliament was the leader o f the AG, Awolowo, thus 
enabling his lieutenant Chief S.L. Akintola to become the premier o f Western region. 
Both men soon fell out particularly because Akintola refused to carry out party 
directives regarding the governance o f the region leading the rank and file to dismiss 
Akintola. But he quickly formed his own party, the Nigerian National Democratic 
Party (NNDP) (Ibid: 284-318).
With the crisis113 raging in the West, the Nigeria government declared a state of 
emergency in the area and appointed a Yoruba Administrator. Investigations into the 
activities o f the AG led to Awolowo being sentenced to 10 years for treasonable 
offences. Meanwhile, Akintola was reinstated as premier of the Western region. In 
1964, Federal House o f Parliament was dissolved and elections were scheduled for 
December 1964. Towards the election, the NPC formed the Nigerian National 
Alliance (NNA) with the NNDP in the West and the Mid-west Democratic Front. 
The NCNC on its part formed an alliance known as the United Progressive Grand 
Alliance (UPGA) with the AG in the West, the NEPU in the North and the United 
Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), also in the North.
The UPGA boycotted the 1964 federal elections following the violence that preceded
1,3 The power struggle between Awolowo and Akintola caused political mayhem in the Western region 
that threatened to spill over to other parts o f Nigeria. Even though the Federal government acted to 
bring the situation under control, the crisis led to a series o f events which culminated in the Nigerian 
civil war o f 1967-1970-.
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it, while election rigging in the West prompted rioting (Vickers 1967: 106-124).114 
Following the crisis and accusations o f election rigging, the figurehead President 
Azikiwe initially refused to re-appoint the Prime-Minister from the winning party -  
the NNA. He later re-appointed Balewa as Prime Minister. But the crisis continued 
unabated and eventually plunged the Nigerian state into a civil war. It was at this 
stage that the military started intervening in Nigeria’s socio-economic and political 
landscape, and this continued intermittently until 1999, when a new democratically 
elected civilian administration was sworn in.
This is the Nigerian question confronting Nigerians today. But importantly, the 
delicate nature o f the Nigerian society makes the Nigerian question more 
problematic.and it is informed by history. For instance, the “Panel on Nigeria since 
independence p ro jec t. . .” in 1989, made the following declaration:
The problems o f the Nigerian political process are reducible to the difficult 
relations between State and society in Nigeria. The historical conditions in 
which the Nigerian State emerged have precluded its integration into a 
composite society (cited in Ekeh et al, 1989: 8).
But to fully evaluate w'hy the Nigerian state has become enmeshed in this situation, it 
is also important to know its socio-economic basis. This is discussed next.
2.4b The socio-economic setting
When Nigeria attained independence in 1960, it was only on the political front as 
much o f its economy was heavily dependent on Britain and the industrialised western 
countries. The result was that the economy was structured to supply raw materials for 
the industrialised west and then serve as markets for their manufactured goods. This 
created a situation whereby Nigeria’s economic relationship with the industrialised 
countries was based on merchandise trading which, grew between 1960 and 1970. 
This is acknowledged in the ‘Nigeria Handbook’ (1991: 140), as follows:
The growth o f merchandise trade, the core o f Nigeria’s economic transactions, 
showed a gradual increase from 1960 up till the early 1970s. In 1960, 
merchandise imports stood at 1 million (Nigerian currency). It rose to 550
114 See also Harris 1965: 25-31; Essien-Udom 1966.
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million in 1965, N885 million in 1970.
However, when in the 1970s Nigeria experienced oil boom, oil115 became its “most 
important single export commodity”, accounting “for more than 80 per cent of total 
export earnings” (Ibid). Indeed, as indicated in the ‘Handbook’, from the 1970s 
upward there was an increase in Nigeria’s trade relations with the industrialised 
countries as this rose from “N885 million in 1970, (to) N1.7b in 1974, reaching N14b 
by 1980, the highest ever recorded” (Ibid). The ‘Handbook’ also notes that “the 
growth o f exports within that period was even more remarkable (because) “from 
N339m in 1960, it rose to N885m in 1970, N5.8b in 1974, and N22b in 1980” (Ibid). 
This gave the impression o f growth in the Nigerian economy because as stated by the 
Nigerian President, Obasanjo116 “In 1979, we (Nigeria) were ranked 48th position in 
the leading world economies.”
But the oil boom era brought about the neglect and non-development o f Nigeria’s 
non-oil sectors, particularly agriculture, creating an imbalance and a dislocation in its 
economic structure117. And this explains why, Obasanjo lamented the fact that “by 
1999 when we (a new civilian democratic government) came back, we were
j  y y t h  1 8
Such a drastic drop in Nigeria’s world economic ranking confirmed that the structural 
imbalances in the Nigerian economy were unsustainable. It took the uncertainties, 
fluctuations and fall in the prices o f oil, Nigeria’s major export since the 1970s, to 
expose the fact that Nigeria was unable to sustain such economic structure that has 
been in place since independence in 1960. For instance:
“From a peak o f $26b in 1980, oil revenue tumbled to SI4b in 1982 and 
continued to fall, reaching $7b and $5,5b in 1986 and 1988, respectively” 119
115 Nigeria celebrated the 50th anniversary o f  the discovery o f oil in its shores in June 2006. Shell 
d’Archy, which later became known as Shell BP obtained a licence in 1938 and began oil exploration 
in Nigeria. However, it only discovered oil in commercial quantity in 1956 and then export o f crude oil 
took o ff in 1958.
1.6 President Obasanjo stated this while meeting with British Foreign Secretary, Mr Jack Straw on his 
visit to Nigeria, on February 14th, 2006, and published in the online edition o f The Guardian 
(Nigerian), on 15/02/06 (http://www.guardiannewsngr.com/news/article01).
1.7 See Nigeria Handbook, 1991: 141.
118 Read Obasanjo’s point as published by The Guardian on 15/02/06
1,9 See Nigeria Handbook, 1991: 140.
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With these realities, Nigerian authorities were faced with the dilemma of how to 
reduce Nigeria’s heavy dependence on foreign imports which had been sustained by 
the massive foreign exchange earnings from oil exports. This fell to the 
democratically elected civilian government o f Nigeria’s second republic (1979-1983), 
led by Alhaji Shagari and one of the choices it made was to secure a loan of S ib from 
the IMF in 1982 to cushion the effects o f reduced foreign exchange earnings. When it 
became clear to the administration that that was not going to resolve the economic 
crisis, it again in 1982, came up with a package o f economic policies to curb imports 
into the Nigerian economy. Nevertheless, this so-called austerity measures failed to 
redress the situation as Nigeria continued to suffer heavy balance of payment 
deficits.120
This situation continued unabated until the late 1980’s as Nigerian authorities 
persisted with other economic measures to stem the decline in the Nigerian economic 
environment with the resultant economic burden on vulnerable Nigerians. One of such 
measures was the one introduced in 1986 by the military administration led by 
Babangida. Tagged the structural adjustment programme (SAP), its aim was to 
remove distortions in the Nigerian economy, ensure sustained growth and maintain a 
balance o f payments position. As put by Nigeria’s military government’s leader then, 
Babangida:
“It seeks to harmonise what we consume with what we produce, using our 
domestic endowment of human and material resources. It would involve new 
uses of wealth, new property relations, new product and production processes, 
new attitudes to work, new consumption habits, and new interaction with the 
rest o f the world. It would be a painful process, but any further delay would 
only intensify the consequential hardships.” (Ibid, 141).
But developments within the Nigerian economic environment show that the situation 
has hardly changed. There is the argument that Nigeria is still a mono-cultural 
economy, with no industrial base. In the words o f a renowned Nigerian academic,
1 *7 1Professor Peter Egbon: “Nigeria’s economic structure remains highly undiversified
and disarticulated as oil exports account for about 95 per cent of exports while
1 79manufacturing exports are less than one per cent.”
120 Ibid
121 Professor Egbon was the Vice-Chancellor o f Nigeria’s Delta State University, between 2000 and 
2004.
122 Professor Egbon’s remarks were made at a conference organised by the Institute of Chartered
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These dire economic circumstances of Nigeria,123 have also been articulated by a 
renowned Nigerian commentator, Dr Chinweizu:
What Nigeria has been engaged in ...is the development of its consumania, 
using its petro-dollar bonanza to feed its appetite for foreign goods and 
services o f every sort...without the concomitant development of industrial 
productive capacity.. .Nigeria still has no basic industries...it has failed to 
build a steel mill despite 30 years and $10 billion o f effort. It has failed at 
managing such basic utilities’ suppliers as NEPA124 and NITEL125. In four 
decades as an oil exporter, Nigeria has squandered some $500 billion of petro­
dollar bonanza.126
The economic restructuring programmes that the authorities have embarked upon 
under such a context have unleashed untold hardships on particularly the vulnerable 
Nigerian masses. For instance, Dr G.A Akinola o f the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, 
has identified Nigeria’s economic crises “which have badly undermined the 
stabilizing force o f the family and the middle class”.127 as one of the problems facing 
the Nigerian state today.
It is recognised that the Nigerian economy needed some readjustments to correct the 
imbalances within it. And it is also believed in some quarters that the adjustments 
programmes set in motion some modest growth that the Nigerian economy has 
recorded recently. Among them is the World Bank which, in the appendix to its 
document titled: "Regional Outlooks":128
“Indicated that Nigeria is sub-Saharan African second largest economy with 
"a vibrant private sector and strong investment spending , which kept its
Accountants o f Nigeria (ICAN) in 2007
123 Even Nigeria’s current President, Shehu Musa Yar’Adua acknowledged this at the recent Nigerian 
Content Summit held in Abuja, in December 2007 when he stated that although Nigeria makes a lot of 
money from oil and gas sector, the sector contributes less to Nigeria’s GDP because o f “low level 
participation o f Nigerians in the sector, due to a lack o f institutions and system that would enhance 
local content development” (see The Guardian [Nigerian] online: 
http://www.guardiannwesngr/energy/articleO 1 /indexn2_html?pdate=261207&pti...)
124 National Electric Power Authority (NEPA).
125 Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL).
126 Read his comments in The Guardian (Nigerian) online edition o f 24/06/05, under the title: “The 
reconstruction o f Nigeria: Four delusions on our strategic horizon” 
(http://www.guardiannewsngr.com/policy_politics/articleO 1)
127 See The Guardian (Nigerian) online edition o f 26/06/00 
(http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/editorial2/en789707.html
128 This was reported in The Guardian (Nigerian) online edition o f 17/07/07.
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overall growth at 5.6 per cent in 2006, despite an estimated 1.6 per cent 
contraction in the oil sector caused by the unrest in the Niger Delta."
In spite o f this, some have also argued that the various economic measures have 
created the negative social, economic and political circumstances which Nigerians are 
faced with today. When the ICAN organised their 37th Yearly Accountant Conference 
in Lagos, in December 2007, their verdict was that these Nigerian plights have been
1 *70exacerbated by the “failure of governance”. Professor Egbon, one of the keynote 
speakers, noted that this has also created weak state institutions incapable of ensuring 
that “development must be moving around people, not people around development 
(and that also), it should empower individuals, rather than dis-empower them.”
But nothing captures this situation, as described by Egbon, more than the fall-outs of 
the effects o f oil politics in Nigeria, which is the Niger Delta crisis. The Niger Delta is 
the oil producing area of Nigeria but following years o f neglect o f their plight, caused 
by oil exploration, by various Nigerian government, some militant groups have 
sprung up in the area resorting to violent means to air their grievances; As The New 
York Times130 has observed:.
“A big part o f the problem is that the people of the country’s oil-rich Niger 
Delta remain deeply impoverished, largely because o f endemic corruption in 
distributing oil wealth and the historical indifference o f oil companies to those 
economic inequities and to environmental devastation in the Delta. At the 
same time, the militants who claim to represent the Delta people have evolved 
into criminal gangs, adept at stealing huge amounts o f oil on black markets, 
the proceeds o f which are used to buy ever more sophisticated weapons.”
The Niger Delta crisis was first raised in the 1958 Williink’s Commission report 
which also touched on how to develop the area and improve the living condition of 
the people. And when in 1995, the World Bank carried out a comprehensive study of 
the region, it also concluded that: ”Niger Delta area is the least developed area of 
Nigeria.”131 This is a paradox given the fact that Nigeria’s wealth is produced in that 
part o f  the Nigerian state. Not surprisingly, the people o f the area are demanding for a
129 This was reported in The Guardian (Nigerian) online edition o f 02/01/08
130 See The New York Times editorial opinion o f 27/02/08.
131 See The Guardian (Nigerian) online edition o f 26/12/07 as referenced in the next footnote
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much bigger share o f Nigeria’s oil revenue but also local autonomy as regards how 
the area should be developed following the destruction caused to it by oil exploration,. 
The historical basis to this is analysed by Sklar (2004)132 as follows:
In Nigerian history, the economic foundation of regional autonomy is the 
constitutional principle of economic derivation , meaning that revenue derived 
from exports should be returned to the region o f origin.. .Resource control 
connotes the demand o f those people who inhabit the areas from which 
marketable resources are derived to control their ownership and management 
(original emphasis)
The escalation in the crisis is a pointer to the fact that this has not been adequately 
addressed. As Mr Timi Alaibe,133 said:
As a consequence, the people have over the years engaged in different forms 
o f agitation, conflict and unrest”, adding that “by the 1990s...long years of 
neglect and deprivation, as well as failures in addressing the development 
challenges prevalent in the region, had created a volatile atmosphere where 
youths disrupted oil production activities at will and communities frequently 
engaged, with little provocation, in destructive inter and intra community 
strife.
Importantly, this oil politics has generated so much pressure on other aspects of the 
Nigerian state that they are threatening its corporate existence hence Nigerians are 
now calling for a restructuring o f the nation. How can these be addressed within the 
context of one Nigerian entity? With such a possibility, which institution in the 
Nigerian state can help promote and foster it, and therefore stem its slide towards 
anarchy? One institution in the Nigerian State which, many Nigerian experts believe 
has the potential to address and effectively contribute to the promotion of one 
Nigerian entity and therefore the resolution of the Nigerian question is the mass media 
(Nnaemeka et al, 1989: Vols. 1&2). Their belief is based on their findings to the effect 
that the evolution o f the Nigerian press is connected with the historical development 
of the Nigerian state. And as earlier noted, this study aims to find out what role an 
institution like the Nigerian press can play to ensure the process of maintaining 
Nigeria’s corporate entity.
132 Under the heading: “The Federal Question”
133 Mr Alaibe, managing director/chief executive officer, Niger Delta Development Commission 
(NDDC) made these remarks at the fifth convocation ceremony o f Igbinedion University, Okada, Edo 
State, Nigeria on Wednesday, 26/12/07 and published in The Guardian (Nigerian) online edition: 
http://www.guardiannewsngr.com/focus_record/articleO 1 //indexn2_htm l?pdate=2 812..
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But it is within the unhealthy economic environment that has been foisted on the 
Nigerian environment as a result o f its historical connection with the western 
industrialised world, as has just been analysed, that the press is expected to fulfil this 
task. This is what has earlier been referred to as the neo-colonial structures within 
which the Nigerian State still operates (See, Madunagu, E., 1984; Ihonvbere, J. ed. 
1989). Nowhere is this more obvious than in the way that Nigeria was sunk into debt, 
in the 1970s and 1980s.134 Debt repayment135 created a parlous economic situation 
that has brought the State to her knees.136 All the institutions in the Nigerian state 
could not function properly because scarce funds needed for development were used 
to service debts. In fact, according to a report published in The Guardian (Nigerian), 
on-line edition o f Thursday, 2/1/03, Nigeria spent 82 percent of her total budget 
proposals for the year 2003 on her debt servicing obligations for that year137. With 
such a burden, it is no surprise that the Nigerian State was unable to import the much 
needed raw materials to run, for example, the State’s print media institution.138
Given the impact o f these realities on the press, are there ways that it could be made
more effective in the task of mobilising Nigerians towards integration and
1consequently, instilling in them a sense of collective national identity? But we 
cannot know this without an evaluation of the press vis-a-vis its contribution to the 
resolution of the Nigerian predicament. Towards this end, a brief survey of the 
Nigerian press and an analysis of how the nature o f the Nigerian state has shaped it
134 Read the views o f interviewee Momoh, pp.201-202.
135 In 2005, the Paris and London Clubs announced the cancellation o f debts owed to them by the 
world’s poorest nations, including Nigeria. In the deal the Paris Club wrote off $18b out of the $30 
billion dollars that Nigeria owed the International Financial Agency (Cowell, A. 2005; Anuforo, E. 
2005). However, the fact that the debts have been written-off has not changed the precarious economic 
situation in Nigeria and its debilitating effects on the newspaper institution.
136 For an insight into Nigeria‘s economic situation and external debt, see: ‘Perspectives on the 
Nigerian economy4 by Ishrat Husain {1987: 1-38; also, for an account o f the economic conditions in 
Nigeria, see: Okeke, O. et al. eds. 1998; Ihonvbere, J. and Shaw, M. 1998.
137 Also see: “Obasanjo links poverty to debt servicing-says Nigeria pays 30% o f annual budget to 
creditors”, ThisDay newspaper on-line, 22/12/04; “How debt puts Nigeria in chains, by DMO (A 
Nigerian federal government agency)”, The Guardian [Nigeria] on-line, 27/10/03; “Govt spends N92b 
on debt servicing in 10 months”, The Guardian [Nigerian] on-line, 13/10/03; “75.14m Nigerians poor”, 
ThisDay newspaper on-line, 21/12/04; “Okonjo-Iweala {Nigeria‘s Finance Minister} seeks debt pardon 
for Nigeria”. Also, for updates on how much debt Nigeria is owing, see, “External debts rise to N4.4 
trillion, says minister”, The Guardian [Nigeria], on-line, 15/10/03; “External debts now $34b, says 
Okonjo-Iweala {Nigeria’s Finance Minister}, The Guardian [Nigeria] on-line, 15/12/04).
138 Read the views o f interviewees on pp. 201-203 below.
139 Read the views o f interviewees on pp. 204-207, below
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are essential.
2.5 The Nigerian press: A brief survey
The involvement o f the Nigerian press in the socio-political process o f Nigeria started 
in the 1920s, as noted. Writing in "Philosophy and Dimensions o f National 
Communication Policy", Enwenwa (1989: 76-77), remarked that:
... the history o f the Nigerian mass media institution is intimately tied to the 
j  political development of the country ... [whatever] the field of newspaper 
publishing, for instance, either by regional sectional interests or regional 
governments.
In the same vein, Golding and Elliot (1979: 21) noted that:
Nigerian journalism was created by anti-colonial protest, baptised in the 
waters of nationalist propaganda and matured in party politics.
One o f the foremost authorities on the Nigerian press, Professor Fred Omu (1978: 
248-250), has referred to the Nigerian press as “providing a remarkable example of 
overzealousness and irresponsible partisanship and recklessness”. As noted by Uche 
(1989: xvii):
The establishment of the mass media in Nigeria were along ethnic lines and 
\ j  their ethnic orientation has somewhat affected their functionalism. Also, the 
mass media played the leading role o f promoting the political, social and 
economic aspirations o f their tribesmen.
Thus the partisan nature of the Nigerian media and the consequent negative impact on 
national integration, constitute a field of inquiry.140 An extensive part of these 
inquiries has tended to focus mainly on how the historical manifestations o f Nigeria 
have impacted on the media's ability to foster national integration and consequently 
instil a sense of national identity in Nigerians.141
140 See for example, Atwood, et al, 1982; Chicks, J.D. 1971; Grant, M. A. 1971; and West Africa, 
1980.
141 See Dare, O. 1997; Almond and Coleman 1960; also read the views o f  A. Maghezi, quoted by 
Enwenwa, 1989: 81-2.
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Even though others have acknowledged the role history has played in shaping 
contemporary Nigerian media, they also maintain that this should not hinder its efforts 
to perform within the context o f the goals of the State. Enwenwa (1989: 93) 
distinguishes the choice o f method or mode o f national integration from the historical 
context in explaining the nature o f media institutions. His contention is that it is "not 
the history and past heritage, but rather the actual political situations, the choice of 
method or mode o f national integration and the implementation o f that policy that 
better explain the nature, organisation and functioning o f the mass communication 
institution”. In other words, the effectiveness and relevance o f the media institution 
would depend on its ability to fulfil and achieve national objectives. As he put it:
^  If societal integration is an evolutionary process of synthesis based on a 
conscious effort towards the set goals or national objectives, then the mass 
communication institution must symbiotically dovetail and not just mirror the 
set o f values and ethos that define the State.
The thrust of. Enwenwa's findings142 is that the media should be organised in terms of 
Nigeria's national objectives in order for it to fulfil the constitutional obligations 
prescribed for mass media, to wit: "The press, radio, television and other agencies of 
the mass media shall ... uphold the fundamental objectives of establishing Nigeria as 
a united, strong and self-reliant nation, a great and dynamic economy, a just and 
egalitarian society and a free and democratic society and uphold the responsibility and 
accountability of the Government to the people" (1989: 88-89).
The fact that it has been accorded this special recognition in the Nigerian constitution 
since 1979,143 shows how important a role it could play in the struggle to enthrone a 
truly independent Nigerian state where unity, peace and the civil liberties for all reign 
supreme. However, to understand the Nigerian press, knowledge of the context where 
it operates is essential. In a study done by Professor Sam Oyovbaire (2000), he noted 
that the Nigerian context is complex and pluralistic. According to him:
"Nigerian pluralism has in recent times acquired the vocabulary of a six zonal 
structure namely: the north-west zone sometimes referred to as the core
142 In his study o f "Communication Policy and National Integration" in Nigeria.
143 See The Constitution o f the Federal Republic o f Nigeria, 1979, Chapter II [21]
Islamic North; north-east zone; north-central zone, sometimes also referred to 
as the middle-belt or the Northern minority zone; south-west zone which 
corresponds to the majority Yoruba nationality; south-east zone, which 
corresponds to the majority Igbo nationality, and the south-south zone which 
generally corresponds to the Southern minority nationalities (100-101)..
Oyovbaire also talks about the pluralism of religion and religious sensibilities, as well 
as the pluralism that evolved out o f the development of the post-colonial state. 
Although the ownership structure o f the media has largely been informed by the 
pluralistic nature o f the Nigerian society, Oyovbaire notes that by and large the 
ownership has "remained with politically orientated wealthy Nigerians with partisan 
political agendas and a few veteran journalists with professional-cum-business 
interests in the industry" which invariably means that such owners use the media for 
their political objectives and motivations (Ibid: 103).
But a very crucial factor in the Nigerian press environment is its prime location, 
which was brought about by historical circumstances (Ibid: 101-102). True, 
newspapers have been established and are still being established in other zones of 
Nigeria. Indeed newspapers have been established in Benin City, Enugu, Kano, 
Kaduna, Abuja, Jos and Calabar, yet none of these newspapers established outside the 
south-west zone, also known as the Lagos-Ibadan axis, has more influence on the 
final product o f the Nigerian press. All the newspapers that circulate widely across the 
Nigerian state, namely: Daily Times, The Guardian, ThisDay, Vanguard, Nigerian 
Tribune, Post Express, Daily Champion, Daily Sketch (now defunct), Punch, Comet, 
New Nigerian - which although it has its headquarters in Kaduna, also prints from 
Lagos - are all located in the south-west zone. The history behind this, as 
acknowledged by Oyovbaire, is because:
The media in Nigeria developed from the second half o f the 19th century side 
by side with colonisation and Christianisation. In this connection the media 
made its debut into what later transformed into the Nigerian society from the 
south-west zone which is the materialist location of the Yoruba nationality. 
Christianisation, modem education and the seat of colonial power in Lagos 
provided the locational stimuli for the media. It also provided the initial 
market or readership audience for the propagation of its role. From this point 
o f view the media is highly rooted in south-western Nigeria or in the famous 
Lagos-Ibadan axis (Ibid).
The implication o f this, in Oyovbaire's words, is that although the media may be
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relatively diverse and plural, they will come to have a particular perspective derived 
from the situation in which they are placed:
A combination o f the forces of sociology and political economy, market and 
geo-political forces, locational imperatives and the phenomenology o f content 
and focus have provided for the media, deliberately or inadvertently, the 
dissemination o f information, news reporting and analysis from a world view 
dominated by the south-west.144 The diversity and pluralism of the media in 
this context is mediated or vitiated by the monopoly o f a south-west world 
view (Ibid).
The general synopsis o f Oyovbaire's argument seems to suggest that an institution like 
the media cannot adequately perform a unifying role in society if  it is dominated by a 
world view that is generally unrepresentative o f a pluralistic society like Nigeria, for 
instance. It could be argued that this is not unique to Nigeria. It is also doudtful if  this 
notion holds generally for the media in any pluralistic society or whether that is the 
role the media is supposed to be performing. The media should endeavour to 
accommodate other views within a pluralistic society irrespective of the location from 
which it emerges145. But what is important is whether or not in the course of 
performing its role, it is able to, as the study o f the British press shows: "encourage 
commonsense identification with the nation as the dominant form of identity" 
(Brookes, 1999: 261). For instance, what is generally referred to as the British press is 
mostly located in London and that has not diminished its role in promoting a British 
national identity (Ibid: 247-262). Although Brookes (Ibid: 250) notes that “the idea of 
the British press is itself problematic”, he nevertheless agrees that it exists, as his 
following explanation shows:
Scotland has significant national newspapers o f its own, notably Daily Record, 
while British popular and middle market titles are published in Scotish 
editions which include different content...W ales does not have a daily 
newspaper in the tabloid market but does support specific national media 
institutions elsewhere in the press and broadcasting sectors. Yet the 
predominantly London-based editions which are widely taken to constitute the 
British national press usually purport to speak for the whole of Britain, 
subsuming the national identities of the ‘stateless nations’ (Ibid).
For us then the first step to ensuring that the press lives up to its expected role in the
144 See Oyovbaire, S., 2000 [End Note 3]: 111
145 Read the views o f Fieldwork Interviewees: 157-160.
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Nigerian state is to know what constitute the character of the press and also what 
obstacles, if  there are, could hinder its performances. Put differently, we would want 
to know why the Nigerian press is the way it is now and what are the limitations that 
could hinder its ability to perform its expected role within the Nigerian nation. Indeed 
the socio-political context from which the Nigerian press emerged has also remained 
detrimental to its potential to serve as a unifying institution within the nation's socio­
political landscape. For instance, Omu (1978), as noted above, has depicted the 
Nigerian press as providing "a remarkable example o f overzealousness ..." in their 
coverage o f the major events of the sixties, such as the AG crisis of 1962, the 1962-63 
and 1963-64 census, as well as the federal elections o f 1964 and its aftermath. So 
although the Nigerian press has always remained vibrant and provided a "diversity of 
viewpoints", it has continued to be associated with propagating narrow, divisive and 
parochial interests, thereby mitigating the impact it could have on public opinion and 
consequently, public policy. Dr Olatunji Dare (1997: 543-544) aptly reiterates this 
point thus:
With so many titles on the news-stand, the Nigerian press offers at all times a 
diversity o f viewpoints. But the newspapers are serving all kinds o f competing 
interests, and are subjected to all kinds o f Editorial control, sometimes subtly, 
sometimes blatantly. These influences that are brought to bear on the press, 
may be ethnic, political, religious or economic ... Newspapers owned by 
Yoruba or Igbo or Hausa proprietors can hardly be expected to be neutral in 
reporting and commenting upon issues affecting their ethnic groups in 
significant ways. Powerful advertisers or suppliers of inputs vital to the 
newspaper industry are often in a position to influence the editorial direction 
of a newspaper. And when a newspaper is owned (or controlled) by a 
politician or political party, it will have to reflect the political preferences of 
its proprietor...
As stated above, the peculiar nature o f Nigeria's media development would inevitably 
make it vulnerable to such influences. And clearly this could be seen as a negative, if 
the press is to serve as an agent o f national integration.
2.5a The Nigerian press within the context of the Nigerian society
Essentially, to most writers, the nature of the Nigerian state is basically post-colonial, 
which they also see as a hindrance to any institutions of the state that could be 
mobilised to achieve societal aspirations (Nnaemeka et al: 1989). The consequences
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of all this, as Enoch Oyedele (1994: 514-524) has noted, is the non-resolution of what 
he called the “National Question” which, according to him, should be “concerned 
with social development and the effective liberation o f all national groups and classes 
from oppression, which is the antithesis of capitalist development.” In effect what the 
post-colonial Nigerian state might address is (a) how to bring together the 
multifarious groups that constitute these states in order to achieve national integration 
and unity, and, (b) the roles that should be assigned to the institutions o f the states, so 
that national objectives and aspirations could be realised.
O f relevance to us here is how to delineate the best practicable way to articulate what 
is needed to promote national integration and consequently instil a sense of national 
identity amongst the various groups and interests within a post-colonial state like 
Nigeria. As stated the mass media146 is one of the nation’s institutions that could carry 
out this task, because of the unique role it has played and the position it has occupied 
in the evolution o f the Nigerian state. (Nnaemeka et al, 1989). Besides, the press, 
more than any other institution in society, has what it takes to influence other 
institutions to follow whatever direction o f development it is structured to move in 
(Ibid: 8).147. Moyibi Amoda (1977: 262)148 reiterated this stating:
The media can effectively help to maintain contact and understanding between 
the government and the people, between rural areas and the cities, and among 
nations. Nationally, the media are an important integrative agency. They are a 
powerful force as an educator, agitator, mobiliser, motivator and entertainer. 
Their power can be great and immeasurable. They can create a feeling of 
involvement and participation. It is through them that the agenda of the day is 
presented to the nation. They are a national forum for the continuous debate, 
which is necessary in every country, on issues and problems. No developing 
country, therefore, serious with its development programme or a country 
struggling against neo-colonialist social and economic structures can afford 
mass media, which are mainly for commercial purposes and not committed to 
the national cause.149
However, because o f historical and cultural antecedents, in order for the mass media 
to be effectively used for such a purpose, it is imperative that we know what
146 See Herbert Altschull: 1984
147 Also see Nwosu, 1996: 20; Momoh, 1985.
148 From the Working Group on Black Civilisation and Mass Media at the FESTAC Colloquium
149 Quoted in Nnaemeka, et al, 1989a: 244
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Nnaemeka et al (1989) referred to as the “theoretical and philosophical issues and 
perspectives involved” in formulating a national media policy that would be geared 
towards the attainment o f the national objectives and goals.
The media is presented as having the potential to bring about ‘diffusion of group 
identities’ and ‘nurture a strong national identity’ among a variety of groups 
(Fitzgerald 1991: 193). Essentially, following this understanding, Nnaemeka150 that 
"the specific roles which can easily be delineated for the news media in our particular 
circumstance are those o f decolonisation o f the mental and behavioural dispositions of 
our people, as well as the orientations o f their institutions and attitude to social 
processes ..." (Ibid: 6).
But to Oyedele (1994: 516), the ruling elite in a post-colonial state like Nigeria is 
unable to do this because they do not have a free hand to address those issues as they 
are very much dependent on ‘the imperialist powers’, who continue to influence 
events within such a state. In his own words: “The imperialists powers do in fact 
prevent even the adoption o f their own methods in the amelioration of their own 
problems associated with the National Question by the post-colonial states. Instead, 
they engineer nationalist uprisings and supply all parties with arms as a means of 
perpetuating political instability in the post-colonial state systems.” (Ibid)
For our purpose here, we want to designate the basic characteristics of the Nigerian 
state as surmised by Nigeria's former information minister, Prince Tony Momoh:151
Our colonially structured external political, cultural and trade relations which 
have the effect of deepening our continued dependences (sic) on our erstwhile 
British colonial masters in practically all aspects of our national life; the 
ethnic-linguistic and sectarian religious sectionalism that has characterised the 
conduct of our national life prior to and since independence with the 
concomitant negative impact on the process of national unity and the 
emergence o f a truly patriotic citizenry ...
The proponents o f the decolonisation of neo-colonial structures, who see it as a 
prelude to effective utilisation o f national institutions for development, believe that 
such persisting realities within the Nigerian nation will be detrimental to the use of the
150 Read Dr Nnaemeka’s point in Nnaemeka, et al, (1989a: 1-9)
151 His views are stated in the ‘Preface’ to Nnaemeka, T., et al. eds, 1989b: xv.
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press for the promotion of national integration and unity. This, according to 
Nnaemeka, is because, besides having to operate within the contemporary context of 
the Nigerian state, the mass media itself is also a colonial legacy.152 . To him this has 
persisted because "the struggle for political independence did not involve theoretical 
and philosophical questions about the nature of the institutions o f the news media and 
the role it has to play in the construction and reconstruction o f an independent nation" 
(Nnaemeka, 1989: 4). His view is supported by Hachten (1971: xvi), who noted that 
in Africa:
In spite o f the outward trappings of self-rule ... the basic mass 
communications situation has not significantly changed since independence. 
In post-independence years, media institutions and practices ... have had 
strong continuity (with their colonial origins).
Nevertheless, Enwenwa (1989) believes that such colonial legacy could be eliminated 
if only there is a conscious effort by government to formulate a rational and 
systematic national integration goal-oriented policy as a way o f curbing the 
disputations and other negative messages that permeate the nation's mass media 
content. Putting it succinctly, Enwenwa (Ibid, 77-78) argues that
Where the existing value systems are either in conflict or in competition or 
where some secondary or parochial values contradict and are not rationally 
derived from an overarching primary value system of national integration, for 
example, the mass media can only function to promote national illogicalities 
and irrationality ...
The important thing about this submission is that for any institution of society to 
effectively perform its role, its characteristics have to be in congruence with the stated 
objectives o f the nation-state. In effect, the effectiveness of the press is a direct 
function o f a socio-political milieu where there is a much settled issue o f what should 
constitute the nation-state and what its purposes and objectives should be (Nnaemeka 
et al, 1989a).
152 For instance, see Kitchen, H., 1956; Ainslie, R., 1966; Hachten, W., 1971; Omu, F., 1978; Echeruo, 
M., 1976; Mackay, I., 1964; Ladele, O., et al, 1979
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In the quest for the realisation of a common national objective, how are the goals and 
aspirations o f the diverse groups to be met? For example, is there a better route to 
integration without recognition of diversity? Reacting against those who argued that a 
federal constitution, to take care o f the diverse nature of the Nigerian state, would be 
detrimental to Nigeria’s unity, the late Awolowo, one o f Nigeria’s foremost 
nationalists, noted:
For reasons which we have failed to grasp, those who advocate a unitary 
constitution for Nigeria look upon themselves as THE true Nigerian patriots 
who sincerely desire, and conscientiously work for, the unity o f Nigeria, while 
the federalists are enemies o f that unity and are, therefore, not true patriots ... 
The making of a constitution for Nigeria, as we have said before, is a weighty 
and momentous undertaking. Every qualified Nigerian citizen is entitled and 
in (sic) duty bound to make his contributions on the matter before a final 
decision is taken ... Those who arrogate to themselves a monopoly of 
patriotism and wisdom in the execution of this solemn undertaking must be 
told, ... that they are the agents of the country’s disruption and doom, and 
NOT its builder.153
So, although Enwenwa talks about the possibility of an atmosphere of ‘national 
illogicalities and irrationality’ prevailing in the mass media because of a lack of a 
common national goal, to whose pursuit it should be committed, it is also important 
that due recognition should be given to the nation’s diversity. The importance of this 
lies in the fact that, as a result, the different groups or nationalities are able to pursue 
and actualise their respective and peculiar endeavours.
However, as the foregoing already shows, the complex nature of the Nigerian society 
would inevitably mean that there are many issues which would interrupt the 
possibility o f bringing about the full integration of all its component parts and thereby 
promoting a national identity. It is beyond the scope of this study to identify them all. 
But the issues nonetheless are never permanent or static, as they change from time to 
time, depending on the changes in the socio-economic and political milieu at different 
time periods in Nigeria. Nevertheless, it suffices to add that there are some very 
fundamental issues154 which, if the way the press treats them are carefully analysed, 
will give us some indications as to how the press has impacted on Nigeria’s quest for
153 Quoted in Mahadi, A., et al. eds. 1994: 529
154 For purposes o f this study the issues have already been analysed on pp. 10-13.
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national integration and unity over time.
The pre-occupation at this juncture is to trace the history of the Nigerian press as a 
prelude to understanding how the reality of contemporary Nigerian press came to be 
in relation to its role within the context of the Nigerian State.
2 .6  A brief history of the Nigerian press155
One way o f knowing how the Nigerian press has come to be what it is today is by 
learning how it has evolved. It has already been stated that the history of the struggle 
to realise a Nigerian State free from colonial oppression was mainly expressed 
through the Nigerian press. The major landmarks and trends that set the press on this 
cause started in 1859 with the establishment of Iwe Irohin,156 at Abeokuta, by 
Reverend Henry Townsend. A fortnightly newspaper, it was devoted to the promotion 
of a reading culture. From then till 1960, when Nigeria attained political 
independence and after independence until now, when the Nigerian polity had gone 
through civilian and military administrations, the Nigerian press has undergone 
various changes that have either positively or negatively impacted on its role in the 
Nigerian society. Starting with the changes in the size and composition of its 
practitioners; in the range of institutional structures and internal organisations; in the 
complexity o f roles; in its public image, power and influence, Omu and Awolowo, 
have remarked that the Nigerian press has evolved from being “a place of refuge for a 
variety o f frustrated and distressed people in the nineteenth century” (Omu, 1996: 1) 
and “an unprofitable, frustrating and soul-depressing career of the 1930s” (Awolowo, 
quoted in Omu, Ibid), to “become in the 1990s, an attractive, dignifying and much- 
sought profession” (Ibid).
In order to understand how this came about, it is important, for our purpose in this 
study that we give a brief account o f how the various stages o f the development of 
print journalism in Nigeria unravelled. These can be divided into seven, namely:
155 For a comprehensive analysis o f the history o f the Nigerian press see (Omu, 1978 and 1996). Also 
for a comprehensive list o f  the names of the newspapers, frequency o f publication and names of their 
proprietors from 1859-1988, see Nnaemeka et al, (eds) 1989a: 401-411.
56 It was published in both Yoruba and English languages.
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Missionary Journalism; Journalism and the rise of nationalism; Journalism and the 
period of the first world war; Democratisation o f Journalism; Journalism and the 
1950s; Journalism during the first republic; Journalism in the 1980s (Ibid, 1-17).
2.6a Missionary Journalism
This started, as noted above, with the establishment o f the Iwe Irohin in November 
1859, by Townsend. It is believed that the newspaper was devoted to the 
encouragement of a reading habit among the populace. The idea was to imbue them 
with Western values through the spread o f education (Ibid: 2). Following the Iwe 
Irohin was the Anglo-African which was a weekly publication, set up by Robert 
Campbell in Lagos on June 6th 1863, geared towards literary matters in an effort to 
encourage the growth o f literacy. But when this newspaper collapsed in 1865, Omu 
(Ibid), remarked that it brought home a lesson to prospective journalists that “no 
serious newspaper could survive if it ignored the excitement of local political 
conflicts”.The death o f the Anglo-African also marked the end o f this era in Nigerian 
journalism.
2.6b Journalism and the rise of Nationalism
Journalism, during this period grew in response to the rise in the number of educated 
Africans, who became restless in their campaign to participate effectively in 
government and influence the trend of events. Having been denied equality, and being 
discriminated against by the colonialists, these educated Africans saw the press as one 
powerful institution that they could use to realise their dreams of identity and dignity. 
Therefore, through journalism, they were able to bring about and encourage a sense of 
political and nationalist awareness among the colonised Nigerians. The leading 
newspapers157 of this period were Lagos Times (1880);158 Lagos Observer (1882);159 
Eagle and Lagos Critic (1883);160 Lagos Weekly Record (1891-1930);161 Lagos 
Standard (1893);162 Nigerian Chronicle (1908);163 Nigerian Times (1910).164
157 These newspapers which were all based in Lagos, lasted for a few years because o f poor financial 
backing.
158 A forthnightly newspaper set up by R.B. Blaize.
159 A forthnightly newspaper set up by J.B Benjamin.
160 A monthly/forthnightly newspaper set up by C.E. Macaulay.
161 A weekly newspaper set up by J.P. Jackson.
162 A weekly newspaper set up by G.A. Williams.
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However, closely aligned with this period is the effect that the period of the First 
World War had on the development o f Nigerian journalism, which is the thrust of the 
next sub-heading.
2.6c Journalism and the First World War
This period marked another turning point in the evolution o f print journalism in 
Nigeria. For instance, when Lord Lugard completed the amalgamation of the 
Southern and Northern Protectorates o f Nigeria in 1914, there emerged a “national 
journalistic constituency” (Omu, 1996: 5). This ‘national’ environment saw the birth 
of several newspapers whose pre-occupation was the sensitisation of the colonised 
peoples o f the entire new Nigerian state to the need to overthrow the oppressive 
colonial machinery. The newspapers devoted to this task were as follows: Nigerian 
Pioneer (1914);165 African Messenger (1921);166 Nigerian Spectator (1923);167 
Nigerian Advocate (1923); 168 Lagos Daily News (1925-1936);169 Nigerian Daily 
Times (1926);170 Nigerian Daily Mail (1930);171 West African Nationhood (1930);172 
The Comet (1933);173 West African Pilot (1937).174 This period also witnessed the 
emergence of vernacular newspapers in the Yoruba and Hausa languages, followed by 
provincial newspapers that were based in Calabar, Onitsha, Aba, Port-Harcourt, 
Enugu, Ibadan, Abeokuta, Ijebu-Ode and Osogbo, all in Southern Nigeria. Another 
significant point to note is that although a majority of these newspapers were 
nationalist in outlook and therefore anti-colonialist, one newspaper, the Nigeria 
Pioneer was pro-colonialist (Omu, 1996: 5).
163 A weekly newspaper set up by C. Kumolu Johnson.
164 A weekly newspaper set up by J.B. Davies.
165 A weekly newspaper set up by Kitoye Ajasa.
166 A weekly newspaper set up by Ernest Ikoli.
167 A weekly newspaper set up by Dr R. Akin Savage.
168 A weekly newspaper set up by S.H. Braithwaite.
169 The first daily newspaper in Nigeria set up by one o f Nigeria’s foremost nationalists, Herbert 
Macaulay. It was a political newspaper as it served as an organ o f Mr Macaulay’s political party, 
Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP).
170 The second daily newspaper to be set up .This was done by the Nigerian Printing and Publishing
Company. It has survived till today and now known as the Daily Times.
171 Another daily newspaper set up by Ernest Ikoli.
172 A monthly newspaper set up by J.C. Zizer
173 A weekly newspaper set up by Duse M. Ali.
174 This was another daily newspaper which was set up by Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, a foremost Nigerian 
nationalist, who later became the leader o f the NCNC, a political party he formed together with Herbert 
Macaulay in 1944. The newspaper survived till the early 1970s before went out o f circulation.
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2.6d Period of journalistic revival and revolution: Democratisation of journalism
This era coincided with the arrival o f nationalists and journalists into the fray to route 
out the colonialists. For instance, people like Azikiwe, who had studied in the United 
States, came back home in the 1930s, after his brief sojourn as a journalist in the Gold 
Coast (now Ghana), to establish national and provincial newspapers, all geared 
towards the mobilisation o f Nigerians to the fight against colonialism, starting with 
his establishment of the West African Pilot in 1937. Together with other journalists, 
they expressed themselves to reject established “traditions o f dependence and token 
political participation ... in favour of the popular struggle for political emancipation 
and independence” (Ibid: 8).
2.6e Decline of concerted action for a common objective or cause
The unanimity o f purpose that was characteristic of the way that nationalists and 
journalists prosecuted the fight against colonial domination was lost, beginning from
|  *TC
the 1940s, when mutual suspicion began to define the relationship between 
newspapermen (see p.?).176 This was exacerbated by the feud that engulfed the West 
African Pilot and the Daily Service in the 1940s over the nomination and election of a 
candidate into the Federal House of Representatives. Nothing could have been more 
devastating for the nationalist instinct of every Nigerian at this point than this 
controversy, which was played out on the pages of these two hitherto nationalists’ 
newspapers because, according to Omu, it “contributed to the regionalisation of 
nationalism and the crystallisation of inter-group tension and animosity which 
characterised political developments for a long time” (Omu, 1978: 248). All this was 
happening at a time when political parties were in control of different regions. In 
particular, newspapers, with few exceptions “were owned by or supported by rival 
political parties (mainly) the NCNC (West African Pilot) and the AG (The Nigerian 
Tribune)'". Reflecting on the harm that these developments did to the cause of 
Nigerian integration and a national identity for the Nigerian populace, Omu concluded
175 What should be noted here is that although Nigeria was a colony until independence in 1960, the 
British colonialists also ensured constitutional developments which enabled political parties to emerge 
and contest democratic elections. And this struggle for political power among the various parties was 
done on the pages o f once nationalistic newspapers. Because the papers were each owned by political 
parties, the relationship among journalists declined.
176 Under the title: “The sociopolitical and economic settings”.
73
I
thus:
It is one of the ironies of Nigerian history that in a crucial decade in the 
nation’s development, a period which witnessed the taking o f political and 
constitutional steps which led inexorably to independence, the newspapers 
were completely immersed in the vortex of partisan politics and were in no 
position to prepare the people for the challenges of independence and national 
unity (1978: 250).
2.6f Journalism during the First Republic
The important points to remember here are that: (1) the British colonialists were no 
longer at the centre stage o f political controversy and therefore no longer the common 
enemy, and, (2) given the diverse nature o f Nigeria and consequently the emergence 
of fundamental differences of opinion about the future of the state, when political 
independence was achieved, there arose the problem of what would be the best way to 
meet the challenges of nationhood. It was therefore no surprise that the different 
political parties used their respective newspapers to fight on their behalf. It is said that 
‘competing political party newspapers advertised their fanaticism’ (Adamu, S., 1994: 
469) and in effect heightened the internal political struggles among rival regional 
groups. However, this is not to diminish the united stance that almost all the 
newspapers took against the proposed Preventative Detention Act o f 1963, during this 
divisive period. But the issue is that their best efforts at this time pale into 
insignificance when viewed against the damage and division that their roles and
1 77activities caused during such major events o f the 1960s like the AG crisis of 1962; 
the 1962-63 and 1963-64 National Census controversy;178 and the controversy that
1 70trailed and ruined the 1964 Federal Elections.
Perhaps another important issue to note is the fact that the ownership structure of the 
print media in Nigeria, coupled with the partisan and divisive politics of the day,
177 To understand the origin o f the AG crisi, see pp 48-54 above; alo see Nnoli, (1978: 154-156).
178 The national census in Nigeria has always ended in controversy. The reason for this is because 
revenue allocation is tied to the population o f a particular region or state. In other words, the more 
people in your region, the more money you would get from the federal government. The census 
conducted in Nigeria since it became a republic in 1963 has always shown the northern part o f Nigeria 
as having a higher population than the southern part. But most southerners dispute this, leading to 
accusations o f rigging. Even the last census conducted in 2006, saw a Nigerian (southerner) 
commentator, Dr Reuben Abati, write an article in The Guardian (Nigerian), titled: “Census as 
robbery”, which was published in its online edition on 24/03/06
179 For the controversy that eventually led to ruination o f the elections see pp. 52-54 above.
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brought about a situation whereby the different governments, both regional and 
federal, became more involved in the establishment of newspapers as a way of 
making their views and positions known in the tense and very hostile political 
atmosphere. For instance, at independence, the Federal government which, was being 
controlled by the NPC-led coalition had no newspaper and was as a result subjected to 
scathing criticisms by the other newspapers owned by rival political parties, namely: 
the NCNC and the AG. Hence in 1961, the Federal government set up the Morning 
Post. In the same vein, following the controversial Federal Elections of 1964 and its 
aftermath, the Western Regional government led by the Akintola’s NNDP, which was 
a break-away faction from the AG, established the Daily Sketch. It was also the 
political situation that led the Eastern Regional government and the Northern 
Regional government to set up the Eastern Nigerian Outlook in 1960 and the New 
Nigerian in 1966, respectively (Omu, 1996: 10).
What was unfortunate about these developments, however, was that the emergence of 
these regional and federal government-owned newspapers did not bring about a 
balance in the political arguments in the country, as journalists were only allowed to
1ROfunction “within the narrow confines of official interests” (Dare, O. 1985; also see 
Nwosu, 1996: 26). So, given this structure of ownership, there came to an end the era 
and ‘legacy o f crusading journalism’ with the result that, subsequently, journalism 
came to be characterised by what Omu (1996: 10) described as “a cacophony of 
voices” .
2.6g Government / Press relationship and journalism in the 1980s
What is striking about the evolution of the Nigerian press and its roles in the creation 
of the Nigerian State and the Nigerian identity is that these have changed over time in 
response to the changes within Nigeria’s socio-political and economic environment. 
These changes, as acknowledged earlier, are generated both internally and externally. 
But it is also important to note that Nigeria’s internal politics has played a significant 
role in the way that the press has operated and continues to operate vis-a-vis its 
constitutional role. While, for instance, during the era of British colonialism the press 
was in the forefront o f the campaign to actualise an independent Nigerian State, with
180 Cited in Nwosu, 1996: 26).
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its own identity in the comity of nations, but bitter and divisive partisan politics, even 
before political independence was realised, brought an end to that unanimity of 
purpose that informed their fight against colonialism. So what became manifest, just 
before and immediately after independence in the 1960s, was that there was no over­
riding common crusade to nurture the inchoate and fragile diverse socio-cultural 
environment into a united Nigerian State, one where the multi-cultural groups are 
allowed to flourish within the context of a collective identity. This is articulated by 
Matthew Kukah (1996: 134):
With independence, the press found itself a victim of the political pressures on 
the regional tripod on which Nigeria rested. The press was now conscripted to 
fight regional and ethnic battles in defence o f the political classes of the three 
regions.
Under these circumstances, it is quite in order to state that the press was seriously 
handicapped in meeting the requirements needed to unify the diverse Nigerian 
society. In fact this was not helped by what Kukah (1996: 134) also described as the 
failure of the press to educate the people on the essence o f unity, but that, instead, the 
southern press in particular “opted to reinforce old prejudices”, which portrayed the 
government and people of the North “in very negative, hostile and pejorative terms” 
(also see Sardauna, 1986: 134). Putting the overall performance of the Nigerian press 
in perspective, Kukah (1996: 135), concluded that “the press has been unable to rise 
above ... [their] prejudices.”
Nevertheless, any analysis of the Nigerian press must take cognisance of all the 
realities that have affected the growth o f the Nigerian press, in which the Government 
has played a very major part. For the purpose o f this study, Government / Press 
relationship will be divided into: pre-independence and post-independence though a 
common phenomenon is that it is characterised by conflicts. The consequences for the 
press have been that the government, whether colonial, civilian or military, has often 
responded with repressive measures to muzzle the press181 (see Omu, 1996: 14-16).182
181 The military authorities in Nigeria have always regarded the press with suspicion, as they found it 
difficult to conduct affairs o f  state in a democratic manner. But in the absence o f political parties to 
articulate the positions o f the Nigerian citizens, the battle to be heard was fought on the pages o f 
newspapers, o f which the military tried to curtail with various draconian decrees.
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Indeed, Ekpu’s submission points to the fact that governments in Nigeria have taken 
various draconian measures to emasculate the press to the extent that he labelled the 
Nigerian press “an endangered profession” (Ekpu, 1996: 42).
But if  there is any issue that has further complicated government / press relationship 
in Nigeria, it is the intervention o f the military into Nigerian politics and 
administration. The overwhelming verdict by many Nigerian authors on the Nigerian 
press and the military, is that through its centralisation o f authority, the military not 
only destroyed the federal and regional constitutions which were aimed at allowing 
the various groups that make up the Nigerian state to express themselves, under its 
administration the Nigerian media in general and the press in particular also became 
victims of what some have referred to as “the military arrogance and power play” 
(Kukah, 1996: 141). Kukah also idenfies other major obstacles that the press has to 
overcome in carrying their activities within the Nigerian context. In an article titled: 
“Public Perception in Nigeria”, Matthew Kukah (1996: 141-143), contended that it is 
important to realise that “part of the struggle of the press has to be seen within the 
context of the quest for self definition in a very hostile environment”. Echoeing the 
same sentiment, Stanley Egbochukwu (1996: 212-227), in his article “Media 
management and the economics of publishing in Nigeria”, advanced an economic 
rationale to explain the press reality in Nigeria. To him therefore, “under the 
(Nigerian) situation, what matters is no longer profit but survival ... [because] the 
newspaper industry in Nigeria today is plagued with very low demand, reduced 
advertisements, over capacity, escalating costs, debt burden, large scale fraud, non­
credit business practices and so on”.
These are some o f the issues that have made the Nigerian press what it is today and 
which, no doubt, provide the basis for an understanding o f print journalism in Nigeria, 
which witnessed some remarkable changes in the 1980s. Many writers on the 
development o f the press in Nigeria have adduced various reasons for this, although 
they all agree that the changes became inevitable as the press has to respond to the 
new realities engendered, particularly by the modest advancements which the 
Nigerian state made in the areas of education and in the economy. Regarding this
182 See also Kukah, 1996: 141; Ekpu, 1996: 42-55; Jason, 1996: 31-41.
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era,.Omu stated that there was “a spirit o f creativity and experimentation which 
engendered a new journalism”, as exemplified by The Guardian newspaper,183 which 
was established on February 27, 1983 (1996: 10-11).
2.6h The press and Nigeria
Some analysts maintain that the Nigerian press or the media as an institution in 
Nigeria exhibit some inadequacies which are antithetical to the professional standards 
that the media institution needs to live up to, at all times, if  it is to fulfil its 
constitutional role in the Nigerian State. Their views can be divided into three:
Firstly, some argue that in order for the media to be useful to the complex and 
culturally diverse Nigerian society, it has to show professionalism in every 
situation and become a “handmaid and catalyst of social development” (Nwosu, 
1996: 24-25).184
Secondly, there are those that believe that the Nigerian media can become an 
effective institution for mobilising society towards the necessary changes needed 
to unite and integrate the Nigerian State, if  it “re-asserts itself as a vanguard o f the 
people” and also “decide which way society goes instead of always reacting to 
what the society has become” (Jason, 1996: 36).
Thirdly, the media and the journalists are always vulnerable to both private and 
government control, and therefore ineffective in carrying out its constitutional 
role, the journalists should ensure that they establish the media or medium, which 
is entirely owned and financed by themselves (Nwosu, 1996: 26-27).
These points are debatable because one could also argue that merely referring to these 
issues is not an alternative to their resolution, which only a proper diagnosis of their 
causes can achieve. For instance, it can hardly be disputed that the Nigerian media 
and the press in particular cannot operate outside of what the socio-political and
183 The newspaper is usually referred to as the ‘flagship’ o f the Nigerian press. Because o f its 
background. See its mission statement in Chapter three, pp. 93-95 below. Also read the views o f 
fieldwork interviewee, Alhaji Jose on pp. 178-180 below under the headline: “Newspapers set up in 
response to new socio-economic reality”, and those o f Chief Odukomaiya on p. 151.
184 Also see Kukah, 1996: 141-143; Idowu, 1996: chap. 14; Eteng, 1996: 287-290; Omu, 1996: 17.
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economic context allows. This is a view shared by Dr Jubril Mohammed (1996: 309), 
who remarks:
Nigeria’s dependent status in the international capitalist system has resulted in 
a stunted private sector, too weak to sustain a flourishing news media system 
commensurate with the needs o f the country. In addition, a significant 
proportion [of] - Nigerian journalists [are] barely educated and professionally 
tampered [sic]. Their working environment is poor and condition of service 
horrible. [Additionally]...the existing journalism institutions...barely [have 
the] theoretical knowledge and basic skills which the profession requires.
It is therefore no surprise that despite the best efforts to make the Nigerian media 
institution work, it has continued to be plagued by problems (Jason, 1996: 36-40);185 
that are inimical to the growth of an independent media institution that could be used 
effectively and efficiently to mobilise Nigerians towards the attainment of the overall 
Nigerian State’s objective of “unity in diversity”. The poor state of Nigeria’s level of 
national economic development, which has made publishing a rather painful and 
excruciating undertaking, has also not helped the situation. Salient to this is the way 
that the press, in particular, has to mostly rely on revenue from advertisements to 
survive. Given that substantial advertisements cannot be generated from within a very 
poor economy like Nigeria’s, the newspapers or the press become vulnerable to the 
negative machinations o f the few advertisers available186. The situation is even made 
worse by the fact that most, if  not all the advertisers depend on Government patronage 
to operate within the economy. So, as noted by Stanley Egbochukwu (1996: 215-216):
Buyers of advertisement spaces are scared to be identified with any medium or
185 Also see Egbochukwu, 1996: 212-219 & 222.
186 The role o f the advertisers in nation building and national identity is important insofar as they play a 
major role in the way that newspapers survive in Nigeria. This explains why the newspapers set up 
outside the Lagos/Ibadan axis can hardly survive because all the major advertisers are based in that 
southwestern part o f Nigeria. A newspaper can only play an integrative role if it continues to publish. 
But what part the advertisers play in that respect is not so clear-cut in Nigeria. The reason is that the 
advertisers themselves also rely on government patronage to sustain their businesses because most 
economic decisions are not not determined by objective economic conditions but rather on mainly 
political expediency on the part o f most govermnets in Nigeria, hence in spite o f the various economic 
measures that they have taken in the past, they have failed to lift Nigeria out o f economic doldrums 
(Ssee Chinweizu’s article as published in The Guardian (Nigerian) edition o f 24/06/05 and titled: “The 
reconstruction o f Nigeria: Four delusions o f our strategic horizon”. So as Egbochukwu (1996) has 
analysed, advertisers in Nigeria are sceptidcal about advertising in newspapers that are mostly hostile 
to the government. It is also the case in Nigeria that newspaper proprietors have been known to put 
pressure on the journalists to be less critical o f government in order to ensure that their newspapers 
continue to enjoy government’s patronage and therefore the survival o f  their newspapers (Read 
interviewees on pp. 176-178 under the heading: “The motives for setting up newspapers”.
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newspaper that they perceive to be anti-government.
2.6i Press development in different parts of Nigeria
One o f the reasons mostly associated with the concentration of the press in the 
southwest, is linked to the historical development of Nigeria, coupled with the 
southwest’s natural location as the gateway to Nigeria, through the sea, that have 
ensured the overwhelming economic advantages which that part o f Nigeria has over 
the others (Oyovbaire, 2000: 103) particularly the northern part. This accounts for the 
widely held view that the so-called Southern press is actually based in the Southwest 
o f Nigeria which, is also sometimes referred to as the Lagos/Ibadan axis. But in most 
cases, this fact is erroneously taken as if the Southern press actually speaks for every 
part o f Southern Nigeria, whenever there is a comparison made between the influence 
that both the Southern press and the Northern press wield in all areas of governance 
within the Nigerian State.
Typical is the point articulated in Haruna’s article titled: “The Press: The Northern 
Nigeria Experience”, which portrays the Southern press as one unit in his analysis of 
the ways that the press fights the south’s cause, as against the North’s. His reasoning, 
however, fails to acknowledge the argument that what is generally seen as the 
southern press hardly represents the views of all the areas that make up the Southern 
part of Nigeria. Rather, many in Nigeria have come to regard the so-called Southern 
press as representing no other view than the worldview of the Yorubas, which is the 
ethnic group that constitute the south-western part o f Nigeria (Oyovbaire, 2000: 99-
1 R7112;). In any case, many Nigerians now regard the “media as a political weapon” 
which they believe is good for balancing the political arguments in Nigeria, of which 
most northerners see themselves as victims (Haruna 1996: 56-70). 188 According to 
Haruna, one way by which the Northerners can overcome this problem and prevent 
the threat from the Southern press against Northern values, is if: “rich northerners 
overcome their reluctance to invest in the press so that the contention of sectarian and
187 See also Nnaemeka, 1989: 7 in Nnaemeka, et al. eds. 1989a; also see views o f fieldwork 
interviewees: T. Momoh, on p. 156 and D. Onabule, on p. 160.
188 See Sunday Democrat Editorial o f May 29, 1994, titled: “Who will save the Northern press”, quoted 
in Haruna, 1996: 56.
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regional interests and ideas in the country can be balanced and even-handed” (Ibid, 
69-70).
Even though Haruna reached this conclusion, he nevertheless attacked the basic 
premise o f the Sunday Democrat’s Editorial, which is that the failure of the northern 
elite to establish newspapers due to their lack o f entrepreneurship, has resulted in the 
poor state of newspaper development in the north as compared to the south, where 
newspapers are not only being set up very often but are also flourishing. He even 
questions the viability or profitability o f southern newspapers or any Nigerian 
newspapers because “except the Daily Times and the Nigerian Tribune, (based in 
Lagos and Ibadan respectively)”, none publishes its profit and loss accounts annually, 
adding that there is also no independently certified circulation figure of any 
newspaper or magazine (Ibid: 56). Further, Haruna is quick to add that the viable 
economic environment in the south masks the differences that exist in different parts 
of the south in terms o f their ability to establish and sustain a viable newspaper. In 
effect, although Haruna believes that “the southern press has always been far more 
active than that of the North ... [and are] far more numerous and wider in circulation 
than the northern media”, he notes, however that that in itself cannot provide a fair 
assessment o f the state o f media in the north when it is compared with the same 
situation in the south. As his explanation indicates, the proper context for an 
examination o f the northern media will show that the press everywhere in Nigeria is 
of doubtful profitability, and that the mortality rate within the southern press is also 
relatively high - and that it is not the entire south that is better served than the north 
(Ibid: 58)
This point is borne out by the fact that, try as some entrepreneurs have, in the 
Southeast (made up mainly of the Ibo ethnic group), to establish viable national or 
even local newspapers, they have never succeeded. Okey Ekeocha (1996: 72-97) has 
adduced various reasons for this, and they include the following: the individualistic 
nature o f the Iboman, bad management techniques, lack of co-operation among stake­
holders, the involvement of government and self-serving individuals in newspapering 
which, result in people using their newspapers to promote selfish political interests 
etc. Although this may well be the case and does indeed corroborates Haruna’s 
misgivings about the state of the media in the south, however, Ekeocha’s submission
81
does not explain why an Iboman that failed in the southeast to establish a viable 
national newspaper, succeeded in doing so in the southwest, as the experience of 
Chief Emmanuel Iwuanyanwu, the proprietor o f the Lagos-based Champion
« OQ
newspaper shows. . The reason simply is that, as experience has shown, for any 
entrepreneur wishing to establish a national newspaper in Nigeria, they are more 
likely to succeed if  located within the so-called Lagos/Ibadan axis190.
What we have tried to do in this chapter is navigate our way through those 
fundamental issues that have made the Nigerian press what it is today. However, since 
our main focus is to investigate what role the press plays in the promotion of a 
Nigerian national identity, it is necessary to understand the nature and structure o f the 
press in question. For example, as noted above, the nature o f the Nigerian society has 
been instrumental in the establishment o f the various presses in Nigeria today.191 
Surely then, it is to be expected that whatever they do ought to be directly influenced 
by the purpose for which they were set up. Hence background knowledge o f the press 
is required. This is the next project that will form the kernel of chapter three.
189 See the views o f fieldwork interviewee: H. Odukomaiya, on p. 160.
190 This refers to the newspapers which are located within the southwestern part o f Nigeria. They are 
the national newspapers and are the most viable in Nigeria.
191 See pp. 48-54 above.
82
CHAPTER THREE
The Sampled Newspapers: Social Context and Mission Statements
In considering the background of all the selected newspapers, two o f the issues that 
will be used are their individual social context and mission statement. The following 
is a categorisation of the newspapers into the various interests that they represent. The 
newspapers have been selected not only because o f the history behind them but also 
because o f their geographical reach, audience, size and type, as well as their format 
and content characteristics (Maja-Pearce, ed. 1996).
However, before we go into a detailed discussion o f the background of each o f the 
newspapers, it is worth stating how this is going to be done. With particular reference 
to the mission statement of each of the newspapers, it should be noted that it was not 
possible to locate the individual mission statement of each o f them because o f the 
various issues that relate to the stark reality which usually confronts any researcher in 
Nigeria, as discussed.
Usually, a new newspaper or publication publishes its mission statement on the front 
page of its maiden edition. But for some of our selected newspapers, the first editions 
were either missing or where they were unavailable; their front page was tom out of 
the newspapers. But I was able to lay my hands on the mission statement of at least 
one newspaper in each category o f newspaper ownership in Nigeria. For example:
(i) O f all the selected three state government-owned newspapers, namely 
Nigerian Observer, Daily Sketch and Nigerian Statesman, it was only the 
Nigerian Observer that I managed to get hold o f one of its early editions, 
where Lt. Col. Samuel Osaigbovo Ogbemudia, the military governor o f the 
then Mid-Western state o f Nigeria, the owner and publisher o f the newspaper, 
spelt out the aims and objectives of the Nigerian Observer.
(ii) For the Federal Government-owned New Nigerian and Daily Times, I could 
only locate the first copy of the New Nigerian where its mission statement was
192 See Chapter Four below
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published.
(iii) Out o f the four privately-owned newspapers used for this study, that is The 
Guardian, National Concord, Daily Champion and Vanguard, only the 
mission statements of the first two were readily available, although I was able 
to source the Vanguard’s media profile that also dealt with the aims and 
objectives o f the newspaper, which it published on its website on 24/10/00.
There is some relevance in this. For instance, in the case o f government-owned 
newspapers (state or federal), their mission statements are quite similar since they are 
all usually set up to take care o f the interest of the state or of the entire federation of 
Nigeria, as the case may be. In effect, getting to know the Edict setting up one 
government newspaper or the mission statement of any government-owned
10 tnewspaper, is knowing what those o f the others are (Read interviewees, p. 152). 
This is by no means saying that they are all the same. But the Edict setting up a state- 
owned newspaper like the Nigerian Observer, is never too different in purpose from 
the ones setting up other state newspapers like the Nigerian Statesman or the Daily 
Sketch}9* Also, in the case of Federal Government-owned newspapers, the functions 
that the New Nigerian would serve will be similar to that of the Daily Times. In the 
same vein, it could be said that not much difference exists in the mission statements of 
the privately-owned newspapers. So although the mission statement of each of the 
privately-owned newspaper could not be said to be alike, the mission statement of a 
newspaper like The Guardian could be a fair reflection of that o f the Vanguard, Daily 
Champion and National Concord195, particularly with regard to their national focus 
and economic ideology.
Nevertheless, we need to add a caveat here: each o f the newspapers chosen for this 
study came into being in different circumstances such as the various stages from 
colonialism to post-colonialism, and from military rule to civilian rule, etc.196 
Consequently, some of these newspapers have had to or have been made to change 
their editorial direction accordingly. This is particularly true in the case of 
government-owned newspapers, although the privately-owned National Concord is an
193 Under the title: “The impact o f ownership on the press”.
194 By 2002, the state government-owned Daily Sketch had ceased to exist.
195 The National Concord is also now defunct.
196 See pp.60-81 above.
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exception, since it actually started more or less as the political organ of the National 
Party of Nigeria (NPN) during Nigeria’s second republic (1979-1983) but later 
changed its editorial policy to become nationally focussed, after its proprietor, Chief 
M. K.O. Abiola quit the NPN in 1982 (Nnaemeka, et al, 1989a: 408).197 But as 
regards the government-owned newspapers, their circumstances have changed at one 
stage or another and therefore they have tended to shift their editorial directions to suit 
those circumstances. The point to remember here is that the editorial direction of 
government-owned newspaper has always been dependent on the type, nature and 
character of the government, whether as military or civilian administrations in 
Nigeria.
But this phenomenon will be easier to understand if we take it from the angle of the 
two categories of government ownership of newspapers, that is, state and federal. It is 
necessary to make this point because each came to own their respective newspapers in 
two distinct ways. For example, to have a newspaper of their own which they need, 
first and foremost, to cater for the interests o f their individual state, state governments 
set up their own newspapers, while the federal government considered it necessary to 
have its own newspaper because almost all the state governments have their own 
newspaper (and considering the privately-owned newspapers), all o f which may not
198necessarily provide adequate coverage of the activities of the federal government.
However, the federal government did not initially set up the federal government- 
owned newspapers, that is, Daily Times and New Nigerian. The Daily Times first 
started in 1926, as a private undertaking, while the New Nigerian was set up by the 
then, northern regional government in 1966 with the sole purpose o f protecting its 
interests within the context o f one Nigerian nation (Muhammadu, 2000: Chapter 
one)199 They were both acquired in 1975 by the federal military government, led by
General Olusegun Obasanjo, and their editorial policies had to change to suit their
200new owners.
197 See also Haruna, 1987.
198 See views o f fieldwork interviewees, pp 165-166, under the title: “Issues that account for the 
differences between north and south” .
199 See fieldwork interviewees: Sam Amuka, G.G Darah, and, Dan Agbese. on pp. 157-159..
200 Predictably, state newspapers have also had to change direction to suit the government o f the day. A 
typical example o f how government-owned newspapers, in Nigeria, make U-tums to serve the 
government o f the day, is exemplified by the various news reports which, the then Bendel state
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The situation is not also helped by the transient nature of leadership in the Nigerian 
political environment.201 The effect is that there is no generally accepted ideology202 
to guide the leadership o f a state or o f a federation as to what purpose government- 
owned newspapers should serve on behalf of the populace or the general objective 
that they should perform in the interests of all, at the state or federal level. As a result, 
the editorial direction o f government newspapers change in accordance with the 
wishes or interests o f the government in power, at state/federal level (Abati, R. 2002).
That is why the newspapers, as discussed, behave in a radically different way 
depending on whether the administration is military or civilian. But those who are 
well informed about the Nigerian newspaper industry in particular, and the media in 
general, maintain that this is an unhealthy situation. Their argument is that, no matter 
who is in power, the responsibility of government newspapers is to "publicise 
government programmes and report them to the public very accurately with a view to 
getting feedback to the government on public policies and programmes” ("Osoba 
decries official interference in govt newspapers", Daily Times, 19/6/91, back page).
In respect o f privately-owned newspapers, it is also worth reiterating that two 
categories exist in Nigeria. That is, there are private newspapers that were set up for
government-owned Nigerian Observer, splashed across its front pages on the days leading to the 
General Elections in Nigeria in August, 1983. For instance, on the week before the elections, the 
newspaper not only urged the people o f Bendel state to give the incumbent Governor, Professor 
Ambrose Alii, a second chance to rule the state, but to also pray for him to defeat his rival in the 
Governorship race, Dr Osaigbovo Ogbemudia o f the opposition NPN party, in the following reports 
titled: “One week to election -  The People’s prayer” (03/08/83), and “Give Alii a second chance” 
(12/08/83). But immediately after the election result was declared and the candidate o f the opposition 
NPN party won the Governorship, the Nigerian Observer quickly changed its tune by carrying on its 
front page the story: “Ogbemudia’s second coming...He thanks Bendelites” on 16/08/83 and also 
published an editorial titled: “The People’s verdict”, on page three o f the same edition. State 
government-owned newspapers in other states o f the Nigerian federation, where the incumbent did not 
win, also had to change their editorial policy in response to the new dispensation. These developments, 
not surprisingly, prompted the NPN-controlled federal government-owned newspaper, New Nigerian, 
to publish, on page three o f its edition o f 20/08/83, the story titled: “Newspapers make U-turn to serve 
new masters”. But the Nigerian Observer retorted by carrying an editorial comment on its front page 
titled: “Where we stand” [see Appendix II], in its edition o f 28/08/83, to try to rationalise the way it 
had carried out its responsibilities.
201 For instance, between 1966 and 1999, Nigeria witnessed seven military coups d’etat that also 
aborted two democratically-elected civilian governments in Nigeria during that period.
202 See fieldwork interviewee: E. Izeze, on pp. 163-164, under the headline: “The Nigerian press 
reflects nationality perspectives”.
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political and economic purposes . Except for the National Concord during its first 
three years (1980-83), none of the other private newspapers selected for this study 
( Vanguard, The Guardian and Daily Champion) wholly fall into the first category. In 
fact, apart from the thriving Nigerian Tribune (Tribune at 50, Haruna, 1996: 56),204 
which was established in 1949, as the political wing of the AG led by the late 
Awolowo during Nigeria’s First Republic (1960-1966), all the other newspapers that 
were established by political parties, or were set up for political purposes, could not 
survive and therefore folded for lack of patronage and funds.205
Based on the foregoing, the background o f all the newspapers will now be discussed 
in the following order:
(a) State government-owned newspapers - Nigerian Observer, Daily Sketch and 
Nigerian Statesman206 .
(b) Federal government-owned newspapers- New Nigerian and Daily Times.
(c) Privately-owned newspapers, divided into: (i) Newspapers owned by 
publishers from minority ethnic groups, namely, The Guardian and 
Vanguard; (ii) Newspapers owned by publishers from majority ethnic 
groups, namely, National Concord, and Daily Champion.
3.1 State Government-owned Newspapers
3.1a The Nigerian Observer
The Nigerian Observer was established, financed and owned by the then Midwestern 
state government of Nigeria. The State was renamed Bendel state in 1976, but later 
split into two in 1992, namely: Edo and Delta States.207 The research period (1983- 
1993), falls into the time when the Bendel state government owned it. It is on that
203 Read fieldwork interviewees under the heading: “The motives for setting up newspapers”, pp. 176- 
178..
204 Read the viewsof fieldwork interviewee: Al-Bashir under the heading: “The motives for setting up 
newspapers”, pp. 176-178.
205 For a list o f the political newspapers that were set set up in Nigeria between 1978 and 1983, see 
Nnaemeka, et al, 1989a: 408.
206 Later known as The Statesman
207 The Edo state government now wholly owns the Nigerian Observer. Delta state has also established 
its own newspaper and it is called The Pointer.
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basis that the activities of the Nigerian Observer will be documented.
However, of much relevance here is the Bendel state context within which the 
Nigerian Observer had to operate. It was different from all other states in Nigeria 
because o f its multi-ethnic composition, which earned it the tag, ‘mini-Nigeria’. It is 
not difficult to see why. The state had more ethnic groups compared to the other states 
within the Nigerian federation. Bendel state was made up o f the following ethnic 
groups: Edo, Urhobo, Itsekiri, Ishan, Igbo, Ijaw, Isoko, and Afemai (Nigeria 1991: 
Official Handbook: 52-54). This is quite significant because the politics of Bendel 
state which the Nigerian Observer was caught up in were mainly determined by 
ethnicity, as with Nigerian state (see Nnoli, O., 1978).
The Nigerian Observer's mission statement, on establishement in 1968, was to 
promote the interests o f the state. As noted, without a copy o f the first edition of the 
newspaper, the aims and objectives of the newspaper were instead spelt out by the 
Military Governor o f the then Midwestern state, Lt. Col. Samuel Osaigbovo 
Ogbemudia, who presided over the establishment of the Nigerian Observer.
[At the inaugural session], I told the Directors that the main aim for 
establishing the MIDWEST NEWSPAPERS CORPORATION is to print and 
publish a daily newspaper which will provide the means of informing the 
public o f the intentions, programmes and policies of government and also as a 
medium of education, information, and the enlightenment o f our people.
“ ... news in the OBSERVER does not reflect the view of the Government, and 
very important ... is the independence and freedom of the Nigerian 
Observer...
[and though] Government sponsored... it must ... be free from Government 
control as to what it should write or not write ... [and] be free to criticise any 
aspect o f Government policy which it considers worthy o f criticism in the 
interest of the public. ...[It is] established primarily to educate, inform and 
enlighten the people, [and therefore] must be free and unfettered in the
■1AO
discharge of its responsibility. The function o f this Board of Governors is to
208 He further said here: "My belief in the freedom o f this paper is fully enshrined in the Edict setting 
up the Corporation through the provision o f a Board o f Governors under the chairmanship o f the Chief
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play the role of an effective custodian o f the integrity, independence, and 
freedom o f the NIGERIAN OBSERVER. ... [The] MIDWEST 
NEWSPAPERS CORPORATION guarantees ... [its] newspapers the liberty 
to gather news, to spread enlightenment, and to speak their minds candidly 
(.Nigerian Observer, Monday, August 26, 1968: 7).
3.1b Daily Sketch
The Western Regional Government of Nigeria established the Daily Sketch under the 
leadership o f Akintola, in 1964. It was printed and published by the Sketch Publishing 
Company Limited. But after the creation o f the three states of Ogun, Ondo and Oyo, 
out o f the former Western Region o f Nigeria in 1967, the newspaper became jointly 
owned by all three. Although more states have now been created out of the former 
Western Region, our period o f research covers the era when it was still owned by 
these three states.
There are two important points to be noted when talking about the context of the 
Daily Sketch, which served as great influences on the newspaper’s activities during 
the period under study: The first is that, in the area where it operates, there is also the 
very influential privately-owned newspaper, the Nigerian Tribune, established in 
1949 by Obafemi Awolowo, as the political arm of the AG, which he also led. The 
AG, was indeed one o f the political parties that fought for Nigeria’s political 
independence and dominated the Western Region’s political landscape, during 
Nigeria’s first republic (1960-1966). When in September, 1978, the ban on political 
activities was lifted to usher in Nigeria’s second republic (1979-1983), Obafemi 
Awolowo, also founded the UPN, and, as the Nigerian Tribune was made to do for 
the AG during Nigeria’s first republic, it also became the political arm of the UPN. So 
even though the Daily Sketch was also there to serve the three UPN-controlled state 
governments o f Oyo, Ogun, and Ondo there was the Nigerian Tribune, which was a 
100 percent supporter o f everything UPN in that Yoruba-speaking area of Nigeria, 
where the influence o f Awolowo was dominant and complete.
Justice o f the State, assisted by the Chairman of the State Public Service Commission, the Leader o f the 
local Bar Association, the chairman of the State's Apex Co-operative Organisation, and a recognised 
trade union leader."
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The second point is that, in the Yoruba-speaking area o f Southwest Nigeria there is a 
clear anti-North feeling. This has its origin in the way that the struggle for the political 
leadership o f Nigeria has been conducted since Nigeria’s political independence in 
I960., tThe general feeling among most Nigerians, including the Yorubas, is that the 
northern-based Hausa-Fulanis are seen as having dominated the political leadership in 
Nigeria for a very long time (see Usman, Y.B. ed. 1982: ix). For instance, in the 1983 
presidential election, Awolowo was the presidential candidate of the UPN and 
contested against Alhaji Shehu Shagari, a Hausa-Fulani from the north, who was the 
flag bearer o f the NPN. And so, not surprisingly, the Daily Sketch was anti-Shehu 
Shagari’s NPN.
3.1c Nigerian Statesman/The Statesman
The Imo State Government owns the Nigerian Statesman and as is characteristic of 
government-owned newspapers; its editorial policy is geared towards informing the 
people of the state about the government’s programmes and policies. The newspaper 
is based in the south-eastern part of Nigeria, where anti-North feeling is also very 
strong. The fact that the NPP had Azikiwe, an Iboman from the southeast, as its 
presidential candidate for the 1983 elections was one o f the factors that influenced the 
coverage o f the Nigerian Statesman in June 1983. But more importantly, the other 
overriding aim of the Nigerian Statesman was to represent the voice of the Ibo ethnic 
group in the Nigerian scheme of things (see Daily Champion, 8/6/93).
3.2 Federal Government-owned Newspapers 
3.2a New Nigerian
The New Nigerian newspaper was the only newspaper that was 100 percent owned by
'JOQ
the Federal Government of Nigeria, during the period covered by this research. The 
northern regional government in 1966, at a time when the political atmosphere in
209 The New Nigerian was put up for privatisation by the Civilian government o f Nigeria, led by 
Olusegun Obasanjo. Also see: “El-Rufai explains delay in sale o f NNN”, Daily Trust newspaper, 
12/ 12/02 .
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Nigeria was very tense, set up the newspaper. The editorial policy, as spelt out in its 
mission statement when it was launched on January 1, 1966 by the Sardauna210 of 
Sokoto and the Premier o f the then Northern Regional government, Sir Ahmadou 
Bello, is as follows:
“The Principles by which we stand-or fall
The New Nigerian makes its bow in troubled times
A few weeks ago a leading daily newspaper closed down. Another faces a ban 
on sales in two regions o f the Federation.
For a time, at least, the bigots have had their way.
Where stands the New Nigerian? There are many things we shall strive to 
achieve - but above all we shall try to be a good newspaper, dispensing news 
and comment without fear or favour.
As a Northern newspaper, we shall seek to identify ourselves with the North 
and its peoples, their interests and aspirations. For that we offer no apology. 
But at the same time we shall champion the vital need for national unity. For 
without unity and the trust and mutual respect that go with it, this great 
country will never find its rightful place in the sun.
In the same way that we shall oppose the evil extremes of tribalism, so we 
shall raise our pen against all forms of racialism and discrimination. We shall 
honour truth and try to instil within our editorial staff, a sense o f purpose and a 
pride in their profession. We shall welcome all shades o f responsible opinion, 
for we are conscious of the fact that we represent the people as a whole, and 
not just a section of it.
We shall try to show understanding towards all. We ask the same and no more 
from the public.
Thus the principles by which we stand are simple, but should truth and justice 
be assailed by ignorance and fear, or tolerance challenged by prejudice, then 
they will become the principles by which we shall fight and, if  necessary, fall 
(Maiden edition, New Nigerian, January 1, 1966:1).
The Sardauna was indeed very passionate about the newspaper’s editorial policy
210 This is the title o f the spiritual head and leader o f adherents o f the Islamic religion in the northern 
part of Nigeria.
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(Muhammadu, T., 2000: Chapter 1). In the calculation of the Sardauna, this was 
inevitable during that period in Nigeria’s socio-political development, particularly as 
they relate to the handicap faced by the people o f the region then as they lacked any 
credible medium through which they could contribute, not only to the crucial debate 
to shape Nigeria’s future, but to also present an accurate assessment o f Northern 
Nigeria to the rest of Nigeria, which the mainly Southern Nigeria-based press was not 
doing (Kukah, 1996: 133-136; Haruna, 1996: Chapter 5).211
Thus, from the onset, the New Nigerian was acknowledged as a well focussed
010newspaper, with a clear editorial direction. Importantly, barely two weeks after the 
newspaper was launched, Nigeria witnessed its first military coup d ’etat (January 15, 
1966) and other events which subsequently led to the outbreak of the civil war which 
threatened the corporate existence of the Nigerian State. With those developments, the 
New Nigerian soon became a national newspaper that stoutly stood behind Nigeria’s 
military government in their quest to keep the Nigerian State as one and united 
(Muhammadu, 2000: Chapter 3).
However, the editorial content o f the New Nigerian has never been the same again 
after the Federal military government acquired the newspaper in 1975. From then 
on the newspaper became the mouthpiece of the federal government, with this 
assuming a destructive proportion214 after the military handed power over to a 
democratically-elected civilian administration to usher in Nigeria’s second republic in 
1979 (Haruna, 1996: 64-65).
3.2b Daily Times
211 Also see Muhammadu, 2000: Chapter 2).
212 Read the views o f fieldwork interviewees: Sam Amuka, G.G.Darah and Dan Agbese on p. 160, 
under the heading: Each section o f the press constructs a notion o f national identity”, pp. 157-161. Also 
read particularly the views o f interviewee T. Momoh about New Nigerian newspapers on p. 159
213 Read the views o f fieldwork interviewee: H. Odukomaiya, G.G Darah, Farouk Ibrahim on pp. 149- 
151 under the heading: “Negative effects o f military administration on the press”.
214 The democratically-elected civilian government in Nigeria (1999-2007) led by Olusegun Obasanjo, 
(the same man that was at the helm of affairs as Nigeria’s Military Head o f State in 1975 when the New 
Nigerian and Daily Times were acquired by the federal military government), took steps to privatize 
the two federal government-owned newspapers. In fact the Daily Times was up for sale on the Nigerian 
Stock Market between November 12 and December 13, 2002. Also see Eke, E., 2006; Garba, K.A., 
2005; & 2006.
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The Daily Times is often referred to as “Nigeria’s oldest surviving newspaper”, 215 
having been founded in 1926. Almost all the national newspapers in Nigeria, were 
started by people who have, at one time or the other, had some kind of connection 
with the Daily Times. It was established by “a group of Nigerians and foreigners 
under the Nigerian Printing and Publishing Company” (see Abati, 2002).
However, it took off as “a reactionary newspaper” with a policy to “support 
Government as far as possible”, and so it was no surprise that the Daily Times was not 
really “a part o f the anti-colonial movement”. Nevertheless, when the Daily Times 
sold its controlling shares to the Daily Mirror Group of London in 1947, its editorial 
direction changed for the better as it “became less reactionary, providing quality 
leadership in different aspects of Nigerian life and society” (Ibid).. These 
developments culminated in progressive and professional journalism, that led one 
commentator on the Nigerian media, Dr Reuben Abati (2002: p. 1), to describe the 
Daily Times as “the newspaper of record for the principle trials of the period leading 
to the independence of the Nigerian nation and after, [because] it shed its reactionary 
garb gradually, and became the parliament o f the poor struggling people of Nigeria”.
But unfortunately, the Daily Times' fortunes took a turn for the worse, when, in 1975, 
the Daily Mirror Group decided to sell its majority shares and withdrew from the 
newspaper. It eventually did and the Murtala/Obasanjo military administration (1975- 
1979) in Nigeria, at that time, directed the National Insurance Corporation of Nigeria 
(NICON), “to acquire 60 percent of the Daily Times, on behalf of the Nigerian 
government” (Ibid).. Effectively, from August 30, 1975, when the Nigerian 
government became its majority shareholder, with the remaining 40 percent being 
shared by private interests, the Daily Times became the “propaganda arm of ... the 
Federal Government” (Ibid). Consequently, the Nigerian public abandoned the Daily 
Times as a non-credible medium. It is the activities of the Daily Times during this
2,5 The period 1979 to the late 1990s was particularly difficult for the newspaper because its credibility 
was seriously damaged during Nigeria’s second Republic (1979-1983). For instance the public 
abandoned the newspaper. Attempts were also made to bum the premises down after the public became 
disillusioned that a federal government-owned newspaper was used by the ruling party during the 
second republic, the NPN, against political opponents. It never regained public confidence after that. 
The newspaper no longer attracted adverts and was hardly seen on the newsstand because o f its 
financial difficulties.. These led to a series o f events that led the federal government under civilian 
administration o f Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007), to privatise the newspaper. Also see Abati, R. 
2002.
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period that will be documented in this study.
3.3 Privately-owned Newspapers 
3.3a The Guardian
The Guardian newspaper was set up by and also owned by Chief Alex Ibru, a 
Nigerian businessman. It is fondly referred to by its admirers as the ‘flagship of 
Nigerian journalism’ and as the first newspaper in Nigerian history to have been set 
up purely in response to Nigeria’s economic and socio-political environment (Omu,
7171996: 11). At inception, the newspaper declared its mission as follows:
“What THE GUARDIAN stands for: The Guardian is an independent 
newspaper, established for the purpose of presenting balanced coverage of 
events, and of promoting the best interests o f Nigeria. It owes allegiance to no 
political party, ethnic community, religious or other interest group. Its primary 
commitment is to the integrity and sovereignty of the Federation of Nigeria 
and [beyond that] to the unity and sovereignty of Africa.
“The Guardian is a liberal newspaper, committed to the best tradition and 
ideals of republican democracy. It believes that it is the responsibility of the 
state not only to protect and defend the citizens, but also to create the 
conditions, political, social, economic and cultural, in which all citizens may 
achieve their highest potentials as human beings. It is committed to the 
principle of individual freedom, but believes that all citizens have duties as 
well as rights.
“The Guardian does not, in principle, object to the ideology of free enterprise, 
since this would be inconsistent with its commitment to individual liberty and
216 Read the report titled: “DAME reaffirms The Guardian as the flagship o f Nigerian press” published 
in The Guardian (Nigerian) edition o f 12/11/05. DAME stands for Diamond Award for Media 
Excellence
217 Also read the views o f fieldwork interviewee H. Odukomaiya on p. 161 under the heading: 
“Ownership and space for neutrality”, and B. Jose, p. 179 under the heading: “Newspapers set up in 
response to new socio-economic realities”.
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freedom. But it believes that the state must intervene judiciously in the 
economic life o f the nation, in order to minimise the adverse effects o f free 
enterprise and ensure that less privileged citizens have reasonable and fair 
access to the basic necessities of life.
“The Guardian will at all times uphold the need for justice, probity in public 
life, equal access to the nation’s resources, and equal protection under the laws 
o f Nigeria for all citizens.
“The Guardian believes that Nigeria is a legitimate member of the 
international community, but holds that she can best fulfil her international 
obligations only if  her own security and integrity are assured.
“The Guardian’s logo is the ancient Egyptian symbol for Conscience. The 
motto, “Conscience, Nurtured by Truth,” is inspired by Uthman Dan Fodio’s 
saying: Conscience is an Open Wound; only Truth Can Heal It.” (The 
Guardian, Sunday, February 27, 1983 p.l).
3.3b National Concord
When the National Concord came into existence on March 1, 1980, it was generally 
regarded by many Nigerians as an organ of the National Party o f Nigeria (NPN) 
(Nnaemeka et al, 1989: 408). The reason why the National Concord was described as 
such was because its proprietor, Abiola, was one of the founding members o f the 
NPN, and had used the newspaper to promote everything pro-NPN. However, when 
Abiola quit the NPN in 1982, following a row over the party’s nomination for the 
1983 presidential election, the editorial policy of the National Concord changed (Ibid) 
against the NPN as the newspaper now adopted a policy of publishing anti-NPN and 
anti-NPN controlled Federal Government stories and issues (Haruna, 1987: 7)
But its Mission Statement, when it hit the newsstands in March, 1980, was laid out as 
follows:
“WHAT WE STAND FOR - by the publisher”
“OUR name says it all - NATIONAL CONCORD.
“We are out for harmony, unity, peace, friendship, understanding and co­
operation in Nigeria. These are ideals to which we shall devote our energy and 
attention in order to build a virile and progressive country. In doing this, we 
shall remain scrupulously faithful to the ethics of the noble profession of 
journalism.
“National harmony is one thing that has sadly eluded Nigeria since she 
attained political independence on October 1, 1960. Before then, the several 
constitutional conferences in London and here at home had given signal to the 
political confusion which was later to follow after independence.
“Our problems”
“The basic problem of disunity has manifested itself in several ways ever 
since. Whether you call it tribalism or factional politics or extreme 
parochialism, it is the same cankerworm which has been responsible for the 
excessive corruption and indiscipline which successive leaders have vainly 
promised to remove.
“What has happened in the past is that the load of fighting these evils has 
devolved on the leadership alone. But this country does not belong to the 
leadership alone. We all own the country and collectively created its problems 
and must collectively solve those problems.
“The role of the Concord group of newspapers will be to assist, in every way 
possible, efforts made to rid our great nation of these evils. Attempts to 
worsen the situation or prevent progress towards a solution shall be fought to 
certain defeat. This is where we stand (National Concord, March 1, 1980, 
front page}.
3.3c Vanguard
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The Vanguard was established in 1984. According to the newspaper’s media profile 
as published on its website on 24/10/00, pp. 1-3:
“The Vanguard was set up in 1984 by veteran journalist, Sam Amuka, as a 
private enterprise. No government affiliation. No partisan bias. It is committed 
to democratic ideals, freedom and the rule of law ....
“EDITORIAL ORIENTATIONS”
“All our publications - Vanguard, Sunday and Weekend Vanguard are 
authoritative national publications that provide reliable and analytical 
information in local, national and international news. They are all mass 
circulating and are geared towards a better life for the people ...
“As a truly mass-circulating and wide readership newspaper, there is a 
deliberate policy to target decision-makers by our editorial coverage and 
presentation.
33d Daily Champion218
The Daily Champion newspaper was first published on October 1, 1988. Its 
proprietor, Chief Emmanuel Iwuanyanwu, is a very successful businessman from one 
of the major ethnic groups in Nigeria, the Ibo. No other Nigerian would know the 
motivation for Iwuanyanwu in setting up the newspaper more than the man who 
provided the professional advice and expertise to make the Daily Champion 
newspaper a reality -Chief Henry Odukomaiya, its first Managing Director. His own 
words provide an insight into what the Daily Champion stands for:
The other national newspaper, the Champion, which I  also helped to set up 
(the first being the National Concord), has as its proprietor, Chief Emmanuel 
Iwuanyanwu. You know as at that time, the West African Pilot21 which, was
2.8 See what the Daily Champion stands for, as published on its website on.05/03/2006: 
http://www.champion-newspapers.com/aboutUs
2.9 The West African Pilot was one o f the foremost nationalist newspapers that articulated the Nigerian 
position during Nigeria’s struggle for political independence from Britain.
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established by another Iboman, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, on November 22, 1937, 
had already gone into extinction and so Chief Iwuanyanwu thought that the 
Ibo race stood to be marginalised i f  there was no voice to speak on their 
behalf
“The only voices that were available to them at that time only existed in their 
own part o f  the country ... the East. For instance, newspapers like the 
Nigerian Statesman and the Daily Star were published from Owerri in the 
Eastern part o f  Nigeria, and so they were regional or local newspapers.
“So Chief Iwuanyanwu wanted a newspaper which would be a nationally 
accepted newspaper but which would start o ff by protecting the rights o f  the 
Ibo nation, the Ibo cause... The philosophy had to do with the intention o f  the 
proprietor to use the newspaper to integrate the Iboman into the Nigerian 
society.
“In its mission statement, it simply stated: 'Starting with the Ibo nation.' In 
effect the Champion newspaper was set up by an Iboman, using the newspaper 
to promote the interest o f  the Ibo nation within the context o f the Nigerian 
State. The newspaper first came out on October 1, 1988 and that Mission 
Statement is there for you to read and understand (Chief Henry Odukomaiya. 
Fieldwork interview in Lagos).
Another clue as to what the Daily Champion newspapers stand for was also given in 
1989, by the Executive Director and Acting Managing Director o f the newspaper, Dr. 
Ihechukwu Madubuike:
“Having carried out adequate market surveys, we were confident that there 
was a general yearning for a new kind of newspaper - a quality tabloid with 
mass appeal, the kind that is not too ‘high brow’ but instead caters for the 
needs of virtually all strata o f the society ...
“We are read in all parts of the country and all parts of the country are 
adequately represented on our staff’ (Daily Champion: 24/6/89:12).220
The social context and mission statements of these newspapers vis-a-vis their 
constitutional role in national integration, are indications of how they will fulfill that 
role. But factors within the Nigerian context will inevitably affect how such a role is 
performed. These are what would be engaged with next.
220 Indeed, on its website, accessed on 05/03/06, the Daily Champion declared: All our publications ... 
are authoritative national publications that provide reliable and analytical information on local, national 
and international issues. They are all mass-circulation.
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3.4 The Nigerian press: Limitations and obstacles
This issue relates to the question of whether the print journalists in Nigeria, with 
privately- or government-owned newspapers, have the freedom to practice their 
profession without being encumbered by the interference of the owners. Additionally, 
this section addresses other encumbrances affecting newspapers or the journalists 
working for them. For instance, to what extent do the social context and mission 
statement of each of the newspapers, as delineated above, influence the way that the 
Nigerian press conducts its activities?
In order to answer this question, it is important that we analyse the reality of the press 
in Nigeria by way o f the limitations and the obstacles that it is faced with. It is very 
common to hear mostly government officials in Nigeria extol the freedom of the press 
that the journalism profession in Nigeria enjoys, even though evidence within the 
Nigerian press show that the contrary is the case. Indeed, as Chief Segun Osoba, a 
renowned newspaper administrator and journalist has said, the freedom of the press in 
Nigeria is a qualified one, given all the anti-press decrees222
Yet another significant point is that observers of the Nigerian press scene have argued 
that it is erroneous to believe that only the government-owned press that have been 
subject to outside interference from their owners. Indeed they have shown that the 
owners of the privately-owned press also interfere with the way that their newspaper 
outfits are run or managed. As Malam Mohammed Haruna (1987: 7) contends:
Private ownership does not necessarily guarantee free press or a commercially 
successful one ... In Nigeria, the private newspapers may be relatively
221 See for example the report: Nigerian Press is freest in Africa” published on page three in the New 
Nigerian edition o f 10/06/85, and attributed to the then Chief o f General Staff, Supreme Headquarters, 
Major-General Tunde Idiagbon, during the General Muhammadu Buhari military administration in 
Nigeria, from 1984-1985.
222 See: “Ours is qualified freedom-Osoba”, Daily Sketch, 22/06/83, back page. Also see Momoh, 
1995: Chapter 2..
223 At the Second National Media Week o f the NUJ held in Owerri, the capital o f  Imo state o f Nigeria, 
the then Nigerian Information Minister, Prince Tony Momoh accused the press o f being 
confrontational saying that if  they accuse the government o f interfering with its own media house, they 
shouldn’t forget that owners o f private newspapers do not fair better. As he put it: “The objective of 
private papers is that it does not criticise its owners and its interest.” Read Prince Momoh’s comments 
as published in the Vanguard edition o f 6/6/89, p. 7.
224 Hharuna views can be found on page 7 o f the New Nigerian edition o f 18/6/87, in the article titled: 
“Ownership Control o f Press in Africa”.
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independent of government interference, but the notion that they are 
necessarily freer than government newspapers arise from the erroneous 
thinking that government is the only threat to press freedom ... Government is 
not only the owner o f newspapers and all owners tend to behave alike, that is, 
that as those who pay the piper, they try to dictate the tune ...
Haruna made particular reference to the proprietor o f the National Concord:
Interference by one can be as invidious and pervasive as by the others. [Some] 
clear evidence is how the National Concord turned around from uncritical 
support o f the National Party o f Nigeria (NPN) [to which its publisher 
belonged], into the most vitriolic attacker o f the party’s officials, when Chief 
Abiola had to quit the party ... [Also] the paper has never been known to 
focus on the inefficiency of our communications system, for which the 
International Telecommunications (ITT), whose vice-chairman, Chief Abiola 
is, may or may not have been to blame.
Yet there are also those that contend that whether or not a Nigerian editor, for 
instance, enjoys any freedom to practice or manage a newspaper is really dependent 
upon the personality of the editor., there is the belief among some journalists that 
unnecessary self-censorship, rather than interference from the owners, has been the 
major obstacle to press freedom in Nigeria.226
Given that in Government-owned media, in particular, the appointment and dismissal 
of journalists is at the behest of governments, it is no surprise that the journalist is 
weighed down by the threat of dismissal if he/she does not toe the government line. 
As one commentator on the Nigerian media, Mr Lewis Obi, notes, for some political 
and other extraneous reasons, journalists would be sacked for actions which are
7 7 7“professionally in order but politically indiscreet.” This indeed, has always been the 
case. For instance, see the Nigerian Observer, 8/6/83, p.9, where it is noted that the 
newspaper owned by the Bendel State government had had 10 editors in 15 years. The 
State government in November, 1982, appointed Chief Arogundade, a renowned civil 
servant to manage the newspaper. Mr James Jukwey- Editor o f Benue Voice, owned
225 Read fieldwork interviewees on pp. 155-156 under the heading: “Does government always interfere? 
Editors engage in self-censorship”.
226 See the statement credited to Mr Steve Osemeke, Chairman, Nigeria Union o f Journalist (NUJ), 
Bendel state branch, in the report: “Alii wants freedom for journalists”, Nigerian Observer, 09/06/83, 
page three; Also see the paper given on April 29th, 1987, by Dr Olatunji Dare, then Senior Lecturer in 
die Department o f Mass Communication, University o f Lagos, Nigeria, in Ilorin, the capital city of 
Kwara state o f Nigeria, under the auspices o f the Kwara State branch o f the NUJ.
227 See the article: “The King’s Song and the Press”, published in the National Concord of 17/6/83, p.
3.
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by the Benue State government was forced out of his position by the State 
government because he refused to yield to pressures from government to publish 
stories favourable to the State government. He was moved to the Circulation 
Department o f the newspaper as the Manager. He quit. Similarly, Mr Bobo Brown - 
Editor o f the Sunday Tide, owned by the Cross River State government was fired 
because he protested against the insertion of a front page lead story by the State 
government different from what he had approved.228
Beyond the risk o f being demoted or fired, editors of newspapers that are critical of 
government are every now and then picked up and detained by state security 
operatives, with no explanation given as to what offences that they have committed 229 
Newspapers or magazines are also closed down or proscribed, as was the case with 
the Newswatch magazine in 1986. . Nigerian government State Security Service
(SSS) operatives also go to the extent of arresting and detaining wives and children of 
Editors if  they are unable to arrest their Editor husband.
Editors o f government-owned newspapers are also summoned, at any time, to 
government house “to answer serious allegations” against them by whomever the 
government chooses to listen to.232 What happens as a result o f all these is that many 
editors (government or private) have often argued that if they are fired for refusing to 
succumb to owner interference, other journalists are on the ready to take over their
. . 233positions.
However, even if  we discount the negative effects that direct ownership interference 
(government or private) can cause to press freedom in Nigeria, it could still be argued 
that the journalists themselves are their own enemy when it comes to the issue of 
press freedom. A very good case in point, is the fact that though it is generally known 
that Nigerian governments interfere in the management of their newspapers, there is
228 Also see National Concord, 1/6/93, p.2 in respect o f the “premature retirement o f journalists 
working with The Herald newspaper owned by the Kwara State government.
229 see New Nigerian, 3/6/83; Daily Times 22/6/83 and 23/6/83; New Nigerian 24/6/87, p. 11; The 
Guardian, 26/6/93).
230 see also Vanguard 17/6/89; National Concord, 1/6/91, front page
231 See Vanguard-22/6/%3; National Concord 2 1/6/89, p. 10 and 20/6/89 front page; Daily Times 1/6/91, 
front page; National Concord 1/6/91, front page; The Guardian, 25/6/93, p.3.
232 (see New Nigerian, 25/6/93, back page).
233 See “Standard Editors resign”, The Guardian, 19/06/93, page A2.
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also the evidence that journalists, during civilian administrations in Nigeria, for 
instance, often allow themselves to be used by politicians.234
Indeed, generally, journalists have often been criticised for making themselves 
vulnerable to government manipulation, for instance, by their sycophancy and seeking 
favours from the government in power, be it civilian or military. For instance, Dare 
(1987) castigated Nigerian journalists by pointing out that “the collapse o f [Nigeria’s] 
Second Republic, occurred largely in spite of, not because o f them [the journalists] 
[because] some o f them were too busy partaking in the pillage to raise any alarm”.
The Nigerian journalists frequently solicit the assistance of Nigerian governments, 
(State/Federal) to finance their various activities. Perhaps what is more devastating 
to the newspaper industry in Nigeria is the way that the government, whether civilian 
or military, tries to strangulate and control the press through its policies.236 A typical 
example is the way that the government ensures that there is a reduction or a 
substantial cut in the supply o f newsprint to the newspapers, particularly those that are 
privately-owned and which in most cases are those that are very critical of the 
Nigerian government.237 The government embarks on the politics of newsprint 
through:
(i) Deliberate denial o f import licences for the importation o f newsprint to most 
newspaper houses
(ii) Making sure that the few newspaper houses which are lucky enough to obtain 
such import licences are subjected to untold hardships in their bid to obtain the
234 See “Parties and Press in Anambra, The Guardian, (Nigerian) 19/6/83, p.3.
235 See Nigerian Observer, 09/06/83, ,page 3; “Anambra NUJ bags N 145,000 from govt”, Daily 
Champion, 12/06/91, page 21; “NUJ thanks Buhari, Idiagbon”, The Guardian, 04/06/85, front page; 
simply because the two Nigerian leaders, acknowledged the invitation o f the NUJ to its 30th 
anniversary celebrations and declined to attend. Also see: “You can get our media houses to publish 
whatever you want them to publish”, a statement attributed to the late premier o f the Eastern Region o f 
Nigeria, DR Michael Okpara, as published in the New Nigerian o f 10/06/85, page 2; and also the report 
about Dr. Okpara’s outburst at a news conference, titled: “Dr. Okpara raves at reporter”, on the back 
page o f the Nigerian Statesman o f 05/06/83.
In 1985, the federal military government o f Nigeria, in a letter said to have emanated from the office 
of the Secretary to the federal government, directed that the federal government, its parastatals,-and its 
ministries should place their adverts only on newspapers owned by the federal or state governments. 
Given the fact that in Nigeria, the greatest spender on advertisements is the federal government, its 
ministries and its parastatals, it was quite obvious that through its policy on advertisements, the federal 
government was shutting off the private newspapers from a large chunk of revenue.
7 See the National Concord story on Concord’s newsprint abandoned by the roadside.
102
necessary Form M, which has to be completed to allow importation o f goods into 
Nigeria
(iii) Also ensuring that the newspaper houses are subjected to agonising delays during 
the processing o f their Form M and the issuing o f the letter of credit needed for the 
importation of newsprint from overseas manufacturers.238
The newsprint issue has become such a major problem to the newspaper industry that 
many newspapers are actually faced with the constant fear of folding as a result of 
their inability to source such a vital product239 . For instance, in 1983, the situation 
became so dire that the Newspaper Proprietors Association o f Nigeria (NPAN) 
published a paid advert in major Nigerian newspapers alerting the nation to the danger 
being faced by the newspaper industry due to the government policy to restrict 
supplies 240 During that period also, the General Secretary o f NPAN and also 
Managing Director o f Sketch Group of Newspapers, Chief Segun Osoba stated 
emphatically that some newspapers may fold because o f various problems caused by 
non-availability of newsprint, high prices o f printing materials and the fact that 
Nigeria's Ministry o f Commerce only issued licences for a token importation of 
newsprint to a very few selected newspapers.241 Following the parlous state of the 
Nigerian economy, the federal military government had in 1985 set up a special task 
force on the importation o f essential commodities into Nigeria. Newspaper proprietors 
took advantage of this development to appeal to the head o f the task force, Alhaji 
Adamu Ciroma to grant special concession to the newspaper industry by acting 
promptly to look into their newsprint difficulties. The foregoing, in reality, is the 
context under which the Nigerian press operates.
Nevertheless, the general argument among those who believe that interference o f any 
sort could be avoided is that for that to happen:
There is a need to devise a means which will insulate practitioners from the 
owners, whether they are private, government or party. This is for the simple 
reason that in Africa, the conditions o f a free and successful press... namely, a
238 See "Nigerian newsprint crisis revisited" [Editorial] Nigerian Statesman, 3/6/83, p.3; also see "The 
NPAN case" [Editorial] National Concord, 1/3/83, p.2..
239 See the online editions o f The Guardian (Nigerian) newspaper published on: 24/09/03; 02/09/05; 
24/03/06
240 See "Newspaper Proprietors' Association o f Nigeria", National Concord, 6/3/83, p. 10..
241 see "Some newspapers may fold up-Osoba", New Nigerian, 2/6/83, p. 16.
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high level o f literacy and universal education; a thriving democracy; an alert 
citizenry; a developed economy with a high standard of living; equitable 
distribution of wealth; developed communications and distribution system etc, 
are absent.
They also contend that:
There is the need to create trusts for the press, especially the government and 
party press ...because in our [Nigerian, African] context o f capitalism, one is
free at least to use his wealth how he wishes, so long as it is within the law and 
does not threaten national security242
Armed with the foregoing, as the social contexts and mission statements of the 
Nigerian press, how do we then determine the role that they play in the promotion of a 
Nigerian national identity? What research methodology/methodologies should be 
employed to achieve this purpose? In the next chapter we will focus not only on this
issue but also on what informed the choice of the methodological
approach/approaches and why, as well as what rules and guidelines will be applied in 
order to realise the objectives.
242 See “Ownership, control o f press in Africa, National Concord, 18/6/87, p.7. Also see: 'Charles 
Sharp mourns Democrat [newspaper], where the first Managing Director o f the New Nigerian 
expressed his views on why newspapers fail in Nigeria).
CHAPTER FOUR
Methodology
4.1 Intensive/In-depth Interviews and Qualitative Content Analysis
A researcher undertaking a study of how the Nigerian press promotes a collective 
Nigerian national identity could be advised to look at not just the press content alone, 
but the whole ‘circuit o f mass communication’, involving also the examination of 
press production and audience response in order to establish and measure its success 
in this endeavour. Indeed, Jenny Kitzinger and David Miller (1998: 10), note that: 
“...it is impossible to determine how people will understand or interpret a (media) 
text simply by analysing the content; it is necessary to examine the responses of 
actual audiences.” However, Professor Kitzinger, in her own article titled: “Resisting 
the Message: The Extent and Limits of Media Influence” (Miller et al, 1998: 211), 
acknowledges that “media power is certainly not absolute, nor does it exist in a 
vacuum, and audience reception is not an isolated encounter between an individual 
and a message”. But she also came to the conclusion that although “the media do not 
operate as a single force in a hermetically sealed ideological conspiracy ... [because] 
there can be a powerful interaction between media messages and broader contextual 
assumptions ... [they] still influence the way we think”. The thrust of Kitzinger’s 
article is that the audience is diverse and the way that they decode media messages is 
influenced by their own social and political positions. But in spite of this, as her study 
shows, the media has a powerful influence on the way we think and interpret things.
This is the crux of this study whose main focus is to find out how the Nigerian press 
contributes to Nigerian integration and unity. In which case, the emphasis is not on 
press production or audience response, but on how the press, through its activities, is 
able to promote a sense of collective Nigerian national identity, and consequently 
contribute to the realisation of Nigeria’s fundamental objective o f national integration 
and unity.
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The research questions to which answers are sought are:
• Does the Nigerian press’ inclination to promote nationality, group or sectional 
identities hinder its ability to contribute to the overall Nigerian national goal of 
integration and unity?
• Does the Nigerian press’ promotion o f a collective Nigerian national identity, 
using some events, involving Nigeria, within and outside, to ‘flag’ the state, 
foster Nigerian national integration and unity?
In seeking to answer these questions, it is hypothesised that:
•  The extent to which the Nigerian press can contribute to national integration 
and unity is determined by its ability to promote nationality, group or sectional 
identities within the Nigerian state.
•  The ability o f the Nigerian press to instil a sense of collective Nigerian 
national identity in the nationality and diverse groups or interests that 
constitute the state is directly related to the way it uses some events or 
occasions to ‘flag’ the Nigerian state.
With these issues in perspective, my initial plan was to do a quantitative content 
analysis o f the newspapers. This was with a view to taking a look at the issues 
represented in them. The idea was to look at the different events that occurred 
throughout any particular period as represented by what all the newspapers covered in 
accordance with their ideological beliefs, followed by a comparison of all o f them. 
For instance: how did the Vanguard newspaper report the same issue as Daily Sketch, 
The Guardian and National Concord, etc?; did they cover different issues on the same 
day?; why did they choose particular stories, even though others did not cover them 
on the same day? However, after an initial pilot study, I changed my methodology to 
take into account the nature of Nigeria and the effects that that nature has on an 
institution like the press within it.
Nigeria is a post-colonial state where civil society is weak - particularly in terms of 
accountability and the rule o f law, aspects that centrally guide democratic nations 243
243 See pp.35 & 138-142 above.
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The result is that there is no adequate theoretical background about the Nigerian 
press/media to serve as a guide for what I was looking for. A typical example would 
be the agenda setting theory244 of the press. The press has no power to set an agenda 
in Nigeria and so this theory is not useful here. I had to look for what was really 
happening which is what the press is actually doing. And this aligns with the 
argument that the Nigerian press cannot operate outside of what its environment 
allows 245 The reality therefore is that because of the Nigerian context and the press’ 
structure and ownership pattern, its content is predictable. As articulated in Chapters 
One and Two, the press is ‘partisan’, ‘manipulative’, ‘collaborative’, ‘preventive’, ‘a 
tool o f government and political parties’, and ‘a promoter o f nationality interests’ 
(Jeter et al, 1996: 11).246 All it was doing was counting what I already knew to exist. 
Quantitative content analysis was not going to tell me something new or different. 
Instead I concentrated on using a more qualitative research approach by doing a 
critical reading o f the contents of the newspapers and examining them. This involved 
analysing the patterns o f coverage over extended periods and thus did involve a 
content analysis. However there was no attempt to do this in a strictly quantitative 
manner, but rather to establish trends and patterns and to make comparisons. The aim 
was to employ the research tools that would adequately address the research 
objectives and produce the best result. According to Wimmer and Dominick (2000: 3 
& 25):
The important thing for any researcher... to understand is the correct 
approach to follow to ensure the best re su lt... research methods ... should be 
selected ... because they are appropriate for a given study and are understood 
by the person conducting the analysis (original emphasis).
Therefore, given the realities of the Nigerian circumstances vis-a-vis the focus o f this 
research, a combination of intensive/in-depth interviews and qualitative content 
analysis were adopted as the methodological approaches. While the former was used 
to gamer data from those experts on the Nigerian press and analyse what they said
244 The philosophical context o f the media in Africa, as enunciated by Jeter et al shows that the media is 
limited in the influence it can wield, for various political, economic and social reasons. So, the press in 
die classical sense does not exist (Read, for instance, the views of fieldwork interviewees on pp. 161- 
164 under the heading: “The Nigerian press refdlects nationality perspectives”.. Nevertheless it is still 
playing a useful role. Despite the fact that it is not really winning, it is getting the voice of people 
heard.
245 See Jakande, 1979: 110-111 and views o f interviewee Farouk Ibrahim on p. 133 below
246 See Uche, 1989; Ruijter, 1989.
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about its nature and character vis-a-vis Nigeria’s national goal of integration and 
unity; the latter was needed to understand what the Nigerian press is engaged in on 
the ground.
The next discussions will be focussed on the two methodological approaches, 
followed and on analyses of the various sampling methods and how they were 
employed to collect data at different stages of each of the research methods.
4.1a Intensive/In-depth Interviews as a research tool
The intensive/in-depth interview is one of the techniques that was used to gather the 
data for this study because the advantages it presents are enough to erode any 
disadvantages that might affect the outcome. For instance, although Wimmer and 
Dominick (1991: 148-149) recognise that for in-depth interviews, ‘generalizability’ is 
sometimes a problem, as they are non-standardized and sensitive to interviewer bias, 
they explain the strong points to include providing a wealth of details, and more 
accurate responses on important issues because it creates a rapport between the 
interviewee and the interviewer (Ibid).
Therefore, the interview is very useful as a research tool for a study of this nature. It 
enables a researcher to gain insights into areas not otherwise obtainable and thus 
“allow(s) for a more accurate and greater understanding” of the intricacies of the 
press’ context like that in Nigerian (Frey and Oishi, 1995: l).247 The interviews served 
as a useful background to the qualitative content analysis aspect of this study. For 
instance, Lindlof (1995: 168) contends that:
Researchers also use interviews to verify, validate, or comment on data 
obtained from other sources (original emphasis).
Thus, it was not just enough to conduct interviews, as it was also important to 
examine what the interviewees said against the actual activities/content of the
247 Cited in Alison Oatey, 2006: 1, 3; see also Lindlof, T.R., 1995: 163-194.
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newspapers, which had happened ten years earlier. This involved the triangulation of 
research methods: content analysis, interviews and comparisons. This time lapse is 
argued, however, not to be a problem because of the breadth and number of 
interviewees who are given voice. Indeed, it can rather be seen as an advantage in that 
they were able to give considered views about the past events and coverage in 
conditions released from the hurly-burly of the events themselves.
Therefore, the triangulation of methods obtained is argued as appropriate in relation to 
this study because it made it possible for me to tap into the experiences of those who 
were themselves responsible for the content/activities of the press. The journalists 
hold clear expertise and insights and consequently I was interested in knowing how 
and why they do what they do. Lindlof (1995: 167) articulated this position when he 
noted that:
Interviews are especially well suited to helping the researcher understand a 
social actor’s own perspective. Often, a researcher will interview persons only 
if their experience is central to the research problem in some way. They may 
be recruited for their expert insight, because they represent a certain status or 
category or because of the critical events in which they participated. The 
researcher expects the special nature of what they have experienced to result in 
a special articulation: words that can be expressed only by someone who has 
‘been there’ (original emphasis).
To appreciate the usefulness of this methodology, it is also of vital importance that the 
process of the interview should be clearly delineated (Hansen et al 1998: 280). The 
interviews were conducted over a three-month period (between December, 2000 and 
February, 2001 in Nigeria. The process involved holding the interviews in Lagos and 
Kaduna, southern and northern parts of Nigeria respectively and, conducting them in 
offices, homes and a conference centre for ‘convenience and practical feasibility’ 
(Liebes and Katz, 1990: cited in Hansen et al, 1998: 271) and ensuring they did not
' JAQ
last more than two hours each (Oatey, 2006: 2). The type o f interview is the ‘non­
structured interview’, which allows for open-ended questions.249 This type of 
interview makes it possible for questions to be asked in an informal way with the 
interviewer having the opportunity to ask follow-up questions for a more detailed
248 Also see Wimmer and Dominick 1997: 455 cited in Oatey, 2006: 2.
249 See appendix I
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answer. It also gives the interviewees250 the opportunity to talk freely (Nichols, 1991: 
131; Wimmer and Dominick 2000: 163) 251
The interviews made it possible to gauge the views of some of the experts on the 
Nigerian press. This sought to serve as a useful background (Lindlof, 1995: Chapter 
6; also see Hansen et al, 1998: Chapter 10) to the textual aspects of the project, which 
is the analysis of what the newspapers do. This allows a way of ascertaining how their 
activities impact on the quest for a collective national integration and unity.
All but one of the interviews was recorded, using a cassette tape recorder and later 
transcribed. The tapes ‘labelled for...date, interviewee name’ (Lindlof, 1995: 209)... 
and place of the interviews remain in my possession. My informal discussion with 
Uncle Sam was not taped, as explained, but was also a ‘purposeful conversation’ 
(Frey and Oishi, 1995: 1; Palgrave-skills4study, 2006: 1-2).
The ‘textual data’ from the interviews were analysed, focussing on some of the 
‘essentials’ as they relate to fundamental issues that confront the Nigerian state (see 
Hansen et al 1998: 278-283).252
4.1b Qualitative content analysis as a research tool
The qualitative approach was particularly suitable for my research because of the 
nature of the research population and its context. While discussing the qualitative 
research method, Wimmer and Dominick (1991: 139) state how it differs from the 
quantitative research along three main dimensions. For instance, they explain that 
while quantitative research is objective and can be seen by all because it is out there, 
qualitative data is subjective and only exists in reference to the observer. Additionally, 
while quantitative research looks for general categories to summarise the behaviour of 
humans, qualitative research does the opposite by looking for different categories; 
while quantitative research aims “to generate general laws of behaviour and explain 
many things across many settings”, thereby emphasising breadth, qualitative research
250 See appendix V, for profile o f the interviewees
251 See also Jenson and Jankowski 1991: 155; Hansen et al 1998: 257-261).
252 Also see the various headlines in Chapter Five under which the data from the interviews were 
analysed.
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attempts “to produce a unique explanation about a given situation... (and therefore) 
strive for depth”.
Based on these distinctions, my use o f the qualitative method enabled me to look 
selectively at issues that the newspapers covered, using my own background 
knowledge and understandings, and that of my interviewees, to focus on key moments 
and events in the history of Nigeria as the focus of my analysis. This was relevant 
because the behaviour of a press like the Nigerian’s is not determined by one set of 
categories but by different and distinct categories created by the different 
circumstances that the Nigerian situation throws up. I was therefore not looking for a 
general pattern that could explain the behaviour of the press but something in-depth 
that would reveal its behaviour in relation to specific and local events and issues.
Therefore prominence was given to aspects of the issues represented in the 
newspapers, that were likely to affect newspapers’ personnel and determine their 
editorial direction. This was particularly relevant whenever there was a change in 
government, depending on the type of administration in place, that is, civilian or 
military. These issues are: (1) General and (2) Specific issues (see Table 1 below). 
This was done, taking into account the predictable nature of the Nigerian press, which 
meant that there was no point in spending hours analysing it to know how it generally 
conducts its activities. Instead it was more useful to analyse some patterns of its 
behaviour as evident in the archival materials during the period under study (Lindlof, 
1995: 208-209), using the two issues noted above as my points of departure. For 
instance, an important aspect of the press is its use of specific events to ‘flag’ the 
Nigerian state. This showed the conditions under which the press was promoting 
collective Nigerian identity - allowing detail that a quantitative content analysis would 
fail to uncover.
Wimmer and Dominick (1991: 140-153) list four common qualitative research 
techniques as: field observations, focus groups, intensive interviews and case studies. 
The intensive interview has been discussed, but at this juncture, it is important to add 
that Alan Bryman (2001: 376 & 378), has also identified documents as another 
qualitative technique that is used in media research. As he puts it “mass media output 
can be explored using a qualitative form of data analysis like content analysis, which
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“entails searching for themes in the sources that are examined”. According to him, the 
kinds of source upon which content analysis is often carried out are documents, such 
as newspaper articles ... [which are appropriately examined) in qualitative research”. 
On the basis of his explanation, sources such as editorials and news stories can be 
used to ascertain how, for instance, the newspapers promoted the overall Nigerian 
national objective of integration and unity during the research period. Also referring 
to the importance o f documents to researchers, Lindlof notes that:
Documents indicate, among other things, what an organisation produces and 
how it certifies certain kinds of activities ... that memoralize its own history or 
achievements ... [and these) documents can help the researcher to reconstruct 
past events or on-going processes that are not available for direct observation 
... (1995: 208; original emphasis).
But J. Scott (1990-cited in Bryman, 2001: 376-377), suggests four criteria for 
assessing the quality of documents: they should be authentic, credible, representative 
(i.e is it typical of its kind) and have meaning in terms of being comprehensible. The 
archival materials/documents of the Nigerian press used for this study meet these 
criteria for two main reasons: Firstly, they were selected because of the interests that 
each of them represent and secondly, as an archival record of press coverage they are 
a credible source.
Lindlof nevertheless states that one way to avoid the limitations of using documents 
for research purposes is to “evaluate the subtle prejudices that may have affected the 
construction of the ‘facts’ therein ... [particularly because] documents reflect certain 
kinds of organizational rationality at work, such as news media procedures for 
defining who is or is not a spokesperson for a public group" (Ibid)..This was relevant 
to my analysis, as my interest, as stated was in analysing what the newspapers do, 
from whose perspective, and how this impacts on the whole question of the Nigerian 
goal of national integration and unity.
Bryman has identified four approaches to use to interpret documents, namely, 
qualitative content analysis, semiotics, hermeneutics and discourse analysis. For this 
study, the interest is in qualitative content analysis. He defines it as comprising “a 
searching out of underlying themes in the materials being analysed” adding that “the 
processes through which the themes are extracted is often„left implicit (as) the
extracted themes are usually illustrated-for example, with brief quotations from a 
newspaper article or magazine” (p. 381).
Roger Fowler (1991: 1) talks about “how language is used in newspapers to form 
ideas and beliefs”. His emphasis is particularly on how language represents things and 
makes people believe highly patterned things (see Ibid, pp. 2, 4, & 11). Analysing the 
patterns that are common in the content o f the Nigerian press helped with the analysis. 
This was much more useful because it shows that what I have done is there and it’s 
based on the premise that the Nigerian press promotes national identity in various 
ways, was therefore a key methodology. The Nigerian press use momentous events 
involving the state on the one hand and promote nationality and other interests that are 
not detrimental to the Nigerian state’s overall objective o f national integration and 
unity, on the other. This method was designed to establish the patterned ways in 
which this is done.
I also focus on the "style" and the "rhetoric" that the newspapers employ in the 
process of reporting issues in the pages selected to be analysed. Van Dijk (1991: 209), 
for instance, notes that "style has to do with the choice and variations of the words 
journalists use when writing...", while "rhetoric deals with special ploys, such as 
alliterations and metaphors that help catch the reader's attention, and which therefore 
are primarily used with a persuasive aim."
Accordingly, in this study the newspapers’ texts are read as documents which tell me 
the direction of each of them, in terms of their history and policy (Lindlof, 1995: 208- 
209). The purpose is to treat them as documents that represent the policy and editorial 
direction of the newspapers over a period of time. In other words, my interest is in 
looking for evidence that would capture the nuances of the character of the press in 
Nigeria, which would be enough to demonstrate the editorial policy of each of the 
newspapers and how their overall policies influence their activities and consequently 
impact on the issues relating to a collective Nigerian national identity.
What should be emphasised here are the differences that exist in the way the 
newspapers address issues depending on whether the administration in Nigeria is 
civilian or military. During a civilian administration, the political party in control of
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the government, whether at the state or federal level, commandeers the state-owned or 
federal government-owned newspapers and uses them to promote the party’s interests. 
On the other hand, government-owned or privately-owned newspapers tend to have a 
national focus during a military administration because of the centralised nature of 
that type of government (Osuntokun, 1989: 351).
I catgorised the coverage I wanted to analyse under a number of broad headings 
which had to do with major events in Nigeria during the period, taking into account; 
two of the issues already listed in Table 3. To enable me do this, the following 
questions served as guides:
• Who is responsible for the news reported?
• Who controls the news agenda in each o f the newspapers?
• Is it the government that dictates what should be published in government- 
owned newspapers?
• Do government-owned newspapers simply publicise government activities and 
therefore lack the independence to critically examine government activities?
• Do privately-owned newspapers mostly report the political and economic 
interests of their respective proprietors?
• Do the stories in the newspapers (government’s and private’s) emanate from 
independent sources or eyewitness accounts?
• Do journalists have the freedom to carry out investigative journalism and also 
play their expected role of directing the news agenda?
• How do the newspapers go about instilling a sense of collective national 
identity in Nigerians?
On these bases, I came up with the headings:
Analysis of the activities of the Nigerian press during elections supervised by 
a civilian administration;
Analysis of the activities of the Nigerian press during elections supervised by 
a military administration;
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Analysis of the activities of the Nigerian press under a military administration: 
Events in June 1985 and June 1989;
Analysis o f the activities of the Nigerian press under a military administration: 
Coverage of a specific issue - the 1989 SAP riots
Analysis o f the Nigerian press and a collective Nigerian national identity- 
Flagging of the nation: World Cup triumph and hosting of the OAU Summit in 
1991
Having established these categories, my major pre-occupation was to analyse the 
activities o f each of the newspapers under various themes, at different periods as 
represented by the different headings. The purpose was to examine the influence that 
the type o f administration in place, civilian or military, has on the editorial policy that 
each category o f newspaper ownership follows, in carrying out their activities, as they 
relate to those listed in the headings above. In other words, if we take the election 
issue, as an example here, using themes to analyse the activities of the newspapers 
will bring into sharper relief, what influenced the editorial policy that was adopted by:
1. A state government-owned newspaper;
2. A federal government-owned newspaper; and
3. A privately-owned newspaper
Doing a qualitative content analysis of the newspapers in this respect confirmed Jeter 
et al’s (1996: 11) and Ruijter’s (1989) conclusions about the media in Africa253 and 
revealed that the newspapers are: a tool of the political party in power; a megaphone 
of government; a platform for national issues; a voice for nationality interests; an 
instrument for investigative journalism; an instrument against oppression and; an 
agent of unity.
Some graphic illustrations of how the activities of the newspapers reflected each of 
these themes are shown in two tables in this part of this chapter and other tables in the
253 See chapter two above.
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appendix. The purpose is to demonstrate how using qualitative content analysis, 
themes to explain the activities of the press can be extracted from newspaper articles, 
stories or headlines.
For instance, Tables 1 and 2 below show that during the elections organised by a 
civilian administration in 1983, and by a military administration in 1993, the 
government-owned newspapers were tools of the political parties/government in 
power (also see appendices IX, X, XI, XII, XIII). The various reports show that each 
of the newspapers could only publish stories that were favourable to the ruling 
authorities whether civilian or military.
Table 1
State Government-owned Newspaper 
: A tool o f party in power 
Examples o f negative stories against rival parties/opponents o f ruling party
The Nigerian Observer
-Omo N ’Oba’s pay was not 
stopped: NPN agents float 
diabolical rumour to cause 
disaffection-Alii”, (lead, 1/6/83, 
P-l)
-Count down on ‘83: 
Ogbemudia stronghold broken”, 
(2“* lead, 1/6/83, p.l).
-UPN leaders earmarked for 
killing today {by NPN 
agents}?”, (1/6/83, p.l).
-Shagari is enemy o f Bendelites: 
He dispossessed us o f N l l l m  
revenue since ’79-Alii, (lead, 
2/6/83, p.l).
-Benin-Owena borehole
contract: Ogbemudia took
N50m without execution, (2nd 
lead, 2/6/83, p .l).
-Bendel got nothing from F- 
govt”, (2/6/83, p.l);
-NPN will lose Rivers -Opinion 
poll, (4/6/83, p.l).
-Okilo’s lust for opulence, 
(4/6/83, p.l).
-Crisis in Ovia NPN”, (7/6/83, 
p.l)
-Those who fabricated on Oba
The Nigerian Statesman
Unongo [Governorship 
candidate o f the NPP in Benue 
state] was to be killed May 16 
True or False?: NPP 
gubernatorial candidate tells 
police cuddling story o f teargas 
bombardment (lead, 3/6/83, p .l) 
-Why NPN govt should be 
changed -  Uzoigwe (lead, 
5/6/83, p.l).
-Zik [Presidential candidate of 
the NPP] accuses Shagari: 
Violation o f Official Secret Act 
1964 (lead, 5/6/83, p.l).
-P&T staff dismissed: He gave 
President’s special line to 
Emeka Ojukwu (21/6/83, p.l).
Daily Sketch
-NPN can't use the army-Awo" 
(lead, 28/6/83, p.l).
-NPN men attack UPN-2 badly 
wounded”, (lead 14/6/83, p.l).
-Revenue Sharing suit against 
FG: Bendel Govt wins: Court 
says states are entitled to 
statement on money paid into 
Federal Account” and “Power to 
administer states’ share is 
illegal” (lead, 4/6/83, p .l)
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stand condemned, (7/6/83, p.l). 
-NPN candidates are UPN drop­
outs- Agbobu (lead, 21/6/83, 
p.l)
-NPN sure to lose Bendel, 
(21/6/83, p.l)..
Ogbemudia aborted Niger State, 
(21/6/83, p .l).
- -N2.5m Midwest Dev. Fund: 
Ogbemudia left no kobo- Gov. 
Alii, (lead, 28/6/83, p.l).
Table 2
Aftermath o f 1993 Presidential Election 
State Government-owned and Federal Government-owned Newspapers 
The megaphone of government in power
Nigerian Statesman
New Nigerian 
Daily Times
“Why we cancelled June 12 elections-IBB (lead; 
28/6/93, p.l).
“Abiola, Tofa banned” (28/6/93, p.l).
“NRC, SDP to produce new flagbearers” 
(28/6/93, p.l).
“Banned politicians can now contest” (28/6/93, 
p.l).;
“Nigerians receive pat on the back” (28/6/93, p .l)  
“Cancelled Presidential election-Party, Caucuses 
plan meetings”, (lead, 28/6/93, p .l)
IBB, governors meet tomorrow” (lead, 28/6/93, 
p.l).
As appendices XIV and XV indicate, the newspapers can also focus on national issues 
when there is a military administration in Nigeria. The stories that are featured in 
these appendices, confirm one o f the distinguishing characteristics o f the government- 
owned newspapers when there is a military administration in Nigeria. It shows them 
also having a national focus unlike the complete partisanship which they exhibit as 
they reflect only the views of the party that control each o f the states or the federal 
government that own them.
Appendix XVI shows that under another circumstance, newspapers can be used to 
further the interests o f nationality groups. When the interest of any nationality group 
is at stake, a newspaper owned by a state government can be used to foster such a 
group within its domain. This is what the Nigerian statesman owned by the Imo 
state254 government did for the Ibo nationality group in 1993.
This is constituted by the Ibo nationality group.
A look at appendix XVII will confirm that some, particularly the privately-owned 
newspapers, can conduct investigative journalism. This shows that in spite of the 
draconian decrees the military government always put in place to curb what it regards 
as the excesses o f the media institution, some particularly privately-owned 
newspapers are still fearless enough to conduct investigative journalism.
Appendix XVIII shows that the newspapers are also used as instruments against 
oppression.. And when it comes to standing up in defence of the democratic will of 
the Nigerian people, the stories in the table indicates how privately-owned 
newspapers, unencumbered by government control, can stand up against oppressive or 
undemocratic decisions made by any government.
But appendix XVIX confirms the major hypothesis of this research, which is that the 
newspapers that promote nationality interests can still instil a sense of collective 
national identity in Nigerians by using some momentous international events 
involving Nigeria to flag the Nigerian nation. This was exactly what all Nigerian 
newspapers, whether private’s or government’s did in 1985 when the Nigerian Junior 
football team won the Under-17 World Cup tournament.
These tables and appendices are designed to provide examples of the methodology 
being used. Each of them will be fully analysed later in Chapters six to ten which deal 
with qualitative content analysis of the activities of the newspapers. They cover how 
they behaved when dealing with both general and specific issues. In the remaining 
part of this chapter the sampling method used in this research will be focussed upon.
4.2 Sampling Methods
It was important that I designed the appropriate sampling techniques to use to gather 
data at the two methodological stages, with each further divided into sub-stages. At 
the former stage, the questions bordered on who should be interviewed; what should 
be their background and the interest they represent. At the latter stage, the issues were 
how to select the newspapers to analyse; how many years of their activities within the 
period of the research (1983-1993) should be covered; which month or months of
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each of the years should be selected for analysis and how many days or weeks within 
a month/whether a whole month or some months within a year should be examined.
Before doing the sampling, consideration was given to the intervening variables 
regarding: making arrangements for those to be interviewed; the availability of 
archival materials of Nigerian newspapers and; the difficulties o f data collection in 
Nigeria (see Nnaemeka et al, 1989a, Vol. 1:411; Kalu, U., 2004). Consequently, I had 
to consider using a combination of probability and non-probability sampling methods. 
Alan Bryman (2001: 88) defines probability sample as a representative sample that 
reflects the population accurately, so that it is a microcosm o f the population. He 
identifies four types: simple random sampling; systematic sampling; stratified random 
sampling and multi-stage cluster sampling (88-93). However, Bryman notes that non- 
probability sampling is all forms of sampling “not conducted according to the canons 
of probability sampling” and states three types: convenience sampling; quota 
sampling and snowball sampling (Ibid: 97-101).
One of the positive points about simple random sampling, as explained by Alan 
Bryman (1989: 88), is that each unit of the population has an equal chance of being 
represented. However, Wimmer and Dominick 1991: 68) have noted one of its weak 
points to be that it might be more expensive than other methods. Nonetheless, the 
systematic sample enables the researcher to select units directly from the sampling 
frame, for instance all the units in Nigerian newspapers - private; government; state 
and; federal, without resorting to a table of random numbers. Some of the arguments 
for this technique are that selection is easy and can be more accurate than in a simple 
random sampling and the procedure is generally inexpensive (Ibid, 69). But it is noted 
that the downside to this procedure is that to make it worthwhile and eliminate 
possible bias in making the selection, a complete list of the population must be 
obtained (Ibid).
Stratified random sampling enables a researcher to adequately represent his research 
population which means stratifying it by a criterion with a systematic sample selected 
from each of the strata resulting from it. It ensures proportional representation of the 
population as the population is stratified by a criterion, such as ownership (private and 
government-two ownership type equals two strata (see Ibid, 70).
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Cluster sampling occurs when there is the need to sample from a ‘widely dispersed 
population’ which, for instance, in the case of the Nigerian press, would include state, 
federal and private newspapers spread across the length and breadth of Nigeria. 
According to Bryman (Ibid, 91), “with cluster sampling the primary sampling unit 
(the first stage o f the sampling procedure) is not the units of the population to be 
sampled but groupings of those units. It is the...aggregation of population units that 
are known as clusters (original emphasis).
Convenient sampling is a technique that researchers employ either for reasons of 
accessibility of research materials, or for the fact that doing a wholly probability 
sampling would cost a lot of time and money. According to Bryman (Ibid: 97), this is 
acceptable as most research are based on convenience samples. As he puts it:
...in  the field of organisation studies it has been noted that convenience 
samples are very common and indeed are more prominent than are samples 
based on probability ... Social research is also frequently based on 
convenience sampling... (as) probability sampling involves a lot of preparation 
so that it is frequently avoided because of the difficulty and costs involved.
Some of the shortcomings of this method are that it is arbitrary and might not be 
representative and therefore cannot be generalised. However, the fact that a researcher 
can use what is available makes it irresistible particularly given the fact that the 
research outcome can provide “a spring board for other research (Ibid).
Bryman (Ibid, 99), notes that “the aim of quota sampling is to produce a sample that 
reflects a population in terms of the relative proportion of people in different 
categories such as gender, ethnicity, age groups, socio-economic groups and region of 
residence and in combination of these categories. Some of the criticisms against quota 
sampling are that: it is non-representative because the choice of respondents, when for 
instance interview is the research approach, is left to the interviewer; the interviewer 
is likely to make judgement about certain characteristics in deciding who to interview; 
interviewees are assigned to class groupings. However, it was useful for this study 
because it was cheaper and quicker to arrange, and easier to manage (see Ibid: 99- 
101).
Even though I have made reference here about what the literature on sampling
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methods states, I would like to point out that the nature of my research made it 
impossible for me to gather data using the techniques as described by the various 
authors. This point is particularly relevant in relation to how the data was gathered for 
purposes of the qualitative content analysis of the newspapers. For instance, there is 
the problem o f gathering data in Nigeria as finding newspapers archives is 
problematic. Therefore it is impossible to use an efficient scientific approach, as 
described by the authors cited, for such a purpose.
So I was only interested in the content of newspapers as I had an agenda to look for 
themes that explain behaviour of press. As a former journalist in Nigeria, and being 
familiar with the newspapers and the interest that they each represent, it was possible 
for me to do this. In effect on the basis of what I knew was there and on what I could 
assess, I divided the themes up on a convenience basis. For instance, although I 
decided to sample the sixth month of the first year 1983 and every other year after 
that, in order to reduce the amount of materials to be analysed, this strategy really 
worked as the themes which explain the behaviour of each of the newspapers, under 
different circumstances that I was looking for, were there in the dates and number of 
days in each o f the months sampled.
In the next two sub-headings, how the sampling of the interviewees and the 
newspapers was done will be stated.
4.2a Sampling of the Interviewees
The journalists interviewed were selected not only on the basis of their in-depth 
knowledge of the Nigerian press but also because they largely represent, if  not all, 
then most interests groups in Nigeria. Beyond the predictable representation of the 
broad ethnic mix, some are practicing journalists, while some are now retired; others 
have served as government functionaries and/or as publishers. Additionally, the mix 
sought out those journalists who work for or have had the experience of working in a 
newspaper owned by a state or federal government; while others work or have worked 
in privately-owned newspapers.
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This was to ensure that the issues related to the research objectives, were analysed by 
those who have the necessary experience of the nature and characteristics of the 
Nigerian press, in terms of the modalities o f their operations, politics, intrigues and 
overall dynamics (Directory of the Nigerian Media, 1994; Newswatch: Who’s Who in 
Nigeria: 2001). But a notable absentee from the group of interviewees is the female. 
This is argued as not detrimental to this study because the issue was not gender 
related but on the different circumstances that influence the behaviour of the press. 
Although there are very prominent Nigerian females who are knowledgeable about 
the press, trying to locate some of them proved too much a task for me, given the time 
I had for my fieldwork in Nigeria. It was even much more difficult to find a 
prominent female journalist because the hierarchy o f the Nigerian press is male- 
dominated.
Although the interviewees were readily available and served the purpose o f this study, 
they were however selected on the basis that they fairly represent the diverse nature of 
the Nigerian state. But it is important to also stress that only the three majority ethnic 
groups of Hausa-Fulani, Ibo and Yoruba really dominate Nigeria’s socio-political 
landscape (Obasanjo, 1989: 55)255. It is their politics, intrigues and indeed rivalries 
that have, more than anything else, affected the various institutions of the Nigerian 
State. So in the best of all worlds, I would have actually chosen to do interviews with 
some of the journalists from each of these groups because o f their diversity and the 
preference of gaining as wide a selection of voices as possible. Nevertheless, the 
peculiar Nigerian situation, which is bedevilled by lack of good social infrastructure 
like effective telecommunication and road networks, made it practically impossible to 
enable interviews with those journalists from each of the three majority ethnic groups.
First, the telecommunication problem made it impossible for me to contact them from 
the UK before I travelled to Nigeria for my fieldwork. Even when I eventually 
travelled to Nigeria, the problem was compounded by the fact that the non-journalists 
I had intended to interview were either not available or were not prepared to 
participate. A typical case was Usman (now late), a renowned Nigerian academic and 
social critic who turned down my requests for an interview. But his views on the
255 Sanda 1976; Danmola, et al., 1995)
256 Dr Usman was a known critic o f the Nigerian press because he saw them as ‘agents o f
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Nigerian press are well known and some of them are cited in this study. Other non- 
journalists declined for not being ‘qualified enough’ to talk about the issues.
For instance, although journalists, whose ethnic background is Hausa-Fulani and 
Yoruba, were among those interviewed, all efforts made to arrange interviews with 
journalists of Ibo origin came to nought. In fact the situation became so desperate for 
me that I even considered interviewing any important personality from the Ibo ethnic 
group to make up for the journalist. I got that in the form of Nigeria’s former vice- 
president, Dr Alex Ekwueme, whom I met while conducting my fieldwork in Kaduna, 
in the northern part o f Nigeria. But unfortunately all arrangements and promises fell 
through on the grounds that he had not enough time to address the issues raised in the 
questionnaire.257 Probably as a non-journalist he found the questions a little bit 
difficult.
But while my inability to interview journalists of Ibo origin could be seen as a 
weakness of this research, the quality of the data from the other interviewees is sound 
and may make up for it in part because those journalists who were available included 
some of the most experienced Nigerian journalists -  and many had a worldview that 
enabled them to go beyond the confines of their own ethnic interests.
Poignantly, most of the journalists that I contacted were quite willing to participate, 
which may well have had to do with me being a former journalist. Nevertheless, I 
must also add that not all that were contacted readily made themselves available to be 
interviewed.
Uncle Sam (proprietor of one of Nigeria’s national newspapers, Vanguard, himself, a 
former practising journalist, for instance, was very reluctant to participate. He does 
not give interviews, and, having worked for him for seven years, I was quite aware of 
this. He is an extremely busy man, but being such an influential and well respected
misrepresentation o f what is happening in the Nigerian context’. Although I explained the focus o f my 
study to him over the phone, in Kaduna, Nigeria, he was insistent that I read everything he has written 
first before he would agree to sit down with me for an interview. Not even my explanation that I was 
familiar with the ones that were relevant to my study could change his mind.
257 Part o f the letter he sent to me reads as follows: “I have gone through your questionnaire. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible for me to respond to the questions without my undertaking some in- 
depth research o f my own which, I do not imagine is the purpose o f the questionnaire ... I therefore 
very much regret that it was not possible for me to be o f any assistance to you in your work.
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journalist in Nigeria, I thought his views were certainly those that I could not afford to 
do without. However, after a few telephone calls, he agreed to have ‘a chat’ with me 
in his office but insisted that nothing should be taped. I had to respect his wish. His 
‘chat’ with me was brief but I used my journalistic skills258 to ensure that every word 
he spoke was written down (Palgrave-skills4study, 2006: 2).
With Alade Odunewu, however, I was not so lucky. At the time I did my fieldwork in 
2001, Chief Odunewu was the Chairman of the Nigerian Press Council (NPC). My 
various attempts made to secure an interview with him met with failure either because 
‘Chief is not in’ or ‘he does not like doing interviews’.259
4.2b Sampling of Newspapers
A total o f nine newspapers, were selected for analysis as a representative sample of 
the research population. In this study, the Nigerian newspapers based on their 
ownership pattern and structure, their activities that border on national integration and 
unity and all the issues related to them constitute the population (see Chapter Three).. 
Using a simple sampling technique, the aim was to make sure that they represent the 
basic interests of all sections of the Nigerian society, which in this case are 
categorised into the majority and minority ethnic groups, their culture and religion as 
well as the federal and state governments. Four of the newspapers are privately- 
owned, while of the remaining five, both the federal and state governments control 
two and three, respectively.260 One of the advantages of this process is that there was 
no bias in the selection because it was done on the basis of what they represent and 
the types o f ownership, making them reflect the population accurately.
To ensure this was the case, stratified sampling procedure was used to select the nine 
newspapers from the over thirty newspapers that were in existence during the research 
period. Then using cluster sampling based on ownership, two clusters southern and 
northern Nigeria emerged. In which case, private newspapers from south and north;
258 One o f the skills I learnt as a practising journalist in Nigeria was short words and letters to take 
notes and expand them into reports and stories later. This served me very well when I had a chat with 
uncle Sam without using a tape-recorder.
259 For how my various attempts to secure an interview with Chief Odunewu went, see Appendix iv
260 See Appendix III for the social context o f the sampled newspapers at a glance
261 See Nnaemeka et al, 1989.
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federal newspapers from south and north; state newspapers from south and north. But 
in using this procedure a problem arose. The availability of newspapers was 
inconsistent between the two areas. While records of some newspapers were available 
to some extent in the southern part of Nigeria, it was not the case with those 
newspapers that were published in the north. Besides most of the newspapers (See 
Nnaemeka at al, 1989: 401-411), that were in the north were not well circulated even 
within their base and I found no records o f them in the archives of the National 
Library of Nigeria and Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, both in Lagos. As a 
result, state government-owned and privately-owned newspapers from the northern 
part of Nigeria are missing from the sampled newspapers.262 This could be seen as a 
problem and their non-selection could be interpreted as a weakness of this study. Yet 
the effect of this is minimal for three main reasons: the fact that there is no adequate 
theoretical basis for the establishment of newspapers in Nigeria. They are set up for 
one or more of the following: (a) for personal and political reasons; (b) to protect 
nationality/ethnic interests; (c) to protect the interests of governments at federal 
and/or state levels, and; (d) for economic reasons. In other words, while there are 
clear differences between the newspapers in terms of their aims and objectives, all of 
these are represented in the sample -  and are thus substantially representative of the 
newspaper population.
4.2c Sampling of newspaper materials for analysis
It should be noted that not all the newspapers were always available for examination 
either because they were: established after 1983; out of circulation after being sealed- 
up by Nigeria’s military regimes for falling foul o f draconian military decrees (Maja- 
Pearce, 1996: 202-203; Article 19, 1997) or due to the poor facilities for conducting 
research in Nigeria as has been noted.264
Two reasons therefore informed the sampling procedure that was used to select the 
materials for analysis. First, the Nigerian circumstances pose some difficult problems
262 As discussed elsewhere, the nature o f the Nigerian press is such that it is predominantly within the 
Ibadan-Lagos axis, and Northern newspapers have consistently failed to thrive (see p. 25 below).
263 Read fieldwork interviewees: pp. 176-180
264 See Nnaemeka et al, 1989a: 411.
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for any researcher wishing to collect comprehensive data for analysis. The problem is 
much more pronounced when it comes to having access to past copies of newspapers 
because of lack o f needed materials and personnel for keeping adequate records.265 
For instance a recurring feature o f even some o f the copies o f newspapers that were 
available in library archives was that some o f the pages were either tom or missing 
completely, Second, because of the enormous amount o f materials involved, it was 
necessary to limit the number o f newspaper materials to be analysed to a very 
manageable level without compromising the reliability of the conclusions reached 
about the true nature o f the coverage done by the newspapers.
With regard to the first point, Mr Ray Ekpu, Chief Executive of a leading Nigerian 
news magazine, Newswatch lamented the poor state of libraries in newspaper 
houses in Nigeria. The Daily Times (13/06/83 p i 3) quoted him:
[Recalling] an incident in 1980 when a newspaper organisation was setting up 
its new library and had to dispose of some of its old newspaper cuttings and 
photographs as a result o f space shortages ... [and lamented that] many 
newspapers still do not have trained librarians because they still do not see the 
need for them ... Many newspapers still spend peanuts yearly on library 
development, with the result that their libraries have a stunted growth ...
With these in mind, it was important to limit the sample of articles and issues to look 
at, using some issues o f fundamental importance in Nigeria as analytical categones 
as a guide. The analytical categories were not chosen arbitrarily but because they are 
the issues that influence the editorial direction of Nigerian newspapers, be it within a 
civilian or a military administration in Nigeria. The sampling was done in stages in 
order to reduce the texts and articles to be analysed to a manageable level (see Hansen 
et al, 1998: 101-105). I therefore undertook a simple random sample pilot on one 
year’s press of a ten-year period (1983-1993). Consequently, I sampled by focussing 
on:
265 See, for instance, Nnaemeka et al. eds. 1989a: 411; Robertson, A.F., 1985: 279-290.
266 See appendix VI
267 Mr Ekpu said this during a lecture titled: "Libraries: The lifeblood o f newspapers" at the annual 
June lecture o f the Nigerian Library Association, .the Daily Times reported his views under the title: 
“Newspaper managers advised on library”.
268 See table 3
269 See for instance (Hansen, et al, 1998: 106), who state that the selection o f analytical categories 
should be based on the fact that they are directly related to the overall aims and objectives of a 
research.
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How the newspapers treated the issues in the sixth month of the first year;
What they treated in the second week of the sixth month of the year;
Looking around the period that a specific crisis occurred and then treating the crisis in 
detail as covered in all the newspapers in the same week of the same month. For 
example, the June 1989 SAP riots, the aftermath of the annulled June 12, 1993 
Presidential election, and Nigeria’s Under-17 national team triumph at the FIFA- 
organised World Cup tournament, held in Beijing, China, in August 1985.
My intention in doing this was to gauge what a year’s worth of that sampling will give 
me with a view to cutting down the rest of the sampling to a manageable size that will 
still be representative of the activities that the newspapers engage in. In fact the 
sample pilot brought to the fore, what a task it would be to analyse, using the 
sampling pilot procedure, the yearly activities of the newspapers, over a ten-year 
period. After going through the significant amount of materials that I collected from 
the sampled newspapers, it became clear that it would be impossible to explore all of 
the issues that newspapers covered in one thesis.
As a result, using simple convenience sampling methods, I decided to, in addition to 
the first year, 1983; sample the sixth month of every other year after that (1985, 1987, 
1989, 1991, and 1993). And using a systematic sampling technique, I selected ten 
days of coverage from each of the newspapers spread over a four-week period of the 
month, with the first week inclusive, as follows:
• The first seven days of the sixth month of each of the years randomly selected;
• Followed next by every seventh day after (14th, 21st, 28th), till the end of the 
month.
However, the negative aspect to using this procedure was that some of the newspapers 
had missing pages, or some dates or copies were missing from a whole month of
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newspaper publications, thereby creating the possibility of bias. This was 
compensated for by taking other copies to ensure that ten days were still covered 
within the month (see Bryman, 2000: 90) through the following procedure:
• Where there are some copies of the sixth month of the selected year of each of 
the newspapers missing, the convention adopted will be to analyse the first 
seven available copies of the newspaper for the month;
• This was followed also by every available seventh copy thereafter, till the end 
of the month.
4.2d Sampling of stories/articles for analysis
Many Nigerian newspapers, including those selected for this study, publish both first 
and second editions stories. The reason is because of the way that newspapers are 
distributed in Nigeria. As a result of the poor transportation network, etc, the 
privately-owned newspapers based in the Lagos/Ibadan axis, in particular, make sure 
that they reach the northern and eastern parts of Nigeria by sending their first editions 
only. The first edition of each of these newspapers is usually made up of late news. 
For instance, the first edition sent to the eastern and northern parts, say on 12 June, 
1983, is usually the second edition of 11 June, 1983 in the southwest (Lagos/Ibadan 
axis).
Besides, the prominence that different stories are given in the different editions also 
varies. For instance, the lead story in the first edition in the north or east might not be 
the lead in the second edition, where it was published a day before and vice versa. 
Predictably, this is not always the case but happens most of the time. This enables 
many of the newspapers to make sure that the prominence given to any issue is 
relevant to the areas where the edition is sold. In effect a story that would make the 
lead in the north or east, because of its relevance to the area, could have been just one 
of the stories published in the second edition the day before in the southwest. But it 
should be added that most of the stories published in many of the newspapers, 
especially those located within the Lagos/Ibadan axis, selected for analysis, are
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9 7  nsecond edition stories.
But because o f the lack of comprehensive copies of newspapers published during the 
period under study, convenience sampling procedure was used to select the stories to 
be analysed. Every effort was made to ensure that priority was given to the news 
stories on the front pages of each of the newspapers. Some paragraphs in the 
headlines and sub-headlines will be quoted, where appropriate, to illustrate a point. 
Fenichel and Dan (1980: 338) have noted that:
... the main and sub-headlines of newspapers, due to their simplicity and high 
visibility, may in themselves influence public opinion.
The strong points here are ‘visibility’ of stories and their capability to ‘influence 
public opinion’. These explain the choice of the pages in the sampled newspapers 
selected for analysis. So although stories on the front pages and back pages are readily 
seen, the inside pages of the newspapers where the issues that fit into the analytical 
categories are, will also be treated. This will be done particularly if  the front pages of 
the newspapers are missing, in which case, the relevant issues in the available pages 
will be analysed. But more importantly, this will be done in line with my plan to 
analyse the coverage of the newspapers under the categories in the following table:
Table 3
General Issues Specific Issues
Elections and Electioneering June 1989 SAP riots
Activities of political parties Coverage o f the 1991 OAU Summit in Nigeria
June 1993 Presidential Election 
World Cup triumph of Nigeria in 1985
The idea here is to capture how the newspapers treat the issues that might promote 
Nigerian national integration, i.e. they can potentially do so, and that whatever way 
they do choose is clearly deliberate. In effect, on general issues that fall into the 
sampled period, the headlines and sub-headlines news stories, on the front pages, will
270 I am able to make these assertions because I was involved in the management o f two of Nigeria’s 
national newspapers, the Vanguard, for seven years and later, The Independent Weekly newspaper, for 
three years.
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first be analysed. However, when it comes to how the newspapers dealt with specific 
issues, the headlines and sub-headlines stories on their back pages will in addition be 
analysed particularly if such specific issues are not reported by the newspapers on 
their front pages. This procedure will also be used where the front pages of any of the 
newspapers are missing and the back page news stories have dealt with any of the 
specific issues.
The sampling was done this way having taken into consideration the reading habit of 
many of the people that read newspapers in Nigeria. For instance, Nigerian vendors, 
who roam about the streets soliciting for buyers of the newspapers, have a habit of 
displaying the front or the back pages in order to attract potential buyers.271 The 
vendors also maintain a newsstand to display the newspapers for sale. In recent years, 
as a result of the hard economic situation which, has raised the cover price of 
newspapers out of the reach of the average Nigerian newspaper readers, there has 
emerged the FRAN.272
However, where the front page is not available, page 2 will be analysed. But when
Ol'Xpage 2 is unavailable, the back page will be the next in priority for analysis. 
Nevertheless, when the back page is all sports, then the next available page after page 
2, 3, or 4, as the case may be, will be analysed. It should be added here that this 
procedure was necessary274 given the fact that past copies of newspapers, as noted 
above, are rarely available to the researcher in Nigeria.
What have been analysed in this chapter are the two methodological approaches that 
will be used to carry out this research. They were chosen because they are relevant to 
my type of research and convenient for finding answers to my research questions and
271 Also see, for instance, Agbese, D., 1997: 45, where the author noted that newspaper vendors in 
Nigeria, suggest headlines that would sell newspapers to Editors.
272 This stands for the Free Readers Association of Nigeria. What happens in this case is that Nigerians 
who cannot afford the high cost o f newspapers mill around the newsstands to read newspapers for free 
or alternatively, they pay a token amount to the vendors to gain permission for 'free reading'. Also see 
fieldwork interviewees: Al-Bashir, p.193; Egbochukwu, 1996: 214-215; Abati, 2006: electronic source, 
The Guardian, 23/04/2006
273 The back page o f Nigerian newspapers is the last page at the back of the papers. During the period 
under study, it was not the tradition o f the newspapers to feature only sports stories on the back page as 
is mainly the case in the newspapers published in the UK.
274 With respect to issues o f this nature, that is, using documentation as a research method, see 
Magnusson and Bergman, 1990.
130
hypotheses. For instance, the tables show how the qualitative approach was employed 
to analyse the content of the newspapers. The themes that form the headlines in each 
of the tables show what particular editorial policy/policies that the sampled 
newspapers adopted in response to the different circumstances in which they had to 
conduct their individual activities during the research period and these, as earlier 
noted, will be analysed later in the thesis.
But the next chapter commences the next stage of this project, which is, the analysis 
of the intensive/in-depth interviews conducted as part of the qualitative research 
method used for this study.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Interviews
The main thrust of this chapter is the outcome of the various interviews conducted in 
Nigeria, as part of the fieldwork for this study. As already indicated, it provided a 
unique opportunity to use the resources of the experts on the Nigerian press. The 
analyses of the interviews are based on the scope and focus of this study. But at this 
point, some of the issues that informed the way that they have been articulated should 
be pointed out:
• The first is that names of the interviewees have not been concealed. This was 
done with the approval of the interviewees, who said that they were happy for 
their names to be used.
• The second is that because of their expertise and knowledge of the Nigerian 
press, I did not consider it necessary to interpret everything that each of the 
interviewees said. The purpose here is to give readers the opportunity to read 
what they had to say on the various issues that they were asked to comment 
on. As a result, some of them have been quoted extensively where necessary.
5.1 Fundamental issues in Nigeria: Analysis of perspectives of 
interviewees
When interviewed, these experts on the press in Nigeria agreed that the media must be 
mobilised to redress the symptoms of Nigeria's colonial past. As some writers on 
the mass media in Africa note, for the media to do this successfully, there needs to be 
a shift from the colonial model of journalism training, which emphasises Africa's
275 See Prof. Ikenna Nzimiro, 1989: 24-48; Kitchen 1956; Ainslie 1966; Hachten 1971: xvi.
276 This model is usually credited with instilling in African journalists western values of what news is. 
This is now ‘discredited’ because it is thought to be unrelated to the realities o f a post-colonial state 
and therefore unsuitable as a technique to be employed to analyse and understand the situations within 
it. The development model on the other hand is said to be relevant to the African context because it 
teaches African journalists the essence o f the African environment and what is needed to make the 
change for the benefit o f Africans.
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colonial history, to the development model that would ensure that the training that 
African journalists get fully equips them for the task of national development (Jeter et
777al. 1996: 40). However, as discussed elsewhere, because the press has failed to live
• 970
up to this challenge, according to the key informants, it has been portrayed as being 
partisan, regionalised and tribalistic, even though its role in the making o f the 
Nigerian nation is well documented (Omu, 1996: 10; Macebuh, 2001: 2; Nwuneli, 
1986; Amatokwu, 1989). As a result, it has been written off as being incapable of 
instilling, in Nigerians, a sense of collective national identity.
But the Nigerian press is certainly a child of the circumstances under which it found 
itself. In his submission on the "Press and Military rule", Lateef Jakande a Nigerian 
media expert, alluded to this when he stated that
The press is part and parcel of the society it serves. It is the mirror of that 
society. If therefore, the society consents to a particular system of government, 
the press can do no more than work within that system ... the role of the press 
must be reconciled to realities (Jakande 1979: 110-111).
Another observer of the Nigerian press, Dr Omar Farouk Ibrahim, has also 
corroborated this point:
Every press is a product o f its milieu, the society, and it defines itself in 
respect o f  what it finds itself in. (Interview in Kaduna)
But nobody has specifically focussed on how the press’ role has changed over time or 
how it has often stood up, whether in response to threats from outside or within. In 
fact a careful study of the Nigerian press would reveal that certain issues and crises 
that have been represented by the press are structured around national identity. In all 
of the issues, what had tended to guide its behavioural pattern has been the need to 
promote a collective Nigerian national identity within a multi-cultural context. The 
nature of the Nigerian society makes it inevitable that so many issues will be 
involved. But it is possible to gauge and measure the achievements of the press / 
media in this regard through an examination of their role in some of the fundamental
277 See also Adeigbe, ed. 1985; Ugboaja, F.O. et al. 1987; Opubor, 1985: 188; Sobowale 1989: 306- 
397; NPC, 2000: 127; Akinfeleye, ed., 1988.
278 Uche, 1989: xvii; Oyovbaire 2000; Omu 1978; Ciroma 1994: 35.
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970issues, which centre on Nigerian integration and unity. Some o f the issues 
discussed by the interviewees are listed below, followed by their analysis.
1. The press and Nigeria’s unity;
2. The colonial period and the nationalist struggle for independence (1914-1960);
3. The Nigerian civil war (1966-1970);
4. Military intervention in Nigerian politics;
5. Civilian rule;
6. Annulment o f the June 12 1993, presidential election;
7. The controversy over Nigeria's membership of the OIC;
8. The census controversy;
9. The sharia issue;
10. The press and a collective Nigerian national identity.
5.1a The press and Nigeria’s unity
It is generally agreed among the experts on the African media that the press has been 
in the forefront of the quest for Africa’s development in all areas of human 
endeavour. For instance, they are quite united in their belief that the press in Africa is 
more a unifying force than a divisive force.280
Many of the interviewees in this study share this view. They believe that the press in a 
post-colonial state plays a homogenous rather than a heterogeneous role in accordance 
with government's emphasis on unifying all groups in the state:
I f  you look at the history o f the press in Nigeria, it has never compromised 
national unity ... There is no section o f the press that is indifferent to the issue 
o f national integration ... The press wouldn't say 'we don’t need Nigeria', but it 
will tell you that Nigeria will do better i f  you arrange it this way or that. (. G. 
G. Darah: Interview in Lagos)
...The need for Nigeria to remain united has been emphasised by all the 
newspapers. To the best o f my knowledge, this need has been emphasised by 
all o f them in different perspectives. There has never been any Editorial in any 
o f the newspapers calling for the break-up o f  Nigeria". (Al-Bashir: Interview 
in Kaduna).
See pp. 10-13 above 
280 See Tusa, 1992: 15; Ansah, 1981; Arikpo, 1967: 165; Wilcox, 1975: 31.
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...The Nigerian media seek to foster national unity. (Emeka Izeze: Interview 
in Lagos),
No newspaper in this country has ever promoted disintegration. They may 
criticise the structure, they may say we like adjustments here and there...but 
the question o f national unity is uppermost in the eyes o f every newspaper in 
this country ( Mohammed Ibrahim: Interview in Kaduna).
However, there is also the belief that the basis for unity is, for the different units that 
make up Nigeria, to take cognisance of the Nigerian situation and then arrive at a 
generally agreed formula on how the different units should appreciate each other in 
order for them to be able to live together. This is the Nigerian dilemma that prompted 
Professor Wole Soyinka (2000), for instance, to say: "We are a nation that desperately 
needs to define itself'.281
This clearly aligns with the reasoning of both Farouk Ibrahim and Momoh, who 
respectively assert:
"First o f  all you cannot talk o f unity or a nation i f  people do not understand 
each other. You need to know, understand and appreciate your compatriots 
before you can have unity (Omar Farouk Ibrahim: Interview in Kaduna),
In 1914, we had the amalgamation o f the North and the South and that 
geographical space has remained substantially the same. 97,000 communities 
occupy this geographical space, more than 370 nationality groups or national 
groups. But officially we say 250 nationality groups, out o f  which we have the 
major three-Hausa/Fulani, Ibo, and Yoruba. These major three have tried to 
dictate what Nigeria should be. Unfortunately they have not come to the 
recognition from experience that it's impossible to reduce the number to less 
than three. The civil war proved it; we could not wipe out Biafra. The Action 
Group (AG) crisis in the West proved it, we cannot undermine the Yoruba, nor 
is it possible to undermine the Hausa/Fulani who themselves have been trying 
to undermine the other people and make them play second fiddle.
And when we talk o f the potentials o f  all the others put together, they have a 
population more than the three. So these groups or nationalities have more in 
common with themselves as nationalities, as ethnic groups than with a nation. 
We have not really developed a national outlook. (Tony Momoh, Interview in 
Lagos),
5.1b The press and the independence struggle in Nigeria
281 See Ekeh. 2001; Ekeh et al. eds. 1989; Bello, Ahmadu [Sardauna], 1986: 134.
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Starting first with the colonial period, it will become apparent that the Nigerian press, 
more than any other institution in society, fought a heroic battle to ensure the 
realisation of an independent Nigerian nation. This is what Jeter et al (1996: 11) 
referred to as 'the philosophical contexts of Africa's mass media'. Also, Macebuh 
(2001: 2) has remarked that “In the beginning, the Nigerian press played a critical, 
even indispensable role in our fight for independence. Indeed, it is arguable that it was 
the press that transformed the theoretical idea of Nigeria into a living, vibrant reality.” 
However, many of the interviewees couldn’t agree more, as each o f their statements 
below clearly indicates:
The most revolutionary, the most courageous participants in the anti-colonial 
struggle were the Nigerian Press. It was unprecedented in Africa. The 
Nigerian elite, the Lagos elite was insufficiently articulate to generate the 
readership or the reading public for the newspapers. The newspapers kept the 
politicians on their toes.
It was the press that helped to define what you can call the Nigerian interest 
vis-a-vis colonial interest. At a point, in terms o f historical epoch when it was 
required to distinguish between what the Nigerian people want and what the 
British imperialist wanted, it was the press that articulated the Nigerian 
viewpoint.
So the Press grew up in the context o f the evolution o f the Nigerian State. It 
has a very close link to the Nigerian system. From the early 20s to the 60s, it 
was the Press that fought the British much more than you will find  anywhere 
else in Africa where the leading lights were also politicians, a role exemplified 
by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe who came from Ghana to Nigeria. The first thing he 
did was to set up a Newspaper. So he announced his own partisanship into the 
Nigerian struggle in 1937. (G.G. Darah. Interview in Lagos).
"The press' own mission before independence was to work and drive out the 
British from Nigeria, which they did because it was a nationalist press.
(Tony Momoh. Interview in Lagos).
"The Press, pre-independence ...found a common ground in the sense that 
there was a common enemy that is the colonial master and everybody 
recognised the need for independence. So they were able to speak with one 
voice in terms o f independence for the country. (Dan Agbese. Interview in 
Lagos).
In colonial Nigeria, the press was at least to some extent, a popular sector. It 
was very nationalistic [and] maybe at that time we had what I  call a common 
foe, the colonialists. There was not much trace o f ethnic or regional divisions. 
(Duro Onabule. Interview in Lagos).
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In his own contribution, Alhaji Babatunde Jose (interview in Lagos), who was part of 
the campaign against colonial rule, being a journalist at that time, also noted that the 
pre-independence press was very active in mobilising the public in the crusade against 
British colonial rule and for independence. He said that politicians, individuals and 
political parties who owned the press were nationalists and were unanimous that 
British rule was unacceptable and that the country has to become independent. He 
referred to the pre-Zik stage where the politicians started newspapers on their own, 
with their own money. According to him, these politicians were the publishers, the 
editors and sometimes functioned within a one-man weekly newspaper and there was] 
not much news, but opinions, editorials and articles that were directed against British 
rule. The other stage of the press was what he described as the advent of Herbert 
Macaulay's Daily News followed immediately by the Daily Service which were 
both Lagos-based. Alhaji Jose added that the next stage was the ‘Zikist’ era which, 
according to him, started when Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe arrived from the United States of 
America to the Gold Coast (Ghana) and then to Nigeria where he started the West 
African Pilot whose motto was: "Show the light and the people will find the way." He 
said Dr Azikiwe's nationalism was ‘proper nationalism’ and o f a different kind as it 
was not localised among the intelligentsias but also ‘targeted the workers and tribal 
organisations all over the country appealing to the people regardless of their ethnic 
group or ethnicity’.
To Chief Henry Odukomaiya (interview in Lagos), “the role of the press prior to 
independence in 1960 was very significant”. Recalling that Dr. Azikiwe set up the 
Zikist Group of Newspapers, namely the West African Pilot, the Comet and what he 
called “a number of other newspapers, which have now gone”, he said those 
newspapers at that “at that time played a catalytic role of gingering people up to their 
rights (as).. .they sensitised Nigerians to their rights and the need for them to fight the 
British colonialists for independence...(and) .made them aware that they were in
282 Zik stands for the name Nnamdi Azikiwe, a foremost Nigerian nationalist, and journalist. He 
returned from his sojourn in the US in the early thirties and established the West African Pilot 
newspaper in 1937 and used it to campaign against the colonialists. The main difference between his 
newspaper and those that preceded it was that the West African Pilot had much influence on the psyche 
of the colonised Nigerian people because o f its wide circulation.
283 Herbert Macaulay, a foremost Nigerian nationalist, was the leader of what was then known as the 
National Democratic Party (NDP). The Daily Service was owned by the Nigerian Youth Movement 
(NYM) formed by the young intelligentsia, or professionals from British universities.
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bondage because a lot of people did not even know that they were in bondage. A lot 
o f people took it for granted that the British were there and that they would be there 
forever”.
These are all corroborated by the other interviewees as exemplified by the following 
quotes attributed to each of them:
In pre-colonial period the Press essentially saw its duty as that o f  fighting for 
Nigeria's independence. (Dr Omar Farouk Ibrahim, Interview in Kaduna).
The pre-independence Nigerian press was largely under-developed ...in the 
sense that there weren't many o f them. We had the Nigerian Tribune, the 
West African Pilot, the Daily Times, and the Nigerian Citizen as it was then 
and the concern was the struggle for independence, supporting the political 
leadership, the political parties, promoting regionalism rather than federalism 
as a matter o f fact. But the only common denominator at the time was to kick 
the British out in a most peaceful manner. (Mohammed Ibrahim. Interview in 
Kaduna)
"As you know, the Nigerian press pre-independence was more interested in 
fighting the colonialists and ... in making Nigeria become an independent 
nation. The question o f national integration was not much the focus. But o f  
course at the same time ethnicity was not the critical issue as it became after 
independence. So this is the way I  see the press, pre-independence. O f course 
the press in the South, as even today, was in the majority. They were more 
critical o f  the colonialists than the Nigerian Citizen, which was the only 
newspaper really in the North then. There were other smaller ones, but it was 
the Nigerian Citizen that was very prominent... (Muhammadu Turu 
Interview in Kaduna).
5.1c The post-colonial press
One of the strongest points of the Nigerian press is perhaps the fact that it was able to 
react positively to the demands that were thrown at it during the nation's struggle for 
independence. It did that successfully because it quite appropriately articulated the 
Nigerian position vis-a-vis the British colonialists.
So, since independence, how has the Nigerian press performed? What has been its 
main focus and how has this affected the need for the realisation of Nigeria's national 
aspiration of integration and unity? Apparently, the clear perspective on the national 
issue that dominated its activities during the independence struggle has not been
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carried through to the post-independence era (Omu, 1996: 10; Kukah, 1996: 134-
“J O  A
135). . The press was expected to react to the different issues that developed in
terms of how to ensure that all interests in the country were well represented and 
catered for (see Ibrahim, I. and Akanni, T. eds, 1996: 121).
Many of the interviewees believe that, since independence, this is where it has all 
gone wrong with the Nigerian press. For instance, in the opinion of Farouk Ibrahim, 
this became the case because, since Nigeria attained political independence in 1960, 
‘the press has not really redefined its role clearly.’ The reason for this, as further 
explained by Ibrahim, was because during most of the 60s, 70s and even up to the 
80s, the press carried on with the same anti-establishment position that became its 
hallmark in colonial Nigeria. His argument is that this limited the press’ potential to 
play its expected role in society. As he put it:
The post-colonial press is supposed to be development-oriented, to assist the 
government run their administration better, and define what is in the best 
interest o f  the country. I  am not sure that the Nigerian press really has been 
able to define its role in this respect. (Omar Farouk Ibrahim, Interview in 
Kaduna),
Chief Odukomaiya believes that the press did not do anything untoward until the first 
post-independence elections in 1964 and 1965. The acrimonious developments that 
followed these elections, he explains, inevitably led to the first military coup d'etat in 
Nigeria on 15 January 1966 and the subsequent coup d'etat in Nigeria, with all the 
consequences that they have had on the entire Nigerian society (Ekwe-Ekwe, 
1991).285 He contends that 'it was at that time that the role of the press became 
manifest because the ownership structure of the various presses began to show in the 
things that they published and printed.' For instance, he also notes that the way that
n O / T
the military leadership of Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi went about governance 
(Aguolu, 1973: 159) not only generated a lot of discontent against the new military 
regime, it culminated in the killing of Ironsi himself by young military officers of 
northern extraction because they decried what they regarded 'as the discriminatory
284 Also see Bello, Ahmadu [Sardauna], 1986: 134.
285 Also see Adekanye, 1987: 17-30; Agbese, 1990: 293-312; Ehrenreich, 1982: 235-285;; Akpan, 
1988: 40-46).
286 Major General Ironsi was the first Military Head of State o f Nigeria.
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manner in which the first coup was executed.' (See Dudley, B.J., 1973: 104-108). 
Describing this particular event and the effect it had on the Nigerian press, 
Odukomaiya states:
That appeared to have been the last straw that broke the camel's back for the 
Nigerian press, as they no longer had any pretensions o f  unity. It became a 
case o f 'to thy tent Oh! Israel' ... And because o f  the various degrees o f 
schisms that existed in the various parts o f the country, they could not play 
many roles by way o f integration. They could not play any integrative role 
because each o f the newspapers had its own limitations ...as Nigerian politics 
itself was sharply divided along ethnic lines. (Henry Odukomaiya: Interview 
in Lagos).
On his own part, although Momoh acknowledges that the press had striven to be 
nationalist since Nigeria attained independence, he said its methods and activities 
have rarely been effective because, apart from not ensuring accountability, which 
could have guaranteed responsible government in the Nigerian polity, the press has 
not been able to develop an enduring feature of seeing issues from a national
'yon
perspective. In the words of Momoh:
The press has striven to be nationalist since independence and it has seen 
itself to be successful only when it is opposed to government and Nigerians 
seem to be interested in opposing government. Nigerians seem not to believe 
governments because o f the corruption they have come to associate with them 
and the fact that we have lots o f things to hide because o f the failure o f 
accountability. (Tony Momoh: Interview in Lagos)
Mohammed Ibrahim agreed with Momoh's view by stating that although the issues 
that confronted the press after independence, together with other forces in the 
Nigerian political landscape succeeded in getting rid of the British colonialists, were 
"national unity, national integration and national cohesion", it became handicapped 
because it was faced with a situation "whereby the political structure of Nigeria was 
largely based on regionalism" and consequently, "people identified more with their 
regions than being Nigerians". Hence, as his explanation further shows, the political 
parties that controlled each of the regions, "attempted to own newspapers" not only to 
promote regional agenda but as a response to the changes that were taking place in the
287 See for instance, Osuntokun, 1989: 351; for a detailed treatment o f critical issues of national 
importance in Nigeria, see: Okeke, Akpuru-Aja and Emezue, eds. 1998; Nwankwo, 1988; Rasheed 
Na‘allah, 1998; Olagunju, Jinadu and Oyovbaire, eds. 1993; Ayida, 1990; Committee on Creation of 
States, 1983; Agunbiade, 1991; Ellah, 1983; Ayoade, 1988; Suberu, 2001; Ekeh and Eghosa, eds. 1989; 
Diamond, 1988; Badru, 1998).
newly independent Nigerian nation (Adamu, S. 1994: 469-472; Muhammadu, T. 
2000: ii-iii, v-vi, 1-8).288.
Alhaji Muhammadu, also one of the interviewees and former Managing Director of 
the New Nigerian newspapers, also supports Alhaji Ibrahim's view. For instance, 
while referring to the various events that occurred immediately after Nigeria gained 
independence, he put this point in perspective:
After independence, the attention was turned to other various issues that 
arose. There were more regional considerations then than before 
independence. I think after independence, there was the issue o f what should 
be the relationship between the regional governments and the Federal 
government. The Western regional government led by the Action Group (AG) 
was very critical o f the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC), which was in 
control o f the Federal government ... and so the press took their cue from  
there to fuel the controversy ...The Daily Times, which though was a leading 
newspaper, was Yoruba-biased. Then there was the A G ’s own newspaper, the 
Nigerian Tribune, Then on the other hand there was the West African Pilot, 
which was in support o f  the NCNC, and o f course there was the eastern 
newspaper called the Nigerian Outlook. So...these newspapers saw issues 
from the point o f  view o f their owners...as a result o f ethnicity and the 
struggle for power by the political leaders... They all thought along the line o f 
what they will gain sectionally, rather than nationally... And so the 
newspapers took their cues from there... (and) promoted narrow and 
parochial, ethnic and regional self-interests."
(Turi Muhammadu, Interview in Kaduna)
But unfortunately, these developments overall, had the dubious effect, some argue, of
n o n
causing the Nigerian civil war, which ensued in 1967 (Amoda, 1972: 14-75). Some 
analysts believe that the Nigerian press played an active role in it (Osuntokun, 1989: 
351; Adamu, S. 1994). Poignantly, while describing the activities of the mass media 
during this period, Osuntokun referred to them as "the harbingers of the civil war, 
through their irresponsible and jaundiced views expressed either on radio, television 
or in the print media”, adding that “the mass media ... right from the time of 
intervention of the various regional governments were more prone to reflecting 
regional sentiments than working for national unity." (Ibid).
288 In his book, titled: "Courage and Conviction-New Nigerian: The First Twenty Years", Muhammadu 
details the way the press conducted its activities during the period before and after Nigeria4 s 
independence)
289 Also see Aguolu, 1971; Azikiwe, 1973; Nwankwo and Ifejika, eds. 1969; Ekpebu, 1969: 33-60; 
Ekpeyong, 1967; Legum, 1966: 12; Lloyd, 1970: 1-13; Meisler, 1967: 334-6; Azikiwe, 1969; Ekwe- 
Ekwe, 1990; Jacobs, 1987).
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Nevertheless, given the divisions within the Nigerian nation, brought about by the 
long period of colonial rule (O’Connell, J. 1967; Nnoli, 1981: 192-216),290 the press 
could hardly have behaved differently. Indeed some theorists have argued that 
because of the effects of the colonial enterprise, certain groups in post-colonial states 
could become so disillusioned and dissatisfied to the extent that they would opt for 
secession, as in the case of the declaration of the Republic of Biaffa by the Ibo ethnic 
group in Nigeria (Smith, 1991: 133).
5.Id The civil war and the internal divisions in Nigeria
There is no doubt also that the civil war further reinforced the internal divisions and 
tensions within the nascent Nigerian State and consequently, as noted above, shaped 
the way that the press reacted to the various issues that arose. At this juncture, it 
should be noted that in order to douse the tension in the country, the new military 
leader that assumed power after the counter-coup of July 29, 1966, Lt. Col. Yakubu 
Go won, created twelve more States291 as a way of emasculating the Eastern Region,
292which was trying to secede from Nigeria (Aguolu, 1973: 161-166) .
According to Odukomaiya, by that action, Lt. Col. Go won removed the rug from 
under the feet of the secessionist leader, Colonel Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu. 
However, Odukomaiya concluded by saying that when the war ended the way it 
ended in 1970 (Achebe, 1998: 56-64; Obi Ani, 1998; Igbokwe, 1995),293 there were 
so many cleavages in the Nigerian political system and the Nigerian press acted along 
that line. Today that division still echoes through the Nigerian nation's political 
landscape, particularly as it pertains to the Ibos (Igbos), who fought the secession war 
and lost. In a presentation made, in 2001, to the Justice Chukwudifu Oputa
290 Also see Onimode, 1981: 166-191; Andreski, 1968; Diamond, S., 1967; Sale, 1969: 12-14; Anise, 
1970.
291 Three regions, namely: Eastern, Western and Northern existed in Nigeria before she gained political 
independence from Britain in 1960. A fourth region, Midwest, was carved out o f the Western region in 
1963, three years after Nigeria’s independence.
292 Also see Sklar, 2004.
293 These authors have dealt on the effects of the war on Nigeria, particularly as they affect the Igbo 
group
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Commission on Human Rights Violation Investigations in Nigeria, the Pan-Igbo 
Organisation, Ohanaeze, chronicled what it described as the atrocities that the Igbo 
ethnic group has suffered in Nigeria, before and after the civil war.294
On the role of the press, during the civil w ar and after, Duro Onabule's recollections 
of the events of that period in the life of the N igerian  nation, is quite revealing:
The press ... had a lot o f impact on Nigeria, particularly on the eve o f military 
intervention in the Nigerian political system in 1966 and the subsequent civil 
war against the declaration o f  the Republic o f  Biafra by the Ibos. The press 
had an impact because the other side in the civil war, the Ibos, who were 
fighting for the actualisation o f  the Republic o f Biafra, were so handicapped 
in terms o f their access to the press to p u t their own views through to the rest 
o f the country. And suddenly, because o f  the pattern o f the coup, the pattern o f 
the killings as a result o f  the military coup o f  January 15, 1966, a section o f  
the country felt aggrieved while another section, that is the Western part o f  the 
country, was indifferent. Meanwhile, the Easterners (mainly the Ibos) 
somewhat tactlessly believed that it had  conquered what it believed was the 
major political obstacle in the country, ... the Northern leadership. In the 
process, a section o f the Nigerian press, that is the New Nigerian, really 
inflamed the situation ...to such an extent that the repercussions o f the earlier 
coup were inevitable. The newspaper whipped up sentiments, whipped up 
emotions, whipped up anger among the Northerners against the Ibos with the 
result that there were tribal killings and then the counter-coup o f July 29, 
1966 (Duro Onabule: Interview in Lagos)
As Onabule's explanation further shows, the role o f  the press during this period was 
particularly felt in the aftermath of the com ing together of the Western and Northern 
regions against the Eastern region. For instance, he contends that this and other 
developments in the country led to the m ass exodus of Easterners from Lagos and 
from other parts of the country,295 and with the national press mainly based in the 
Lagos area (Western Region), the Ibos had virtually  no medium to put across their
294 Part of the presentation as reported in The Guardian [Nigerian] online edition o f 26/07/01, under the 
title: “Ohanaeze, at Oputa panel, counts Igbo’s losses in N igeria ...” read as follows: “To...understand 
our case on marginalisation and disempowerment..., [it] is purposeful denial o f the rights o f some 
members of a given unit by some other members o f  the group who control the power o f allocation o f 
resources...In all realms of public endeavour, Ndi Igbo have the requisite manpower and natural 
resources. But their rights to a fair share of Nigeria’s resources have been consistently denied them by 
Federal authoritites...Ours is a case o f deliberate exclusion o f  Ndi Igbo form common resources by a 
combination o f ethnic groups which control the centre...Indeed, the observed consistent pattern of 
discriminatory and exclusionary responses o f the Nigerian system to Ndi Igbo in the commanding 
heights of the policy suggests that our exclusion is not only deliberate but also malicious...”
295 See Igbo Youth Movement, 2000; Eastern Nigeria, 1966; Muffett, 1982-These books touch on the 
various events that led to the civil war, particularly as they affect the Ibos.
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side of the story. He added that, subsequently, the media in the other parts of the 
country, particularly in Lagos, simply suffocated the East's side of the story so that 
they had no medium. He said that it is arguable whether such imbalance influenced 
the outcome of the war, but that there was no doubt that the press coverage of the civil 
war, largely determined the stand of the outside world towards the civil war at that 
time.
At the same time though, some of the interviewees noted that the Nigerian civil war 
rekindled the nationalist instincts of the Nigerian press because it generally supported 
the Nigerian government’s stand that the state should remain an indestructible and 
indivisible unit (Macebuh, 2001). Supporting this, one of the Interviewees,. Darah, 
explained: "It was the press that saved Nigeria. We were all young then, but in that 
period of '66 to '69, the press backed the Nigerian government." Declaring that the 
press did this in the interest of a united Nigeria, he added that in a way it was doing 
what the press had done during the anti-colonial period. For instance, he said that
JOf.
when the various colonial constitutions (Richardson, McPherson, Lyttleton) , were 
trying to weaken the Nigerian State, balkanise the people, the press was fighting to 
make Nigeria remain united; fighting the British and challenging British legislation 
that tended to weaken the country by division.
Arguing along the same lines, Mohammed Ibrahim noted:
"The press supported the government (military governmnet’s policy to keep 
Nigeria one) during the civil war years. They ... propagated national unity, 
they propagated reconciliation and restructuring and so forth ... they
campaigned for a strong central government” {Mohammed Ibrahim.
Interview in Kaduna). 
5.1e The Nigerian press and military intervention in Nigerian politics
As indicated above, another central aspect in Nigeria’s history in which the press has 
played a prominent part is in the military interventions in Nigerian politics297. This is
one issue that clearly exposes the press as showing a lack of depth in its
296 See, Ezera, 1964, for a detailed analysis of Nigeria’s constitutional developments during the 
colonial period
297 See Emezi, 1997; Ukpabi, 1972; Dent 1969; Adedeji, 1970; Akinyemi. et al. 1971; Baker, 1971.
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understanding of the Nigerian polity (Uko, 2004: part 4). Although, like other 
segments of the Nigerian society, the press welcomed the military because they saw 
them as a better alternative to the rancorous politicians (Dudley, 1973), what has 
become obvious is that the military was not a better alternative to the civilians which 
they, the military discredited (Obasanjo: 1994: 2 1).298 For instance, as Professor 
Dudley attested (1973: 109), when the implications of the first military coup on 
January 15, 1966, in Nigeria “came to be known and assessed, the reactions changed 
and with disastrous consequences”.
For our purposes here the role that the press played in military intervention in 
Nigerian politics can be divided into two phases. The first period is when they, like 
other Nigerians, were in total support of military rule. This period was characterised 
by the press encouraging the military to overthrow democratically-elected civilian 
administrations (Uko, 2004; Odetola 1982: 26). What then happened afterwards was 
that the press was subjected to military pressure, thus using the press against the 
civilian political class (Adekanye, 1987: 7-30).2"  Statements by some of the 
interviewees, confirm these conclusions. Thus, in the discussion of the press and 
military administration in Nigeria, Onabule said:
The press influenced Nigerians to favour military take-over o f government in 
1966 ... All along the media would create the atmosphere or the tension for  
the military to intervene, rightly or wrongly. The tension, the atmosphere is 
always there for the military to use as an excuse to intervene and the media 
were always guilty at that time o f believing that they would use the military to 
change Government. (Interview in Lagos),
Expressing a somewhat similar viewpoint, Al-Bashir said:
The Nigerian media supported the army. In 1966 after the coup, the Drum 
magazine carried a caricature o f the Sardauna o f Sokoto kneeling before 
Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu)300 and that was at a time when there was tension 
in the country .... The painful [aspect] was that the Nigerian media was able 
to promote this kind o f thing ... when they could have resisted the army at that 
time... [Also] when Alhaji Shehu Shagari was re-elected President in 1983, 
the Nigerian Tribune, for three months after October 1983, on its front page 
kept more or less calling on the military to overthrow the administration o f  
President Shagari because they believed Chief Obafemi Awolowo (The 
proprietor o f the Nigerian Tribune), to have won the election. When the
298 See also Odetola 1982: 18, 26 & 31; Agbese, 1988: 270-286; Ekwe-Ekwe, 1990.
299 See also Agbese, 1990: 293-312.
300 Major Nzeogwu led the first Nigerian coup on January 15, 1966.
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Military struck again on December 31, 1983, the Nigerian Tribune again 
carried an editorial commending the Nigerian Military for overthrowing the 
democratically-elected government o f President Shehu Shagari. Then Punch 
again carried the same editorial supporting the position o f the Nigerian 
Tribune. The new Military ruler, General Buhari was asked on the BBC, when 
he was saying that the Nigerian politicians were messing up, whether he 
brought it to the attention o f the politicians. He said ‘no ’, because the 
Nigerian media had told them everything. So, in other words, the ground had 
been softened for them (the Military) before they struck. (Interview in 
Kaduna)
Mr Agbese’s contribution is that after inviting the military, the press were then 
subjected to prolonged haranguing from the military to discredit the civilian political
OA1
class. In the opinion of Agbese:
The first fourteen years o f military regime, what then happened was that the 
press was subjected to a great deal o f  military indoctrination. And the 
indoctrination took the form that the civilians having been kicked out o f office 
for various offences, among which was corruption, nepotism and their 
inability to settle their own political rifts in the interest o f the nation, the 
military were able to turn the press more or less against the political class. 
And so the political class became the enemy o f the nation.
So progressively the press imbibed military indoctrination and began to act as 
i f  it was a natural thing to do, and that there was nothing good in the civilian 
[rule]. And that was the way the military could establish their own legitimacy, 
I  believe. And so the press was more or less a very strong instrument in the 
war against the political class [that was] waged by the military for a very long 
time. (Interview in Lagos)
But this had dire consequences for civil society because it could be safely said that 
when Nigeria returned to civil rule in 1979, it took a long time to re-orientate the 
press to begin to look at the civilians as the new administrators. So even though the 
military was no longer on the scene, they cast a long shadow over the nation. As a 
matter of fact, for the first four years of the civilian regime, the military psyche was 
still very strong in the press. And, according to Agbese, this was manifested in the 
form of exaggerating whatever disagreements happened, however minor, among 
politicians, which was then used as evidence that the politicians had learnt no lessons 
and they were still behaving the same way, and therefore they were not competent to
301 For detailed analysis o f how military regimes have militarised civil society in Africa, see, for 
example: Rutayisire, 1986; Decalo, 1990; Huthful and Bathily, eds., 1998; Klay Kich, Jr. and Agbese, 
eds., 2002; Hutchfiil, 1989.
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rule the country. In Agbese’s words:
By 1983 when we were going into the second term elections, the propaganda 
was very strong. And the propaganda was about corruption, blatant 
corruption in the political establishment. It was therefore easy by the end o f  
1983for the military to come back because the same problems were played up 
very much by the press. It was played up in this way: the newspapers owned 
by the political parties fished in the ponds o f their political opponents and 
whatever was wrong with the country was found in the backyard o f other 
political parties. So it was terribly exaggerated. There was corruption but it 
was terribly exaggerated. And there is enough fact now to show that even if  
there was corruption in the first and second republic, there was more 
corruption during the military regime. (Interview in Lagos).
This is where the press has come under criticism because, as further articulated by 
Agbese, its role during this period was not entirely Nigerian-as-a-state in outlook, as it 
showed partisanship and engaged in activities which were detrimental to the quest to 
ensure that the various groups that make up the Nigerian state were mobilised towards 
the national effort of integration and unity. Continuing, he noted:
This became the case as the press played up the sentiments against the civilian 
political class probably because it expected that after the military and then the 
return to civil rule, everything would be totally different, the politicians would 
behave differently. And o f course the press didn't reckon with the fact that 
after fourteen years o f  being in the political wilderness, the new political class 
had a lot to learn, plus the fact that there was a new political system, the 
executive presidential system, which was being grafted on to the 
parliamentary system, which the country operated during the first republic, 
1960-1966 (Interview in Lagos)302
According to Agbese, what the press could not understand and analyse properly was 
that the oldest politicians who had experience in the parliamentary system found the 
presidential system of government a new experience. And then, on the other hand, he 
explained, there were the new politicians who had no experience to fall back on and 
so nobody knew exactly how to behave. This dilemma created a problem in the first 
four years, which apparently the press did not understand.
302 Also see the communique from the “Report o f Workshop on Media and Democracy”, NPC, 2000: 
131-133
303 Also see Falola and Ihonvbere, eds., 1985; Ikoku, 2002; Ojiako, 1983; Bemasko, 2000; Ojigbo, 
1980; Joseph, R., 1987; Sklar, 1983: xiii-xxi.
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Why did the press act in this manner, with all the implications it had for the national 
effort? In the view of Agbese, this happened because "at the time, there weren't many 
people in positions of responsibility in the press who had gone all the way from the 
first republic through the military and all the way to the civilian regime. In effect 
nobody was guiding anybody."
But as suggested above, it soon dawned on the press that the military were no 
different from the civilian political class, which they overthrew304. This could be 
called the second phase of the press and military administration in Nigeria. This 
tendency of the press became particularly manifest after 1985 during the regime of 
General Babangida, who had on 27 August, 1985 overthrown the military regime of 
General Buhari in a palace coup. It is important to note here that General Buhari led 
the military coup of December 31, 1983, that deposed Nigeria's democratically- 
elected second republic President, Shehu Shagari.
Authorities on the activities of the press during the military interregnum in Nigerian 
politics argue that the misconduct of some military officers and the prolonged military 
rule eventually alienated the media and the public306 to the extent that, subsequently, 
anger was built up against the military. Indeed, this was an era marked by obvious 
corruption which was perpetuated by the military and which permeated the entire 
Nigerian society. To lend credence to this, a former military Head of State of Nigeria, 
General Obasanjo (rtd), and now Nigeria’s president in the new civilian dispensation, 
said:
Corruption on any scale is bad; so is mismanagement on any scale. But given 
the event of the past ... it is clear that the civilian politicians ... were far less 
rapacious in their corruption compared to the military who succeeded them, 
and far less degenerate in their social and economic management (Obasanjo 
1994:21).
As a result of these clear shortcomings of the military administration, the press was in 
the forefront of the campaign for the military to return to the barracks (Macebuh 
2001: 31). As put by interviewee, Mohammed Ibrahim, "[It is to] the greatest credit of
304 Olugboju et al. 1994; Uko, 2004: parts 2 &3.
305 For a comprehensive analysis o f Nigeria's past Heads of State and Government, see Iroanusi, 1997.
306 Read Dan Agbese’s views above, pp. 146-147. Also see Uko, 2004: part 3; Adeyemi, 1993 in 
Graybill, 1998; Olukotun, 2004; Olugboju, 1994; Article 19, 1997; Onagoruwa, 1976; Thompson, 
1988.
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the Nigerian media ... that they fought the military. They tried as much as possible to 
get rid o f the military to hand-over power to the civilians . . .” Yet Onabule 
acknowledged that this became the case because the hopes o f those who fought and 
campaigned for civilian rule were dashed through what he called ‘manipulations by 
the military*. So although the military returned to barracks, the rivalry among 
politicians became so intense that it was no surprise that the military, led by General 
Buhari. struck again in December 1983.
5 .I f  Negative effects of military administration on the press
W hat w as also very noticeable about this period was the enactment o f draconian laws 
by the military administration to curb press freedom, quite contrary7 to their promise of 
press freedom when they assumed office.307 Such military action clearly had a 
negative impact on the press* role in the Nigerian polity. Odukomaiya gave 
expression to this when he stated:
During the period o f  Military' administration, starting from 1966, the press 
had no freedom, the freedom was suppressed. So the role o f  the press at that 
time had to dovetail towards the ability to just managing to exist. It had to 
suppress its personality', it had to pretend to be loyal to the government o f  the 
day. as otherwise it would be closed down. That was what happened until 
19"5 when General Muritala Muhammed overthrew General Yakubu Gowon's 
regime. (Henry Odukomaiya. Interview in Lagos)
Mohammed Ibrahim couldn't agree more when he said that,
When General Muhammadu Buhari took over in 1983 ... they suddenly 
realised that, after all. General Buhari was not a friend o f  the press. He 
introduced draconian measures to 'instil' discipline ... Detention was rampant, 
even journalists were not spared, other anti-government forces were also not 
spared. They were not [thus] too critical because the consequences were 
there. (Interview in Lagos).
However, during this period also, the negative effects o f press and military 
administration were mostly felt in the way that the military government became
308involved in the running o f the affairs o f once dependable and effective newspapers.
0 See Obasanjo, 1980.
508 Professor Osuntokun (1989: 351), gave a clue as to why the Nigerian military administration 
resorted to this strategy when he reasoned as follows.The military had always distrusted the media and
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For instance, what happened when the government took over the Daily Times and the 
New Nigerian was that the two newspapers lost their objectivity and succumbed to 
government interference (Abati, 2002)..Odukomaiya again:
Not long after the new regime took over power, General Muhammed 
announced the Federal Government take-over o f the Daily Times. I  was still 
there. In fact he announced the seizure o f the Daily Times and said that the 
Federal Government was taking over controlling interest in the Daily Times. 
O f course that was done to muzzle the Daily Times, emasculate it and made 
sure that it did not have any independence (Interview in Lagos)
Darah also agrees with Odukomaiya’s view when he says:
The New Nigerian was very critical o f  government [from] 1975. From a 
nationalist point o f  view, it reflected the northern point o f view, which was 
legitimate ...I t had a regional interest. It was not against national integration. 
It was conservative but it never said they didn't want Nigeria. It was the 
Muritala/Obasanjo administration that appropriated the newspaper in 1975... 
Since then, [its] role as media for articulating... position [o f the northern part 
o f Nigeria], has been weakened almost irredeemably. (G.G. Darah. Interview 
in Lagos)
In a similar tone, Farouk Ibrahim, expresses his opinion thus:
By 1975, the Federal Military Government o f General Muritala/Obasanjo 
took over the New Nigerian ...I t  became a government newspaper ... I  think 
generally a government-owned press is perceived as a megaphone o f the 
government all the time. It doesn’t criticise government and is less than 
objective when it comes to presentation o f facts and policies o f government 
(Interview in Kaduna).
In the case of the Daily Times, for instance, Odukomaiya also noted that before it was 
taken over by the Federal Military Government, it was by far the strongest and the 
most viable o f all the newspapers in Nigeria. However, once both newspapers lost 
their independence, as a result of the take-over, other newspapers that were hitherto 
fearless and independent, took their cue. In effect, although the military's professed
held them as one o f the factors o f instability in the country ... The armed forces, in spite of their 
shortcomings, had a more national perspective of events than the media, which right from the time of 
intervention of the various regional governments were more prone to reflecting regional sentiments 
than working for national unity. Having just fought a civil war for national unity, the military was not 
prepared to allow anything to disturb the peace of the land. The natural tendency in the military is 
towards centralisation o f command...These centralising tendencies manifested themselves in...the 
Federal take-over o f the television and radio houses in Ibadan, Enugu and Kaduna. To cap it all, the 
Federal Government took over the New Nigerian and acquired the majority shares in the Daily Times, 
the only major independent newspaper.
150
aim was to promote unity through centralisation, it became counter-productive. 
Indeed, as further explained by Osuntokun:
This centralisation of the media imposed une unite de direction ...(and 
eventually) led to ethnic rivalry and friction thereby ironically destroying the 
national unity which the military was trying to build (351).
5.1g The Press and military in the absence of formal democratic activities
The overwhelming view about the activities of the press during military 
administration remains that it was the press that held the Nigerian society together, in 
the absence of formal democratic and political activities, by standing against the
TOOmilitary (Maja-Pearce, ed., 1996: 202-203). Hence the events that occurred during 
this period, have led some observers of the Nigerian press and military administration 
in Nigeria, like Macebuh (2000), to note that
In the dark days of tyranny and dictatorship, the Nigerian press stood firmly as 
a lonely scourge of wicked authoritarianism, and relentlessly gave promise 
that this nation would someday triumph over all those who were drunk with 
power, and begin again to retrieve the destiny which is undoubtedly ours.
This was also what veteran journalist and politician, Chief M.C.K. Ajuluchukwu 
(2000: 45), meant, while reflecting on the role of the media during the military regime 
of General Sani Abacha, when he stated that
"... history should record that the Abacha regime brought out the best in the 
Nigerian media. Rather than cave in under his brutal and oppressive onslaught, 
the media tackled him head on, oblivious of the grave danger to which his
Tinopponents were confronted."
On this issue, the thoughts of Darah, typify the views of most of the interviewees. To 
him,
The press in Nigeria is almost the last institution to hold on. It was so on 
December 31 1983, when General Muhammadu Buhari came, till 1993 when 
General Ibrahim Babangida messed up. There were no political parties. There 
were no non-governmental agencies. All the battles were waged inside
309 Duyile, 1989: Chapters 6 & 24; Ogbondah, 1993.
310 Also see, Awoniyi, S.B. 2001.
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Newspapers. It was the Military versus the rest o f  Nigeria. When General 
Buhari promulgated his draconian laws, the press was the first victim. 
Journalists like Nduka Irabor and Tunde Thompson, both o f the Guardian 
Newspapers, were the first victims. Did they relent because o f that? No! The 
press has made life uncomfortable for governments that toyed with the issues 
o f development. The government o f General Buhari couldn't last. (Interview in 
Lagos).
5.1h The impact of ownership on the press
It is appropriate to reiterate that the ownership structure of the Nigerian press affects 
the way that the newspapers perform their roles (Dimpa, 1997?: vii & 109; Duyile, 
1989: 42-64). For example, a unique feature of the Nigerian press is the difference in 
the way that both privately-owned and government-owned presses operate. This is 
particularly evident in state government-owned newspapers where the edicts or laws 
establishing them are meant to specifically promote the activities of the same 
government that established them, although nowhere in the edict is it stated that the 
interest of the government should be at the expense of the entire state or federation, as 
the case may be.311 Hear Muhammadu, Momoh and Izeze, respectively:
There is a difference in the way each o f them operates. The government-owned 
newspapers like the Daily Sketch and the Nigerian Observer etc., were 
established to look after the interests o f the respective government that 
established them, though the New Nigerian was an exception. But the 
privately owned newspapers operate in a different fashion. They have to 
survive first o f all because they don’t get subsidies from the government. And 
so they should be free to publish independent opinions for people to buy them 
and also rely on them as carrying balanced views. (Turi Muhammadu. 
Interview in Kaduna).
I f  you look at the edicts or the laws establishing these presses (government- 
owned), you will be surprised that they are meant to promote the activities o f  
the same government (Tony Momoh. Interview in Lagos).
Oh yes. I f  government owns [the paper], you invariably know how you are 
going to perform. And i f  a private company owns you, you will definitely not 
operate like a government newspaper. You operate on the basis o f a private 
company which means primarily you are there as a company ... to make 
profit. (Emeka Izeze. Interview in Lagos).
311 See, for instance, the edition o f Nigerian Observer, 1968: August 26, p. 7.
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5.1 i Forms of control: The axe and the editor
A very typical feature of the way the presses are managed in Nigeria is that the editors 
of newspapers do not have the freedom to operate in a professional manner as many 
seek to protect their jobs (Jeter, et al, 1996: 31; Rosa & Brown, 1986: 114-121). 
Surely this is bound to have implications for the press' effectiveness in promoting the 
ideals of national integration. The issue here is that if those journalists who are 
employed either by the privately-owned or the government-owned newspapers are to 
keep their jobs then they are not expected to promote interests outside of those 
defined by their employers (Dare, T. 1997: 543-4).312 Indeed it was not uncommon to 
find the Federal government, particularly during the era of military administrations, 
promulgating very draconian laws to bring 'dissenting' journalists and newspapers to 
'order' (Maja-Pearce, 1996: 203).313
5.1j Newspapers: A tool of government in power
However, it is not known that the interests defined by a government in power will 
necessarily be in consonance with the overall national interest (NPC, 2000: 132). 
Hence a government-owned newspaper might become the tool of a government in 
power against political opponents, as is often the case in most of Africa, and indeed in 
Nigeria.314 .
Agbese relates his experience as Editor of the Federal government-owned New 
Nigerian newspaper, during Nigeria's Second Republic (1979-1983):
They (NPN-led federal government) saw the New Nigerian as not merely a 
Federal Government-owned newspaper but because the NPN controlled the 
Federal Government, therefore, it was essentially an NPN newspaper and that 
an editor o f the newspaper should recognise that. Unfortunately, I  couldn’t
312 See Nwosu, E.N. 1996: 20-29. Also see the following editions o f National Concord: 5/6/83, p.2, 
19/6/83, p. 3, 25/6/83, front page, and 17/6/83, p. 3).
3,3See also Olugboju, et al, 1994: 7-39; Olukotun, 2004; Article 19, 1997; Onagoruwa, 1980; 
Thompson, T. 1988).
314 See, Ruijter, 1989, cited in Jeter, et al. eds. 1996: 29; Jukwey, J.I. 1997: 86; Osuntokun, A. 1989: 
357; See the front page report titled: “CENSORED: Media houses under siege”, of the National 
Concord edition of Saturday, 25/6/83; the copies of the Nigerian Observer during the first week of 
June, 1983
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recognise this ... I  think it was during the campaign o f the 1983 elections and 
Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe came to Kaduna for his presidential campaign and I  sent 
a reporter and a photographer to the airport. They brought the story and with 
the photograph, I  made it the back page lead. And it caused, shall I  say a 
consternation within the ranks o f the National Party o f Nigeria (NPN), the 
then ruling party because nobody had done that before. I  remember somebody 
writing and saying, “Yes! There is a change in the leadership and the 
direction o f the New Nigerian."
And my own defence had always been that the New Nigerian is a publicly- 
owned newspaper... I  have read the mission statement o f the New Nigerian 
and nowhere does it say that you cannot give voice to a different political 
view. But it didn’t go down too well. (Dan Agbese, Interview in Lagos),
This scenario became especially manifest during the 1983 electioneering campaign 
when political opponents of the Shagari-led Federal government saw the New 
Nigerian as a hostile environment, and were therefore dissuaded from placing party 
political adverts on the pages of the New Nigerian. This situation was particularly 
obvious in August 1983, in the heat of the presidential campaign, as not a single 
advert was placed in the New Nigerian by the opposition political parties, namely: 
PRP, NPP, GNPP, and UPN. Again, the editor of the New Nigerian, at that time, 
Agbese, explains the possible reason for this:
It is true that in August 1983, during the electioneering campaign when I was 
the editor o f the New Nigerian, only adverts from the NPN were published. 
My own assumption, and I base it at what I  knew at the time because I  have no 
hard evidence for this since I  was not involved in the advert department ... but 
I  assume that the other political parties also assumed that since it was “a 
hostile territory”, whatever they put out would either be submerged or be 
treated in a way that it would make it ineffective. So they didn’t bother to 
place adverts there at all. There was no case o f any advert being rejected from 
any other political party that I  knew of. But I  think it was based on the 
assumption o f “Why go there, they wouldn ’t treat you well anyway? ” Because 
each time there was a press conference by another political party, it was like 
at first when I  got there, they were not involving the New Nigerian. When I  
opened the doors o f the New Nigerian they felt happier and they did invite us 
and they came to my house to discuss [the situation] with me. (Interview in 
Lagos).
Ibrahim acknowledges that the Nigerian press is susceptible to the manipulations of 
the different levels of government:
I  was a practitioner. I  was in the system for over 30 years. Let me tell you this: 
All governments are liars, whether military or civilian. All government, at any 
given time, would want to use the press for their maximum advantage. All 
government would want to ride on the back o f the press to reach the
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population. All governments would want to manipulate the press for their 
objectives. And Nigerian governments, in the last forty years, have behaved in 
this manner. (Mohammed Ibrahim, Interview in Kaduna),
Nevertheless, Ibrahim recommends that, in order for the press to overcome this 
reality, it should be encouraged to remain the watchdog of society, irrespective of 
whether or not it is being manipulated by government, and eventually "ensure that 
democracy, the rule of law, justice and fair play are really established in this country 
and become the norm in the society (Ibid)".
5.1k Does government always interfere? Editors engage in self-censorship
As earlier acknowledged, experts on the Nigerian/African media believe that 
government’s involvement and interference in all aspects of the press limit the press’ 
professional competence.315 Nevertheless, there are those who also contend that, more 
than any other thing, self-censorship among media practitioners is the greatest 
hindrance to their ability to practice professionally (Obazele 1996: 155).
In explaining the role that he played in the establishment of the New Nigerian 
newspaper in 1966, Charles Sharp317 noted that he and his colleagues were given a 
free hand to run the newspaper by the northern regional government who owned it 
(Muhammadu, 2000: 12-26). Indeed, while recalling his experience as the Chief 
Executive of the New Nigerian newspaper, which was owned by Nigeria’s federal 
government during the period covered by this research, Farouk Ibrahim argues that it 
is not always "true that government ownership automatically muzzles the press", 
because, according to him, even though the New Nigerian is owned by the 
government, the newspaper "had been very critical of government when it had cause 
to think that the government was wrong" adding that "luckily at least since this 
regime318 came into power we do what we have to do to run a very good newspaper." 
This is a view that Muhammadu also shares when he says that, particularly in the first
315 See p.46 above.
316 See The Nigerian Observer edition of 9/6/83, p. 3; also read the story: “Concord’s embarrassing 
distortions”, as published on page 8 of The Guardian (Nigerian) edition of 1/6/87).
317 Charles Sharp, a British journalist, was the first Managing Director of the New Nigerian newspaper- 
1964-1969
318 The civilian administration led by President Olusegun Obasanjo was elected into office in May, 
1999
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twenty years of its existence, the New Nigerian, even though established by the then 
Northern regional government in 1966,
... had a very national outlook. Indeed people were even surprised that even 
though it was a newspaper owned by the then Northern regional government, 
it expressed very pungent views, independent opinions and focussed on 
national issues and interests. Towards the end o f the Yakubu Gowon 
administration (1966-1975), the New Nigerian published a  petition against 
Governor J. D. Gomwalk o f Benue-Plateau State even though the Benue- 
Plateau State government was one o f  the owners o f the N ew  Nigerian. (Turi 
Muhammadu. Interview in Kaduna).
But Farouk Ibrahim believes that how government-owned newspapers report or take 
sides on matters concerning Government is essentially a function o f the persons 
running the newspapers. Thus he reiterates:
Sometimes government-owned newspapers over-censor themselves. I  can tell 
you sincerely since I  came to this house (New Nigerian), nobody has ever 
asked why you used this story, even though we have carried things quite 
critical o f  Government. Nobody has ever questioned our activities because it’s 
believed that we are doing it in the national interest. And it's simply because 
we have our reasons and our facts. We say that Government is right here and 
Government is wrong there. I  have said in the past that people feel 
uncomfortable that they don't want to be seen to be criticising the authority. 
(Interview in Kaduna).
In his book titled: “Courage and Conviction-New Nigerian: The First 20 Years”, a 
former Managing Director of the newspaper (1976-80), Alhaji Turi Muhammadu, 
further stretches the argument to add that the reason the Federal government-owned 
New Nigerian was able to stand up against the government, after i t  was established in 
1966, was because it proved itself to be very responsible and m ature in its approach to 
issues (Muhammadu, 2000: vi-vii). This is wholly supported by th e  current Managing 
Director of the New Nigerian, Farouk Ibrahim:
The difference is that when we criticise, we watch our language, we try to be a 
lot more responsible and ... mature. That's part o f the tradition o f this 
newspaper house and we have maintained it. Just outright condemnation we 
don't do that. In the past ... this newspaper criticised Government over 
matters like the Joint Admissions and Matriculation B oard  (JAMB), the 
posting o f vice-chancellors, etc. But we did so in a language that said yes! 
With the Government we disagree but it couldn't but respect the constitution.
(Interview in Kaduna).
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5.11 The press and the Nigerian question
Beyond the foregoing, it is generally argued by the interviewees that the press has 
allowed itself to be completely engulfed by the divisive Nigerian politics, particularly 
after Nigeria's independence in 1960, which, in effect has undermined its professional 
status as the Fourth Estate of the Realm (Adamu, S. 1994: 467-472; Ciroma319 1994: 
35). Nevertheless, there is also the argument that in order to understand why the 
press became caught up in the divisive politics of the Nigerian State, the question to 
ask is how Nigeria came to be in this situation.- what went wrong? And more 
importantly, what happened within the newly independent nation that impacted 
negatively on the press? For instance, many agree that the realities of all the 
institutions in Nigeria today, including the press, are a direct consequence of the 
Nigerian society engendered by many years of colonialism (Enwenwa, 1989: 76-
T2177). ). That Nigerian society, as they see it, has yet to decide the national question
and so it is basically divided along ethnic, regional, religious and cultural lines (Saro- 
Wiwa, 1994: 527-534).322 And the fact is that Nigeria is made up of over 250 
nationality groups, and these groups have more in common with themselves as 
nationalities or ethnic groups than with a nation, with the result that many 
institutions in Nigeria, including the mass media, have developed along those lines.
Additionally, most of the interviewees believe that this erodes the Nigerian press’ 
ability to contribute to national integration and unity.
5.1m Each section of the press constructs a notion of national identity
319 On January 22nd 1994, Alhaji Adamu Ciroma delivered a lecture titled: “The Imperative of National 
Unity and the Responsibility of Leadership” at the First Annual Sir Ahmadu Bello Mmemorial Lecture 
under the auspices o f Arewa House, Centre for Historical Research and Documentation, Kaduna. In 
reference to the Nigerian press, Alhaji Ciroma stated: “Our press today...represents the most sickening 
evidence o f the collapse o f values and order in our society and the sub-ordination of national 
institutions to the control and manipulation o f self-seeking parochialisms with seemingly no notion, 
much less interest, in the Nigerian nation”.
320 See Osuntokun, A. 1989: 351
321 See also Golden, P. and Elliot, P. 1979: 21; Andreski, 1968; Hatch, 1970; Sale, 1969; Aguolu, 1973: 
vii; Onimode, 1981: 166-191
322 See also Abutu, A. 1994: 398-402; Nkom, S. 1994: 430-443; Kukak, M. A. 1994: 445-458; Jibrin, I. 
1994: 459-466; Oyedele, E. 1994: 514-526; Mustapha, A.R. 1986: 81-96
323 Read the views o f fieldwork interviewees on pp. 161-164 under the caption: “The Nigerian press 
reflects nationality perspectives.
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More importantly, the reality o f the different nationality groups has engendered a  
Nigerian Constitution, which provides for a Federal form of government whereby a  
deliberate attempt is made to ensure that states are created along nationality lines, 
with a Federal government at the centre to propagate and implement issues in the 
overall interest of Nigeria (Whitaker, 1966: 7-150).324325 The result, as described b y  
Odukomaiya (Interview.in Lagos), is that the press, as representatives of all sectors o f  
the Nigerian community, only "speak for the Ibos, speak for the Hausa/Fulanis, 
Kanuris and the ethnic minorities" (Uche, 1989).326
Does this augur well for the national effort towards national integration? How can the 
press that represent and speak for their respective groups mobilise the entire nation? 
Even before and after Nigeria attained independence, there were intense discussions 
about how the new nation could forge unity within diversity. This was part of the 
reason why the British Colonial government, in 1957, set up the Willink Commission 
to look into the minority problems in Nigeria (see Ezera, K. 1964).
To Momoh, this is simply the way forward for the press and the nation. He said that 
recognising the nation’s diversities should form the basis for promoting national
• • 328integration in Nigena.
It's inevitable! (We) must recognise the diversities as a basis for promoting 
national integration... each o f the newspapers should do so to reflect their 
own diversities... it's good for national integration. It is important that we  
address the issues as they affect the components o f the nation. National 
integration does not mean unanimity o f opinion. National integration means 
recognising all the component parts o f a nation and attending to their needs 
and they too making sacrifices in the interest o f the nation. (Interview in  
Lagos).
What implications do these have for national cohesion and integration? It has been 
argued that it is possible for a nation or a group to achieve collective identity b y  
recognising and promoting the various nationalities within its domain (see, for
324 See also Lewis 1968: 46-47; Carter (ed.) 1966; Aguolu, 1973: vii & 159; Newsweek, 1969: 52-53.
325 For a detailed account of the Federal structure in Nigeria, see Awa, 1964 & 1976.
326 Also see Omu, F. 1978; Haruna, M. 1996: 56-71; Ekeocha, E. 1996: 72-98; Kukah, M. 1996: 132- 
143; See, Tribune at 50, 1999?; Maja-Pearce, 1996: 202-229.
327 Also see Saro-Wiwa, 1994: 529-531; Coomasie, 1994: 263-269.
328 See also Ajayi, 1984: 1-12; Amuwo, et al. eds. 1989; Obasanjo, 1989.
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instance, Schlessinger, 1991: 191), and the press can play a major role in this 
(Fitzgerald, 1991: 211). Momoh believes that this is not a major problem because, 
given Nigeria's historical circumstances, exemplified by its multi-national and multi- 
cultural groups (see Lloyd, 1970: 1-13), the Nigerian press could and should be 
used to promote nationality interests because, according to him, national 
integration/identity in Nigeria should mostly be seen from the point of view of its 
international relevance. In his own words:
You can only talk o f integration internationally. Or let us put it this way; you 
don't see a particular State newspaper running down the Federal 
Government. But you can see a particular newspaper running down another 
State in competition with another State and only opposing the Federal 
Government when the Federal Government undermines the interest o f the 
State. For instance many States have taken the Federal Government to court 
over the issue o f Revenue Allocation and the Derivation Principle. But that is 
not national disintegration; it is simply addressing the issue. (Tony Momoh. 
Interview in Lagos)
Sounding a similar note, Odukomaiya argues that if  we are going to look at the issue 
of national integration, we have to recognise that there is the need to start from a 
nucleus, from a root because it is from that root that any group or institution can go 
ahead and play any integrative role. While supporting this notion, Onabule (Interview 
in Lagos), echoed the thoughts of the late nationalist fighter, Awolowo, by stating that 
"whatever your nationalist instincts are ... whether you like it or not ... you are from 
your own local government area first before being a Nigerian."
On that score, Momoh singles out the New Nigerian newspaper as "the most genuine" 
of all the newspapers "because it reflected a northern perspective and did not deny it 
(Muhammadu, 2000). It said: 'We are Nigerians from the North'. That is, in the debate 
within the Nigerian polity, it will represent the north but where Nigeria is [talking or 
in dispute] with any other country, it will represent Nigeria."
Some of the interviewees voiced their clear agreement with Momoh because they 
believe it is the legitimate route to national integration in the Nigerian polity:
329 Also see Mackintosh, 1966.
330 The late Minister o f Justice of the Nigerian federation, Chief Bola Ige is also known to share this 
view as noted by Sklar, 2004, under the title: “The Federal Question.
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It is only natural that the New Nigerian has to speak for the North. It has 
always been a Northern newspaper propagating a Northern bias. The Federal 
government did not start the newspaper. It was the Northern government that 
started it. (Sam Amuka-Pemu. Interview in Lagos).
It started as a private newspaper called the Nigerian Citizen. It has never 
compromised national integration. It was partisan. It was very critical o f  
government up till 1975... it reflected the northern point o f view, which was 
legitimate. The Nigerian Tribune was not representing the northern part. 
Daily Times was not doing it effectively. There was no National Concord 
then; there was no Guardian. So the New Nigerian was the voice o f the 
North. It had a regional interest. But it was not against national integration. 
(G. G. Darah. Interview in Lagos).
The editorial policy o f the New Nigerian was primarily to promote the interest 
o f the North, to project the culture o f the North within the context o f a 
Nigerian Federation. In other words i t ’s obliged to look at national issues 
through, i f  you like, the eye o f the culture and politics o f the North. (Dan 
Agbese. Interview in Lagos).
But it should be pointed out that it has not only been the New Nigerian that was 
established to promote the interests of a particular region or ethnic area. Just like the 
Nigerian Tribune (see Tribune at 50, 1999) before it, which was set up to promote the 
Yoruba cause, the Champion newspaper was also set up to promote the interests of 
the Ibos.331. Nobody would know this better than the man who was involved in the 
whole process of bringing the Champion to fruition, Odukomaiya:
The Champion that I  also helped to set up ... has as its proprietor, Chief 
Emmanuel Iwuanyanwu. [While]...the West African Pilot...had already gone 
...so  Chief Iwuanyanwu thought that the Ibo race stood to be marginalised if  
there was no voice to speak on their behalf. The only voices that were 
available to them at that time only existed in ... the East. For instance, 
newspapers like the Nigerian Statesman and the Daily Star, [but]... they were 
regional or local newspapers. So Chief Iwuanyanwu wanted a newspaper 
which would be a nationally accepted newspaper, but which would start off by 
protecting the rights o f the Ibo nation, the Ibo cause. The philosophy had to do 
with the intention o f the proprietor to use the newspaper to integrate the 
Iboman into the Nigerian society. Its Mission Statement said: 'Starting with 
the Ibo nation. ’ In effect the Champion newspaper was set up by an Iboman, 
using the newspaper to promote the interest o f the Ibo nation [but] within the 
context o f the Nigerian State. (Henry Odukomaiya. Interview in Lagos).
331 To understand the feelings o f the Ibos within Nigeria, see the Ohanaeze’s submission to the Justice 
Oputa Commission on Human Rights Violations Investigation, as published in the online edition of The 
Guardian [Nigerian] newspaper on 26/07/01 -  Onwubiko, 2001.
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Poignantly, these three newspapers, the New Nigerian, Nigerian Tribune and 
Champion were each set up to promote the interests of their respective ethnic groups, 
that is the Hausa/Fulani, the Yoruba and the Ibo. This is not in any way saying that 
their significance, as national newspapers, is diminished as a result.
5.In Ownership and the space for neutrality
Two of the most respected national newspapers in Nigeria, the Guardian and the 
Vanguard, whose proprietors are from the minority ethnic groups o f Urhobo and 
Itsekiri respectively, were not set up to specifically protect or reflect the interests of 
the minorities. In explaining the basic rationale for the setting up of the Guardian, 
Odukomaiya addresses this:
The motivation for Chief Alex Ibru was certainly not political at all What was 
apparent at that time that the Guardian was being set up was that the Daily 
Times had already been taken-over by the Federal Government, the Nigerian 
Tribune, o f course belonged to the Awolowo group, [while] the National 
Concord belonged to Chief Abiola, the New Nigerian was supposedly owned 
by the Federal Government but it was still fighting the Northern cause and so 
Chief Ibru saw that there was a very, very good opportunity for a newspaper 
to succeed which did not play any partisan role. So the first newspaper in 
modern times in Nigeria to really come out as an independent newspaper was 
The Guardian. (Henry Odukomaiya. Interview in Lagos).
Nevertheless, according to Momoh:
The Vanguard and The Guardian do not reflect Delta's (state) worldview 
(where the owners come from) or the minority worldview, for the simple 
reason that the minority worldview is o f no consequence in a place as large as 
Nigeria and it does not pay to reflect a minority worldview. (Interview in 
Lagos)
5.1o The Nigerian press reflects nationality perspectives
There is no doubt that the thrust of the interviewees' contention is that in
332 See the mission statements of both newspapers in Chapter Three.
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understanding the role of the press in national integration in Nigeria, then we have to 
relate its efficacy in fulfilling that task to the reality of what it is to contribute to 
integrating (Okeke et al, 1998).333 Here the view that stands out is that because there 
is no Nigerian nation, there is no Nigerian press and, consequently, the press in the 
main do not have a national perspective on issues but instead reflect the nationality
.• 334 335perspectives .
The Nigerian situation is that the media reflect the nationality perspectives ... 
We must look at Nigeria through the media from a perspective o f the 
reflections o f nationalities rather than the national group ...We are not an 
integrated people. Nigeria is not a nation in the sense o f Nigerians 
automatically and involuntarily reflecting and manifesting a national outlook. 
We don’t have it. Everybody, every national group is looking at Nigeria from 
its own nationality window (Tony Momoh. Interview in Lagos).
The press is very much playing the tune o f not necessarily the owners, but 
more importantly, sectional and regional interests. And it has been hindered 
in some kind o f way because when the press is blatantly partisan, when the 
press sees nothing wrong in a particular environment and sees everything 
wrong in another political environment, there is a problem. I  thought we had 
come to a point where we should be able to look at statements made by 
politicians maturely and say to ourselves, would this be in the national 
interest? But we haven't reached that point at a l l ... In other words an Iboman 
who owns a press is still looking at basically the interest o f the Ibo community 
and the same thing with the Yoruba community and the same thing, I  suppose 
with the Hausa community. So they are unable to look at what things unite us 
and move at things that divide us. (Dan Agbese: Interview in Lagos).
During the First Republic ... the newspapers promoted narrow and parochial 
ethnic and regional self-interests. (Turi Muhammadu. Interview in Kaduna).
Overall i f  you ask me to rate the Nigerian Press in terms o f their contribution 
to national integration, I  would say that there is no Nigerian press. I ’d prefer 
to refer to them as [separate] media houses ... [Thus] I  wouldn’t refer to the 
press here as an institution -  [However,] i f  there is a Nigerian nation, there is 
a Nigerian press. We are building a Nigerian nation; we are trying to build a 
[pan-national] press. (Omar Farouk Ibrahim. Interview in Kaduna).
Nigerian integration should be based first on the fact that we are not yet a 
nation and that ... we have been trying, but we have not yet built a nation 
(Babatunde Jose. Interview in Lagos).
333 See also Ekwe-Ekwe, 1991; Ikeazor, C. 1997; Panter-Brick, ed., 1978; Olagunju, et al, 1993; Ayida, 
1990; Nigeria. National Assembly, Conference Committee on Creation o f States, 1983?; Agunbiade, A. 
O., 1991; Oyovbaire, 1985; Suberu, 2001; Ekeh P. P., and Osaghae, E. E., eds, 1989; Okonkwo, I.E.R. 
1987).
334 Mohammed, 1996: 309.
335 See also Omu, 1978: 248-250; Uche, L. U, 1989; Dare, 1997; Kukah, 1996: 134-135
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There is partisanship in the Nigerian press. There is regional partisanship. 
There is ideological partisanship. (G.G. Darah. Interview in Lagos).
Nigeria is not a nation-state yet. And that could be affecting the press. But we 
are on the verge o f becoming a nation-state and the Nigerian press is rallying 
to the support o f the Government in this respect. (Henry Odukomaiya. 
Interview in Lagos).
Regional attitudes dictate how newspapers behave. These are some o f the 
problems we have in Nigeria. Nigeria is [effectively] more than one country. 
(Mohammed Ibrahim. Interview in Lagos).
But important as the idea of the nationality press is, as a catalyst for the construction 
of an integrated nation, some have expressed misgivings as to its effectiveness in a 
context where the citizens do not even agree on what constitutes the nation or whether 
it should exist at all. Farouk Ibrahim's concern is typical:
My position on this matter is that in Nigeria, I  think that media practitioners 
need to be educated to understand. First o f all you have to accept that there is 
a need for the existence o f the Nigerian nation. Sometimes some o f them tend 
to write, let's go our separate ways. It's been written in the newspapers so 
many times. (Omar Farouk Ibrahim. Interview in Kaduna).
Farouk Ibrahim's idea is also echoed by Babatunde Jose, who said that it will be 
difficult for the press to promote national integration in a situation where there is a 
strong attachment to ethnic background brought about mainly by the failure of people 
to succeed at the national level:
Ethnicity in Nigeria is [encouraged] when leaders fail at the national level, 
[as] they pander to their ethnic sentiments. I  believe that we have to accept the 
fact that we are a group o f nations. It is a difficult challenge, but each 
nationality should be developed within their ability. (Babatunde Jose. 
Interview in Lagos).
Nevertheless, Emeka Izeze's account demonstrates that there is nothing sinister about 
this because the reason why Nigerian newspapers are seen as representing nationality 
perspectives is as a result of what he called 'the absence of ideology' in Nigeria's 
socio-political landscape:
Newspapers all over the world have their own political leanings. It doesn't 
matter where. The absence o f ideology in our environment had made people to
163
align with certain worldview, which may well be limited to their own ethnic 
area. Otherwise i f  we were in a society where you have very clear ideology, 
you find newspapers will be differentiated purely on the basis o f ideology. 
Issues tend to dictate the reactions o f people. (Interview in Lagos),
§.lp  Uncoordinated patterns in the press: The effect of differences between 
North and South
As has been shown, many (if not all) of the interviewees have acknowledged that the 
Nigerian press believes in a united Nigeria. However, they are also aware that the 
inherent nature of the press shows that they lack a co-ordinated pattern in how this 
should be actualised. It could be argued, based on their submissions that this situation 
has been brought about by both objective and subjective factors in the Nigerian 
society. Many of them argue that certain critical issues that the pre-independent 
developments engendered, and which now exist and permeate Nigeria, would simply 
make it impossible for the press to be anything other than what it is now. For instance, 
they make reference to the cultural differences between the mainly Muslim northern 
part of Nigeria and its mainly Christian southern counterpart (Haruna, M. 1996: 56-
' I ' l H
71). More than any other factor, they agree that this is one issue that has 
fundamentally shaped the Nigerian press and therefore accounted for the imbalance 
that is immanent in the media institution in Nigeria. This is clearly corroborated by 
the comments of some of the interviewees:
We talk in Nigeria about the Southern-based press and the Northern press - 
their orientation is radically different. Our perceptions o f  the same national 
issues are different and it's not anything unnatural... Your location determines 
exactly what you see with most issues. It’s the rule o f  thumb in journalism. You 
are located in the North where generally the culture, tradition and perception 
o f Government are different from that o f the South. So you can't fail to get 
these reflected on the pages o f your newspapers ... /  think that generally the 
press in the South is not just aggressive but sometimes really less 
responsible... (Omar Farouk Ibrahim, Interview in Kaduna),
The perspective that is being reflected in the Nigerian press is the so-called 
Western perspective, which is called the Lagos/Ibadan worldview. That 
worldview is a function o f the outgoing nature o f the Yoruba people, the 
business enterprising nature o f the Yoruba and, o f  course, the Ibo and the 
Southerners generally. But the fact is that the Northerners are not extroverts,
336 See Nkom, 1994: 432-440 and Odigie-Oyegun, 1994: 221-228
337 See also Ekeocha, 72-98; Muhammadu, 2000; Oyovbiare, 2000: 99-112; Dare, 1997: 543-544; 
Omole, & Omang, eds., 1997: 77
164
their religion has affected their way o f  life ... They do not even see anything 
good in investing in newspapers ...So the Nigerian situation is dominated by 
the Western view...and that is the worldview that has affected the Nigerian 
press (Tony Momoh. Interview in Lagos).
5.1q Issues that account for the differences between north and south
Duro Onabule has delineated four of those issues and, according to him, they have to 
do with the fact that:
1. The northern part of Nigeria has no culture of self-criticism;
2. The typical northern businessman doesn’t invest outside the north and has no 
culture of long-term investment, which the media requires to succeed;
3. The north has no reading habit;
4. The low purchasing power of most people in the north.
These are corroborated by what a notable northern politician, who was also the 
Federal Minister of Agriculture in the defunct second republic, Dr Shettima 
Mustapha, espouses as the major defects in the northern part of Nigerian, and which 
have resulted in the imbalances in the Nigerian press. For instance, at a Nigerian 
Union of Journalists (NUJ) forum (Bomu in 2001), he stated that when it comes to the 
establishment of newspapers in Nigeria:
Wealthy people from the North would rather invest their money in ventures 
that will yield quick money ... In the whole of the North-East, it is a shame 
that there is not a single regular paper, whether daily or weekly, that you can 
say “this originated from the North-East” [from] which you can get 
information, not because there are not people who are wealthy enough to float 
newspapers but unfortunately, our wealthy people see only one way traffic in 
making money. That is why you always sit down and claim that Lagos-Ibadan 
axis or South-West papers don’t like you. Of course they have influence; they 
bulldoze you to do things because you are afraid of them and their pen.
T he crucial point to note here is that any northerner who attains the ultimate political 
position as civilian President or military head o f state of Nigeria is often handicapped, 
as he could be undermined by the southwest-based press in their attempt to project 
ideas which might not be in consonance with the overall national objectives. Indeed, 
the Nigerian Tribune provides a classic example of how a newspaper could be used to 
promote the objectives of a specific ethnic group to the detriment of those who do not
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have access to such a medium of communication.
Onabule and Jose put this point tellingly, as they explained the dilemma faced by 
Nigeria’s first prime-minister, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, a Muslim and a 
Hausa/Fulani from the north, who was subjected to intense opposition by the 
southern-based press owned by his political rivals:
When the Federal government o f Prime-Minister Tafawa Balewa found that it 
was being attacked right, left and centre by the Nigerian Tribune, owned by 
Chief Obafemi Awolowo, attacked by the Eastern Outlook, owned by the 
Eastern regional government, attacked by the West African Pilot, owned by 
Dr Azikiwe, he decided to set up the Morning Post. But the people did not and 
still don’t trust Government newspapers and so the Morning Post died 
because it was ineffective. (Babatunde Jose. Interview in Lagos).
Prime-Minister Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, had no voice until the Federal 
Government, which he headed, set up a newspaper called the Morning Post. 
But then it’s not enough to set up a newspaper unless you have [sustainable] 
circulation and, o f course, are supported by advertisement revenue, no 
newspaper can survive. [But] Prime-Minister Balewa did not have that with 
the Morning Post and the newspaper ... collapse[d], while the Nigerian 
Tribune, set up by Chief Awolowo while in Opposition as the leader o f the 
Action Group (AG), was making headway. (Duro Onabule. Interview in 
Lagos).
Onabule believes that where such imbalances exist, “there is not much a newspaper 
can do to integrate a country For instance, on the role of education in this 
endeavour, Onabule said that "no matter what efforts the press makes towards 
national integration, unless our brothers in the north improve their prospects for
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higher education and acquire a reading habit and then have the purchasing power to 
buy the newspapers, there is not much the press can achieve.”
338 See, for instance, Telia 1989)
339 Higher education in Nigeria is in the Exclusive Legislative List in the Nigerian Constitution. What 
this means is that funding o f education is done mainly through federal allocations to the states of the 
Nigerian federation. The states are then expected to use the funds accordingly. But the issue of 
education in the northern part of Nigeria has a cultural dimension to it informed by the religious divide 
between the northern and southern parts o f Nigeria. While the mainly Christian south had embraced 
mass education right from the onset of colonisation of the area now known as Nigeria by Britain in the 
1880s, this was not the case with the mainly Moslem north. The result is that there are more educated 
people in the south compared to the north hence reading culture is very low in the north. This 
undoubtedly limits the impact that newspapers can make promoting collective national identity through 
its activities. Although this is the case, it does not not edetract from the role that the press can play in 
promoting national identity. As educational prospects continue to improve for the average northerner, 
so too will the reading culture and therefore the press’ influence.
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Indeed, this is what Dr Festus Adesonoye (1989: 105) meant when he stated that, in 
order for a national communication policy to succeed, "a high level of literacy among 
the citizens of the country" is required because "there seems to be no point, for 
instance, in establishing ... newspapers ... when most of the people for whom they 
are intended cannot read them.”
5.1r Effect of high radio listenership in the north
Closely aligned with Onabule’s and Adesonoye’s observations is the fact of the 
predominance of radio listenership in the north, as compared to the south. The 
implication of this is that buying and reading of newspapers are hardly the pre­
occupation of the average northerner and therefore the press has little or no influence 
on them.340 A northerner and former Chief Executive of the Democrat newspaper, Al- 
Bashir was very forthcoming when he explained this:
The readership in the North is very, very, low and it has not been able to 
match the listenership o f radio. In 1997/98, the British Broadcasting 
Corporation released a report and said that after Tibet in China, the highest 
listenership o f radio in the world is Northern Nigeria. I f  you wake up in the 
morning and see the people going to the Mosque or wherever, you will see 
them [with a] radio. You go to the market; it's the same thing... So when it 
comes to discussing international issues with these people, particularly the 
traders, you will be surprised at their knowledge o f what is happening in the 
world. It is not from the newspapers that they get their information, it is from 
the radio. So there is a very, very powerful radio listenership in the North, to 
the extent that newspaper has become more or less an elite kind o f media o f  
communication ... Even [among] the so-called elite, the educated elite, very 
few o f them buy newspapers, unless there is a controversy - election results 
are coming, yes, -ministers are going to be announced, yes - policies are 
[announced], yes. Apart from that, no, they don’t care about newspapers. So 
that attitude also impacts on the newspapers produced here in the North. And 
I  say a newspaper attracts its immediate environment, i f  you know what I  
mean. And so when it does not attract its immediate environment, you don’t 
expect it to be more influential outside its own environment. These are some o f  
the factors militating against the Nigerian press. (Al-Bashir. Interview in 
Kaduna).
340 Read footnote 339 above.
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5.1s The active southerner as against passive northerner341
Recalling his experience as a journalist with the Concord Group of Newspapers, 
Onabule said that when the National Concord newspapers came on the scene in 1980, 
the proprietor, Abiola, who, despite being a Yorubaman from the southwest, dared to 
challenge the mainstream Yoruba views. This meant not reflecting (or reflecting well 
on) Awolowo’s political views and philosophy, whereas the Yoruba press never 
questioned his leadership. Put in his own words, Onabule’s views go thus:
The National Concord came in on the nationalist scale because even though a 
Yoruba man set it up, it did not come out to support the Yoruba cause. In fact 
the newspaper was defending a Northerner, President Shehu Shagari and the 
activities o f the National Party o f Nigeria (NPN) ... (So) from my experience 
with the Concord Group o f Newspapers, the entire Yoruba press before the 
Concord newspapers hit the newspaper stand in 1980, was just personality 
through Chief Awolowo. Most, i f  not all the people in the Yoruba press, 
belonged to the Awo group. But when the Concord newspapers came out, 
we were able to curtail that substantially and were able to balance the 
political arguments in Yorubaland. I f  we are to extend that to the North then 
there will be a balance in the Nigeria press. (Duro Onabule. Interview in 
Lagos).
Indeed his argument is that, for there to be a balance in the Nigerian press, the mainly 
Muslim northern Nigeria should also emulate the culture of challenging the 
mainstream views in their domain, which are antithetical to effective national press 
performance. However, he added by remarking that,
... culturally, it will not be easy to achieve. Easterners and Westerners are by
341 The question could be asked: To what extent does religion factor into cultural attitudes in relation to 
national identity and unity issues? There is no doubt that the attitudes and behaviour of the Moslems in 
the northern part of Nigeria are influenced by their religious faith. This view is supported by one o f the 
interviewees, Prince Tony Momoh who noted that “the northerners...their religion has affected their 
way of life...They do not even see anything good in investing in newspapers” (read Momoh’s views on 
pages 164-165 under the heading: “Unco-ordinated pattern in press: The effect o f differences between 
north and south”). And as Chief Onabule’s explanations show here, the cultural differences between 
the two regions are major factors in the way that people in the area react to issues. It should be 
emphasised here that in relation to this the Islamic religion plays a major role in the north. However, 
when it comes to issues o f national identity and unity the interviewees have demonstrated that the 
Nigerian press does not use such a contentious issue as religion to promote a collective Nigerian 
national identity. What it uses instead are international issues involving Nigeria and other nation states 
(Read their views on pp.203-207 below).
342 This refers to those that follow the idealogy foremost Nigerian nationalist, Chief Awolowo (late), 
who dominated the political landscape o f the southwestern parts of Nigeria.
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nature self-critical, either it is one group against the other or within the same 
group, there are people against one another and it is strongest in Yorubaland. 
It is not entirely the same with our Ibo brothers, but they are building up to it 
gradually. But nationally, I  don’t see the possibility o f the same level o f self- 
criticism becoming a feature o f both the North and the South. Maybe it will 
take some time for the North to imbibe that culture o f self-criticism. These are 
some o f the issues that have shaped the Nigerian press (Duro Onabule. 
Interview in Lagos).
5.It The role played by the location of the press
Another critical factor in the Nigerian press is where it is based. It is generally 
believed that the worldview of the Nigerian press is South-west or what is called the 
Lagos-Ibadan axis, as discussed elsewhere (Oyovbaire 2000: 99-112). This is one 
issue that has come under criticism and has therefore had clear consequences for the 
way that both northerners and southerners perceive issues in Nigeria. So most 
northerners believe that it is the southwest’s worldview that dominates the press, and 
consequently, is unrepresentative of northern and other interests in the nation. For 
instance, while criticising the imbalance in the media institution in Nigeria, Dr 
Nnaemeka (1989: 7) also stated:
The concentration of key national media establishments in the southern parts 
of Nigeria ... has not only been a major source of the furtherance of the North- 
South dichotomy in the political equation of the country, it has equally 
presented seemingly intractable problems of the development of a universally 
acceptable and credible Nigerian national media organisation.
The views expressed by almost all the interviewees amply bear out these concerns. 
Indeed a notable journalist from the Southwest, Onabule, is well aware of this 
phenomenon in the Nigerian system and has been quick to acknowledge its 
shortcomings:
The press in this country is mainly based in Lagos, in the South, particularly 
in the Yoruba area and unfortunately it is that Yoruba area that has continued 
to determine the character o f the Nigerian press ...Private newspapers like the 
Punch, the Vanguard, and the Guardian ... remain at best Southern voices 
and [these are] always against the North. (Duro Onabule. Interview in 
Lagos).
Onabule said that this situation has brought about some imbalances in the Nigerian
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press. In his view, this does not augur well for the purposes of mobilising the press for 
national integration and unity. He said that this, for instance, explains why the 
Nigerian press has been so uncritical of the current Nigerian leader, President 
Obasanjo, who is Yoruba. Onabule arrived at this conclusion as a pervasive 
characteristic of the Nigerian press -  he addresses the way they treated the current 
president, Obasanjo, since the day he handed-over power to a democratically elected 
civilian Government, while he was still the Military Head of State in 1979. According 
to him, when Obasanjo left office in 1979, the Nigerian press took this southern 
Yorubaman “as the darling of the Nigerian press”. Duro Onabule testified to this:
He spared none o f his successors as he criticised almost every move that they 
made, every policy they introduced. He did not spare President Shagari ...o r  
General Buhari and he was most devastating towards General Babangida. 
[But] all o f  them ignored him. Then he thought he could continue it with 
General Sani Abac ha and, o f course, he had his problems with General 
Abac ha who incarcerated him. But ... the same Obasanjo ..., is now back in 
government. (Interview in Lagos).
The press became critical of him though, first of all when he was being sponsored by 
the Military, that he was being sponsored by the North and that he was even being 
sponsored by the former military Head of State, General Babangida. Onabule further 
says that the Nigerian press as a whole came out against him and supported his fellow 
Yoruba Southerner, Chief Olu Falae. The press thus saw Chief Falae as the 
representative of the South, as against Obasanjo, whom they saw as a stooge of the 
Northerners.343
But as soon as he won the election and assumed office as President, he started 
running into problems as he encountered criticisms on various issues. Now he 
was being given just a little dose o f the poison he gave his successors after he 
left office as the Military Head o f State in 1979 as people were criticising him 
and talking about the marginalisation o f the North and the marginalisation o f 
the Ibos in the current political dispensation. However, the same media, the 
same Nigerian press that opposed his candidacy for President, have now made 
a U-turn and embraced the same Obasanjo that they dismissed as a stooge o f 
the Northerners, as their own man.
To the Nigerian press, nobody should criticise President Obasanjo and that 
nothing should happen to him. In fact they have even gone as far as saying 
that President Obasanjo is being criticised because he has stepped on the toes
343 Also indicative perhaps, of the southern-based press.
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o f powerful Northerners. That is the Nigerian press for you. When Obasanjo 
as ex-Head o f State, was criticising Northerners in Government, the Nigerian 
press did not say Obasanjo was criticising those Northerners because they 
stepped on his toes... But in any case, even if  it was true, then those on whose 
toes he too has stepped on should be equally right to criticise him and if  it was 
not true, then it shouldn't be true also that Northerners are criticising him 
because he stepped on their toes.
The Nigerian press should realise that President Obasanjo is being criticised, 
just like every other government anywhere else in the world (Duro Onabule: 
Interview in Lagos).
5. lu  The problem of lack of infrastructural facilities
Another factor that the Nigerian press has to contend with are the apparent 
shortcomings in the infrastructural development in the nation. This is mainly visible 
in the area of poor transportation, which has substantially limited the reach of even 
those newspapers that tagged themselves as national newspapers (Adesonoye, 1989: 
96-98),344 According to Mohammed Ibrahim, despite the infrastructural problems, the 
newspapers still want to give the appearance of nation-wide coverage when they 
could effectively articulate issues within their domain as a way of contributing 
towards the national endeavour. The reason why the newspaper have continued to be 
organised this way is what Alhaji Ibrahim referred to as 'the profit motive' rather than 
the actual reality of the Nigerian environment, which is that Nigeria is not yet a 
nation-state and that national integration would come through developing the 
nationality groups, etc.345
On that basis, Alhaji Ibrahim’s view goes thus:
They pretend to be national newspapers because o f advertising revenue, no 
more; no less ... Let me put it to you this way. There is the general belief that 
any newspaper which is not published in Lagos will not enjoy the kind o f 
circulation it should enjoy, will not have the advertising revenue it requires, 
etc. So this is why, when they publish in Kano, they also want the newspaper 
to circulate in Lagos; when they publish in Kaduna, they want it to circulate in 
Lagos; when they publish in Calabar, they want to circulate in Lagos. This is 
where the pretension is, as I  keep saying. Whereas i f  they are able to develop 
the market within their locality, generate as much revenue as possible, 
diversify their printing business, then they will have no business ... seeking a 
national platform. They would survive as regional newspapers. (Mohammed.
344 See also Egbochukwu, 1996: 212-217; Wilcox, 1975: vi.
345 See, for instance, Enahoro 1993; Madunagu 2000a & 2000b; Otitoju 2000; Saro-Wiwa 1994.
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Ibrahim, Interview in Kaduna).
5.1v Impact of the Nigerian context on press behaviour
As already noted, the Nigerian reality, no doubt, has served as a limiting factor to 
what the press can contribute towards the national effort of national unity and 
cohesion. In effect, what are therefore certain, given Nigeria's history, are the nation's 
socio-economic, cultural and political diversities. It is one thing to recognise the 
significance of nationality press. But what has been the case with the Nigerian media / 
situation? Given the mitigating factors of Nigeria’s reality to the effectiveness of the 
press in this endeavour, the delicate issue facing the Nigerian press would necessarily 
be how to redress the situation. For instance, the question could be asked, whether the 
nation's best interests would be best served through the press expressing Nigeria's 
diversities within the context of one Nigerian nation? If one goes by what some 
commentators and writers on the Nigerian press have espoused, the press, in this 
respect, has failed woefully. Their conclusions have tended towards the notion that 
instead of employing the nation's diversity as a basis for strengthening the nation, the 
press has used it to further weaken the nation (Usman, Y.B. and Abba, A., 2000). But 
the interviewees, in the main, do not see the way the press conducts its activities as 
necessarily detrimental to national integration and unity. Typical is the view of Al- 
Bashir who remarked that:
You can see the biases [in] ... the Nigerian media ... [but none] has come out
to propagate the break-up o f Nigeria. (Al-Bashir. Interview in Kaduna).
5.1w The Nigerian press reflects contentious issues in society
The underlying and significant aspect of the interviewees' arguments is that the 
peculiar nature of the Nigerian society has engendered in the Nigerian press the need 
to react to issues as demanded by circumstances. Jakande (1979: 110-111), has noted 
that the Nigerian press can do no more than reflect the contentious issues in the 
Nigerian state, enhance the nature of the debate within it in order for an acceptable 
national consensus to be agreed upon. Veteran journalist and publisher o f the 
Vanguard newspapers, Mr Sam Amuka, concurred with this:
The press is not pre-occupied with whether we have a country or not. There
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are many grievances about the present Nigerian structure. Various groups in 
the country are complaining that they are marginalised. These ... are being 
reflected in the press ... The country is divided on ethnic, economic and social 
grounds. The press is divided between north and south ... [But while] they 
now talk o f a sovereign national conference. These are the views that are 
reflected in the press. Everything should be traced to sectional interests. What 
is national has become sectional ... People's lives are touched, depending on 
where they come from, by issues. (Sam Amuka-Pemu. Interview in Lagos).
5.1x Press performance: A result of lack of a clearly defined state role
Indeed, in a society like Nigeria’s, where the role of the state is not clearly defined, 
the role of the press is also bound to be eclectic and dependent on circumstances as 
they arise (see Nnaemeka et al, 1989, vols. 1 & 2). This is true of the Nigerian 
situation where the cultural environment has bred and continues to breed a 
multiplicity of media to cater for the many ethnic and sundry interest groups. G.G. 
Darah (Interview in Lagos) contends that the Nigerian situation has remained the way 
it is because no particular group or class in society is dominant enough as to be able to 
stir the nation towards a generally acceptable unity of governance. And so over the 
years, the articulation of national integration has not been defined and informed by a 
common purpose, but by the ever-changing demands of groups and sectional interests:
No one ethnic group has overcome the other ones. Everybody is still a 
contender. So this gives enough room for the press to find operational terrain 
and to hold a diversity o f views ...So  it is not confusion but a multiplicity o f 
voices and all the voices do not compromise on the question o f national 
integration. But because o f different position as to what that integration would 
mean- since Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Niger- Delta,346 you have found a new 
trend in articulation o f national integration ... And for anybody in the Niger- 
Delta now, national integration should include equity, should include justice. 
The way national resources are being distributed now, that's not national 
integration the way they want it. So the press too is responding to the 
evolution o f these new ideas as they relate to social justice-, democracy and
freedom. (G. G. Darah. Interview in Lagos).
However, their position becomes even clearer when we relate it to what Anthony 
Giddens (1981: 13), said while distinguishing between the ‘nation-state’, the ‘nation’
346 The Niger Delta area o f Nigeria, from where Nigeria’s oil wealth is generated, is also one of the
most deprived areas of Nigeria. The area has become so volatile now that, almost on a weekly basis,
foreign personnel o f companies prospecting for oil in the area are targets of local militias, opposed to 
the Nigerian government’s policy in the area, who take them as hostages and demand ransoms. In 
1995, one of the world’s renowned environmental campaigners in the area, Ken Saro-Wiwa, was 
hanged by the military government led by then Nigerian leader, General Sani Abacha.
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and ‘nationalism ’:
What makes the ’nation' a necessary element of the 'nation-state'... is not the 
existence of sentiments of nationalism (however strong these may be) but the 
unification of an administrative apparatus whose power stretches over 
precisely territorial bounds. 'Nationalism', by contrast, may be understood as 
symbols or beliefs which attribute a communality of experience to the 
members of a particular regional, ethnic or linguistic category - which may or 
may not be convergent with the demarcation of the nation-state (cited in 
Schlesinger, 1991: 167).
Seen from the reality of the Nigerian situation, it could be argued that because Nigeria 
is not effectively a nation-state, ethnic nationalism and therefore, regional, religious or 
cultural sentiments take precedence over what should be the pan-national objectives. 
Osuntokun's (1989: 357) reminiscences aptly describe the use to which the Nigerian 
press has been put and therefore how it came to acquire the character it is made of 
now:
Because of the quest for political power on the eve of independence, the media 
became a weapon in the hands of politicians who were more eager to 
consolidate regional power in their hands than to nurture and project the sense 
of common nationality. It took the country the tragedy of a civil war before the 
stark reality of our lack of national focus in the media became obvious.
5.1y Effects of pre-independence developments on the Nigerian press
However, to appreciate this is to also understand how the situation came about. It is 
important that we recognise that whatever character the press is made of today is a 
direct consequence of the various developments that occurred within the Nigerian 
political domain pre-independence.347 But one event that stood out clearly, as they 
relate to the press, was the political row that erupted over the nomination to fill a 
vacant seat on the Lagos Legislative Council in the early 1940s. This came about 
because the two contestants for the post, Ernest Ikoli and Samuel Akinsanya got 
support from two different factions of the nationalist movement. The aftermath of this 
was the press war between two nationalist newspapers: the West African Pilot, owned
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by Azikiwe and the Daily Service, owned by the NYM. Describing the events and 
the repercussions that they caused later, Omu (1978: 55), stated that they "virtually
347 See Sklar, 1983
348 See Adamu, S., 1994: 467-472
174
destroyed the multi-tribal character of the Lagos section of the NYM" adding that the 
feud between the two newspapers, "contributed to the regionalisation of nationalism 
and the crystallisation of inter-group tension and animosity which characterised 
political developments for a long time".
One of the interviewees readily concedes that these events impacted negatively on the 
press:
Suddenly, because o f this division within the political leadership, the media 
failed, despite the efforts o f the Nigerian Youths and the Nigerian students, to 
unify the political forces. [Instead], the media fuelled the division between 
Awolowo and Azikiwe, fuelled division between the Ibos and the Yorubas at 
that time. That was the beginning o f the division within the country. The 
various newspapers took sides ... (Al-Bashir. Interview in Kaduna).
Jose's historical account added a wider sociological analysis of the nature of the 
Nigerian press. To him, the introduction of the 1954 Nigerian constitution, which 
provided for three regions (Eastern, Northern and Western),349 entrenched tribal and 
regional politics in Nigeria that subsequently affected the press (see Uche 1989). As 
his explanation shows, under that constitution people were elected to the Regional 
Assemblies through the Electoral College, although once they were elected, they 
could declare for their own political parties. In the Western region (with Lagos then 
part of this region), elections were conducted, and late Azikiwe, late Dr Olorunibe and 
late Prince Adedoyin were the three elected members to the Western House of 
Assembly on the platform of the NCNC. The constitution also provided for election to 
the House of Representatives using the Regional House of Assembly as an Electoral 
College, so under that constitution three people have to be elected into the Federal 
House of Representatives. When the motion was called for, the AG subverted some 
members of the NCNC not to vote for Azikiwe to go to the House of
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Representatives. Jose described this event that prevented an Iboman from 
representing Lagos in the Federal House of Representatives as 'naked tribalism':
That was the beginning o f naked tribalism in Nigeria ... Dr Azikiwe was 
denied the chance ... because he was an Iboman and not a Yorubaman. [He
349 See Ezera, 1964.
350 For detailed analyses of political developments within Nigeria, before independence, see Sklar 
1983; Ezera 1964
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then sought election to] the Eastern House o f Assembly in order to become 
elected into the Federal House o f Representatives. And so tribal politics 
became pronounced, and this was reflected in the editorial policies o f the 
newspapers owned by the political parties. {Babatunde Jose: Fieldwork 
interview in Lagos).
5.2 Some issues that impact on press’ constitutional role
Of more concern to the interviewees are some issues immanent in the media 
institution in general which impact on the press’ constitutional role. These are what 
one might choose to call the subjective factors that could veer the press from the path 
that would genuinely enable it to bring about national cohesion (See Usman, Y .B. 
and Abba, A., 2000). Although it could be said that these issues are contextual, the 
interviewees believe that some are results of the unprofessional activities of the 
journalists. They articulated their submissions under such themes as:
1. The motives for setting up newspapers
2. Newspapers set up in response to new socio-political reality
3. Complaints about journalists
4. The press is divisive and promotes ethnic cleavages
5. Professionalism and the press
6. Typical ways press conducts its activities
7. The Control factor in the Nigerian press
8. Effect of media control on the Nigerian state Media control and the state
9. The policies of government
10. Press and government policies
5.2a The motives for setting up newspapers
Starting with the first theme, the question could then be asked whether the reason why 
some press collapse in Nigeria has anything to do with the motive/s behind their 
establishment. This question is posed with an understanding that any press that 
collapses cannot be expected to play any further role in the task of national integration 
and unity. Within the context of the Nigerian society, we have already seen how 
writers have blamed the inadequacies of the press and therefore its failure on the 
effects of the nation's colonial heritage.
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But here, for now, our interest is in why certain newspapers established within the 
nation collapse and therefore the adverse effect on the print media institution in the 
overall task of national integration and unity. Most observers of the Nigerian press 
agree that both economic and political considerations account for why some 
newspapers collapse after a few years in circulation. For instance, they argue that the 
newspapers established to serve purposes other than those engendered by purely 
economic or market circumstances, do collapse. A typical example is the Democrat, 
which was published in the northern part of Nigeria. According to its former 
Managing Director, Al-Bashir, the reason this happened was because the newspaper 
was established for political reasons:
"You know the man [the proprietor, Alhaji Ismaila Isa] is in business, he is a 
contractor, and he is a building contractor. Now a lot o f  the percentage o f his 
earnings or o f his activities comes from the government. And because he 
depends on the government, he doesn't want anything bad written about 
government. So the newspaper relied too much on government. From the very 
beginning, the journalists were not given a free hand to operate and I  think 
when I  got there the circulation was just about twenty-something thousand. 
But within six months or one year o f our coming, we were able to raise 
circulation to about one hundred and eighty thousand. But then again, you 
see, pressure was put on me to favour government and all that. And I  said if  
we continue on that path, the newspaper was going to collapse - and it did 
(Al-Bashir: Interview in Kaduna).
As the experience of the Democrat newspaper shows, reliance on government 
patronage resulted in grave consequences for the newspaper. For refusing to sing the 
praises of the government, the government even refused to pay the newspaper for 
earlier services rendered. Again in the words of Al-Bashir:
By the time we closed down in the Democrat, we were not able to collect our 
... revenue from the Northern government amounting to about seventy-eight 
million Naira ... (And) I  remember particularly what happened to the 
Democrat during the time o f General Sani Abacha. They even wanted to 
arrest the publisher and jail all o f  us particularly when we wrote a critical 
Editorial, which we tagged: "The State o f the Nation ", It was very critical o f 
government. In fact they took out a paid advertisement to condemn that 
Editorial. Yes, the Federal government did that. It was in the New Nigerian, it 
was in the Daily Times, and it was in all the newspapers. And we knew that 
that was going to be the end o f the Democrat. And so they refused to pay the 
publisher for the contract he got from the government... and consequently we 
had to close down in September 1997 (Al-Bashir: Interview in Kaduna).,
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But then, one could also argue that, not all newspapers established to serve political 
purposes collapse because, as the example of the Nigerian Tribune shows, its 
supporters always form the financial backbone, as further explained by Al-Bashir:
There are some people when they see the Nigerian Tribune collapsing; they 
give the Nigerian Tribune some money to assist it because o f the position it is 
occupying. So the Nigerian Tribune is a very distinct newspaper. We've seen 
the newspaper survive in the sense that it is not only the owner that actually 
supports it, but other well-wishers, you know, what they call the Awoists (The 
Awoists are those that follow the political philosophy o f  the late Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo, one o f  Nigeria's foremost nationalist leaders that fought 
for Nigeria's political independence). They won't like the Nigerian Tribune to 
go down. And to the best o f  my knowledge they have never challenged 
anything that the Nigerian Tribune says. (Al-Bashir. Interview in Kaduna).
The Nigerian Tribune, established in 1949, was basically the political wing of the AG, 
whose fundamental aim was to represent the interest of the Yoruba group in the 
Nigerian equation. Darah contends that this is not unhealthy for the state because, 
even if, for instance:
The Nigerian Tribune ... takes the position that Chief Obafemi Awolowo 
[leader o f  the AG, one o f  Nigeria’s pre-independence political parties] is 
never wrong. It may say that it's Western Nigeria or nothing, but in doing that 
it is not saying it will supplant or replace Nigeria with Western Nigeria. It's 
only saying that in view o f  the Nigeria that we want to stay in, it should favour 
Western Nigeria. (G.G. Darah. Interview in Lagos)
However, during the Second Republic,351 Jose (Interviewee, Lagos), said that a new 
pattern for setting up and controlling newspapers emerged, although their rationale 
remained the same, which was to promote political aims and counter the attacks from 
political opponents.352 As his explanations indicate, during the Second Republic a 
number of rich Nigerians set up newspapers to advance their own political ambitions 
(Nnaemeka, et al. 1989a: 408). But according to him, on the part of the new civilian 
federal government, the federal-govemment-owned Daily Times was its tool of attack 
against the federal government's political opponents. He stated that the Government 
did this by ensuring that the editors bent to the wishes of the federal government.
351 Nigeria’s Second Republic was from 1979-1983.
352 See also Dare, 1997: 543-548.
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Jose noted that the federal government resorted to this tactic because the Nigerian 
Tribune, owned by one of its political opponents, Awolowo, a Yorubaman, and the
353Daily Sketch, another newspaper from the Yoruba ethnic area, were attacking it 
because they believed that Alhaji Shehu Shagari354 cheated Awolowo to win the 1979 
presidential election (Usman (ed.), 1982:: viii-ix).355 In effect, one could say that this 
development, going by the recollections of Alhaji Jose (Interviewee, Lagos), 
prompted Abiola to come to the rescue o f the federal government, by setting up the 
Concord Group of Newspapers. He concluded by stating: "So you found that the 
National Concord was backing the NPN-led Federal Government of President 
Shagari, although where Abiola's personal interests clashed with that of the 
Government, the National Concord would support Abiola ... The Federal 
Government-owned New Nigerian was also supporting President Shagari."
5.2b Newspapers set up in response to new socio-economic realities
What is obvious here is that where personal or ownership considerations assume 
prominence, the ability of the press to address and tackle national issues will 
inevitably be curtailed (Oyovbaire 2000: 103). However, although this pattern 
predominated during the first and second republics for selfish political gains, Alhaji 
Jose said that the objective conditions within Nigeria’s socio-political terrain now 
have made such tendencies unattractive. His contention is that newspapers are now 
being established in Nigeria mainly in response to new demands brought about by the 
realities of the social, economic and political developments within the state (Omu, 
1996: 9-12). In effect, any owner that does not allow this new reality to direct the 
newspaper, and therefore insists on interfering in the management of their 
newspapers, will not thrive and the newspaper will eventually collapse. Many 
commentators on the Nigerian press have identified this issue over the years. And this
357explains why, particularly, government-owned newspapers do not do well.
353 The Daily Sketch was founded by the late Chief Ladoke Akintola, who used it as the mouthpiece of 
his Democratic Party, which was a breakaway from the Action Group, led by the late Chief Obafemi 
Awolowo during Nigeria’s First Republic (1960-1966).
354 Alhaji Shehu Shagari contested the 1979 Presidential election under the platform of the NPN, while 
Chief Awolowo represented the UPN.
355 See also Oyediran (ed.) 1979.
356 See also Dare, 1997: 543-44; Enwenwa, 1989: 76-77; Omu, 1978: 248-250.
357 See, for instance, ‘Charles Sharp mourns Democrat (newspaper)’, by Charles Sharp [New Nigerian, 
7/6/85, p.4]; ‘Ownership control o f press in Africa’ by Mohammed Haruna [New Nigerian, 18/6/87];
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Jose (Interviewee, Lagos) noted that this situation has now resulted in what he refers 
to as the press' new quest "to find the support and the loyalty o f readers, because 
newspapers are now many". But more importantly, according to him, the newspapers 
are virtually forced to embark on this new trend basically because they can no longer 
publish newspapers just for the promotion o f their proprietors. They have to make 
money as the cost of production is very high and so they have to amend their editorial 
policies in a way that will be acceptable to their readers. He gave the examples of The 
Guardian and National Concord newspapers. He said even though The Guardian is 
owned by the Ibru brothers, it has to publish, not to manifestly promote and satisfy the 
economic interests o f the Ibru dynasty, but to also target the middle class. In the case 
o f the National Concord, owned by Abiola, he argues that since his death or even 
before his political travails, which eventually led to his demise, the National Concord 
too had to look after the interests of not only the Yorubas, in whose target area it is 
published, but to also have a wider circulation and attract advertisements and 
therefore get a good return for their investments.
5.2c Complaints about the journalists
Although these new realities exist, observers and commentators on the Nigerian 
media contend that they have not ensured a positive change regarding what the 
newspapers are being used for. The thrust of their complaints centre around what they 
term as unprofessional conduct o f journalists which have had ‘unsavoury effects on 
the industry’, thereby jeopardising their capability to contribute effectively to 
Nigeria4 s stated national aspirations, including the quest to ensure unity and harmony 
among its multi-cultural units.358 Assessing the activities of the Nigerian media 
practitioners, James Ademola (1997: 77) stated:
... several o f today’s media men believe that professional journalism is a 
licence for reckless writing, self-projection, libel, lies, rumours, speculations, 
[and the] presentation of fiction news, etc.
‘Today's journalist should be a technician-and a thinker’, by Ray Ekpu [Vanguard, 30/6/85, p.26, p.7]; 
‘Osoba decries official interference’ [The Statesman, 19/6/91, back page]; Kwara moves to ... revive 
Herald (newspapers) [The Guardian (Nigerian) on-line, 29/7/03].
358 See chapter two of Nigeria‘s 1999 constitution.
180
This criticism of the journalists is typical.359 Some of the Interviewees acknowledged 
these apparent failings o f the media institution in Nigeria. For instance, Onabule's 
worries concern what some newspaper proprietors now do with their newspapers or 
magazines. With an enormous growth in new publications, inevitably meaning that 
their owners lack experience and maturity, they are in the business o f publishing 
mainly to confront government and defame public figures. He said these set of 
publishers do this in total disregard for the press laws that regulate the journalism 
profession.360
They pick on anybody and concoct stories. Anybody, including an armed 
robber, can just get up, set up a newspaper and call himself Editor-in-Chief 
and start defaming people ... We have some publishers who use the press to 
blackmail Government and Ministers. Most o f  them are contractors ... and 
they use their newspapers to blackmail when they want a particular contract. 
I f  they don’t get the contract they use their newspaper to blackmail, or 
sponsor another newspaper to do it for them ... Even the so-called trained 
journalists, those with university degrees, are also misguided into believing 
that press freedom is a license to defame people. I f  you attempt to cause public 
insurrection using your newspaper, that is not allowed under the press law 
anywhere in the world, [but] 90% o f the journalists and publishers in this 
country do not know that there are laws regulating the profession, [yet] once 
they are called to order, they will be shouting that there is no press freedom, 
the journalists are being harassed, etc. ... I  am still looking for that publisher 
who has set up a newspaper for patriotic reasons. I  don ’t know o f any yet, 
unlike in the colonial days. (Duro Onabule. Interview in Lagos).
Onabule's position is also supported by Momoh, who described what the Nigerian 
journalism profession has become today:
Now what is happening is that many Nigerian journalists go after contracts 
and they favour anyone from whom they can get the contracts. Even the 
proprietors champion these things and they set up newspapers in order for  
them to get contracts. They feature you so that you will give them contracts. So 
what we are now witnessing in Nigeria is that the newspapers that should 
monitor governance have become the clout [stick] for the contractor to get 
contracts ... What this means, therefore, is that the journalist has more work
359 See, for instance, (NPC, 2000: 132-133; Izobo, G. 1989: 130-134; Omu, 1978: 248-250; Oyovbaire, 
2000: 103, Aloba, A., 1995: 101; Dare, T. 1997: 543-544; Kukah, 1996: 134; Omu, F. 1996: 10; 
“Lessons o f the World Communication Day”, the Editorial comment o f the Imo state government- 
owned newspaper, The Statesman, published on 4/6/87, p.3; “Aikhomu castigates journalists”, 
Vanguard, 26/6/91, p.3; “Editors are jokers”, Daily Times, 30/6/89, p.3; “Destabilisation, violence, 
disinformation and transition programme-News Analysis”, New Nigerian, 4/6/89,. front page; “Leaders 
as victims o f calumny”, New Nigerian, 8/6/89, front page; “Press berated for bad reporting”, The 
Observer, 26/6/91, front page).
360 For an insight into the press law in Nigeria, see Yakubu 1999; Fawehinmi 1987; Ugboajah 1980.
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to do when someone uses the medium as a clout, because where his own 
interests or survival are involved, he will simply tell the journalist not to 
publish the story. (Tony Momoh. Interview in Lagos).
All these, according to Onabule, have brought about what he called 'a high level of 
corruption' in journalism practice today in Nigeria. The level of corruption in the 
journalism profession in Nigeria is well documented (see, for instance, Macebuh 
2000).361 Onabule said that two of those who have exposed this pervading flaws in the 
activities of the Nigerian media institution today are prominent journalists, namely, 
Jose and Chief Ebenezer Williams (Aloba) now late. He said the first person to blow 
the whistle was Jose, one of the doyens of Nigerian journalism, who asked the 
journalists who demanded money from him, whether they knew who he was. To 
OnabuleDuro, if  anybody could ask Jose and Williams for bribes, the level to which 
Nigerian journalism has sunk could be imagined, adding that no one can organise a 
press conference today in Nigeria and expect not to bribe journalists 362
Momoh also touched on this issue o f corruption in journalism practice in Nigeria 
when he stated as follows:
[My article] in the Sunday Vanguard o f 11/02/01 titled: Watch it Mr 
Journalist', discussed the complaints about journalists now, especially those 
on beat journalism like the National Assembly Correspondents, the Sports 
Writers Association o f Nigeria, etc. For instance, people are complaining that 
journalists demand such things as brown envelopes [bribes] as they perform 
their duties (Interview in Lagos).
Momoh said that the journalists have tried to justify their corrupt practices by arguing 
that that is the only way they can survive as their wages are poor and are sometimes 
not paid for months. Although Momoh acknowledged that this is common in 
journalism practice today in Nigeria, he added:
The point I  am trying to make is that this is not good for the press. 
Constitutionally, the press is the Fourth Estate o f the Realm and it is not
361 See also Izeze 2006; Idowu 1996: 201-205; Odetola 1982: 153; Ciroma, 1995: 101; “Journalists 
lambasted over brown envelope”, The Statesman, 23/6/93, p. 10
362 See the quote attributed to Dr. Michael Okpara (now late), former Premier o f the then Eastern 
Region o f Nigeria, in the article: “The self-appointed kingmakers”, written by Onwuka Arua and 
published in the New Nigerian 10/6/85, p.2. Asked to give his personal assessment o f the Nigerian 
media at a press conference in 1983, Mr Arua quoted Dr Okpara as saying “... You can get our media 
houses to publish whatever you want them to publish...”. Also see: “Dr Okpara raves at reporter”, in 
Nigerian Statesman, 5/6/83, back page).
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because the press is a business, it is because the press is a profession and the 
pressmen are professionals. I f  the other three Estates collude as they normally 
do, the press cannot do the same because it is the agent o f  the people. So the 
press has a job to do and...the journalists [should]...do their job  
professionally.... It is a very tempting profession and a journalist can easily be 
corrupted, but at the end o f the day he loses his credibility. (Tony Momoh. 
Interview in Lagos).
5.2d The press as divisive and promoting ethnic cleavages
As noted, one of the inadequacies o f the Nigerian press is that it is divisive and 
promotes the aspirations of their owners, which in most cases are sectional. Experts 
have also made the point that this has been brought about by historical circumstances 
which has rendered the Nigerian society to be divided along religious, ethnic, cultural 
lines, etc. Consequently, the nature o f Nigerian media practice is that they have been 
unable to rise above tribal / ethnic politics in the conduct o f their activities.
Nevertheless, Haruna said that this should not be attributed to the so-called divisive 
nature o f the Nigerian society because "there is no society that does not have divisive 
elements within it and are therefore bound to have differences in religion, differences 
in language and so on."
As a reporter or as a journalist, you are supposed to go beyond that. You are 
supposed to overcome your prejudices and be able to reflect as objectively as 
is humanly possible. Since we are prisoners o f our sources the only way you 
will be able to report facts fairly or as objectively as possible is to report from  
all aspects. In other words, all the divisions in society, i f  there is a crisis, talk 
to all sides on the crisis and so on. But you find  that all too often we report 
from only one side o f  the issue. (Mohammed Haruna. Interview in Kaduna)
This tendency is what Al-Bashir has adduced as the rationale for why, over the years, 
the press has been responsible for the construction o f what he called "ethnic 
cleavages", adding that "particularly with the rising tide o f ethnic nationalism, the 
situation has become pathetic in terms o f the media injecting a sense o f national 
unity."
Onabule attributes this very tendency of the Nigerian press to the issue of character. It
363 See Dare 1997: 543-544; Kukah 1996: 134-135; Muhammadu 2000: 1-26); Bello: 1986: 134.
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is his contention that many o f the media practitioners in Nigeria's media institution 
today are young and inexperienced and are therefore incapable o f rising above tribal / 
ethnic politics. In his own words:
I  think it is a character issue. Most o f  the young ones now writing in the press 
were born in the era o f  tribal politics and so there is hardly anything 
nationalistic about them. They are so narrow-minded. They cannot view any 
issue from a national perspective. They only view issues from a very narrow 
and tribal perspective. Always one part o f  the country is wrong and that is the 
North or the East, while the other part, the West, is always right. Even within 
the Western and Yoruba part o f  the country, only the A wo group (those who 
are the followers o f  the late Chief Obafemi Awolowo and who still believe in 
his philosophy) or the A wo idea is the correct one and anything different is 
wrong. (Duro Onabule. Interview in Lagos.
5.2e Professionalism and the press
In as much as many of the interviewees see the Nigerian press in the same light, Al- 
Bashir maintains that there is still hope that the Nigerian press will live up to its 
societal responsibilities, if  the examples being set by some national newspapers are 
anything to go by. Further, Al-Bashir is quite encouraged by what he described as the 
"professionalism being exhibited" in such newspapers as Daily Champion, ThisDay, 
Daily Trust, National Interest and Newswatch Magazine. So in effect, Al-Bashir says 
that "as much as we can see some o f the defects of the Nigerian media in terms of 
their willingness to build national bridges across the Nigerian terrain, there are 
definitely a number Of newspapers that are coming up that are dedicated to this cause 
and they have been doing their best to really see the other points o f view.". The reason 
why Al-Bashir has come to this conclusion is because, according to him, he has 
observed that the above-mentioned newspapers and magazine are fair in conducting 
their professional duties. For instance, he stated:
I rate Newswatch, National Interest, ThisDay, Daily Trust, Champion, as the
best we have so far in terms o f  trying to see the opinion o f  the other side. They 
will carry what you write. I f  you write something Islamic, they will carry it. I f  
you write something Christian, they will carry it. That is fairness in a way. I  
am just giving this as an example ... So we have hope that there are some 
newspapers emerging, as I  have already told you, that can see the Nigerian as 
a Nigerian. They look at you not in terms o f your own tribe but in terms o f  
your humanity, in terms o f you as a human being ... [And one] belonging to 
the Nigerian nation. (Al-Bashir. Interview in Kaduna).
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5.2f Misleading the reader: Bias, prejudice and editorial as fact
If the Nigerian press is to effectively mobilise the Nigerian populace towards the 
constitutional goal o f national cohesion, the way it conducts its activities is o f vital 
importance. There are those that believe that the only way that this will be achieved 
by the press is for it to actually live up to its role as the Fourth Estate of the Realm 
and therefore approach every issue with a strong and balanced professional 
commitment (Omu, 1996: 17).364 But as has been highlighted above, some questions 
have been raised regarding the manner with which the Nigerian press conducts its 
activities. For instance, Macebuh (2000: 1) stated that journalism practice in Nigeria 
today has become so unprofessional to the extent that, for the most part, what one 
finds, “is a mystifying level of gullibility, an anxiety to publish every silly little 
uncorroborated battle.” But what really worries Macebuh, is what he refers to as its 
complete abandonment of “the concept o f apprenticeship,” that is, the tradition of 
submitting the practitioners themselves, for a time, to the tutelage of more 
experienced practitioners. Hence, he stated:
Today ... I cannot in honesty make any sustainable claims for the 
professional, let alone intellectual competence o f much of the generations that 
followed mine. It is a painful condition to admit to, but it now appears that 
every young man or woman just out of school automatically appropriates to 
himself the right to be a columnist. The discipline of news reporting is no 
longer thought to be worthy of attention of supposedly brilliant staffers. And 
consequently, one is constantly bombarded with editorials that purport to be 
factual reports, with incomprehensible and illogical commentary, with news 
reports that do not appear to have any meaning outside their headlines, with a 
measure o f egotism and narcissism that is truly alarming.
Consider, for instance, a news report whose concluding paragraph begins thus: 
‘from the foregoing, it is clear that . . . ’ Prince Tony Momoh or Ladbone (I 
have never been able to call him Lade Bonuola) or Femi Kusa or Tunji Dare 
would almost by reflex have thrown such a piece of foolish reporting into the 
garbage basket. But that is what one sees these days on a virtually daily basis.
Poignantly, Haruna agrees with Macebuh, as exemplified by what he regards as the 
common practice in the Nigerian press, which is their tendency to editorialise their 
news reports and pretend that their comment is built on facts.
364 Nwosu, 1996: 20-30; Jason 1996: 31-41; Kukah 1996: 132-143; Idowu 1996: 198-211
185
Everybody would always have a perspective. I  have one; you have one. But i f  
you want to report you should reflect all the sides to an issue and let the 
reader be the judge. But when you want to come and write your editorial or 
you want to comment, then it's clear that it's your perspective that you are now 
writing about. In that case you can write only your perspective. But invariably 
you find  that among pressmen all too often they even pretend that their 
comment is fact, (Mohammed Haruna, Interview in Kaduna).
He acknowledges that, for any newspaper, there is always a certain interest it is set up 
to protect, whether the owner is an individual or a government. But he adds that the 
media practitioners should also make it a priority to know that there is always the 
overall national interest. For Haruna, therefore, the important thing for the journalist 
to do is to "always try to get all the perspectives when reporting and not just their own 
perspectives".
Some of the interviewees particularly noted that the typical way that the press does its 
business is capable of derailing them from fulfilling their constitutional role. In turn, 
they espoused their different observations the Nigerian press on some fundamental 
issues, like the Sharia and Islam, democracy, the revenue allocation formula and the 
census, three of the interviewees who are Muslims and o f northern origin,Mohammed 
Ibrahim, Al-Bashir, and Farouk Ibrahim believe that the Nigerian press has caused 
disaffection and disharmony within the Nigerian state. As explained by Mohammed, 
this is so because a detailed background to the sharia debate, for instance is often 
lacking in the Nigerian press and consequently, it is susceptible to what he called "the 
sensationalising" and publicising of the views of some individuals, who are most 
uninformed about the facts surrounding the Sharia debate. He made reference to a 
BBC African Service report, which interviewed a leading legal ‘luminary’ on the 
Sharia issue, to describe the very typical way that the mostly southern-based press has 
reported such issues of a very fundamental nature in Nigeria, as follows:
I  can recall very well, one o f  the leading legal luminaries in this country being 
interviewed by the BBC African Service on the Sharia issue, giving the specific 
example o f  a woman who was fined or imprisoned in Niger state, because she 
was selling beer contrary to the Islamic legal system. Now what my respected 
legal luminary forgot to remember was that even in a Christian state, selling 
beer or any alcohol without a license is illegal. You can't go anywhere in this 
country ... and just begin to sell liquor without a license. ... The fact that that 
woman was taken to court and penalised fo r selling beer doesn't mean that
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because she is a Christian, she should not be penalised. She required a license 
to sell and that was what the legal luminary failed to point out when the BBC 
interviewed him. So these are some o f  the misleading criticisms which 
normally come out. Yes, the law says, you can't sell unless you have a license 
(Mohammed Ibrahim: Interview in Kaduna).
To Haruna, it is no surprise that the press has often approached such issues of national 
importance in this manner, because, in his own words, "the press is prejudiced and 
always reporting from an ill-informed position".365 To support his argument, Haruna 
talked about the way the press has reacted to issues relating to the Sharia law 
introduced by some states in northern Nigeria, the Revenue Allocation Formula and 
the Federal Character Principle. What is apparent from what he has observed is that 
the Nigerian press does not report things as factually as possible and, as a 
consequence, their impact on national integration is gravely affected. Thus, he noted:
I f  you take, fo r  instance, the issue o f  Sharia ... all their approach to it is to tell 
lies and ridicule it ... They don’t even understand what Sharia is all about. All 
the time they see it from a negative point o f view. I t ’s like there is a brief for 
them to report only the negative sides ... Now, i f  you do that, you are not 
helping national integration or unity. The press can disagree completely with 
the value system o f Sharia but, at the same time, it should report as 
objectively, as factually, as possible. Now you don’t see that in the Nigerian 
press. (Mohammed Haruna, Interview in Kaduna).
Haruna concluded by stating that this approach is characteristic o f the manner of the 
press’ reportage o f other sundry national issues because it is ‘all too often blinded by 
prejudices, whether they are religious or ethnic’, which as he put it, ‘come right 
through in its reports’.
Al-Bashir agrees with Haruna that the Nigerian press is indeed, "very biased or 
prejudiced". He made reference to the issue of democracy in Nigeria, which he 
pointed out has exposed what he described as ‘the ethnic sentiments and loyalty in 
Nigerian newspapers’.366 Al-Bashir’s disagreement with the Nigerian press on this 
particular issue stems from his observation of the press’ reaction to the alleged 
intentions of former Nigeria’s military ruler (1985-1993), Babangida, a northerner, to 
stand as a presidential candidate in the 2003 presidential elections in Nigeria. He said
365 See also Usman & Abba 2000; Anim 1997: 62.
366 Also see, Haruna 1996: 56-71
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all the press’ campaigns against Babangida, were informed by their intention to stop 
him from running against the incumbent, President Obasanjo, a southerner and a 
Yoruba. Thus he stated:
Former military ruler General Ibrahim Babangida has been the object o f  
insults by some o f the media in recent times. Their grouse against General 
Babangida is that he is allegedly planning to stand as a presidential candidate 
in the 2003 general elections, even though the man himself has never said 
that. But they say General Babangida has no right to contest, and yet the 
media say they are promoting democracy. The best they could do i f  they so 
dislike the man is to campaign against him and ensure that he is defeated in 
the election. It is not for the media to say that General Babangida must not 
contest when there is no law banning him. But they are campaigning against 
General Babangida because he might contest the presidential election against 
the incumbent President Obasanjo. (Al-Bashir. Interview in Kaduna).
On his own part, Onabule simply described this tendency o f the Nigerian press as
‘X fsT I‘double standards’. To substantiate his assertion, he referred to the way the press 
handled some very sensitive issues that came up during two different administrations 
in Nigeria. The first was the way the press responded to what the then Chief of Army 
Staff, Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe, a southerner and an Ibo, who was virtually number 
two in command to the then Head of State, Babangida, a northerner, said when 
questioned by journalists on the issue of Nigeria’s alleged membership of the OIC, an 
Islamic organisation made up of mainly Muslim countries, in 1986. Onabule said 
because Commodore Ukiwe’s response criticised the AFRC, which was the highest 
ruling body in the Babangida administration, by saying that the OIC issue was not 
discussed in the AFRC, ‘the press hailed him as a hero and as a man o f principle’. He 
said the press chose to relate to Commodore Ukiwe like that basically because, apart 
from the press itself being largely Christian-controlled and therefore against Nigeria’s 
membership of any organisation that has connections with the Islamic religion, it is 
also mainly based in the south, which predominantly practices the Christian faith. 
However, Onabule said that in an almost related issue, when journalists asked both 
ex-President Shagari (1979-1983), a northerner and Hausa/Fulani and ex-Military 
Head of State, General Buhari [rtd] (1984-1985), also a northerner and Hausa/Fulani, 
who are members o f the National Council of States (NCS), an advisory body on 
national issues, what the position of the NCS was on the issue of some states in the
367 See also views as expressed in Usman & Abba 2000: 3-8; Oyovbaire 2000: 104-110.
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Nigerian federation taking unilateral actions to introduce the Sharia laws in their
domain, the press tagged their response unprincipled and against the national interest.
Why? Onabule gave his explanations as follows:
Both Alhaji Shagari and General Buhari (rtd), as members o f  the National 
Council o f  States (NCS) came out and admitted before the media that the 
Sharia issue was not discussed by the NCS. So, even though they were both 
correct to say that the NCS did not discuss the issue, the entire Nigerian media 
that only in 1986 hailed Commodore Ukiwe as being principled for saying 
that the AFRC did not discuss Nigeria's membership o f  the OIC, now turned 
round to condemn General Buhari and Alhaji Shagari for the same thing 
obviously because they are from the northern part o f  the country. (Duro 
Onabule. Interview in Lagos).
Giving his opinion on this same issue o f the 'double standard' in the Nigerian media, 
Momoh said the reason why this is the case is because 'the Nigerian media believe in 
selective disclosures and selective justice'. Momoh contended that what has 
happened, as a result is a basic flaw in the Nigerian press, which he describes as its 
pre-occupation with such terms as 'It says'; 'They say'. The point that Momoh is trying 
to make here is that the Nigerian press should do more than simply refer to sources in 
dealing with issues that are particularly fundamental to good governance by giving 
priority to calling people to order or calling people to do what they promised to do. 
For instance, he asked:
How much does the Nigerian press look at the previous budgets to see that the 
commitments in the budgets have been met? How much does the Nigerian 
press go after the projects that have been awarded in contracts to see how the 
contractors are performing in the different fields? How much has the press 
pursued the legislators to take them on, on the regulations that they are 
passing? How much has the Nigerian press studied the Constitution since they 
are supposed to hold everybody accountable to the people in the performance 
o f the duties imposed on those in Government, by the people through the 
Constitution? How much has the press looked at the Code o f Ethics? That 
Code, for instance, provides that no public officer should have a foreign 
account and yet everybody has a foreign account (Interview in Lagos).
Momoh was indeed very scathing about the way the Nigerian press has handled the 
issue of foreign accounts involving public officials in Nigeria. Further, it is alleged 
that corrupt past and present Nigerian leaders have deposited in British banks stolen
368 On this particular point see, for instance, Oyovbaire 2000: 104-110.
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Nigerian money amounting to about four hundred billion Nigerian naira (about a 
billion British pounds) Momoh said, even though the British government had let it be 
known that it will not help the Nigerian government to have access to the stolen 
money without criminal charges being pressed against the alleged culprits, the 
Nigerian press does not need criminal charges to convince the British government that 
an offence has been committed. His reasoning is that all the press has to put before 
Britain is that these corrupt public officials in Nigeria have no right to open foreign 
accounts and that the breach o f the Code o f Conduct in the Constitution, which is also 
a law, is forfeiture. So, in effect, he added: "If any official has a foreign account, it is 
forfeited to the Federal Government and the press should point to the section in the 
Constitution".
But Momoh noted that the reason for the press' inability to serve the Nigerian state in 
this manner is because, as already corroborated above by eminent authorities on the 
Nigerian press, 'the Nigerian press believes in selective disclosure, selective justice'. 
He said even though the Nigerian press is fully in the know that almost all the public 
officials in Nigeria have foreign accounts, they are only prepared to expose those 
officials who are no longer in favourite position, or no longer in government.
On this issue, Farouk Ibrahim agrees with Momoh. In describing what he has 
observed about the Nigerian press, Ibrahim stated:
In Nigeria for now I  think most journalists would say that well, i f  I  have to use 
this information, i f  I  have to withhold this information to destroy an opponent, 
fine. It doesn't really matter to them whether at the end o f  the day; such action 
would be against the national interest... When it comes to talking about the 
press, there is so much difference between what the philosophy o f the Press 
should be and what the practitioners in Nigeria do. There have been so many 
occasions when our newspapers and magazines have published blatant lies. 
They feel, well, we have to sell. (Omar Farouk Ibrahim. Interview in 
Kaduna).
To Haruna:
Some o f  the way we have reported, i f  it were left to the press, Nigeria would 
have gone to pieces. Because sometimes some o f  the headlines you see are 
really divisive headlines. They distort facts about whole sections o f the 
country. Sometimes they tell barefaced lies and so on and so forth. So you
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have this mixed bag kind o f  situation ... I  think the main thing is that we tend 
to be prisoners o f  our sources. I  guess it's by definition the nature o f  the 
Nigerian media ...W e just report the political actors. I f  they are from our own 
side o f  the country we just report what they say without asking critical 
questions, and so on. So it's basically prejudiced. And reporters ought to be 
able to overcome prejudice ... (Mohammed Haruna. Interview in Kaduna).
Al-Bashir's thinking about the Nigerian press is also along that line as he noted that 
"we (the press) are so much attached to the political enclave to which we belong and 
this blurs our minds towards issues of national cohesion."
5.2g The control factor in the Nigerian press
Another factor which has been identified as an impediment against the Nigerian press 
in the task o f promoting national integration is the control factor in Nigeria's media 
institution. It could be said that this phenomenon has a colonial legacy behind it, if  the 
various measures taken by the British colonialists to control the press, particularly 
during the nationalists' struggle for Nigeria's independence, are taken into account 
(Nnaemeka et al, eds. 1989a: 158-159). Further, Nnaemeka et al (Ibid, 162-164) also 
notes that the activities of the nationalists' press so tilted against the colonialists to the 
extent that the various colonial governments had to go into newspaper publishing as a 
way of countering the attacks from the nationalist press. Although different reasons 
abound as to why media control from any source in Nigeria, is almost inevitable, 
the crux of the views from the interviewees is that, any form of control exerted on a 
newspaper, for example, doesn’t have to necessarily make a newspaper ineffective in 
the performance of national objectives insofar as the media practitioners themselves 
invoke the ethics o f the profession as their guide, fulfil constitutional obligations 
prescribed for the mass media and therefore act as a check on control from any
370source.
369 See, for instance, Dare, T. 1997: 543-544; Mohammed, B.J. 1996: 297-310; Egbochukwu, s. 1996: 
215-216; Omu, F. 1978: 248-250; ‘Ownership, Control o f Press in Africa’ by Mohammed Haruna 
published in the New Nigerian edition o f 18/6/87, p.7; Haruna 1996: 56; “Why some states own 
media”, Daily Times, 8/6/83, p.2; ‘Osoba decries official interference’, The Statesman, 19/6/91, back 
page.
70 See Enwenwa 1989: 86-93; Omu 1996: 17; Nwosu 1996: 24-25; Kukah 1996: 141-143; Idowu 
1996: chap. 14; Jason 1996: 36; NPC, 2000: 132-133.
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This is what informs Momoh’s position:
You see that's why I ’m saying that the Nigerian journalist, although 
constitutionally an agent, must be a professional. Let the professionals tell the 
owners and be successful in telling the owners that there is conditionality for  
their owning which is that the press must monitor governance on behalf o f  the 
people ... For instance, as a professional, i f  you say I  should run someone 
down, I  would say, no, I  am not going to do that until I  hear from him. That’s 
the impact o f  ethics. It is drawn up and it tells you what you must do which is 
that you are to publish facts because the law o f  defamation, protects the man I  
am being asked to run down. The same thing i f  I  am asked to run down a 
government. I  would respond, as a professional, by saying that there is the law 
o f sedition and that the things I  am being asked to publish are covered by the 
Official Secrets Acts. O f course, there is also the law o f  treason. So you see 
that all these impact on exuberant ownership ... (Tony Momoh. Interview in 
Lagos).
However, Momoh added that the Nigerian press can effectively overcome the 
ownership obstacle by looking at the role the press is to play, which, as clearly spelt 
out in chapter two of the Nigerian Constitution, should inform their perspectives and 
worldviews:
That is why I  have always said that the media have a responsibility to 
articulate the Nigerian dream which is Chapter two o f  the Constitution o f the 
Federal Republic o f  Nigeria which is known as the “Fundamental Objectives 
and Directive Principles o f State Policy. ” That is what constitutes the 
Nigerian dream and it is our own definition o f the Nigerian interests. It 
defines what everybody must do. It says that sovereignty belongs to the people 
o f Nigeria and not to one part o f  i t ...
It says that through the Constitution, the people o f  Nigeria have delegated 
power to those in Government and that these powers delegated must be shared 
among three, that is those who make laws, those who interpret laws, and those 
who execute the laws. In other words, the powers are shared among the 
Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary but the people are saying that 
these powers are being delegated to those who find  themselves in that and 
according to Section 13 o f the Constitution, they must succumb to, abide by, 
and embrace the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles o f  State 
Policy in the area o f education, in the area o f social policy, in the area o f the 
polity, in the area o f the economy, in the area o f  the environment, in the area 
o f culture, in the area o f foreign policy, they are all there ... That is the 
Nigerian dream and that is what the press must promote to have a national 
perspective on issues. (Tony Momoh. Interview in Lagos).
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Nevertheless, Momoh also believes,371 as do some renowned Nigerian media experts, 
that it would be foolhardy to think that any newspaper, or media in general, can be 
free from any form o f control, whether internal or external, given the fact that they are 
often set up for a purpose, which is to look after and protect certain interests.372
Interviewees Farouk Ibrahim and Haruna agree that any individual or group setting up 
newspapers or any media house would inevitably have some interests to protect in the
373 • •first place. Momoh said this practice o f using newspapers or the media in general to 
propagate certain interests or objectives has been employed by Nigerian publishers, 
whether government or private since colonial times and subsequently during the 
nationalist struggle against the colonialists. The impact of the colonial legacy on the 
way that the Nigerian press conduct their activities today is well documented.374
Indeed, in the view of Momoh, the major political actors during the nationalist 
struggle and immediately after Nigeria gained political independence in 1960, 
established newspapers not only for the purpose o f campaigning against colonial rule, 
on which they were all united, but also to promote their own political ambition against 
their political opponents. But the main thrust of Prince Momoh's views on the control 
factor in Nigeria’s media institution is his delineation o f the various levels at which 
they occur and their effects on the national objectives of cohesion, integration and 
unity into: control through ownership, control through patronage, control through 
policy and control through the ethics of the profession, as well as the control which 
the environment within which the press operates exerts on the press. Put concisely, 
Momoh stated:
371 See Prince Tony Momoh‘s submission at the second national media week of the Nigerian Union of 
Journalist {NUJ}, held in Owerri, the Imo state capital [Nigeria], in June 1989, as published in 
Vanguard, 6/6/89, p.7. The former Nigerian information minister is quoted as saying: “The objective o f 
private newspapers is that they do not criticise their owner and their interest”-
72 Also see, ‘Ownership, Control o f the Press in Africa’ written by Mohammed Haruna, published in 
New Nigerian, 18/6/87, p.7. In this Alhaji Haruna stated: ‘Editorial independence? In Nigeria the 
private newspapers may be relatively independent o f government interference, but the notion that they 
are necessarily freer than government newspapers arises from the erroneous thinking that government 
is the only threat to press freedom. Government is not the only owner o f newspaper and all owners tend 
to behave alike ... [and] that is that for those who pay the piper, they try to dictate the tune”.
373 See Uche 1989; Oyovbaire 2000; Dare 1997: 543-544; James 1997: 77; Aloba 1995: 45-54, 
Ajuluchukwu 2000: 43.
374 See Hachten 1971: xvi. Further, Dr. Nnaemeka (1989: 4), has argued that the colonial legacy has 
persisted because the struggle for political independence, not only in Nigeria but in most o f Africa, did 
not involve theoretical and philosophical questions about the role that the mass media should play in 
the construction and reconstruction o f an independent nation (see also, Enwenwa 1989: 77-78).
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The control pattern is through ownership because when you own you control, 
as he who pays the piper must dictate the tune. Control also is through 
patronage as, for instance, i f  I  put adverts in your newspaper or i f  I  give you 
subventions, you must reflect my perspectives. So you can see the business 
angle to control. Then the final control is through policy, which is that you 
must obey the laws o f  the land. For instance, ...w e hctve the newspaper Acts - 
The Newspaper Ordinance 1917, Amendments 1964, Newspaper Registration 
Decrees, the Nigerian Press Council Decree, etc. These are the laws o f  the 
polity. There is the law o f Defamation, the law o f  Sedition, the law o f  contempt 
and the Official Secrets Acts, etc. These are all control through policy because 
they regulate publications. One can also talk about control through ethics or 
professional control, which is that you must do it through ethics ... and o f  
course there is control through the environment itself. (Tony Momoh. 
Interview in Lagos).
5.2h Effect of media control on the Nigerian state
The important thing to note here is that the various levels o f control have their own 
implications for national integration, particularly as they relate to the way the press 
has treated and continues to treat some sensitive national issues. For instance, Turi 
Muhammadu, while making reference to the press' handling o f an issue like the OIC 
palaver, noted that the press was guided by the ownership interests, which in this case, 
were their loyalty to and faith in their religion coupled with the geographical locations
• •  • T7Sof their newspapers (Muhammadu 2000: v-vni).
If one also considers the views of Jose on the role that the ownership pattern of 
Nigerian newspapers play in the direction that the newspapers follow, it would be 
discovered that this is also tied to the religious beliefs o f the ownership and the 
location of their respective newspapers. On that basis, for instance, it would become 
easier to understand why newspapers like The Guardian, Vanguard and Daily 
Champion, all based in the mainly Christian southern Nigeria and whose proprietors 
are also Christians and southerners as well, were opposed to Nigeria's membership of 
the OIC. But on the other hand, newspapers like the south-based Concord, whose 
proprietor is a southerner but a Muslim, and the New Nigerian, which though owned 
by the federal government but based in the mainly Muslim north, were in favour of 
Nigeria's membership.
375 See also James 1997: 77; Aloba 1995: 45-53; Oyovbaire 2000: 101-102;
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Hence Agbese said the New Nigerian had no option but to support Nigeria’s 
membership of the OIC, whether or not it had any objections about the process o f 
Nigeria’s entry because, as an Islamic religious issue, it is part o f the culture that the 
New Nigerian is supposed to promote.376 On this basis, Agbese explained that:
New Nigerian support was in line with the Muslim religious culture, which, 
among other issue, is that a Muslim cannot, in public, oppose whatever is 
done in the interest o f Islam (Dan Agbese: Interview in Lagos)..
Farouk Ibrahim reasons along the same line when he notes that because the New 
Nigerian is based within a mainly Muslim northern Nigerian environment, it had to 
support any issue relating to Islam, like the OIC and the introduction o f the Sharia law 
by some states in northern Nigeria. He said in order to ensure that such issues do not 
damage national integration and unity, the media in general owe a duty to the 
Nigerian State to organise their reactions on these Islamic issues around the 
understanding that under the constitution, Nigeria is a secular state and that the 
constitution allows for the fundamental rights of the people to be ruled and judged 
according to their faith and beliefs. According to him, it is this aspect o f the Nigerian 
constitution, which the mainly Christian-oriented and southern-based Nigerian press, 
has failed to appreciate and come to terms with (Interview in Kaduna).
But Odukomaiya (Interview in Lagos) remarks that the Nigerian press’ handling o f 
these and other issues (OIC, Sharia, Revenue Allocation Formula, Census, Federal 
Character Principle, etc.) should be judged on the basis that each media house has 
its own standard, its own vision and also its own limitations.378 In effect, it is almost 
impossible to find a situation in which all the newspapers will agree to denounce or 
applaud any particular matter. Momoh also alluded to the same view:
There is no unanimity on the OIC issue because it reflects the religious 
perspectives o f nationalities and, o f  course, there is a division between the 
Christian perspective and the Islamic perspective on this issue ... I f  you ask
376 See “How and why the ‘New Nigerian’ was established”, Muhammadu 2000: 1-26)
377 The federal character principle within the Nigerian society means every in Nigerian should reflect 
the ethnic mix o f the state. Many Nigerians have opposed this arguing that it breeds incompetence 
because people are given positions not based on merit.
378 For the Mission Statement o f each o f the newspapers selected for this study, see chapter three 
above.
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me about how the newspapers have each responded to other issues such as the 
census, [or the] OIC, ...[it was] a reflection o f  the nationality group that 
dominate their place o f  operation. For instance, you see that in the Lagos 
area, what the Yoruba view is dominates the presses, in spite o f  ownership. 
The Vanguard, the Guardian, ThisDay, Champion, even the Daily Times, all 
reflect the Yoruba worldview by and large because the readership is 
Yoruba. (Tony Momoh: Interview in Lagos).
It has already been noted that various writers and experts on the Nigerian press have 
argued that the press needs to be professional to enable it meet its responsibility to the 
Nigerian society. They believe, for instance, that it is only in an environment where 
the media is an impartial arbiter on all national issues that national integration and
• -370unity will flourish. However, Ibrahim, one of the interviewees, contends that given 
the media frenzy generated by Nigeria’s membership o f the OIC, the Nigerian press 
has yet to imbibe these principles and therefore failed to exhibit professionalism in 
their activities by mis-educating the Nigerian public to believe that Nigeria’s 
membership of the OIC was a prelude to Nigeria becoming an Islamic state, ruled 
according to the Sharia law.
OIC has nothing to do with Sharia. OIC is an organisation. Whether you are 
100% Muslim or not, you are free to join OIC. It is the Nigerian media and the 
Nigerian people who made it look as i f  it is whatever ... Successive 
governments [have] realise[d] that it is an added source o f  soft loan for  
development without any strings attached. Sometimes, the loans are interest- 
free. It has nothing to do with religion. It's just because a group o f  Islamic 
countries came together and said that, each country with a Muslim 
population, no matter how small, is free to join. Uganda, Kenya and South 
Africa are all members o f OIC, [despite being] predominantly Christian. So 
these are the distinctions the Nigerian press have failed to make on this issue, 
for their own reasons. ( Mohammed Ibrahim. Interview in Kaduna).
He said if the Nigerian press had made these distinctions; it would have become 
obvious to the Nigerian public that there are two categories of membership, which 
enables any country to be an observer or a full member. In conclusion, he added: “In 
the same vein, if  a nation wants to, it can keep an Ambassador in the Vatican. So that 
is why Nigeria has a mission in the Vatican. There is no reason, therefore, why it 
cannot become a member of the OIC.”
379 For the various arguments and conclusions refer to chapter two above.
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5.2i The policies of Government
What is obvious from the foregoing is that the interviewees concede the fact that the 
media institutions in Nigeria are subject to various controls. Nevertheless, they all 
agree that the control factor in whatever form should not be made to supercede the 
overall national interest o f the Nigerian State. But an important observation about the 
problems that the media control factor has created in the media institution in Nigeria 
made by Nnaemeka et al (1989a: 112) is ‘the absence of any guide to behaviour for 
the mass media, for government and for all other interests provided by a national 
communication policy ... ’
Consequently, Edeani (1989: 111), identified four problems related to mass media 
control in Nigeria as: “(1) political meddling, (2) lack of professional responsibility, 
(3) excessive sensitivity by rulers and government functionaries to unfavourable news 
reports and criticisms by the mass media, 380 and, (4) the absence o f a well articulated 
and effectively implemented national communication policy.”381
These phenomena were also highlighted by Agbese who, while describing the 
relationship between the government and the press, noted that the absence of an 
integrated law for the press to follow has resulted in their inability to challenge the 
government. Rather, their performance is hampered through an array of laws acting 
against the press. Agbese especially describes this as one o f the common features of 
military administrations in Nigeria. For instance, he notes that the military in Nigerian 
politics promulgated retroactive laws to punish ‘offences’ that had not been such 
before.
The problem for the Nigerian press is lack o f  government policies on how the 
press can perform. Because there are no press laws in the country more or
380 See, for example: Protection Against False Accusation, Decree no. 4 o f 1984 in Nnaemeka et al, 
(eds.) 1989a: 142, 365, 377, 392, 396-397, 399 re: Decree no. 27; also see, Akinnola 1998; Article 19, 
1997; Bitrus 1996.
381 This point, in particular, is rooted in colonialism, because today in Africa, in general, instead o f an 
agreed national goal influencing the mass media institution, it is the neo-colonial Western concept of 
news and development that drive the activities o f the African mass media. This has brought about what 
Jeter et al (1996) described as the ‘clash o f media values’ between African mass media and African 
governments, resulting in most African governments resorting to stricter media policies to cow the 
media.
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less guiding the behaviour o f the press. And so we are subjected to 
arbitrariness on the part o f  those in power (Dan Agbese: Interview in Lagos)
To support this notion, Agbese made reference to the stories based on the Cookey
382Report on what was supposed to be the political orientation for Nigeria, published 
in 1987 by the Newswatch magazine. As his explanation shows, government’s 
reaction to the publication was to promulgate a retroactive law to punish the 
Newswatch magazine even though it did not contravene any law by publishing some 
stories based on the Cookey Report. In the words o f Agbese:
In 1987, when we (Newswatch) published stories based on the Cookey Report 
...w e were proscribed for six months. It made sense to them. They then made 
a law ... a decree backing the action. In other words before that we didn't 
breach a law but having taken the action, they had to delegitimise it, they had 
to make a law backdating it. And a whole lot o f things like that were done by 
the military regimes. An action was taken first and then the action was 
criminalised and then the law was brought in to back the action o f the 
government (Interview in Lagos), t.
It was also during the same military administration of Babangida (1985-1993), that 
some other newspaper houses fell victim o f government’s arbitrary powers as they 
were sealed up for publishing stories that the government considered a threat to 
‘security’. Agbese’s verdict on this is
... it's arbitrariness. I  mean what did the Guardian do? Or what did the 
Punch do? They didn't commit crimes and they didn't breach any press law. 
But somebody simply said: what you are doing is offensive to me and so don't 
publish. I f  there is a law and i f  it says I  am doing it under this law then they 
will go to court and say: No, I  have not breached the law
But the problem is the absence o f  [an integrated] law. And I  would personally 
want to have a law to guide my behaviour so that i f  somebody challenges me I  
could challenge him in the court. The court can decide who is wrong and who 
is right. But in the cases just cited there is nothing o f the sort; they criminalise 
your action and bring the law backing it up and you have no defence. That's 
the problem, (Dan Agbese, Interview in Lagos).
But Agbese also acknowledges that the press has also not helped its case by not
382 The Cookey report was based on a series o f memoranda and a synthesis o f the public hearings 
which the Justice Cookey Commission received. The Commission was set up by the President 
Babangida administration and had as its terms o f reference the need to fashion a new political direction 
for Nigeria.
383 See Maja-Pearce (ed.) 1996: 203; Olugboju, Aigbogun & Nwankwo, 1994: 1-39; Duyile 1987: 362- 
375).
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making a consistent and determined effort to fight this government tendency, going 
by the way that it has conducted itself over the years. Perhaps, because o f the already 
stated lack of a state communication policy to guide the mass media in particular, the 
media have been unable to take an enduring and principled stand, in the overall 
national interest, against successive governments’ arbitrary behaviour towards 
oppositional or critical statements by media institutions or individuals. A typical 
example given by Agbese is the way the media generally fail to challenge the military 
governments’ arbitrariness against the politicians that they overthrow. For instance, he 
notes that when the military came to power in 1984 and removed the democratically 
elected civilian government of President Shagari, a whole lot o f politicians were put 
in jail for spending security votes384. Agbese’s concern here is that although the 
politicians spent the security votes under the law, the new military regime ensured 
that the politicians were jailed for it. The regime did this by criminalising the actions 
of the politicians and backdating a new law all the way to 1979, the year that the 
military handed over power to the elected civilian government of President Shagari.
In other words i f  you look at that law, it was like we didn't have a government 
from October 1, 1979 to December 31, 1983. But nobody (in the press) 
appears to look at the implications o f that. The thing was that these guys (the 
politicians) were guilty; therefore we have to deal with them. That is part o f  
the problem. (Dan Agbese. Interview in Lagos).
5.2j Press and government policies
The press has often found its way around harsh and arbitrary government policies 
aimed at emasculating and making it ineffective. One of the ways it has done this has 
been by going underground.386 And indeed any keen observer of the Nigerian press 
would attest to the fact that, whether it was during the colonial era or the dark days of 
military rule, the Nigerian press had often found a way to survive (Macebuh 2000). 
This much was acknowledged by some of the interviewees, who noted that the
384 The security votes which was approved by the NPN-led federal government during the second 
republic (1979-1983) was a separate budget meant to cover issues o f security for the Nigerian state. But 
many Nigerians were sceptical that that was in fact what it was being used for. They came to regard it 
as one way that the NPN government deviced to siphone public money for party political patronage etc. 
This was why many Nigerians were happy when the military clamped down on the politicians for using 
public funds for dubious purposes.
385 See footnote 257
386 See, for instance, Yusuf 1997: 31-35; Olugboju et al. 1994: 11-13.
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Nigerian state has always wanted to handcuff the press.387 However, there is no 
denying the fact that even with repressive government policies against the Nigerian 
press, the press has remained a consistently resilient institution in civil society, which 
everybody, including the government, has to contend with. Indeed, ironically enough, 
government policies have, instead o f muzzling the press, had the opposite effect of 
making it more radical:
The press has operated in defiance o f  government policies. From what we 
have seen in the past ten years, even when regulations are made trying to 
suppress it, it goes underground. Under General Ibrahim Babangida and 
General Sani Abacha, they thought the press how to operate without premises. 
Journals were published with no address. It has mastered working in a very 
hostile environment. It remains powerful any day. Governments can ignore it, 
but at their own peril. (G. G. Darah. Interview in Lagos).
The policies o f government must invariably affect any newspaper. How has it 
affected us? I don’t think it has affected the media negatively as such. I f  
anything it probably was aimed to affect the media negatively but it turned out 
making the media to find  other means o f  survival.
Are we talking about the decrees o f the military in those days? Are we talking 
about Decree 4 or Decree 2? What they did was to make the media grow more 
radical or become very more engaged in the political process. It then meant 
that anytime the government was seeking to enforce those laws, clamp down 
on the media. it became not a matter o f  law and order any longer but an issue 
o f human rights and the violation o f  the freedom o f people to express 
themselves and to publish newspapers and so on and so forth. (Emeka Izeze. 
Interview in Lagos).
In spite o f this, the interviewees also agree that the most important obstacle to the 
press is the policies o f government which have made publishing a very hazardous and 
economically ruinous undertaking. This problem has been exacerbated by the fact that 
in the Nigerian State, government is involved in almost every aspect o f the Nigerian 
nation,388 and, in effect, its policies are bound to affect an institution like the 
media/the press in many other ways. Many authorities on the Nigerian media have 
written about the negative effects that Nigeria4s economic environment has had and 
continues to have on the press.389 What has therefore happened, as many of the
See, for instance, Odetola 1982: 14, 26, 152-153.
388 In 1981, the late renowned Nigerian Professor o f Political Science, Claude Ake, in his Presidential 
address to the Nigerian Political Science Association, was quoted as saying: ‘The Nigerian state 
appears to intervene everywhere and to own virtually everything, including access to status and 
wealth’. See also Olurode 1990: 18.
389 See, for instance, Jason 1996: 37; Ekeocha 1996: 93-94.
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interviewees acknowledge, is that the dire economic environment created by 
government’s stringent economic policies, has led to a situation whereby only a few 
newspapers are able to survive purely on their own and operate as professional media 
establishments:
Only a few newspapers are able to survive on sales and advertisements. The 
others have to be [subvented] by their owners. Inflation, the 
underdevelopment o f  the nation's infrastructure, the technological 
backwardness to the extent that except fo r the English we write, most o f the 
things we use in the newspaper are sourced from abroad - newsprint, ink ... 
the vehicles we use fo r conveying it, etc. The business is excruciating. (G.G. 
Darah. Interview in Lagos),
5.3 The impact of foreign influence on the Nigerian press
The realities o f globalisation on mass media institutions in nation-states constitute a 
major field of research in media and cultural studies.390 The effects of international 
communication on the Nigerian media institution are not the focus of this study. 
Rather, the foreign influence on the Nigerian press that is under scrutiny here relates 
to the links between the international economic environment and the economic 
policies that Nigerian governments have enunciated vis-a-vis the excruciating effects 
of such policies on Nigeria’s media institution.391 During the research period, the
1Q2
crisis resulting from Nigeria’s debt to international financial institutions was a 
recurring feature of Nigeria’s socio-political and economic landscapes.
Some o f the details o f Nigeria’s debt burden, as provided by Momoh, gives an insight 
into how their negative impact manifest in the print media process. In his words:
I  have just written my column fo r  the Vanguard newspapers and it is titled: 
"Deny the Debts". Basically what I  am saying is that Nigeria should deny the 
debts because we had no capacity to pay them. We had no legal capacity, we 
had no economic capacity and we had no social capacity. We were not told 
what the implications o f  what we were signing were before we signed the 
agreement fo r the loans. But as it is now obvious to us, the implication for 
signing such documentation, which was meant to be short-term loans, was that 
our children and their children would be paying such debts.
390 See, for example, Srebemy-Mohammadi et al, 1997; Curan & Gurevitch (eds.) 1997; Mohammadi 
1997.
391 See socio-economic setting on pp.54-60 above
392 Such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the London Club and the Paris Club.
We borrowed $3.5 billion dollars in the 70s and at that time the rate o f  
exchange was $2 dollars to N1 but since then we have been paying through 
the nose. In fact we have paid $13.6 billion dollars; we still owe $28 billion 
dollars and the going exchange rate o f  the Naira is more than N100 to 
$1 dollar. That is the Western world fo r you. They made us sign the documents 
without telling us the implications and so we didn't have the legal capacity 
and indeed, they even drafted the agreement, our own was to sign. We did not 
have the economic capacity to pay because we were on the receiving end. We 
were expected to meet the basic needs o f  our people but because o f the debts 
we had to pay back we didn’t have enough fo r our people. Yet and at the same 
time, our creditors were threatening us that unless we paid, they were not 
going to give us spare parts fo r  our machines etc. Then when we now paid the 
debts what happened? They devalued our currency before they gave us the 
next loan and as a result o f  all these, our economy is now completely messed 
up. This is affecting every facet o f  our lives including the press. So to that 
extent I would say that foreign influence is very real. (Tony Momoh. 
Interview in Lagos).
Indeed, the negative impact o f the debt burden on the Nigerian press has been 
phenomenal. For instance, during the mid-80s and in the 90s, because of the 
devaluation of the Nigerian currency (Naira), against the British pound and the 
American dollar, foreign exchange that the newspaper houses needed to import 
newsprint became so scarce that not enough raw materials were available to them to 
maintain their production level.
For instance, on this issue, Odukomaiya and Izeze had the following to say:
Within the past 15 years the restrictions [include that] newsprint has become 
a very scarce commodity, even though the Federal government purported to 
have set up a newsprint firm  at Oku-Iboku in Aqua Ibom State in 1980. [But] 
that industry has existed only in the breach. It is there and even when it was in 
its fu ll bloom, what it was producing was not enough for the Nigerian 
newspapers to consume.
Now, as i f  that was not enough, the Federal Government is imposing a very 
high and prohibitive duty on the importation o f  newsprint. Well, there is 
nothing [more] discriminatory ... [than] the imposition o f prohibitive duties
393 For an in-depth knowledge o f how Nigeria4s parlous economic situation, brought about by the 
excruciating debt burden, has affected the Nigerian press, see The NPAN (Newspapers Proprietors 
Association o f Nigeria) case, the National Concord Editorial 1/3/83, p.2. Also see: the paid full page 
advert placed by the NPAN in the National Concord f  6/3/83, p. 10; the Editorial in the Nigerian 
Statesman, titled: ‘Nigeria‘s newsprint crisis revisited’ 3/6/83; ‘Some newspapers may fold up’, by 
Segun Osoba, the then General Secretary o f NPAN, in New Nigerian, 2/6/83, p. 16; ‘Newspapers to 
benefit from SAP {Structural Adjustment Programme} relief package’, National Concord, 15/6/89, 
front page; “NUJ wants govt to reduce cost o f newsprint”, The Guardian {Nigeria} on-line, 24/9/03)
by the Federal Government on the importation o f  the raw materials used by 
the press ... [as they are] bound to have a very deleterious effect. (Henry 
Odukomaiya, Interview in Lagos),
What [also] happened was that foreign exchange became scarce and ... [this 
affected our ability to obtain] newsprint. And even those who made it their 
business to import newsprint, they were unable to import as much as was 
needed in the market. And once supply is not meeting demand, the cost will be 
going up. That was what happened ...
... [Another reason was] because the Naira was depreciating rather fast and 
the revenue o f  newspapers were not improving significantly. ... [Yet] even i f  
you raised cover prices it wouldn't have ... [been enough]. They couldn't raise 
advert rates either, [even though] many newspapers are not surviving on 
adverts ... (Emeka Izeze. Interview in Lagos),
The alternative for the newspapers was for them to raise their cover prices because the 
adverts that they normally rely on became uncertain as most industries were subjected 
to the strains of the austere economic environment (Egbochukwu, 1996: 212-227). 
But then the option to raise cover prices hardly made any economic sense as the 
following explanations o f Nigeria’s economic plight, given by Al-Bashir, also 
indicate:
There is also the issue o f ... poverty ... In 1987 ... I  think the average worker 
was receiving one thousand, five hundred Naira per month. At that time the 
cover prices were between thirty to forty Naira ... [so just] one newspaper 
[would be] about nine hundred Naira per month [which makes it impossible]. 
So the low earning capacity o f  the average Nigerian affected the sale o f  
newspapers. And ... they even formed an informal Newspapers Readers 
Association ... [going to a] vendor in the morning, sit down there with him, go 
through all the newspapers, then at the end ... they will give the vendor twenty 
or thirty Naira and he will accept it because the vendors have no liability for 
unsold copies.
And cover prices were going up because o f  the raw materials .... In 1988, 
when I  joined the Democrat, I  think a ton o f  newsprint was selling for about 
N7000. By the time we closed a ton was N70000-N75000. So within ... nine 
years... the price had [massively] jumped ... [as] with all the other raw 
materials. So we had to increase the cover price ... I  was [then] arguing ,,, 
that i f  we increase the cover price we are not going to get a lot o f people to 
buy the newspaper, that the best we could do was to increase the advert page. 
But the argument they advanced was that only few  people advertised and so i f  
you don 7 increase the cover price and expect something from adverts, the 
newspaper was going to collapse. But then again i f  you increase your cover 
price, the very person whom you hoped will be reading your newspaper will 
not be doing so. So there was this kind o f the impact o f  the economic situation 
in the country, which reduced the circulation o f  the newspapers. (Al-Bashir,
Interview in Kaduna).
5.4 Where press reflects national outlook and promotes a collective 
national identity
Several studies have shown that the press can play a major role in the promotion of a 
nation’s national / collective identity, even within the context o f multiculturalism 
(Billig, 1995: 11 & 94).394 Commentators on the Nigerian press have often indicated 
that the press can play a major role in helping to realise Nigeria’s national objectives 
of integration and unity, where those objectives are clearly stated and known, if it 
becomes truly professional and re-asserts itself as a vanguard o f the people.395
There is the belief among the interviewees that the press must recognise Nigeria’s 
diversity as a basis for promoting national integration. But for that to be achievable, 
Momoh also stresses the need for the press to be in the forefront o f the campaign to 
promote the overriding interests that define Nigeria as a nation and then respect those 
interests, in addition. But he contends that as far as national integration is concerned, 
Nigerians have not worked hard at integrating because the institutions are not working 
to integrate Nigeria, as ethnic and other sundry divisions are still immanent within the
396Nigerian nation. (Interview in Lagos).).
Indeed, cognisant of the peculiar nature o f the Nigerian society and how it has shaped 
the Nigerian press, some o f the interviewees emphasised that the only way by which 
the press can successfully fulfil its constitutional role, is by becoming truly 
professional. To Momoh, for instance, “it is the safest way to national integration”, 
because then the point of departure for journalism practice would only be the Nigerian 
Constitution. In the same vein, Onabule noted as follows:
We have to educate our people, our journalists to know what the law 
regulating the profession is all about. Whatever a journalist publishes, he has 
to prove that it is the truth. You don’t just publish anything in the name o f
394 Fitzgerald, 1991: 193 & 211; Anderson, 1991: 35; Schlessinger 1991a: 191 & 1991b: 301-307; 
Brookes, 1999: 251 & 261.
395 See Enwenwa 1989: 77-78; Omu 1996: 17; Nwosu 1996: 24-25; Kukah 1996: 141-143; Idowu 
1996: 209-210; Jason 1996: 36; NPC, 2000: 131-133).
396 See, for instance, Nnoli, 1978; Nnoli, 1989; Ayida, 1990; Ayoade, 1988; Suberu, 2001; Diamond, 
1988; Badru, 1998; Lewis, 1968: 46-47; Mbaeyi, 1971: 15-20; New York Times, 1969: 1&24; Aguolu, 
1973: vii; Usman, 1982: vii-xvii; Alkali, 1987.
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press freedom. That is not journalism. (Duro Onabule, Interview in Lagos).
The views of Darah, in respect o f the need for professionalism in the Nigerian press, 
amply corroborate Onabule’s and Momoh’s position:
When we talk about the role o f  the press, it doesn’t mean the press should 
behave like claptrap. The press should reflect the dynamism and the 
divisiveness that is inherent in the multiple interest o f  the country. It must 
reflect it; otherwise we won ’t be able to find  the quality o f  thought, the quality 
o f ideas in the country, i f  you are looking for a consensus all the time. The 
press should reflect the dialectics and the controversies. It should not shield 
them, because it becomes the mirror through which we evaluate the energies 
in the country.
Governments don’t fa ll as a result o f  that. Countries don’t collapse as a 
result; instead, they get strengthened. Nigeria is in that sense the America o f  
Africa in terms o f  the media diversity. Nigeria is the United Nations o f Africa 
because it has over 394 languages and each language is an interest group, 
each has its own heroes, its own leaders, and its own religion. We don’t have 
enough newspapers in the country to cater for these interests. The more we 
have the merrier. (G.G.Darah. Interview in Lagos).
Many of the interviewees agree that there are certain issues which the Nigerian press 
has often used to reflect a national outlook and therefore mobilise Nigerians and instil 
a sense of Nigerian national identity in them. Odukomaiya’s description of the 
Nigerian press aptly captures this fundamental essence of the character of the 
Nigerian press:
The press has always done that whenever the issues at stake do not pertain to 
any particular ethnic group, whenever the issues involved are not contentious 
and do not border on the interest o f  a particular ethnic group, whenever the 
issues involved do not relate to any particular religion, whenever the issues 
involved do not border on, fo r instance, gender, the press could rise up and 
speak with one voice ...
The press spoke with one voice when we were fighting for independence. But 
once independence was won, o f  course everybody went his own way. When we 
fought against the Military, the press spoke with one voice. For instance, now 
the press would rise up against any coup, no matter the section o f  the press, 
even including the New Nigerian. They would rise up to condemn the coup i f  
ever there was any attempt. So... i f  any group o f  soldiers tries to stage a coup, 
they will not get a good reception from the press. They will not, I  can tell you 
th a t... (Henry Odukomaiya. Interview in Lagos).
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The comments by some of the other interviewees also bear out Odukomaiya’s 
assessment of these particular characteristics o f the Nigerian press:
The press wouldn’t say we don’t need Nigeria. But it will tell you that Nigeria 
will do better i f  you arrange it in this way or that way. So the main trend is for  
national integration. I f  the press were to concentrate on and orchestrate the 
break-up o f Nigeria, the politicians could not hold it.
So you have this regional emphasis. But overall you cannot find  a Nigerian 
newspaper that has on its own crusaded for dismemberment o f  Nigeria. You 
won't find any. Newspapers have written very angry editorials but they all 
point to one theme, which is that there is need for a good government. They 
might argue, for instance, that this position or that position that the 
Government is taking is wrong, or that the Government should do better than 
it is doing. That is what newspapers have been doing. (G.G. Darah. Interview 
in Lagos).
The country is divided on ethnic, economic and social grounds. But none o f  
these divisions wants a separation. Each one is opting for a better share o f the 
cake. They now talk o f  national conference. These are the views that are 
reflected in the Nigerian press.
(Sam Amuka-Pemu. Interview in Lagos).
Another clear area in which the Nigerian press employs or expresses a national 
perspective to issues is particularly obvious when international issues are involved, as 
attested to by some other interviewees:
National integration is reflected in only one aspect o f the life o f  our nation and 
that is when, for instance, Nigeria has a contest with other countries, like 
international football matches, international boxing, and so on ... So it's not 
that it is totally absent. I t ’s just that when stages o f contest occur in the polity, 
it’s inevitable that all those areas o f  control through ownership o f the press 
will take its place ...
ECOMOG (The fighting Armed Forces o f the Economic Community o f West 
African States [ECOWAS]) readily comes to mind. Nigeria spearheaded 
ECOWAS' military effort to bring peace to Liberia, through the ECOMOG, 
and so, when it comes to that issue, Nigerians are in support o f Nigeria. I f  you 
also take the issue o f  the Bakassi Peninsular,397 which is the border dispute 
between Nigeria and Cameroun, Nigerians are always united in their support 
o f the Government. In sports it is the same. There is no unanimity on the OIC 
issue because it reflects the religious perspectives o f nationalities and, o f  
course, there is a division between the Christian perspective and the Islamic 
perspective on this issue. There is no newspaper in Nigeria that supports the
397 The International Court o f Justice (ICJ) has now settled this issue in favour o f Cameroun.
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debt burden o f  Nigeria. They are in support o f  Nigeria in this area. There is 
no newspaper in Nigeria that is opposed to the price o f  oil at the international 
level, because we are interested. There is no newspaper in Nigeria that is 
opposed to Nigeria's place in the Commonwealth and in the United Nations. 
There is no newspaper in Nigeria, no medium in Nigeria that is opposed to 
our Nigerian President or Government in relation to any other Government in 
the world. (Tony Momoh. Interview in Lagos).
The only time we do that is when Nigeria is externally attacked. On the 
Bakassi Peninsular border dispute with Cameroon, we are united. No doubt 
about that. When anybody threatens Nigeria, like when our people were 
mistreated in Libya or in South Africa, the Nigerian media are united. On 
international issues, the Nigerian media are united. But on domestic issues, 
the Nigerian media can tear the Nigerian nation apart. (Al-Bashir. Interview 
in Kaduna).
When it comes to international issues involving Nigeria and other countries, 
you can trust all sections o f  the press to speak with one voice. (Henry 
Odukomaiya. Interview in Lagos).
However, and more importantly, in relation to the international issues involving 
Nigeria, even though the Nigerian press is able to straightforwardly articulate and 
promote them as one sure, guaranteed process o f propagating a Nigerian identity, it 
has been found wanting in its commitment towards an enduring policy that will 
ensure a durable perspective to guide its articulation of issues that will bring about 
national integration (Adamu, S., 1994: 467-472).398 Momoh recognises this 
shortcoming, and in effect recommends that in order for Nigeria to integrate, there is 
the need for national institutions to be developed so that the “largeness of the Nigerian 
nation can be made to exceed the nationality level” (Interview in Lagos). He weaves 
his argument around his notion that Nigeria’s identity can only be realised at that 
point of convergence, “where Nigerians can identify the cultural and the 
constitutional”. This is what he refers to as the “Senatorial level”. According to him, 
the Senatorial level is the only effective level where the nationality perspective can be 
undermined because it is the sub-nationality level where the different worldviews 
within Nigeria are located (Ibid.).
The preceding paragraphs have been a detailed analysis of the views expressed by 
some experts on the Nigerian press. Their relevance lies in how they relate to the role 
of the Nigerian media institution in Nigeria’s quest for integration and therefore its
398 See also Ciroma, A., 1994: 35; Nnaemeka, 1989: 1-8; Omu, 1996: 9-11
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contribution to the promotion o f a collective Nigerian national identity. The overall 
verdict is that, despite all the obstacles created for the press by the context in which it 
operates, the way the press is behaving is the way to achieve national integration 
because in today’s world it is possible to promote unity within a multi-cultural 
context.
Overall, the upshot o f the data gathered from the interviewees can be summarised as 
follows:
1. The press partially reflects the diverse nature of the Nigerian society.
2. The cultural differences between the northern and southern parts of Nigeria 
impact negatively on the overall performance of the press.
3. The press is mainly based in the southwest and it is the worldview of that part of 
Nigeria that dominates the press.
4. The press’ role in the articulation and promotion o f a collective Nigerian national 
identity is dynamic as it reacts to different circumstances as they occur in Nigeria.
5. It is healthy for the press to reflect the nationality perspectives in Nigeria as a 
basis for promoting national integration and therefore Nigerian national identity.
6. The press is largely able to make a distinction between the ‘national’ and the 
‘local’ in dealing with issues that arise within the Nigerian nation from time to 
time.
7. Mass media practitioners exhibit negative tendencies that run counter to their 
professional ethics and therefore act as a hindrance to their role in the Nigerian 
society.
8. The only way that the press can effectively promote Nigerian integration and then 
instil a sense o f national identity in the diversified Nigerian society is by adopting 
professional standards in all its activities.
9. The press has to reflect the Nigerian diversity, yet also recognise and promote 
those issues and interests that define Nigeria as a nation.
10. The editorial direction of the press is vulnerable to the manipulative tendencies of 
their owners, whether government or private.
11. Although freedom o f the press is relatively curtailed in Nigeria, it is unnecessary 
self-censorship, particularly on the part of those journalists that are in the employ 
of State or Federal governments that stifle journalistic freedom to publish.
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Qualitative content analysis of the Nigerian press, using available archival materials, 
will be the subject of the next stages o f this study. The focus would be on the different 
circumstances that influenced their activities over the ten-year period covered by this 
study. One of the features o f the Nigerian socio-political context during this period 
was the predominance of military administration. In August, 1983, the democratically 
elected government that has been in place since the commencement of Nigeria’s 
second republic (1979=1983) organised an election after its first four-year term. That 
election which was rancorous provided the atmosphere for another military coup and 
therefore a military administration in Nigeria that was still in place in 1993, the last 
year of the period covered by this research. The military government’s economic and 
political measures during that time led to a series of crisis. Eventually however, the 
election organised by the military administration to usher in Nigeria’s Third Republic 
was also annulled by the same administration and eventually plunged Nigeria into 
further crisis. It is the activities of the press during that period 1983-1993, that inform 
the next five chapters.
Chapter six is devoted to the analysis o f the press’ activities during the elections 
organised by a civilian administration, Chapter seven focuses on how the press 
conducted itself when a military administration organised a democratic election. The 
thrust of Chapters eight and nine is the press’ coverage of events during the sixth 
month o f each of the years 1985 and 1989... The latter Chapter particularly touches on 
the way the press treats a crisis situation under a military regime. Chapter ten 
examines the activities of the press when there are momentous events involving the 
Nigerian state and other states in the international community
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CHAPTER SIX
Analysis of the activities of the Nigerian press during 
elections supervised by a civilian administration
For anybody reading Nigerian newspapers or magazines, now or in the past, on a 
typical day, it would seem as if  the country is going to fall apart the next minute. Such 
headlines as these are typically splashed across the front pages of Nigerian 
newspapers and magazines almost frequently:
"Break-up Imminent?" (TELL: 20/03/00);
"Nigeria Breaks ... The Shape o f What Will Come" (TheNEWS: February, 1994); 
"Now Nigeria is Finished" (TELL: 6/12/93).
Yet, on another day, the whole picture o f the Nigerian State, as portrayed on the pages 
of the Nigerian press, could change to a celebration o f national pride, unity and 
solidarity.
"Soccer World Bows to Nigeria" (National Concord: 12/08/85);
"Nigeria Goes to the East and Conquers the World" (The Guardian: 12/08/85); 
"Nigeria Makes Soccer History ... Wins World Cup" (The Nigerian Observer: 
12/08/85);
"Eaglets herald Nigeria's World Leadership?" (National Concord: 19/08/85); "God is 
a Nigerian" (National Concord: 5/01/84, p. 3).
Indeed, for a country made up of about 394 ethnic and nationality groups,399 there are 
several issues that could be represented on the pages of the various Nigerian 
newspapers. To the discerning observer, the "mood swing" typical of the Nigerian 
press is determined by the nature o f the issues at stake. But typical or not, one o f the 
arguments that has been advanced against the press is that it has earned itself a 
reputation for allegedly perpetuating arguments and positions that "are not backed by
399 See Studies in Nigerian Languages, no. 5, 1976 in Usman and Abba 2000: 100-103.
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the truthful presentation of what has actually happened and what is happening in 
Nigeria (as the stories published), are based on the misrepresentation of the historical 
and contemporary realities of Nigeria." (Usman & Abba 2000: 3).
As one Nigerian journalist (Al-Bashir, Interviewee. Kaduna) has put it:
On international issues the Nigerian media is united. But on domestic issues, 
the Nigerian media can tear the nation apart.
Perhaps more scathing is the notion that the press sets its own agenda and is selective 
in its treatment of issues of national importance.400
In this chapter, the activities o f the press are explored when there is a civilian 
administration in place in Nigeria. As noted earlier, however, it is impossible to deal 
with all the issues represented in Nigerian newspapers, and that it is only those that 
are likely to affect newspapers’ personnel and in effect determine their editorial 
direction, that will be looked into. During the period of a civilian administration in 
Nigeria, one such issue is the elections and electioneering. A typical example of how 
journalists interpret their roles and duties in a government-owned newspaper is 
narrated in the front page “Comment” o f the Sunday Observer [a publication of The 
Nigerian Observer], edition of Sunday, 28/08/83. It clearly shows that government- 
owned newspapers serve the purpose o f the government in power, with no agenda- 
setting responsibility, but just doing and following what the government says. So, 
ironically, when the NPN won the Governorship election in Bendel state, after the 
August 1983 general elections in Nigeria, the New Nigerian, which was under the 
control of the NPN-led Federal government, accused the Bendel state-owned The 
Nigerian Observer o f making a u-tum from serving the former UPN-led Bendel state 
government to serve the newly elected NPN-led Bendel state government.401 In the 
response of The Nigerian Observer as published in its Sunday front page “Comment”, 
as already noted above and titled: “Where We Stand”, it noted that, as a state-owned 
newspaper, it:
“ ... not only stood firmly with [UPN] Governor Alii to publicise the activities
400 See Oyovbaire, 2000: 99-112; Adamu 1994: 467-472; Ciroma 1994: 35; Dare: 1997: 543-548.
401 See, for instance: "Newspapers make U-turn to serve new masters", New Nigerian, 20/08/83, p. 3.
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of his government, but also did a lot to project his person as Chief Executive 
... We served Governor Alii, his government ... faithfully and loyally. Now, 
Time And Tide Have Changed...Government is a continuing process, but 
individual heads may change ... [Therefore], the Observer must in all honesty 
pledge its belief and loyalty to the in-coming [NPN] administration ... 
Journalists had to contend to understand and adjust themselves and their 
practice to the requirements o f a ... government ... [So], the U-turn is very 
necessary in terms o f our set objectives -  publicising government activities 
and educating the people”.
Between 1979 and 1983 Nigeria witnessed a second attempt at democratic 
governance. A democratically-elected civilian administration was swom-in in 
October, 1979, when the military handed over power to the civilians, and had a 
mandate for four years. So in June 1983, the civilians themselves were expected to 
organise elections as a continuation o f the democratic process. This they did and it is 
how the press conducted itself during that period that will be documented in the 
remaining part of this chapter. This will be done in three parts in accordance with the 
structure of press ownership in Nigeria, and each will be treated in this order, namely: 
the activities of: State government-owned newspapers; Federal-govemment-owned 
newspapers; and Privately-owned newspapers.
6.1 State government-owned newspapers
6.1a Elections and State government-owned newspapers: A platform for various 
interests in the state or a tool for protecting only the interests of the political 
party in power?
The three state government-owned newspapers in June 1983, made sure that the 
political objectives of their respective governments were realised by adopting an 
editorial policy which made each o f the newspapers become the platform for the state 
governor, government officials and officials o f the political party in government in the 
state, to discredit and/or denounce rival political parties and political opponents at 
both the state and federal levels.
Indeed, the reality as it concerns governments that have established newspapers (state
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or federal) is that the government in power, usually make their government-owned 
newspaper an arm of the government department, where it is made to promote only 
the interests of the government in power to the detriment of its opponents (West 
Africa, 1980, no. 3305: 2357-2359).402 This is particularly true during civilian 
administration when politicians use any means at their disposal to gain advantage over 
their political opponents (Osuntokun, 1989: 357).403
For instance, all through the month o f June 1983, the three state-owned newspapers 
splashed highly favourable stories about the activities of their respective state 
governors and state governments, as well as the officials of the political parties that 
controlled their respective state government, at the state and national level, on their 
front, inside and back pages. Other stories that made the front page were negative 
stories about the NPN, in control o f the federal government. As the 1983 general 
election approached, the editorial policy o f each of the state-owned newspapers was 
clearly focussed on how to enhance the electoral chances of their individual State 
Governor, together with his political party, and damage or limit the chances of their 
rivals.
So, whatever the state-owned newspapers were reporting, their overriding objective 
was to ensure the return of the State Governor and his political party to power by 
adopting the following strategies:
(1) Portraying the political party in control in each of the states as the best 
party for the people of the State; and,
(2) Demonising and/or discrediting, in particular, the NPN as a political party 
incapable of delivering for them.
Central to these strategies, the coverage will be examined under three themes:
(1) State government-owned newspapers reported negative stories or issues about
402 See also Rosa & Brown, 1986; Hamelink, 1983 cited in Jeter et al 1996: 30. Also read views o f  
fieldwork interviewees on pp. 153-155, under the heading: “Newspapers: A tool o f government in 
power”.
403 See also Ruijter, 1989; Oyovbaire, 2000: 103. Also read, in particular, the views o f Interviewees D. 
Agbese on p. 153 and M. Ibrahim on p. 155.
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rival political parties and the political opponents of the political party in control of the 
state government;
(2) The newspapers are used to campaign for and report all positive stories about the 
political party that is in control o f the government in each of their respective states;
(3) Report the activities o f the other political parties or other electoral issues as long 
as they can have no negative effects on the electoral fortunes of the ruling political 
party in the state, but can militate against the chances of its nearest rival, particularly 
the political party controlling the federal government, the NPN.
The samples for the qualitative content analysis cover ten days, spread through the 
month of June 1983, as the first week Wednesday 1 June to Tuesday 7 and subsequent 
seven days after till the end o f the month as 14, 21, and 28 June. They are stories that 
are mainly related to the campaigns for the general elections conducted in Nigeria in 
1983 by the civilian administration during Nigeria’s second republic (1979-1983).
It should be noted that as far as the newspapers are concerned, there is no policy 
geared towards setting any news agenda, and investigative journalism is hardly 
undertaken (Ademola, J., 1997: 79; Dare, 1997: 544). Instead, the news pages are full 
of what government or political party officials have said, etc., besides the newspapers 
being used to denounce opponents.
Therefore what we intend to examine in the first part of this chapter, is the extent to 
which this pattern dominated the editorial directions of state government-owned 
newspapers during the electioneering period o f 1983.
6.1b "NPN government should be changed": A smear campaign by publishing 
everything negative about the rival political party
"Why NPN govt should be changed -  Uzoigwe"
THE Deputy Governor o f Imo State, Prince Isaac Uzoigwe, has given reasons 
why it is necessary to change the NPN-controlled federal government on
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October 1, this year by the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP).
Addressing a mammoth crowd at the kick-off of the Uhuru/Umuchieze NPP 
campaign rally recently Prince Uzoigwe said the NPN-controlled federal 
government had since 1979 proved that it was not competent to handle the 
country’s affairs ...
The deputy governor said the only party that would bring joy, peace and 
stability to the “common man” is the NPP and called on the entire citizens of 
Imo State and Nigeria in general to vote massively for the party. (Sunday 
Statesman, 5/6/83).
This front page lead story published in the Imo state government-owned Nigerian 
Statesman was typical o f the way that each of the state governments of Bendel, Imo, 
and the other three state governments o f Oyo, Ondo, Ogun, which owned The 
Nigerian Observer, Nigerian Statesman and Daily Sketch respectively, used their 
individual newspaper to campaign for the political party that was in control of the 
state government. In this endeavour, the NPN was seen as the major political 
opponent of the state governments and the political party that controlled it, which had 
to be presented as negatively as possible, not just to the people of their respective 
state, but also to the entire Nigerian public.
Experts on the African press, in general, and the Nigerian press in particular, have 
acknowledged various ways by which most governments in African countries 
manipulate the press for their own ends (Ruijter, Ibid)). This is particularly apparent 
during electioneering, when the political parties, registered to contest democratic 
elections, employ various tactics to outdo their political opponents (Read 
Interviewees, pp. 153-155).404 One o f the tactics that these experts have identified, is 
the use to which owners o f the press (both private and government), put the press 
during electioneering campaigns. Typical is the way that government-owned 
newspapers are used to campaign for the political party in control of either a state or a 
federal government to ensure that that party is voted back to power (Read, Ibid).405
Towards this end, the political party in government make sure that only stories 
emanating from government officials constitute the news (Pratt,, 1996: 11; Ruijter,
404 Alsop see Rosa and Brown, 1986
405 Also see Ajuluchukwu, 2000: 43
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1989: 57-69, cited on p. 35 o f Jeter et al; 1996; Dare, 1997: 543-544). In the case of a 
state government-owned newspaper, for instance, the general pattern, during the 
electioneering period o f 1983, was that they reported what the state governor and 
other state government officials said against the rival political party to the political 
party controlling the state government; what state and national officials of the political 
party that is in control of the state government said against the rival political parties, 
particularly the NPN, which was the political party in control o f the federal 
government (Dare, 1985; Nwosu, 1996: 26).
Consequently, the media practitioners have found themselves in a situation where 
they have to function within the confines of official lines. This situation becomes 
almost inevitable basically because when it comes to the instruments of their 
profession, the media institution depend so much on government policies. In effect, 
the journalists tend to be careerists rather than being professionals in order to ensure 
their job security (Pratt, 1996: 3 1).406
Not surprisingly, government-owned newspapers are filled with stories about 
government officials to promote the political objectives of the political party that 
controls the government (Jukwey, 1997: 86; Dare, 1997: 543-544).407
But of all the three, the Bendel state government-owned The Nigerian Observer and 
the Imo state government-owned Nigerian Statesman showed the most overt 
commitment to campaigning for the return to power of the UPN and NPP, which were 
the political parties in control of Bendel state government and Imo state government, 
respectively, between 1979 and 198 3408.
In Bendel State, throughout the period, the front pages o f The Nigerian Observer were 
reserved, almost exclusively, for what the state governor and the other government 
officials said against the NPN in the state and the NPN-controlled federal
406 See also Rosa and Brown, 1986: 114-121 35; Breed, 1955: 326-335); Also see: National Concord, 
17/6/83, p. 3; FG directive on placing o f adverts only on government-owned newspapers in 1985; 
National Concord, 1/3/83, p. 2; Nigerian Statesman, 3/6/83, p. 3; National Concord, 6/3/83, p. 10; New 
Nigerian, 2/6/83, p. 16).
407 Also see; Dare, 1985; Ajuluchukwu, M.C.K., 2000: 43..
408 For a list o f political parties that won in the different states o f the Nigerian federation in 1979 and 
1983, see Olurode, L. 1983: 72.
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government.
Sample such headlines, in the newspaper in June 1983, as:
“Omo N ’Oba’s409 pay was not stopped: NPN agents float diabolical rumour to cause 
disaffection - Alii”, (The Nigerian Observer, lead, 1/6/83, p.l);
“Count down on ‘83: Ogbemudia410 stronghold broken”, (2nd lead, 1/6/83, p .l);
“UPN leaders earmarked for killing today [by NPN agents]?”, (1/6/83, p.l); “Shagari 
is enemy of Bendelites: He dispossessed us of N 11 lm  revenue since ’79 -Alii”, (lead, 
2/6/83, p.l);
“Benin-Owena borehole contract: Ogbemudia took N50m without execution”, (2nd 
lead, 2/6/83, p .l);
“Bendel got nothing from F-govt”, (2/6/83, p .l);
“NPN will lose Rivers411 - Opinion poll”, (4/6/83, p .l);
“Okilo’s412 lust for opulence”, (4/6/83, p .l);
“Crisis in Ovia413 NPN”, (7/6/83, p .l);
“Those who fabricated on Oba stand condemned”, (7/6/83, p .l);
“NPN candidates are UPN drop-outs-Agbobu414, (lead, 21/6/83, p.l);
“NPN sure to lose Bendel”, (21/6/83, p .l);
“Ogbemudia aborted Niger State”, (21/6/83, p .l);
“N2.5m Midwest415 .Dev. Fund: Ogbemudia left no kobo416- Gov. Alii”, (lead, 
28/6/83, p.l).
In a story like: "Omo N'Oba's pay was not stopped" (The Nigerian Observer lead,
409 The Bini term stands for the title o f the traditional ruler o f the Bini people of Nigerian who live in 
the Edo state o f Nigeria
410 Dr Samuel Osaigbovo Ogbemudia, former military governor o f the then Midwest state o f Nigeria 
(later known as Bendel and now Edo State), was the Governorship candidate o f the NPN during the 
general elections in Nigeria in 1983.
411 Rivers state is one o f the states o f the Nigerian federation
412 Chief Melford Okilo stood on the platform o f the NPN for the governorship election in Nigeria in 
1983.
413 Ovia was one o f the local government areas o f the then Bendel state of Nigeria in 1983.
414 Mr Patrick Agbobu, the UPN Publicity Secretary in Bendel state during Nigeria’s second Republic 
was the then Bendel East UPN Senate candidate for the 1983 general elections.
415 Midwest state o f Nigeria, later known as Bendel state, has now been split into two states - Edo and 
Delta.
416 Kobo is one name for the Nigerian currency. So, in Nigeria, the national currency is known as the 
Naira or kobo.
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1/6/83, p .l), the State Governor, Professor Ambrose Alii urged the people of the state 
to recognise the 'evil desire' o f the NPN for Bendel state, as he accused some people 
he tagged "NPN agents", o f floating "diabolical rumour to cause 
disaffection...between him and the Omo N'Oba, as well as his brothers and sisters in 
Edoland.417 In doing a report like this, the government-owned newspapers make no 
attempt to contact the opposition party and therefore give it the opportunity to defend 
itself. They become tools in the hands o f the political party that controls the 
government (Read interviewees, pp. 153-155 above).418 The Omo N ’Oba’s report, for 
instance, was based on a radio and television broadcast made by the State governor, 
Professor Ambrose Alii, the night before the publication. However, the newspaper 
simply reported what the Governor said and followed that up with the full text of the 
broadcast starting from the front page to pages 8/9 inside.
Part of the story, as published in the newspaper, reads as follows:
“OMO N ’OBA’S PAY WAS NOT STOPPED-NPN agents float diabolical
rumour to cause disaffection-ALLI”
The Governor of Bendel State, Chief Professor Ambrose Alii, has 
described as most wicked lie and unfounded media reports and rumours of an 
alleged intention by his administration to depose the Oba of Benin and the 
stoppage o f his salary
In a special broadcast to the people of the state on Tuesday night, Professor 
Alii said: “I wish to state in very clear terms and without mincing words that 
no action of this nature was ever contemplated by me or my government.”
He pointed out that these rumours which are very diabolical in nature were 
being floated around by agents o f the National Party of Nigeria in their evil 
desire to cause disaffection between him and the Omo N ’Oba, as well as his 
brothers and sisters in Edoland.
Full text of Governor Alli‘s broadcast reads: ... (The Nigerian Observer, 
lead, 1/683).
All the state government-owned newspapers adopted this strategy. That is, the 
newspapers only report what government or ruling political party officials have said
417 Edoland is the Edo state o f Nigeria and occupies part o f the southwestern area o f Nigeria.
4,8 Also see Ademola, 1997: 77
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against their rivals. In each o f them the NPN was variously referred to as:
A party of drop-outs “NPN candidates are UPN drop-outs - Agbobu [UPN Publicity 
Secretary in Bendel state]' (The Nigerian Observer lead, 21/6/83);
A party, which, in order to win the elections, planned to assassinate key figures in the 
other political parties 'Unongo [Governorship candidate of the NPP in Benue state] 
was to be killed May 16 True or False?: NPP gubernatorial candidate tells police 
cuddling story of teargas bombardment' (Nigerian Statesman lead, 3/6/83);
A party being led by Nigeria's President, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, who has no respect 
for the rule of law 'Zik [Presidential candidate of the NPP] accuses Shagari: Violation 
of Official Secret Act 1964' (Nigerian Statesman lead, 5/6/83);
A party that have hatched some strategies capable of manipulating the election 
process to favour the NPN as in "NPN can't use the army-A wo" (Daily Sketch lead, 
28/83), where the newspaper noted that the UPN flag-bearer for the presidential 
election, Awolowo, alerted the people o f his south-western Nigeria constituency, in 
particular, of the NPN plan to rig the elections and therefore urged the people to reject 
the NPN at the polls since, in Nigeria, according to him, "everything would be 
normalised if  the UPN was voted into power".
This type of reporting is quite characteristic of the way that government-owned 
newspapers are used to campaign against political opponents of the ruling party. To 
achieve this purpose, all the newspapers show overzealousness and outright 
partisanship (Omu, 1978: 248-256; Adamu, S., 1994: 467-472; Enwenwa, I., 1989: 
86-88). Indeed, writing about the activities of the Nigerian media during Nigeria’s 
second republic (1979-1983), a Nigerian media expert, Ajuluchukwu, (2000: 43), 
stated thus:
“The media in the Second Republic seemed unable to adapt to an environment 
of new found freedom. They were divided along party political lines”.
Being overzealous and partisan was particularly reflected in the way that each of them 
gave prominence to what was said against the rival political party by the state and
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national officials of the ruling political party in each of the states. This was apparent, 
whether the newspapers were reporting about:
Those decamping from the opposition party, as in;
“Count down on '83: Ogbemudia's stronghold broken” (The Nigerian Observer,!/683, 
p i ) ;
Uncovering a plot by the opposition party to eliminate members of the party in 
government:
“UPN leaders earmarked for killing today?”
“NPN men attack UPN - 2 badly wounded”, (The Nigerian Observer, 1/6/83, p.l and 
Daily Sketch lead, 14/6/83, p .l), respectively.
Or portraying the rival party, in this instance, the NPN, as corrupt, untrustworthy, 
oppressive and therefore not to be relied upon to serve the people and meet their 
needs (Read Interviewees: Agbese, p. 162; Farouk Ibrahim, p. 190; Haruna, p. 190), for 
their views on how newspapers are used to distort stories about opponents of ruling 
political parties):
“Benin-Owena boreholes contract: Ogbemudia took N50m without execution”; and 
“Okilo’s419 lust for Opulence” (The Nigerian Observer, 2/6/83, p.l and 4/6/83, p.l 
respectively);
“Revenue Sharing suit against FG: Bendel Govt wins: Court says states are entitled to 
statement on money paid into Federal Account” and “Power to administer states’ 
share is illegal” {Daily Sketch lead 4/6/83, p .l);
“P&T staff dismissed: He gave President’s special line to Emeka Ojukwu”420 
{Nigerian Statesman, 21/6/83, p .l).
419 Mr Melford Okilo was the Governor o f NPN-controlled Rivers state o f Nigeria during Nigeria’s 
Second Republic, 1979-83
420 Chief Emeka Ojukwu was the rebel leader during Nigeria’s civil war 1967-1970. He returned from 
exile in Ivory Coast, during Nigeria’s second republic (1979-83) and joined the NPN, which was the 
political party in control o f the federal government o f Nigeria, who gave him pardon from charges of 
treasonable felony due to the part he played in the civil war.
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It is worth highlighting how some of the newspapers dealt with at least one of the 
issues noted above. While reporting what it stated was the decamping of some NPN 
members to the UPN, The Nigerian Observer went about it as follows:
‘Count down on ’83: Ogbemudia’s stronghold broken’
THE leadership of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) in Oredo, Ovia and 
Orhionmwon Local Government Areas is now threatened with massive 
decamping of followers.
In the forefront of this impending decamping exercise are foundation 
members of the party who claim that after a careful consideration of their 
roles, they have come to the conclusion that NPN as a party should be 
discarded as a leper.
One of them, Mr Michael Isede, patron of the Youth Wing of the NPN and 
foundation member o f the party with his teeming supporters in Oredo, have 
already quit the party and declared for the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) at the 
weekend.
Speaking at a mass rally held to welcome them in Benin City, Mr Isede 
said that it is now common knowledge that all foundation members of the 
party in the state are now in the cooler, adding that they have abandoned the 
NPN, which he described as ‘hijackers’.
He declared: How can we entrust the destiny of Bendel state to hijackers 
whose stock-in trade is to amass wealth to the detriment of the teeming masses 
that constitute the electorate?
Mr. Isede ... accused the state leadership of the NPN of collecting 
thousands of naira from party members who contested nomination for the 
various elective posts under the party flag without giving them documentary 
receipts to such collections ... (The Nigerian Observer, 1/6/83, p.l).
Reporting also about what it described as the corruption that permeates the NPN as a 
political party, The Nigerian Observer revealed:
‘Okilo’s lust for opulence’.
As the people of Rivers State suffer from daily deprivation, impoverishment 
followed with the machinery of the government grinding to a halt as a result of 
strike actions by civil servants and teachers, Governor Melford Okilo’s 
potentials for squandermania and insatiable lust for opulence knows no ends 
and bounds.
Governor Okilo today seems to represent the forces of contradiction and 
counter production in our body politic.
That, no doubt, is why Melford Okilo should spend millions of naira to 
purchase an executive jet . . . f  or his use when he has not been able to pay 
salaries and other emoluments to teachers and civil servants for the past six 
months.
This is a pointer to his (Okilo’s) visionless-ness and the NPN deceit of the
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good people o f Rivers state.
This year’s election result will show whether the common people will ever 
learn.
The Daily Sketch noted that an attack against a UPN campaign convoy in Oyo state 
was orchestrated by the NPN. In reporting the incident, the newspaper splashed across 
its front page the following story:
‘NPN MEN ATTACK UPN - 2 BADLY WOUNDED’
NPN members yesterday launched a brutal attack on the advanced party of 
Chief Bola Ige’s entourage at Oyo township.
During the attack, two UPN members were seriously wounded and later 
rushed to the State Hospital in the town where doctors battled for several 
hours to save their lives.
According to an eye-witness account ... the UPN men were going in a 
convoy o f buses when they were stopped by anti-riot policemen.
Immediately, the eye-witness added, the NPN men took control and 
smashed the windscreen of UPN buses and beat up the passengers in the 
vehicles ... {Daily Sketch, 14/6/83, p .l).
6.1c Campaigning for the political party in government
Another major ploy used by the newspapers to discredit the rival political party was to 
report positive stories or issues about the ruling party. Nigerian media experts have 
observed that government uses the press to promote its own political agenda in a 
number of ways. One o f these is what they have identified as government’s strategy to 
ensure that journalists in government-owned newspapers are those that will toe the 
official line (Dare, 1985). So, not surprisingly, the newspapers conduct their activities 
in consonance with such socio-political reality (See p.98 above, titled: “The Nigerian 
press: Limitations and obstacles”). The government-owned press therefore has no 
hesitation whatsoever in blanking out the campaign activities of opposition parties 
and ensuring maximum coverage for the political activities and pronouncements of 
the state and national officials o f the ruling party (For a classic example of how 
journalists under the employ of government interpret their role when there is a civilian 
administration in Nigeria, see Appendix II). It has also been stated that the Nigerian 
journalists have come to recognise and learn to operate within the Nigerian context. 
Indeed, this was exactly what the journalists in government-owned newspapers did
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during the electioneering campaign in 1983. For instance in June 1983 all the state 
government-owned newspapers readily published, on their front pages, mostly what 
government officials said to favour their respective political parties and therefore 
increase their electoral chances in their electioneering campaigns. In Bendel state, 
some of the stories that The Nigerian Observer credited to the state Governor, 
Professor Alii, and splashed across its front pages read as follows:
“Shagari is enemy of Bendelites - He dispossessed us of N i l  lm  revenue since ’79 - 
Alii” (The Nigerian Observer lead, 2/6/83,, p .l), where the Governor is reported as 
telling the people why they should reject the NPN-controlled federal government 
under the leadership of Alhaji Shehu Shagari at the polls because it has deliberately 
starved the state of much needed revenue for the welfare of the people of Bendel state.
Other stories about what the Governor said and which the newspaper printed on its 
front pages were:
“Awo [presidential candidate o f the UPN] means prosperity - Prof Alii” (The 
Nigerian Observer, lead, 5/6/83, p .l)  and;
“Ogbemudia left no kobo - Gov Alii” (The Nigerian Observer, lead, 28/6/83, p.l).
In the former, the Governor tells, not just the people of Bendel state but the entire 
people of Nigeria, why they should vote for the UPN’s presidential candidate, Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo, while in the latter the newspaper focuses on what the Governor 
said to discredit the NPN’s Governorship candidate in Bendel state, Dr Samuel 
Osaigbovo Ogbemudia.
But apart from reporting about the state Governor’s activities, The Nigerian Observer 
also filled its front pages with what was said by the officials of the UPN in the state. 
A recurring feature o f the newspaper, during this period, was headlines such as:
“Alii has great respect for Obas-Giwa Amu [a member of the UPN and former 
Solicitor-General o f Bendel state]';
“Awo assured of victory”;
“V-P lacks home base”; and,
“UPN dominates Ika L-G area” - all credited to Mr Sule Uzum, the UPN candidate for
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the Federal House of Representative and published on the front page of the The 
Nigerian Observer, 28/6/83);
“Alii has made name”;
“Only Awo qualifies for presidency”;
“NPN sure to lose Bendel”;
“UPN set to drown other parties”; and,
“Ogbemudia aborted Niger state”
Front page stories in The Nigerian Observer issue of 21/6/83, about what the Publicity 
Secretary of UPN in Bendel state, Mr Patrick Agbobu, said while promoting the UPN 
cause).
In the case of the NPP in Imo state, it was typical of the Nigerian Statesman to 
publish on its front pages, positive stories to prop up the incumbent Governor, Chief 
Sam Mbakwe, against the challenge o f the NPN, in the state, with:
"Okpara421 did not perform better in 6 years as premier - Mbakwe”422 (Nigerian 
Statesman , lead, 2/6/83, p .l)  and;
"I seek 2nd term to complete my jobs - Mbakwe” (Nigerian Statesman, 4/6/83, p.l).
A similar strategy was also adopted by the newspaper to further the cause of the NPP 
and its officials at the national level:
“Unongo's423 advice to Police” (.Nigerian Statesman, 2,/6/83, p.l);
“We'll pass currency bill - Obi Wali424” (Nigerian Statesman, 6/6/83, p .l);
“DG's quit won't affect party” {Nigerian Statesman, 7/6/83, p .l), credited to the 
Secretary of the NPP in Plateau state, Alhaji Saidu Baba Toto, who is reported to have 
said that the resignation of the N PP‘s Deputy Governor of Plateau state, Alhaji 
Muhammadu Danladi Yakubu, to join the NPN, will not affect the NPP in the general
421 Michael Okpara, now late, was the premier o f the defunct eastern region o f Nigeria during the first 
republic, 1960-66, was a stalwart o f the NPNduring the second republic, 1979-83.
422 Chief Sam Mbakwe, now late, was the civilian governor o f Imo state o f Nigeria during the second 
republic and contested the governorship elcion in 1983 under the platform o f the NPP.
42 Mr Paul Unongo was the Governorship candidate o f the NPP for Benue state o f Nigeria during the 
1983 general elections.
424 Chief Obi Wali was the NPP Senate leader during Nigeria’s second republic
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election.
There were also stories about the campaign activities of the NPP presidential 
candidate, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe [known as Zik]:
“Ugo polo field”; “Zik campaign in Imo state June 15-17” which were the only stories 
on the front page of Nigerian Statesman o f 14/6/83; and,
“Zik promises Effiong425” (Nigerian Statesman, 21/6/83).
For reasons already outlined above (see p. 89) the Oyo, Ogun, Ondo states’-owned 
Daily Sketch, conducted its activities somewhat differently426. As a matter of fact, in 
spite o f the electioneering period o f June 1983, the Daily Sketch, still gave a great 
deal of coverage to very local and non-partisan issues relevant to the Yoruba-speaking 
area of Southern Nigeria (Oyo, Ogun, Ondo and Lagos states) as well as other issues 
of national relevance. It was not entirely committed to covering only the stories 
having to do with its owners, the state governments of Oyo, Ogun, Ondo or used for 
the coverage of only the activities o f the UPN at the state or federal level. Examples 
in June 1983, where the newspaper focussed on mainly national issues, featured such 
headlines as:
“Thumb printing: FEDECO blames Police over poor turn-out” (Daily Sketch, 2/6/83, 
p i ) ;
“JUNIOR WORLD CUP: NIGERIA SHOCK USSR” {Daily Sketch, lead, 6/6/83, 
p i ) ;
“Electoral law: CRUCIAL TALKS TODAY” {Daily Sketch, lead 21/6/83, p .l) and; 
“ODIZOR’s427 WINNING RUN ENDS”, {Daily Sketch, 28/6/83, p.l).
But there was no mistaking the fact that the Daily Sketch’s commitment was towards
425 Lt. Col. Phillip Effiong fought on the side o f the secessionists during the Nigerian civil war o f 1967- 
70 and was the officer that formally conceded defeat and surrendered to the Nigerian federal troops 
after the Biafran leader, the then Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu, now a staunch member of the NPN, fled to 
Ivory Coast in 1970
426 Also see Oyovbaire, 2000.
427 Mr Nduka Odizor was a popular Nigerian tennis player who reached the last sixteen o f the 
Wimbledon Championship, in June 1983.
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its owners— i.e. the governments of Oyo, Ogun, and Ondo states, each o f which was 
controlled by the UPN, and fundamentally against the NPN, which was the strongest 
rival to the UPN-controlled states and also a major obstacle to the UPN’s plans to 
dislodge the NPN-controlled federal government (Usman, Y. B., ed. 1982: ix). So just 
like the purposes which the other state government-owned newspaper were made to 
serve, the Daily Sketch was also, basically used to promote the state and national 
objectives of its owners. Where the newspaper did not show outright negativity 
towards the NPN, there was a tendency to portray the UPN as positively as possible. 
In a story like:
“Plea to Police”: a front page story that the newspaper published on 6/6/83. It showed 
the UPN as a party committed to protecting the electoral process by reporting that the 
party’s governorship running mate in Rivers state, Mr Gomba Osarollor, urged the 
Rivers state Police Commissioner to protect all party supporters in the state from 
activities whose consequences would be detrimental to the democratic elections.
6.Id Reporting about the rival political party to promote/without damaging, the 
ruling party
‘If I win presidential election: I’LL PURGE NTA - ZIK’
Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, the leader and Presidential candidate of the Nigeria 
People’s Party (NPP) at the weekend threatened to flush out all those who 
have aided and abetted partiality in the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) 
if he wins the forthcoming presidential election ...
He accused the NTA o f advertising the NPN and President Shehu Shagari 
and discriminating against him and the other presidential candidates.
He declared: “President Shehu Shagari minus being a President is a 
presidential candidate.
“Why does the NTA ... find it more convenient to always advertise the 
NPN and Shagari and will not advertise Azikiwe, Awo and others? ...” (The 
Nigerian Observer, 14/6/83).
Although the three newspapers also adopted a similar editorial position of reporting 
the activities of the rival political party to the ruling party, the main objective, 
however, was to ensure that such stories did not in any way mitigate the electoral 
chances of the ruling party. Indeed, according to one of the Interviewees, Alhaji 
Mohammed Ibrahim (see p. 154):
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“All governments would want to manipulate the press for their objectives. And 
Nigerian governments, in the last forty years, have behaved in this manner”.
Each of the newspapers handled this in a different way to achieve the same purpose. 
For instance, the story above, as published in the UPN-controlled Bendel state 
government-owned The Nigerian Observer, was about what was said by the NPP 
Presidential candidate in the election, Dr Azikiwe, against the NPN. Even though the 
NPP was a rival to the UPN, the story nevertheless served the purpose of the UPN 
because it also showed to the Nigerian public the reason why they, as the electorate, 
should reject the NPN at the polls. Or take another story in the same edition of The 
Nigerian Observer (14/6/83, p. l )  titled:
“Probe Green Revolution Vote - Ogunsanya”
The story was based on what the Chairman of the NPP, Chief Adeniran Ogunsanya, 
said in Enugu, the capital o f Anambra state o f Nigeria, while launching his party’s 
presidential rally there. However, The Nigerian Observer found it worthwhile to 
publish the story on its front page because it denounced the NPN’s agricultural 
programme of Green Revolution as not only having been a waste o f money but has 
also brought “hunger and inflation to which the Nigerians have been subjected”.
In the same manner, the NPP-controlled Imo state government-owned Nigerian 
Statesman, on 7 June 1983, felt comfortable to publish on its front page a story about 
the NPN and its governorship candidate in Bendel state, titled: ‘Don’t vote for 
Ogbemudia - Ewharekuko’, because it was in favour of the NPP governorship 
candidate in Bendel state, Chief Daniel Ewharekuko.
In the story “Effect of FED EC0428’s sequence on outcome of ’83 polls: PPA very
428 The federal electoral commission (FEDECO) was the bosy responsible for organising the 
democratic elections that ushered in Nigeria’s second republic (1979-1983) in 1979. It was set up by 
the military government o f the Murtala/Obasanjo era (29/7/75-30/9/79) that organised the election. 
Nigeria was ruled by three military governments between 15th January, 1966 and 30th September, 1979. 
However, FEDECO as an electoral body was trailed by controversy and there were accusations that the 
democratic elections that declared the leader o f the National Party o f Nigeria (NPN), Alhaji Shehu 
Shagari, winner was rigged. FEDECO has now been replaced by another body known as the 
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC).Other parties that contested the elections were 
Unity Party o f Nigeria (UPN), Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP), Great Nigerian Peoples Party (GNPP), 
and Peoples Redemption Party (PRP).
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hopeful - Omoregie”, the Nigerian Statesman (7/6/83), quoted a UPN front liner, Dr. 
Nosa Omoregie, as saying that the Progressive Peoples Alliance (PPA) has embraced 
FEDECO’s arrangements for the 1983 general elections because it believed “it will 
curb the big plan by the NPN to rig the elections”.
The fact that the PPA was formed as a result o f the political alliance between the 
NPP, UPN, GNPP, and PRP, to fight the NPN was enough reason for the Nigerian 
Statesman to make a story, credited to a stalwart o f the UPN, a front page lead. This 
was also what prompted the Daily Sketch to publish:
“Waves of harassment, terrorism, killings: PPA blames [NPN-controlled] FG” (Daily 
Sketch, lead, 3/6/83, p .l); and,
“No way for accord - Zik” (Daily Sketch, 3/6/83, p .l), where the Presidential 
candidate of the NPP, Azikiwe, was quoted on the occasion of the PPA summit as 
saying that his party was opposed to any NPP/NPN accord, as had happened after the 
1979 general elections.
But it wasn’t always against the NPN that each o f the newspapers published stories to 
promote the political party that controlled their respective state government owners. A 
typical case was the story about the NPP which The Nigerian Observer published on 
14/6/83, titled:
“NPP M Psjoin UPN”
In reporting the story, the newspaper stated that the reason why the two NPP 
legislators from the Anambra state House o f Assembly, Messrs P. I. Eze and S. J. 
Udeorah resigned to join the UPN, was their belief that the leader and presidential 
candidate of the UPN, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, was “the only messiah who will 
salvage this country (Nigeria) from its economic mess.”
6.2 Federal government-owned newspapers
Just as the state governments control their respective newspapers, the federal
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government in Nigeria also owned and controlled the New Nigerian and the Daily 
Times newspapers during the period covered by this research. As was shown to be 
typical of government-owned newspapers, both newspapers mostly report official 
sources without any attempt made at criticising government policies or actions. But 
our concern here is the fact that, during the 1983 General Election campaign, both 
newspapers were under the control o f the NPN-led federal government. As a result, 
these newspapers became vulnerable to the machinations o f the NPN and its officials 
at both the state and federal levels429. There is certainly evidence to show that the 
weight of the stories or issues that they covered favoured the NPN and the NPN-led 
federal government. These will be documented under the following themes:
(1) The weight of coverage and editorial direction o f the newspapers are to the 
advantage of the NPN and the NPN- controlled federal government officials as 
more space is given to issues or stories that promote the NPN.
(2) Anti-NPN issues or stories are virtually non-existent, as some other stories that 
discredit/denounce the other rival political parties to the NPN are given 
prominence on the front pages o f the newspapers.
6.2a A megaphone of the NPN and NPN-controlled federal government: "Poll 
favours Shagari" and "NPN will win"
It was common to see pro-NPN and NPN-controlled federal government headlines 
and stories on the front pages o f the New Nigerian and the Daily Times during the 
June 1983 general elections campaign. Referring to this period, with regard to the 
Daily Tmes, Abati (2002: 2) noted:
What happened was that the NPN turned the Daily Times into a party organ, 
using it as the propaganda arm of both the Federal Government and the NPN. 
This marked the decline o f the newspaper ... Every successive government 
since Shagari sought to control and manipulate the Daily Times. Editorials and 
front page stories were faxed to the paper from Government House. Managing 
Directors who tried to produce a professional newspaper ... were shown the 
way o u t ...
Three of the interviewees also noted that both newspapers were made the propaganda
429 See Abati 2002; also read Interviewees: D. Agbese on p i53 and; M. Ibrahim on p. 155.
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arm of the NPN, which was the party in control at the federal level, as virtually every 
aspect of their report was tilted in favour of the NPN.430 The reports vary from:
The campaign itinerary o f the President and the Presidential candidate of the NPN, 
Alhaji Shehu Shagari, as in: “Shagari storms Campos Square' {Daily Times, 3/6/83).
What he said during his electioneering campaign, such as “NPN'll take care of Lagos' 
{New Nigerian, 3/6/83); and, “Lagos is federal government baby: Developments are 
inherited from Central administration [not from UPN-controlled Lagos state 
government] {Daily Times headline, 3/683); or,
What positive things have been said about the President, the NPN and the NPN- 
controlled federal government, such as “Opinion poll favours Shagari's re-election” 
{New Nigerian, 4/683), “Shagari made it with peace”, “NPN will win comfortably”, 
“Other achievements of Shehu's govt” (all headline stories in the Daily Times edition 
of 21/6/83).
Passages from the Daily Times and New Nigerian stories below also give a clear 
indication of where the editorial preferences o f both newspapers lay during this 
period, which was to ensure that the NPN was presented to the Nigerian public as the 
only party that had the proven record and experience that Nigeria needed for good 
leadership and administration. For instance, in the story “Opinion poll favours 
Shagari's re-election”, the New Nigerian on 4 June 1983, reported on its front page as 
follows:
"THE President, Alhaji Shehu Shagari would score 51 per cent of the total 
votes cast in this year's presidential elections, a public opinion poll has 
indicated.
A Lagos-based opinion poll research conducted in 17 States of the federation 
said that while Alhaji Shehu gets this figure, the NPP leader, Dr. Nnamdi 
Azikiwe would get 16 per cent while the UPN flag-bearer, Chief Obafemi 
Awolowo was credited with 22 per cent. Others scored 3 per cent each ...
In the case of the Daily Times, its lead headline on 21 June 1983, while reporting what
430 Read, for instance, the views o f Interviewees H. Odukomaiya, D. Darah and O. Farouk Ibrahim on 
p. 149 under the heading: “Negative effects o f military administration on the press”.
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the Presidential Adviser on Political Affairs, Ahaji Suleiman Takuma, said in the 
Daily Times political forum, titled: "TIMES FOCUS" read:
“Shagari made it with peace.”
... President Shagari stands foremost among other political leaders with his 
style of leadership, which has exhibited incredible maturity and tolerance.
He is therefore the man the nation needs at this period we are nurturing a new 
democracy ...
And also under the report “NPN will win comfortably”, the Daily Times quoted Alhaji 
Takuma as follows:
"LEADERSHIP and the state o f the nation's economy are the two major 
issues in this year's general elections, Alhaji Suleiman Takuma has declared.
Only the President has answers to these two problems in one, Alhaji 
Suleiman Takuma declared at 'Times Focus' ...
Discussing the chances o f the NPN in the coming elections, Alhaji Takuma 
said President Shagari not only commands the leadership qualities and style 
needed to run Nigeria at this period of trying democracy, but also has the 
experience to deliver the goods ... {Daily Times, 2nd lead, 21/6/83).
6.2b Anti-NPN stories are non-existent
A critical look at the way that both the federal government-owned newspapers 
covered the campaign activities o f the NPN would indicate clearly that the intention 
was to favour the NPN at the expense o f the other rival political parties. Even when 
positive stories about the other political parties were published, this was done in a 
way that such stories did not necessarily cause electoral damage to the NPN and the 
NPN-controlled federal government.
In effect, any stories that they published about the other political parties were not 
based on the negative things that the leaders o f such parties said about the NPN and 
the federal government. Rather, they were stories that would not cause any harm to 
the electoral chances of the NPN as such stories were mainly to do with:
(a) The reactions of the leaders of the other parties to some harmless accusations 
made against them like:
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“Role in civil war explained: Why I starved Igbos - Awo” (New Nigerian lead 
headline, 7 June 1983); and,
“Awo was right to starve Igbos - Ajuluchukwu” (New Nigerian lead,, 
21/6/83)..
The former story had the UPN presidential candidate, Awolowo,431 being quoted as 
saying "I'm happy about my action because it was my action that united Nigeria and 
destroyed Biafra", to counter an accusation made by an NPN member and former 
secessionist leader, Chief Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu.
The latter story was all about what the UPN's Director o f Publicity, Ajuluchukwu, 
said to substantiate Awolowo's defence o f his role during Nigeria's bloody civil war 
(1967-1970).
(b) Some of the issues raised by the leaders o f these parties at their campaign rallies: 
“Payment of party agents- PPA disagrees with Shagari's view” (New Nigerian lead, 
3/6/83) where the PPA432 leaders, in a communique issued at the end o f their summit 
meeting in Lagos, were reported as expressing disagreement with President Shagari 
over such irrelevant issue as how party agents for the general elections should be paid. 
Or the obscure story on the front page o f the Daily Times edition of 14 June 1983, 
titled: “Police chiefs will be under Governors if  I win”, which was about such an 
electorally unimportant issue o f who should or should not control Police 
Commissioners in each state o f the Nigerian federation, credited to the national leader 
and presidential candidate of the NPP, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe.
By contrast, however, both the federal government-owned newspapers gave 
prominence to and published negative remarks about the other political parties made 
by the leaders o f the NPN or its presidential candidate and incumbent President, 
Alhaji Shagari. Consider some o f the following negative stories about the other
431 Chief Obafemi Awolowo (now late) was one o f the foremost nationalists that fought for Nigeria’s 
political independence from Britain. He was credited to have used starvation as a weapon against the 
rebels during Nigeria’s civil war (1966-70), when he was Finance Minister. He denied ever using 
starvation as a war strategy, but was never forgiven by the Ibo tribe who had tried to secede from 
Nigeria.
432 The Progressive Parties Alliance (PPA) was a political alliance formed by the NPP, UPN and PRP 
during Nigeria’s second republic to campaign against the ruling NPN’s federal government of Nigeria.
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political parties as they were splashed across the front pages of the New Nigerian and 
the Daily Times during the electioneering period of June 1983:
“Police recover 21,000 FEDECO forms. Scene: Residence o f Press Secretary to 
Bendel State Gov [UPN-controlled state]” (New Nigerian lead, 1/6/83);
“Shagari accuses Zik [NPP leader] of inconsistency” (New Nigerian, 6 /683);
“President Shagari speaks at rally in Enugu: Nwobodo [NPP Governor o f Anambra 
state] asked to explain use of N300m” (Daily Times lead, 6/6/83);
“2 NPP commissioners join NPN” (Daily Times, 6 /6/83); and,
“Akinloye [NPN Chairman] takes Awo [UPN leader] to task - ‘Tell the nation the 
source of N60m for UPN vehicles’” (Daily Times lead, 14/6/83).
To appreciate the extent of the NPN-controlled federal government-owned 
newspapers' campaign against the other political parties, it is appropriate to quote 
some passages from each of the newspapers. In the story “Shagari accuses Zik of 
inconsistency”, the New Nigerian reported as follows:
The NPP presidential candidate, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe has been accused of 
inconsistency in his political utterances and associations.
Addressing a mammoth crowd o f NPN supporters in Enugu ... the 
President, Alhaji Shehu Shagari criticised the NPP flag-bearer's political 
flirtations, which, he said, dated back to the Owelle's advent in politics.
Alhaji Shehu also accused the NPP government in Anambra of mismanaging 
public funds by setting up a newspaper and a radio station to the detriment of 
the people of the state ...
Amidst shouts of 'shame, shame', the president called on the people of 
Anambra to ask the state government what it had done with its share of 
statutory allocations and foreign loans of more than 300 million Naira which, 
he said, were guaranteed by the Federal G overnm ent... (6/6/83: I),
The Daily Times, under the headline “Akinloye takes Awo to task— ‘Tell the nation 
the source of N60m for UPN vehicles’”, published thus:
THE National Chairman o f the NPN, Chief A.M.A. Akinloye, has 
challenged the UPN leader, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, to tell the nation where 
he raised over N60 million which his party used to purchase vehicles
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distributed all over the country.
Addressing a large crowd o f party supporters ... in Lagos, Chief Akinloye 
maintained that in order to bribe the electorate, the UPN leader taxed his party 
governors to donate over N5 million each from the coffers of the state 
governments.
He said the UPN has been a tribal political party, which has no respect for 
traditional rulers and the culture o f the country ... (Front page lead, 14/6/83/
6.3 Privately-owned newspapers
The privately-owned newspapers differ in one respect from government-owned 
newspapers: they are unencumbered by the pressures to publish government- 
sponsored stories or the pressures to be partisan in favour of the political party in 
control of the government. They do, nonetheless, make some attempts to set and 
determine the news agenda, for reasons not unrelated to the socio-political 
circumstances that informed their establishment and in which they had to operate in 
order to survive (Omu, 1996: 11-13).433 At the same time, however, it is important to 
distinguish between privately owned newspapers in Nigeria. Being a private 
newspaper does not make them immune from political partisanship (Dare, 1997: 543- 
548).434 This is particularly true in a situation where political parties435 set up 
newspapers to promote their parties.436
During the 1983 general elections campaign, only the National Concord and The 
Guardian, out of the four privately owned newspapers selected for this study, were in 
existence437. The different circumstances in which the two newspapers were set up 
showed in the way that they each conducted their activities during this period. And 
the fact that The Guardian was new and still a weekly newspaper then, made the 
difference even more obvious. As a matter of fact, in the month when most of the
433 See Interviewees: B. Jose on p i79, under the heading: “Newspapers set up in response to new socio­
political reality”, and H. Odukomaiya on p i61 under the heading: “Ownership and the space for 
neutrality”.
434 See Haruna, 1987: “Ownership Control o f Press in Africa”, New Nigerian newspaper, 18/6/87, p7. 
See also views o f Interviewee: H. Odukomaiya on pi 61.
435 For a comprehensive list o f the newspapers that were established by political parties during Nigeria’ 
second republic, see Nnaemeka et al, 1989a: 408.
436 Read the views o f Interviewees Jose and Onabunle on p i66 under the heading: “Issues that account 
for the differences between north and south; Al-Bashir and Darah on pp 177-178 under the heading: 
“The motives for setting up newspapers”, regarding the Nigerian Tribune newspaper, set up by the late 
Chief Awolowo to support his political party, AG, during Nigeria’s first republic. The Nigerian 
Tribune is still a viable newspaper today.
437 See Chapter 3 for analysis o f social context o f all the sampled newspapers.
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newspapers, whether government or private were filled with the general elections 
stories, most of them partisan, The Guardian did not focus mainly on politics.
The stories that it focussed on could be classified as non-political. The headlines, for 
example, read as follows:
“US airline exposes Nigeria Airways” (The Guardian lead, 5/6/83); “Wanted NTA 
director yet to be arrested”;
“A tiny cocaine world in Lagos”; and,
“The Guardian covers Junior World Cup' (The Guardian front page stories, 5/6/83); 
“Cash problems keep phone lines dead” {The Guardian, 12/6/83, p .l);
“2 names tipped to lead Supreme Court” {The Guardian lead, 19/6/83); “Late youth 
service for Polytechnic students” and “WOO,000 fraud claim rocks Mobil” {The 
Guardian front page stories, 19/6/83);
“Drums' giant closes down” and “Gas firm dumps wastes in the drain” {The Guardian 
front page stories, 26/6/83).
In general, the focus o f The Guardian coverage was national and the issues had 
national relevance, as opposed to narrow party political issues that dominated the 
government-owned newspapers. But even when it reported politics, it showed no 
partisanship or loyalty towards any o f the political parties registered to contest the 
elections.438
However, compared to the coverage o f the National Concord during this period, there 
was a difference. For instance, the National Concord was unique (and worth restating) 
in the sense that (see p.95) it started out as a newspaper sympathetic to the cause of 
the NPN and the NPN-led federal government o f Nigeria. Indeed when its proprietor, 
Chief Abiola was a staunch member o f the NPN, he used his National Concord to 
campaign for the NPN and against all the other registered political parties during 
Nigeria's second republic (1979-1983). But when Chief Abiola came to the 
conclusion that he could not realise his political ambitions within the NPN, he quit the
438 The six political parties registered to contest the 1983 general elections in Nigeria were: UPN; NPN; 
NPP; GNPP; PRP; NAP
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party in 1982.439 Soon after that the editorial policy of the National Concord changed. 
Although the newspaper became nationally focussed and therefore showed no overt 
support or favour towards any o f the six registered political parties for the 1983 
general elections, it was clear that the newspaper became one of the fiercest 
opponents of the NPN and the NPN-controlled federal government440. For instance, 
the National Concord began to publish very negative stories about the NPN, its 
officials and the NPN-controlled federal government. It did this by:
(a) Allowing opponents o f the NPN to use the newspaper as a platform to launch a 
scathing attack against the NPN, as in:
“Bad leadership ruins NPN govt”, which was one of the stories based on the negative 
remarks made by a UPN political stalwart at the “Concord Forum”441 and;
(b) Conducting its own investigation to expose the shortcomings of the NPN-led 
federal government, as in:
“High tyre prices: Concord investigation: Economy not to blame”;
“Outstanding money on building materials: FG owns up’;
“Nigerian Consulate stinks: lm-dollar fraud alleged”.
A reading of some paragraphs from two o f the stories above would show the extent to 
which the National Concord turned against the NPN. For instance, in “Bad leadership 
ruins NPN govt”, the newspaper reported that:
THE NPN Federal Government has enough talented men to run the country 
but the administration is plagued by bad leadership, a UPN legislator, Senator 
C. O. Adebayo has said.
He said the leadership o f the Federal Government “is also plagued by bad 
utilization of resources and inability to inspire despite the abundance of talents 
available in the President’s cabinet”.
The Senator, who was speaking to journalists at the Concord Forum in 
Lagos, said ... the country’s bad economic situation was an electoral asset to 
the UPN, adding that, “If it were in other countries, this NPN government 
won’t come back” ...
439 See Nnaemeka et al, 1989: 408.
440 Haruna, 1987 in New Nigerian 18/6/87: 7.
441 This was a forum run by the senior editorial members o f the Concord newspapers to ask Nigerian 
leaders and other eminent persolities questions relating to issues o f the day.
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With regard to “High tyre prices: Concord investigation: Economy not to blame”, the 
thrust of this headline story on its front page read as follows:
SCARCITY o f tyres and the exorbitant prices at which they are at present 
being sold have nothing to do with the current economic recession in the 
country.
This is the finding o f a special National Concord investigation into how 
tyres, which sold at N60 each under a year ago, are now selling at N200 or 
more, each.
National Concord found in its investigation that [the] Federal Government 
was deliberately holding back on the issuance of import licences for tyres and 
its raw materials for local production ...
What is significant about these stories is that it would have been unthinkable for the 
National Concord to publish such when Chief Abiola was a member o f the NPN. 
Chief Abiola's departure from the NPN therefore marked the beginning of a new 
direction for the National Concord (see, for instance: "Concord wears a new dress", 
The Guardian, 5/8/83, p.2)
So, although both the National Concord and The Guardian were established under 
different circumstances, not much difference existed in their editorial direction after 
the National Concord relinquished its support for the NPN, beginning from 1982. 
They did not publish the same stories, but were quite similar in other ways. In one 
respect, it was inevitable that this would be the case, particularly because of 
government policy442. In fact, an examination of how these newspapers conducted 
their activities during the June 1983 general elections campaign would reveal that 
there were some similarities in their editorial direction. These will be documented 
under the following theme:
(1) There was no overt loyalty shown to any political party as the newspapers tried to 
publish balanced reports about the elections and gave fair coverage to the 
activities of each of the political parties. The stories treated had national focuses 
and were of national relevance.
6.3a No loyalty to any political party
442 See Pratt, 1991 cited in Jeter et al, 1996: 30.
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The difference in the way that the privately owned newspapers covered the 
electioneering campaigns of June 1983 was their relative neutrality as compared to the 
activities of government-owned newspapers and those other newspapers that were set 
up to achieve political purposes (see Nnaemeka et al, 1989a: 408). O f all the election 
stories that The Guardian and National Concord covered, it could not be said that 
they were reported in a way that they would favour any o f the political parties. Their 
strategy was to report any election or political issues that they considered were of 
national relevance and interest.
In effect, a common denominator for explaining the coverage that these newspapers 
gave to the election issues of 1983 is their main focus on issues regarding the political 
actors and government officials and what they said or did. In effect, setting the 
political agenda and moulding the opinion of the Nigerian electorate were not their 
major pre-occupations.443 This was characteristic of these newspapers during the 
electioneering period. So, even though there is clear evidence to the effect that they 
were non-partisan, they were not particularly engaged in the construction of the 
Nigerian public opinion, just like government-owned newspapers.
Starting first with The Guardian, on 12 June 1983, the newspaper, under the front 
page lead story, “Barau out o f jail, back in politics”, reported about a former Senator 
who was elected to the Senate in 1979 on the platform of the PRP. The focus of the 
story was on the travails of one of the political actors of the second republic (1979- 
1983). This was quite a major shift from government related or partisan stories that 
usually dominate the pages of government-owned newspapers.
Also focussing on general election-related national issues, as opposed to parochial 
partisan politics, The Guardian led with a front page report titled: “Polls: Students on 
forced holiday” on 26 June 1983. The story was to the effect that the closure of the 
University of Lagos in June "was prompted by a Federal command likely to affect all 
universities before the elections". The approach o f The Guardian was to report it as it
443 For a general view about the way the Nigerian press and its practitioners conduct their activities, 
read the views o f the filedwork interviewees in Chapter Five, under the headings: “The complaints 
about the journalists” on pp. 180-182; “The press as divisive and promoting ethnic cleavages” on 
ppl82-l83; “Misleading the reader: Bias, prejudices and editorial as fact” on ppl84-190.
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is. Thus, political developments throughout the country were reported, irrespective of 
the political party in control in any o f the states of the Nigerian federation. For 
instance:
“Bendel House waylays governor”, which describes how the Bendel state governor, 
Professor Alii, was locked in battle with the State House of Assembly over the UPN- 
led government's request for a N 32,188,590 addition to the state's budget. The article 
noted that:
"After ex-govemor Balarabe Musa of Kaduna state, impeached in 1981 (by 
the Kaduna state House o f Assembly), Mr Alii is probably the only other chief 
executive critically embattled by the legislature ... [as] the House ... may 
serve the Governor a notice of impeachment" (The Guardian, 26/6/83, p .l).
It might be misleading to say that the National Concord adopted the same approach in 
covering the electioneering campaigns. Nevertheless, the way that it reported during 
this period was also premised on not showing loyalty to any of the political parties. 
The stories that the newspaper reported during this period were generated from:
(1) What the important political figures in any of the political parties and government 
officials said:
“Plan on votes’ counting scares V-P [Vice-President, Dr. Alex Ekwueme]”, (lead, 
2/6/83, p .l);
“Council of State decided on peaceful elections”, (front page, second lead,, 2/6/83, 
pi ) ;
“Priority for Lagos - says [President] Shagari at campaign”, the only story on the front 
page of the newspaper on 3/6/83.
On 4/6/83, the National Concord attributed its front page story, “Goni’s wife named 
UPN governorship candidate”, to the UPN’s director of organisation, Mr Ebenezer 
Babatope; and,
On 6/6/83, its front page lead story titled, “Governor’s job scares me - Adebayo”, was 
credited to the UPN’s governorship candidate for Kwara State, Senator Adebayo.
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(2) Its efforts to set the agenda o f the political debate by uncovering issues and raising 
questions about the general conduct of politicians, as in:
“Outstanding money on building materials - FG owns up”, which was a story 
uncovered by the newspaper to the effect that the NPN-led “federal government ... 
paid out millions o f naira to some nominated contractors for building materials not 
supplied” (National Concord, lead, 4/6/83, p .l); and,
“Headache over the recovery o f loans ... from legislators” where the newspaper 
reported what it called ‘authoritative sources’ as informing it that the accounts 
department of Nigeria’s National Assembly was at a fix as to how to recover balances 
of vehicle loans granted to one hundred and fifty members of the federal House of 
Representatives, in 1979 (National Concord, 29/6/83, p.l).
(3) The need to inform and educate the Nigerian public about what plans were in 
place to ensure that the election was successfully conducted, as in:
“As ’83 elections draw nearer - Police at full alert ... To stop thugs and save lives” 
(National Concord, lead, 7/6/83, p .l), in which the newspaper, let it be known to the 
Nigerian electorate that it has been informed by ‘competent sources’ that “more than 
40,000 policemen have been trained and specially equipped to curb violence and 
ensure safety of lives and property during the ... general elections.”
In this story, the National Concord demonstrated a commitment to the ideals of a 
democratic environment by not only being non-partisan but also doing a job of 
investigative journalism to unearth the mechanisms being put in place by Nigeria’s 
electoral body to ensure free and fair elections. For instance, while reporting what it 
said it garnered from its ‘competent sources’, the newspaper noted that “25,000 more 
(policemen) would be trained and made combat ready before the Presidential ballot 
..." In all, evidence from the reports show that the motivation for the National 
Concord was to report the election and all the issues related to it.
In this chapter attempt was made to demonstrate how the Nigerian press behaves 
when there is a civilian administration in Nigeria, using elections and electioneering 
as our points of departure. From the examination of their activities, it is apparent that 
there is a difference in the coverage of the privately-owned newspaper and the 
government-owned (whether state or federal) newspapers. While, for instance, the
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former shows no overt loyalty to any political party, particularly in a situation where 
the proprietor is not involved in partisan politics, while the latter is subject to the 
control and manipulation o f its owner, at the expense of the political opponents of the 
owner. In the next chapter, the focus will be on how the press conducts itself during 
elections within the context of a military administration in Nigeria.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Analysis of the activities of the Nigerian press during 
elections supervised by a military administration;
The similarity between 1983 and 1993 in Nigeria's political history was the fact that 
elections were conducted in each year to usher in a democratically-elected civilian 
administration. However, there was still a difference between them. In June 1983, it 
was a general election which the press focussed on, whereas in June 1993 it was the 
Presidential election. Also in June 1983, for instance, the general election was 
organised by a civilian administration and contested by six registered political parties 
which evolved as a result o f the alignment and re-alignment of political forces within 
Nigeria (Madunagu, E., 2002a). However, in 1993, the two allowed political parties, 
the National Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party 
(SDP),444 were not only created by the military but were also conducted and 
supervised by the military administration which was then in power.
The point to stress here is that the Presidential election that was held on June 12 1993 
was the culmination of the more than eight-year programme of political engineering 
by the military administration to pave the way for a new civilian administration in 
Nigeria. The year has proved to be a watershed in Nigeria's political development, as 
the Presidential election, its subsequent annulment by the military and the aftermath 
of that annulment have continued to impact on Nigeria's political landscape. Before 
the presidential election, however, there were other elections conducted to elect a 
civilian executive governor to administer each of the then 30 states of the Nigerian 
federation. Civilians were also elected into the National Assembly (Senate and House 
of Representatives), and into each of the state's House of Assembly. In effect, 
although the military had disengaged from lower levels o f governance, it still had
444 The Guardian (Lagos, October 8, 1989) announced, on October 7, 1989, (military) President 
Babangida’s creation o f two political parties -  the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and National 
Republican Convention (NRC) -  with a “little to the left and a little to the right ideologies” 
respectively.
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control of the executive arm of the federal government, from which position it 
conducted and supervised the presidential election. It should also be added that 
because the military administration had twice shifted its hand-over date (1990 and 
1992) to a democratically-elected civilian administration, Nigerians had become 
disillusioned with the military administration and were particularly sceptical about the 
sincerity o f the military to successfully organise the June 12 Presidential election.
This was the context within which the newspapers conducted their activities in June 
1993. But, unlike 1983, when each o f the government-owned newspapers was under 
the control of the ruling party at state or federal levels and was therefore campaigning 
for their respective ruling party, the control that the various governments in 1993 had 
over their respective newspaper was not that clear cut. This was basically because, as 
earlier noted, the two allowed political parties were the creation of the military and 
the rules and regulations under which they had to operate were spelt out by them, 
which was part of the effect of the centralised nature of military rule in Nigeria.445 But 
as with every issue in Nigeria, other factors influenced the activities of the various 
newspapers, not least, the Ibo question, which would become apparent in the way that 
the Imo state-owned Statesman conducted its activities during this period. So, with the 
exception of The Statesman, there was a general pattern in the way that all the other 
newspapers covered the presidential election campaign in June 1993. For our purpose, 
the overall coverage of the newspapers will be examined under the following themes:
(1) The non-partisan editorial policy that most of the newspapers adopted in their 
coverage of the presidential election.
(2) The Statesman's overt support for the NRC and its presidential candidate, Alhaji 
Bashir Tofa, and
(3) The stand of the newspapers on the contentious cancellation of the June 12 
presidential election.
7.1 June 12 presidential election engenders a national editorial policy
One basic characteristic of the Nigerian press when operating under a military
445 See Osuntokun 1989: 351.
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administration is that they tend more often to be national in their editorial direction. 
This was the case with their presidential election coverage in June 1993. Although 
there were some variations in the story slant of each of the newspapers, there was no 
doubt that all the newspapers, except one, The Statesman, showed no loyalty to 
neither of the two political parties, NRC and SDP, quite uncharacteristic of the way 
that most Nigerian newspapers cover electioneering campaigns (Omu, 1978: 248- 
250).
One of the four characteristics of govemment-media relations in Africa, as articulated 
by Ruijter (1989), is that both collaborate to bring about inter-dependency between 
the state and the media in the task o f nation-building. The press regarded the 
transition programme of the military administration, of which the June 12 presidential 
election was a part, as a laudable step towards installing a democratically-elected 
administration in Nigeria. The motivation for this was not unconnected with the 
realisation by the newspapers that one way to galvanise Nigerians against continued 
military rule446 was to ensure that the elections were conducted in a free and fair 
atmosphere devoid of violent-prone partisanship. In this endeavour, both the 
privately-owned and the government-owned newspapers adopted a similar editorial 
policy of informing the Nigerian electorate about the election through the elaborate 
coverage that they gave to the events before and after the election.
This editorial line taken by most of the newspapers could be related to Pratt's (1991) 
finding that the role of privately owned and government-owned media in Africa is 
blurred. Expanding on this further, Jeter et al (1996: 30-32), noted that the reason for 
this is the need to unite all strata of society in order to fulfil government's aims and 
objectives. The major task of the press during this period was to mobilise the entire 
Nigerian public to participate in the election. This they did through giving coverage to 
election-related issues, such as:
(1) What the federal military government's authorities were saying or doing about
446 On May 1, 1999, The Guardian (Nigerian), published the result o f a survey conducted by the 
International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), under the tiltle: “Nigerians won’t compromise 
civil rule, says survey” and reported that, no matter how badly civilian administrations may perform, 
Nigerians prefer them to military rule. Also read the views o f Interviewee, H. Odukomaiya on p. 198 
where he notes that Nigerians will no longer tolerate military rule.
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the election;
(2) What the National Electoral Commission (NEC) was doing; and,
(3) Reporting about the activities, programmes and leaders of the political parties.
For instance, many of the newspapers focused on the enactment of Decree 13 of 1993 
by the federal military government. Titled "The Presidential Election (Basic 
Constitutional and Transitional Provisions) Decree 13" was about the guidelines on 
how to ensure that the election was conducted in a free and fair atmosphere. Typical 
headlines on the day following the enactment of the decree were:
“Don’ts of June 12 polls: Decree out; Guilty candidates to be banned for 10 years; 
Police, Governors, NEC officials, media, affected” {Daily Sketch, 3/6/93);
“June 12 elections: MKO, Tofa may still be disqualified” {Daily Champion, 3/6/93); 
“Flag bearers risk 10-year ban for election fraud” {Daily Times, 3/6/93).
Basically the newspapers reported that, according to the new decree, any presidential 
candidate who involves himself in corrupt practices during the June 12 election would 
be disqualified and barred from contesting or voting in future elections for a period of 
10 years. They noted that the decree identifies punishable corrupt practices as 
including impersonation, treating voters to drinks and food, use of undue influence, 
bribery or aiding and abetting corrupt practices.
In doing this it would seem that the idea was for the newspapers to enlighten the 
Nigerian public on why it was important that the transition programme should 
succeed (Ruijter, Ibid). This was echoed by many of the newspapers on 8 June 1993, 
when they reported what President Ibrahim Babangida (‘IBB’ below) said while 
declaring open a workshop on the events, issues and sources of Nigerian history 
(1960-70s) in Kaduna. Headlines like:
“Let's learn from past mistakes - IBB” {New Nigerian); and,
“We must learn from history - IBB” {Daily Times);
These two federal government-owned newspapers sum up the essence of the story as 
reported by some of the newspapers. In the articles, President Babangida is reported
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as explaining that Nigeria has learnt many lessons and also recorded some 
achievements in the course of formulating and executing the transition programme, 
which would culminate in the June 12 presidential election.
On 4 June 1993, the newspapers reported that the NEC had given N80m to the two 
political parties, as one of the measures to ensure that there were no hitches in their 
preparations towards the election. The newspapers considered this a significant story 
as some of them made it the lead. For instance, consider the headlines:
“Parties get N80m lifeline from NEC” ( Vanguard, 4/6/93);
“NRC, SDP get N80m more for activities” (The Guardian, 4/6/93);
“NRC, SDP get N80m for campaigns” (New Nigerian, 4/6/93) and;
“N80m lifeline for NRC, SDP” (Daily Times, 4/6/93).
The thrust of the story was that, according to the National Electoral Commission’s 
director of public affairs, Mr Tonnie Iredia, the grant was in accordance with sections 
17 and 22 of the Political Parties (Registration and Activities) Decree No 27 of 1989, 
the aim of which was to assist the political parties in their campaigns for the 
presidential elections.
The newspapers also undertook the major task of making sure that the Nigerian public 
was well informed about the programmes and activities of the two political parties. 
The various reports revealed what the leaders of the political parties were saying or 
doing, the idea being to enable the voters make an informed judgement in casting 
their votes. One of the major events of the presidential campaign in June 1993 was the 
first live television presidential debate. The two presidential candidates went head to 
head in a television debate, thus giving them the opportunity to convince the Nigerian 
public about what their individual party stood for and how they would go about 
governance. Many of the newspapers tagged it the 'great debate' and provided the 
details of what the presidential candidates said:
“Great TV debate: Abiola, Tofa 'clash' over oil subsidy” (National Concord lead, 
7/6/93);
“I owe my country my all, says MKO”, and “Why I attacked Christianity -  Tofa”
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CNational Concord front page stories about SDP and NRC presidential candidates 
respectively, 7/6/93);
“Abiola, Tofa in historic debate” {Vanguard lead, 7/6/93);
“Tofa, Abiola present economic blueprint” and “Candidates differ on national 
conference” (The Guardian lead, 7/6/93);
“The Great Debate: MKO, Tofa face Nigerians” and “Tofa preaches unity” {Daily 
Sketch lead, 7/6/93);
“Mismanagement, nation's bane - Abiola, Tofa” {New Nigerian lead, 7/6/93); and, 
“The Great Debate: Abiola Vs Tofa - keen, revealing” {Daily Times lead, 7/6/93).
The way that the newspapers reported the election campaign in general, and the 
television debate in particular, corresponds to what the Working Group on Black 
Civilisation and Mass Media at the FESTAC Colloquium said about the media, which 
is that:
Nationally, the media are an important integrative agency. They are a 
powerful
force as an educator, agitator, mobiliser, motivator and entertainer ... They 
can create a feeling of involvement and participation. It is through them that 
the agenda of the day is presented to the nation. They are a national forum for 
the continuous debate (cited in Nnaemeka et al 1989a: 244).
But what was unique about the way that the press tried to fulfil this role during this 
period was the largely non-partisan way that they covered the activities of the 
presidential candidates of both parties. Many Nigerian newspapers are notorious for 
their partisanship (Oyovbaire, 2000; Haruna, 1987),447 but this time, most of the 
newspapers gave equal attention to what the two candidates for the presidential 
elections were saying, probably because, as already noted, the press was fully 
committed to the national agenda to disengage the military from the political scene, 
and realised that only elections conducted under a free and fair448 atmosphere would
447 Also see Omu, 1978.
448 The point should be made that the atmosphere at that time in Nigeria was not really conducive to a 
free and fair election given the fact that the whole political process was planned, directed and executed 
by the military. For instance the two presidential candidates that contested under the platform of the 
Social democratic party (SDP) National Republican Convention (NRC) were not seen as particularly 
representing a spectrum o f interest in Nigeria since the parties were the creatures o f the Babangida 
military regime. But the press as did the Nigerian populace took the view that anything that will result 
in the disengagement o f the military from the political scene was acceptable (See fieldwork 
interviewee, Chief Odukomaiya on p. 138. and also the survey in the Guardian about Nigerians
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facilitate the process. According to Enwenwa (1989: 93), the mass media can still 
perform within the context of the goals of the state, irrespective of its history. In other 
words:
It (is) not the history and past heritage, but rather the actual political situations 
... the choice o f ... implementation of (national) policy that better explain the 
nature, organisation and functioning of the mass communication institution.
This was quite apparent in the way that many of the newspapers showed neutrality 
while reporting about the elections. Some of the headlines read:
“Abiola promises drug barons big fight” (New Nigerian, 5/6/93);
“Tofa outlines programme for women” (New Nigerian, 7/6/93);
“MKO to end fuel shortage” and “I'll share nation's wealth equally -  Tofa” (Daily 
Sketch stories about SDP and NRC presidential candidates respectively, 3/6/93); 
“MKO promises home-made drugs” (Daily Sketch, 10/6/93);
“[Tofa] ... promises to increase fuel prices to save NNPC” (Daily Sketch, 11/6/93); 
“Tofa promises to abolish oil dichotomy” (Vanguard, 2/6/93);
“Abiola, Tofa bank on minorities for victory” (The Guardian, 6/6/93);
“Tofa pledges respect for women's rights” (The Guardian, 7/6/93).
7.2 'Only Tofa speaks for the east*
The Imo State government-owned The Statesman, adopted an editorial line quite 
different from the others in covering the presidential elections in June 1993. While, as 
demonstrated, the other newspapers tried to give a fair coverage to all the election- 
related issues, The Statesman was by contrast outwardly campaigning for the NRC 
and its presidential candidate, Alhaji Bashir Tofa. After elections to the state 
legislatures and the state executives were conducted in 1990, the NRC emerged as the 
ruling political party in Imo state and Anambra state, both made up of the mainly Ibo 
(Igbo) ethnic group (Olagunju et al: 1993). It was no surprise that the Imo state 
government used The Statesman to promote its political objectives.
The Statesman's stand against Chief Abiola was rooted in Nigeria's geo-politics. The
preferring civil rule to military rule
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Ibos maintained that they have often been excluded from Nigeria's mainstream 
decision-making political process, particularly, since after the Nigerian civil war 
(1967-1970), when the Ibos fought unsuccessfully to secede from Nigeria 449 And so, 
when Chief Abiola emerged in 1992 as the presidential candidate o f the SDP, the Ibos 
were disappointed that he chose a Muslim, who is a northerner (Hausa-Fulani), as his 
running mate/vice-presidential candidate. With Chief Abiola being a Muslim from the 
Southwest (Yoruba), this ensured a Muslim/Muslim ticket for the presidential election 
for the SDP. But the NRC's presidential candidate, a Muslim from the north, on the 
other hand, chose Dr Sylvester Ugoh, an Ibo man (a Christian from the south-east), as 
his vice-presidential candidate, thus making the NRC a Muslim/Christian ticket.
From then on, the Ibos saw the NRC and its presidential candidate as the only 
political group that was better placed to protect and further the interests of the Ibos. 
These sentiments were all reflected in the "Tofa Solidarity Nigeria" statements that 
The Statesman posted on the top right comer of its front page throughout the month of 
June 1993. Four examples o f such statements read as follows:
Before you vote
If Abiola can influence the marginalisation of the East within the SDP, whose 
unity he purports to represent in picking Kingibe, what will he do to us when 
he gets to Aso Rock?450 Tofa has shown that he respects and cares for all 
sections of this country. Say no to arrogant patronage - Tofa Solidarity 
Nigeria (The Statesman, 2/6/93).
Before you vote
'We shall not allow the marginalisation of any group in the party'. That was 
MKO Abiola at the launching -of the SDP Presidential Campaign. We the 
Easterners know the truth. The exact reverse has happened to us. We have 
been skilfully out-schemed. Abiola's remarks and consequent actions are a 
hallmark of double talk and inconsistency. Vote a consistent Tofa you can 
trust - Tofa Solidarity Nigeria (The Statesman, 8/6/93).
Before you vote
More than ever, the Eastern States are farming a common front to tackle issues 
of common interest. This is how it should be. We are a people whose future is 
tied together. Ugoh has promised to enhance this unity by recognising the East 
as his Primary constituency. Who is going to represent us in the Abiola
449 Read footnote 293 on p. 143 above for an extract from the case for the Igbos, as submitted to the 
Oputa Panel by the Pan-Igbo Group, Ohanaeze; Achebe, C., 1983: 56-64; Statesman context above in 
chapter three; Also see the articlei'Igbos and V-P post', published in The Statesman, on 8/6/93.
450This is the term used to describe the seat o f the Executive arm (presidential palace) o f the federal 
government o f Nigeria based in Abuja, Nigeria’s federal capital city.
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combination? Nobody. Our only hope for a better tomorrow is Bashir Tofa 
and Sylvester Ugoh - Tofa Solidarity Nigeria (The Statesman, 9/6/93).
Before you vote
In their debates, Abiola and his running mate claimed that they are going to be 
Presidents of Nigeria not of SDP or Muslims. Indeed! But here below is 
Abiola for you ... "Nigeria is Nationally and Internally a Muslim State and 
you may stop patronising the Concord if you do not like my Statement. 
Afterall, I am a millionaire!! Bashorun MKO Abiola - responding to critics 
over his role in OIC. Fellow Nigerians ... think about this as you cast your 
vote on Saturday (The Statesman, 10/6/93).
In effect, while the other newspapers were pre-occupied with reporting all aspects of 
the elections as they related to issues at both the national and state levels, The 
Statesman followed this clear editorial line of campaigning for the NRC and its 
presidential candidate, Alhaji Tofa. It continuously presented Alhaji Tofa not only as 
the candidate speaking for the Easterners (Ibos) but also as the more capable 
candidate of the two. On 1 June 1993, it ran the lead story:
“Political power sharing in Nigeria: Tofa says you can't scheme out the East”, and 
quoted the NRC presidential candidate as saying:
"Nigeria belonged to all and you cannot have a successful country by ignoring 
anybody".
The following day it followed up with the lead headline:
“Mammoth crowd at NRC rally ... Tofa says attempt to marginalise the East must be 
resisted”, and also quoted Alhaji Tofa thus:
"There will be no unity in a country where an essential component of the 
nation appears to be relegated to the background in the scheme of things of the 
nation."
And on 10 June 1993, its lead story was:
“Saturday's Presidential elections: Tofa tipped to win”. 451
451 According to The Statesman, its article was based on the findings "conducted by the Centre for 
Socio-legal Studies and Research (CSSR), Enugu (Anambra State)".
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Even when the other newspapers were reporting about the issues that the two 
presidential candidates talked about during the first ever presidential debate in 
Nigeria. The Statesman chose to focus only on Alhaji Tofa. Its lead on 8 June 1993
was:
"Tofa scores high marks - at NTA debate with Abiola”.
The article was based on the information that the newspaper said it garnered from 
"The Statesman's opinion poll shortly after the debate”, and the "viewers scored the 
NRC presidential candidate, Alhaji Bashir Tofa very high for his brilliant 
performance at the interview".
7.3 Reporting the annulment of the June 12 election: fNigerians reject 
fresh elections1, and 'The peoples* will must prevail1
The goal that the Nigerian press set out to achieve in June 1993 was more than any 
other thing the need to ensure that democratic ideals took root and flourished in 
Nigeria.452 At the same time, though, there were some differences in the way that the 
government-owned and the privately-owned newspapers responded to this challenge. 
This was particularly apparent in the way that they reported the annulment of the 
election by the military authorities. Most of the government-owned (state or federal), 
newspapers' reports were focussed on what the military government said in 
announcing the annulment o f the election and why the action was taken, as well as 
what the officials of the two political parties were planning to do in the wake of the
453announcement.
Nevertheless, among the government-owned newspapers, slight differences still
452 For their views on how the Nigerian press plays its role, read Interviewees: G.G., Darah on pp.203 
& 205 and, S. Amuka-Pemu on p.205 under the heading: “Where press reflects national outlook and 
promotes a collective national identity”, pp. 203-206.
453 For instance, Jeter et al (1996: 27) note that the press collaborates and is supportive of the 
government on issues o f national importance, just like the announcement made by the military 
government to explain the reasons for annulling the election. Also read the views o f Interviewee H. 
Odukomaiya, on p. 139 to the effect that the Nigerian press co-operated with the military government as 
a way of encouraging the military to disengage from politics.
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existed in the way that they reported the annulment. But basically these newspapers 
(state and federal) took an editorial stance that was supportive of and sympathetic to 
the federal military government's position (Jeter et al 1996: 27). They simply reported 
the official position of the government and blanked out the outrage and condemnation 
of the government's action by those opposed to the cancellation.
Typical was the way that the Imo state government-owned The Statesman, reported 
the annulment. It devoted the whole o f its front page on 28/6/93 to what Nigeria’s 
President, General Babangida, said in a radio/television broadcast:
“Why we cancelled June 12 elections - IBB (lead);
“Abiola, Tofa banned”;
“NRC, SDP to produce new flagbearers” ;
“Banned politicians can now contest” ; and,
“Nigerians receive pat on the back”.
In the lead story: 'Why we cancelled June 12 elections - IBB', for instance, it starts:
" THE Federal Military Government has given reasons for the cancellation 
of the June 12, Presidential election.
President Ibrahim Babangida said in a nation-wide broadcast that the 
elction did not meet the basic requirements of a free and fair poll just as it 
happened to the primaries of last year which were also cancelled".
This clearly showed how the newspaper became a platform for the government to use 
to rationalise its position.
And as one of the newspaper's sub-headlines on the front page: Nigerians receive pat 
on the back' showed, while there was widespread condemnation of the cancellation of 
the election, the newspaper was reporting that the President appreciated them and 
wanted them to stand behind the government in the interest o f peace and unity, as in:
"PRESIDENT Ibrahim Babangida has expressed government's appreciation of 
the patience and understanding o f Nigerians against the background of the 
current political situation in the country. He urged all Nigerians to keep faith 
the unity, peace and stability o f the country and o f the commitment of the 
present administration".
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Similarly, the two federal government-owned papers led with the following stories:
“Cancelled Presidential election - Party, Caucuses plan meetings”, {New Nigerian, 
28/6/93); and,
“IBB, governors meet tomorrow” {Daily Times 28/6/93).
But nowhere in the stories or on their front pages did they report or give prominence 
to the condemnation of the annulment o f the election. Rather, in the New Nigerian 
story, Alhaji Usman Alhaji, the former national secretary of one of the two political 
parties, the NRC, was reported as saying that the political logjam could be resolved 
within the limited period set by the military authorities to conduct another election. 
The newspaper reported Alhaji Usman thus:
"Meanwhile, former NRC National Secretary, Alhaji Usman Alhaji, has said 
that the only thing that could give the Federal Government a sign of 
seriousnesson the present political situation in the nation, was to make 
adequate arrangement within the limited period and conduct the election.
Alhaji Usman maintained that if  the government action was to save the nation, 
the decision was a welcome one, adding "I see in the new style some kind of 
stability ..."
This was clearly against the mood in the country, which was that Nigerians were not 
prepared to go through another election, as it was generally believed that the June 12 
election was won by the Presidential candidate o f the SDP, Chief M.K.O Abiola. 
Indeed, compared to the way that the privately-owned newspapers dealt with the 
issue, there was a marked difference. They mostly published the opinions of 
Nigerians, including politicians, condemning the cancellation, and demanding that the 
election should be upheld. Some o f the headlines that these newspapers splashed 
across their front pages, after the announcement o f the cancellation o f the election, 
read as follows:
‘“Declare June 12 Presidential poll result now’- NLC (Nigerian Labour Congress) 
issues ultimatum -  Nation-wide strike looms” {Daily Champion, 29/6/93);
“Nigerians uphold June 12 election” (Vanguard, 28/6/93); and,
“Politicians, others flaw poll’s cancellation, fresh agenda” {The Guardian, 28/6/93);
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Using examples of some passages from the Daily Champion’s story will show the 
extent of the privately-owned newspapers’ anger towards the military authorities for 
annulling the elections organised in a bid to disengage the military from Nigeria’s 
body politic. When the Daily Champion screamed across its front page the headline 
"’Declare June 12 presidential poll result now' - NLC ISSUES ULTIMATUM 
♦Nationwide strike looms", the newspaper reported as follows:
"THE Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) yesterday threatened to embark on 
a 'national action* from Thursday, if  the Federal Government fails to declare 
the winner of the June 12 presidential election by tomorrow.
A statement issued at the end o f its central working committee (CWC) 
meeting in Lagos said the action would be on July 1 and 2 in the first instance.
Speaking to newsmen shortly after the meeting, the NLC's deputy 
president, Mr Adams Oshiomole, said a statement rejecting the government's 
reason for the cancelling the election would be sent to President Ibrahim 
Babangida and the 30 state governors today.
The congress is of the opinion that the last election was peaceful, orderly, 
free and fair; an unprecedented development in the history of the conduct of 
elections in the country.
Nigerian workers, according to the congress, are convinced that the 
election was the best, contrary to the reasons advanced by government for its 
cancellation and the "staged-managed" protests in some states.
It insisted that government's statement did not reflect the judgement of most 
Nigerians and the international community ..."
Another privately owned paper, National Concord, made its position clear on the 
cancellation of the election on the front page stories and comment on the 27/6/93.454 
The first two paragraphs of the lead story, NIGERIANS REJECT FRESH 
ELECTIONS’, read:
Nigerians spoke in unison again yesterday in firm opposition to the fresh 
presidential elections [sic] plan outlined by the military government last night.
The main plank of the objection which came from Nigerians of diverse 
background was that there was no basis for a fresh election since there was no 
deadlock in the 12 June election in which the SDP presidential candidate won 
convincingly.
The other stories on its front page on that day were:
454 A copy o f the National Concord o f 28/6/93 was not available for examination, though its position 
was predictable as its publisher was Abiola.
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"IBB Lists New Rules, Unchain Banned Politicians"; and,
"Another transition to what?”
But the front page also featured an editorial titled: "Front Page Comment - The 
People's Will Must Prevail", where the newspaper concluded:
"... It is clear that a President-elect has now emerged, that Nigerians have 
chosen the man whom they want to lead them for the next four years under a 
democratic government. It is also clear that those who are trying to frustrate 
the sovereign will o f the people constitute only a small, selfish minority within 
this military administration ... We completely reject the idea of conducting 
any other election and call on the government to announce the result of the 12 
June election in its entirety and to declare the winner without further delay ..."
What has been documented in this chapter is how the press behaves during elections 
conducted and supervised by a military administration. It is clear that both 
government and private newspapers see elections from a national perspective. This is 
understandable since they are not bogged down by partisan politics as it’s the case 
when they operate under a military administration. Nevertheless, it can rightly be said 
that differences still exist in the way that the private newspapers generally behave 
during elections compared to what the private newspapers are allowed to do, 
particularly when the issues are contentious like the Presidential election in 1993. In 
other words, the government uses its newspaper to articulate and defend its position. 
The private newspapers on the other hand remain nationally focussed and become 
anti-government in its editorial policy, particularly when the government tries to 
truncate an electoral process deemed to have been freely and fairly contested and 
won.
In the next two chapters (eight and nine), we will analyse other activities of the press 
when there is a military administration in Nigeria. To do this, the focus will be on: 
How the presses generally conduct their activities, using as examples, their coverage 
of events in June 1985 and June 1987; and, How they cover specific issues, like the 
riots that almost brought Nigeria to a standstill in June 1989 following the 
introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) by the military 
administration.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Analysis of the activities of the Nigerian press under a 
military administration: Events in June 1985 and
June 1987
In the preceding two chapters, six and seven, the differences in Nigerian press 
coverage during civilian and military administrations was analysed, with particular 
focus on elections organised by a civilian administration and those conducted under a 
military administration.
In this chapter, the pre-occupation will be on how the press generally covers events 
during the military administration, with reference to the way that it covered events in 
June 1985 and June 1987. The important point to note is that, as noted in Chapter 
Seven, during military administration in Nigeria, the newspapers often have a national 
focus. This is most noticeable in the State's newspapers because, unlike when they are 
being run during a democratically-elected civilian administration, they give priority to 
national stories rather than to those that are o f immediate importance to the local 
areas.
Paramount to understanding the actions o f the press here (particularly the federal or 
State government papers) is that the military administration is centralised and 
therefore effectively destroys the federal structure o f Nigeria (see Falomo, 2003).455 
This is why a State government-owned newspaper, under military administration, 
does not necessarily lead with State news or what State government officials say or 
do. Rather, the news based on what federal government officials say often takes 
precedence, and in terms of the prominence that they are given. In the same vein, the 
newspapers also give priority to issues seen as o f national relevance, irrespective of 
whichever State of the Nigerian federation that it emanates from (see Jeter et al 1996: 
8- 11).456
See also Nwabueze, 1992; Okadigbo 2000; Ezomon 2001.
456 This is a marked difference from what happens in a civilian administration, where the newspapers 
become the tool o f the political party in power and their officials and are used against political 
opponents. For instance, a newspaper controlled by a political party in charge o f a government in a
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The task here is to document how state government-owned newspapers generally 
behave under a military administration. To put this in perspective, it is essential, for 
purposes of the analysis, to outline the general pattern that the State-owned 
newspapers report news during a military administration. This could be divided into 
two, namely that:
(1) The newspaper becomes the platform for the State military govemor/State 
government officials to address the nation.
(2) Activities of federal government officials and those of national commentators are 
often reported and in most cases take precedence over State news.
8.1 State government-owned newspapers
8.1a The nation comes first: 'Reduce alcoholism'; 'Nigeria needs active labour 
force' and 'No compromise on national security'
As noted, because of the centralised nature o f military administration, the newspapers 
editorial policy is often national in focus. In effect the state governors who are 
appointed by the highest military authority in the country reflect the national focus in 
whatever they do. Government-owned newspapers toe the line accordingly. But it 
should be added that the issues or events that prompt the military governors to address 
the nation happen at different times in each state of the Nigerian federation. 
Therefore, when such issues come up in any o f the states, the military governor in that 
particular state uses such occasions to address the nation. Consequently, the Nigerian 
nation is always the focus o f attention. This is a basic feature that distinguishes a 
military from a civilian administration in Nigeria. Military officials at state or national 
level see Nigeria as one constituency, which in turn informs their reactions to issues 
of national importance. The media then become the conduits, through which the 
administration reaches the Nigerian society,457
particular State, during a civilian administration, will only report stories about the activities of officials 
of that political party at the national level (see chapter six).
457 Read the views o f Interviewee D. Agbese on pp. 146-148 regarding how the Nigerian military 
governments use the press, particularly against the political class under the heading: “The Nigerian 
press and military intervention in Nigerian politics”, pp. 144-149.
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8.1b June 1985: fGov calls for ban on sale of alcohol to youths under 16yrs'
In June 1985, for instance, the activities o f the Military Governor of Imo State of 
Nigeria, Brigadier Ike Nwachukwu, as reported by the state-owned Nigerian 
Statesman during the period in question, typically exemplify this. As some passages 
from the above-stated caption o f the front page lead story o f the newspaper, published 
on 1 June, 1985 show, Governor Nwachukwu used the National Symposium on the 
Brewery Industry in Nigeria to condemn “the rate of alcoholism in the Nigerian 
society . . .” The major concern of Nwachukwu was that there were no measures in 
place to protect the Nigerian youths against such a social vice. He then “called for a 
ban on the sale of beer to children under 16 years in hotels, bars, restaurants and 
similar places, as a way of reducing the rate of alcoholism in the society.” (Nigerian 
Statesman, lead, 1/6/85, p.l).
The following day, the story the newspaper published on its back page was titled: 
“Call for review of Civil Service”. This quoted Governor Nwachukwu as suggesting 
to the Study Group on Re-organisation o f the (Nigerian) Civil Service, “to lay 
emphasis on how to motivate the civil servant to perform his duties and on time too” 
(Nigerian Statesman, 2/6/85).
“Gov calls for economically active labour force” was the headline that the newspaper 
splashed across its front page on 3/6/85. This reported Nwachukwu as urging the 
"Nigerian workers to constitute themselves into an economically active labour force 
with the specific purpose of aiding in pulling the economy out of the woods". The 
Governor used a colloquium on finance in Nigeria, held in Owerri, the capital of Imo 
state, to address the Nigerian workers.
An important aspect o f the function o f a State Governor, during a military 
administration, is that in their duties and pronouncements they reflect the policies and 
objectives as laid down by the highest military ruling body at the centre. The passage 
from the front page lead story titled: 'Governor commends immigration men - says no 
compromise on national security', that the Nigerian Statesman carried on 6/6/85, 
shows Nwachukwu focussing on the federal military government's policy on 
immigration, especially as they relate to the effect that illegal immigrants could have
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on Nigeria’s national security. When the Assistant Director of Immigration in the 
State, Mr Allison Iyawe, paid him a courtesy call at Government House, Nwachukwu 
saw it as an opportunity to address the Nigerian Immigration authorities not to 
compromise Nigeria's national security when carrying out their duties. The newspaper 
quoted Governor Nwachukwu as saying, "In as much as the department tries to avoid 
any act that could tend to embarrass foreign nationals or their home governments, it 
should ensure that the interest and security o f the country were paramount and should 
not be compromised."
8.1c June 1987
It was the same editorial policy that the newspapers continued to follow in 1987, as 
the military administration was still in place. The Military Governor of Imo State, 
Amadi Ikwechegh, used the occasion o f the visit o f members of the Enugu zone of the 
Alumni Association of the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPPS) 
to dwell on what is needed to be done for Nigeria to attain its potential and 
consequently become a great nation. As the newspaper owned by the State 
Government, The Statesman, was the channel through which this message was 
conveyed to the Nigerian nation. So, not surprisingly, it ran the story as follows:
'Help govt build strong, stable future for Nigeria - Gov charges NIPSS 
alumni'.
Members of the Alumni Association of ... [NIPSS] have been called upon to 
offer useful and expert advice, which would assist the Federal Government in 
ensuring a strong and stable future for Nigeria.
Governor Amadi Ikwechegh o f Imo State made the call at the weekend while 
exchanging views with members o f the Enugu Zone of the Association who 
called on him at the Government Lodge Owerri ...' (The Statesman, 1/6/1987,
p. 1).
In Bendel State, the Governor, Col. John Mark Inienger, was also addressing the 
nation, while commissioning an industrial project in the State capital, Benin City. 
This time the Governor's point of departure was the Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) introduced by the Federal Government to help resolve Nigeria's 
economic crisis. Titled: “SAP: big boost to economy” the government-owned The 
Nigerian Observer, on its front page on 4/6/87, reported the Governor as saying that:
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Nigeria has the resources to launch her on a path of sustained industrial 
development ... According to the Governor, the innovative efforts of 
industrial outfit as a pioneer in indigenous engineering technology is a 
vindication o f the federal government Structural Adjustment Programme 
(SAP) which lays emphasis on local production o f equipment with available 
local resources and to conserve scarce foreign exchange ...
Also on that same day The Nigerian Observer reported what Governor Inienger told 
participants at the 6th annual conference of Chief Executives of Nigeria Public 
Enterprises, held in Benin City. Under the headline: “Evolve result oriented 
programme-Inienger tells Chief Executives”, the newspaper stated:
CHIEF executives of public enterprsies in the country have been charged to 
perfect result-oriented strategies for managing such organisations.
Making the call ... [he] noted that the problem of the Nigerian public 
enterprise had been that o f deficiency in effective and efficient implementation 
of public policies and programmes ...
8.2 'Soleve warns: FMG not father Xmas*: A voice for the federal 
military government's (FMG) officials and national commentators
Another characteristic which State government-owned newspapers in Nigeria exhibit, 
during military administration, is the prominence that they give to the activities of the 
federal military government, its officials and any prominent/renowned Nigerians who 
voice their opinions on national issues, thus conforming with the military authorities’ 
desire to ensure that the media deviate from "reflecting regional (or State) sentiments" 
and "work for national unity" (Osuntokun, 1989: 351). In this endeavour, all the State 
government-owned newspapers take it as a duty to publicise any key issue that the 
officials of Nigeria's federal military government or national commentators are 
involved in. This same approach was adopted by all the three sampled state 
government-owned newspapers in June 1985 and June 1987. In this part of this 
chapter, some of the stories that these newspapers carried to fulfil this objective are 
examined. Although several stories are highlighted, only one each from the three 
newspapers is treated in detail, starting with their coverage o f events in June 1985 and 
then June 1987.
8.2a June 1985
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When the Nigerian federal Minister of Finance, Dr. Onaolapo Soleye delivered a 
keynote address titled: 'Financing Public Enterprises in Nigeria', to Chief Executives 
of Public Enterprises at a conference in Jos, the capital of Plateau State, The Nigerian 
Observer, owned by the Bendel State government, reported what Dr. Soleye said 
under the caption: 'Soleye warns: FMG not father Xmas'. In the story, the newspaper 
reported Dr Soleye as expressing unhappiness about the fact that "The N20 billion 
which the federal government pumped into investments in the form of loans or 
capitals in public enterprises over the years have not yielded expected dividends ... 
[because] public enterprises have come to regard the treasury and guaranteed loans for 
their projects as extensions of government subvention”, adding that “this attitude of 
non- or irregular payment of loans and capital repayment does not augur well for the 
nation" {The Nigerian Observer, lead, 4/6/85, p .l).
Some of the other national stories that the newspaper featured on its front page in the 
month included:
“N25,000 tools for coal industry” (7/6/85), which was about developments within the 
Nigerian Coal Corporation, as stated by the Acting Manager of the Corporation, Mr 
R. E. Ohaneje.
“Western press flayed” (14/6/85) was a report based on the views expressed by an 
American professor, blasting Western media for reporting invariably negatively about 
the third world, during a discussion he held with some journalists in Lagos.
A further story followed the comments made by the former Premier o f the defunct 
Midwestern region of Nigeria, Chief Denis Osadebay, about military intervention in 
the Nigerian body politic, The Nigerian Observer reported the story under the caption: 
“Why military appears on the stage” (28/6/85).
On 1/6/85, the Imo State government-owned Nigerian Statesman, also reported on its 
front page what Nigeria's federal Minister o f Defence, Major-General D. Y. Bali said 
in a keynote address at the national symposium on the brewery industry in Nigeria. 
According to the story, which the Nigerian Statesman captioned 'FMG determined to
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reduce import bills', Major-General Bali touched on one of the banes of the Nigerian 
economy - imports. The Nigerian Statesman noted Bali as saying that the government 
was determined to reduce "the nation's high import bills to very manageable limits 
by developing within the Nigerian economy, the "raw materials [needed] for 
agro-based industries thus redressing Nigeria's "mono-cultural economy with 
heavy dependence on oil" {Nigerian Statesman, 1/6/85).
Also in the same month, what the Nigerian Statesman reported on its front pages 
were, among others:
“Fed Govt to establish food information centre”, attributed to the Nigerian Chief of 
Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Major-General Tunde Idiagbon, while he was opening 
the United Nations University Workshop on Food Science Technology for African 
countries in Lagos (5/6/85);
“Experts agree on privatisation”, which was about the views expressed by Prof. 
Austin C. Ezejelue and Chief Emmanuel C. Adiele at a colloquium on finance, held in 
Owerri (3/6/85); and,
“Local beer expected in Nigerian markets within five years” based on the views of a 
team of industrial experts at a symposium in Owerri on substitution of imported raw 
materials for the brewing industries in Nigeria (4/6/85).
Rather more seriously, the Nigerian military authority subverts the media’s ‘Fourth 
Estate’ role to the extent that they become willing tools in the military authority's 
attempt to discredit the civilian political class that they overthrew, by blaming all the 
ills of the Nigerian society on them.458 Consider the slant o f this lead story captioned: 
“We're on the path ... Towards achieving our goal - Buhari”, which the Daily Sketch, 
owned by the governments of the then Ogun, Oyo, Ondo States of Nigeria, splashed 
on its front page on 29/6/85. While using the story to report what was said at a 
military graduation ceremony by the head o f the military administration, Major- 
General Muhammadu Buhari, the Daily Sketch stated:
458 Read the views o f Interviewees: D. Onabule, Al-Bashir, and D. Agbese on pp. 144-149 under the 
heading: “The Nigerian press and military intervention in Nigerian politics”.
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"Major-General Buhari yesterday took stock of the military administration's 
18 months in office and concluded that it was on course towards rectifying the 
failures of the defunct civilian regime."
In reporting the military authority's sentiments against the civilian political class, the 
newspapers often focus on what the military administration is doing differently in 
order to improve the process of governance in Nigeria. For instance, in the Daily 
Sketch story above, one of the ways that the military administration intended to 
achieve this was by making the overthrown civilian political class appear before 
military tribunals to account for their period in office, thus making public 
accountability a part of Nigeria's political culture.
"General Buhari disclosed that in addition to various decrees to tackle social 
vices, public officers had been made to account for their stewardship before 
special military tribunals."
In the report: “Why N127m Port deal doubled”, the Daily Sketch also noted what the 
former Chairman of the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) told the panel probing the 
Nigerian Ministry of Transport and Aviation contracts (1/6/85). On the issue of how 
the detained politicians, who were overthrown by the military, will be tried and 
brought to justice in the Nigerian courts, the Daily Sketch reported the views of the 
Nigerian Minister of Information, Group Captain Omeruah, under the caption: 
“Omeruah speaks on detained politicians” (15/6/85).
8.2b June 1987
In June 1987, the pattern was the same for all the state government-owned 
newspapers. They continued to give priority attention to issues that had a national 
focus, particularly those attributed to federal military government officials and 
important social, political and economic figures within Nigeria. One of the ideals that 
the Nigerian military often promises to maintain and protect, after overthrowing what 
it usually refers to as “the corrupt civilian administration”, is Nigeria’s national
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security.459 In effect, anything that is said or done by the military authority in 
pursuance of this objective is given a wider coverage by the Nigerian newspapers 
which, in that period in Nigeria’s socio-political development, regarded the Nigerian 
military as more capable o f providing a better administration for Nigeria than the 
civilians 460 A classic case in June 1987 was when Nigeria’s Chief of General Staff, 
Rear Admiral Augustus Aikhomu addressed the Fourth General Conference of the 
Social Science Council of Nigeria in the northern city of Zaria. Both The Nigerian 
Observer and The Statesman gave it coverage on the front page of their respective 
editions on 5/6/87. While The Nigerian Observer captioned it:
“CGS calls for nation’s security”;
The Statesman chose the headline:
“CGS urges Nigerians to work towards national security”.
Nevertheless, the kernel of the story remained broadly similar, but, interestingly 
enough, the first paragragh of both newspapers read exactly the same:461
“The Chief of General Staff, Rear Admiral Augustus Aikhomu has called on 
Nigerians to engage in activities that will sustain the internal cohesion and 
security of the nation.” {Nigerian Observer and The Statesman).
Apart from its security objective, the Nigerian military administration, at its inception, 
also lay out the economic and political as well as social agenda it wished to 
implement 462 The newspapers often serve as the conveyers of this message to the 
entire Nigerian nation. One o f the economic programmes that the military set out to 
achieve then was the development o f the rural areas as a way of boosting food 
production.463 The responsibility was given to the Directorate of Food, Road and 
Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI) under the Chairmanship o f Air Commodore Larry D.
459 For the full text o f the broadcast by Major-General Yakubu Gowon to the Nigerian nation on the 
Declaration of National Emergency and Creation o f 12 States, on the 27th May, 1967, see Aguolu 1973: 
161-166.
460 See Uko2004. Also see the views o f Interviewees: D. Onabunle, and Al-Bashir on ppl35-6.
461 Perhaps suggesting that a press release had been used verbatim for this passage.
462 See Iroanusi 1997.
463 Ibid, 116-118.
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Koiyan. So when he addressed mass media executives in Lagos to brief them about 
the activities of the Directorate, The Nigerian Observer ran the story on its front page, 
and under the headline “Model rural communities for each LG”, it stated:
“The Directorate of Food, Road and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI) has directed 
every local government area in the country to nominate two rural communities 
to serve as models for others to emulate . . .” (2/6/87).
The Statesman also reported the story with the caption: “Chairman urges press to 
spread activities of directorate” (2/6/87, p.9).
Another economic objective o f the Nigerian military administration was how to de­
regulate and therefore revamp the poor Nigerian economy. The authority came up 
with a programme it tagged: Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), for this 
purpose. Under that programme, it introduced the Second tier Foreign Exchange 
Market [SFEM], (Ibid, 112-115). Although many Nigerians were suspicious of the 
programme, thereby eliciting fierce criticisms from some quarters, nevertheless the 
newspapers, in the main, did their utmost to adequately inform the Nigerian public 
about the long-term benefits. One o f such occasions was when the Daily Sketch made 
the story:
“Call on Govt to scrap SFEM - Shonekan replies. Aluko ... says SFEM is good for 
economic revival” (front page lead on 28/6/87).
Chief Ernest Shonekan who was the Chairman/Managing Director of the United 
Africa Company o f Nigeria (UACN) was reacting to the call made by a renowned 
Nigerian economist, Professor Sam Aluko, for the abolition of SFEM; otherwise, 
according to him “the country’s economy would be ruined”. In reporting the story, the 
Daily Sketch noted Chief Shonekan as saying that he did not share Professor Aluko’s 
pessimism about SFEM and quoted him thus:
“I think SFEM is a good device [by the military] to revamp our economy”. 
Continuing, the newspaper reported:
"Chief Shonekan recalled that the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of
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which SFEM is a component was introduced because:
• The Nigerian economy was overvalued
• There was scarcity o f essential goods due to lack of raw materials for 
manufacture
• Nigerian goods were not competitive in the external market thus 
depressing our economy . . .”
8.3 Federal government-owned newspapers and privately-owned 
newspapers
8.3a Focus on the nation: “Govt stops fund for studies abroad”, “Gov wants civil 
service bodies amended”, “Fifth plan is nation’s last chance, “Leaders advised on 
national issues” and “Nigerians favour 2-party system”.
Basically, as explained, when the newspapers are run during a military dispensation, 
evidence shows that they are devoid o f political loyalties and wrangling. Within that 
context, all the newspapers are immune from the political pressures to toe the official 
lines of a political party, as when a civilian administration is in place. So, in reporting 
issues within Nigeria’s political terrain, both government-owned and privately-owned 
newspapers mostly focus on national issues, for purposes o f promoting national unity 
(Jeter et al, 1996: 30-33). On that basis, the work now examines the activities of the 
federal government-owned and privately-owned newspapers. It finds that:
(1) The focus of the stories/articles that they publish, are national in nature; and,
(2) Within the context of a military administration in Nigeria, there is some evidence 
of investigative journalism or some stories based on independent sources which 
are sometimes critical of government, though mostly in the privately-owned 
newspapers.
As seen from the earlier interviewees, a basic tendency exhibited by all Nigerian 
newspapers is their ability to promote Nigeria’s national course when the issues at 
stake are not contentious.464 The era o f military administration often provides the 
press with this opportunity as they more often than not assume the role of political 
parties, articulating the views of Nigerians o f all political hues, thereby serving as the 
bridge between the Nigerian populace and the military administration (see Macebuh
464 For instance, read the views o f Interviewees on pp.203-206 under the heading: “Where press reflects 
national outlook and promotes a collective national identity”.
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2001; Ajuluchukwu 1995: 45).465 The military, on its part, being the only institution 
that holds political power, then uses the newspapers to gain access to the entire 
Nigerian population. This is in line with one major feature of military administration 
in Nigeria which, as earlier noted, is centralisation.
Accordingly, all the newspapers adopt a national perspective to issues as they are 
delivered by the military government through its officials, state or federal. Such was 
the case in June 1985 and June 1987. Some passages from a story like:
“Govt, stops fund for first degree studies abroad”.
The Guardian splashed this across its front page on 14/6/85, and typifies the way that 
the newspapers give attention to very topical national issues, particularly because of 
the impact that they are likely to have on a spectrum of the Nigerian public. In the 
story, The Guardian captured the essence o f the debate in Nigeria, during that period, 
about the wisdom of allowing young and impressionable Nigerians to study for a first 
degree overseas, when it reported as follows:
“The Federal Government will no longer fund or approve foreign exchange 
for Nigerians who wish to pursue undergraduate studies overseas ...
The order came after an inter-ministerial committee set up by the 
government to review the curricula o f the universities approved that the ... 
programmes run by Nigerian universities satisfy the need in under-graduate 
education ...
Executive Secretary o f the National Universities Commission (NUC) Malam 
Yahya Aliyu told The Guardian that the ... approved programmes were enough 
and their course content covered all the fields anybody would want to study 
abroad ...”
Another important issue that was a major national concern in Nigeria was the 
northemisation policy466 of most o f the states in the northern part of the federation 
(see, for instance, The Guardian, 16/05/06, Editorial titled: “The Yobe state law on 
private schools).
465 Also read interviewee G.G. Darah on pp. 151-152 under the heading: “The press and the military in 
the absence o f formal political activities”.
466 When Nigeria attained political independence, there was the fear that the north was not ready, 
particularly in the area o f education. Northemisation policy was put in place by the northern regional 
government to protect the interests o f people o f the northern region who were not as qualified as their 
counterparts from the southern part o f Nigeria
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This issue again attracted national attention on 5/6/87 when the Vanguard, in a very 
bold front page headline stated:
“Jaji students flay Kano g o v t... over its ‘unhealthy’ employment policy”.
The government of Kano, one o f the Northern states, had in place a policy whereby 
Nigerians who were not from Kano were offered employment on a contract basis. 
When a group of the Nigerian Armed Forces personnel, studying at the Command and 
Staff College in the city of Jaji, near Kano, found that this was the case after an 
extensive study tour, they condemned it and called for it to be scrapped. This was the 
angle from which the Vanguard saw it and reported accordingly.
But two of the Interviewees, Haruna and Momoh, have also noted that most of the 
Nigerian newspapers exhibit a basic characteristic which is that, apart from reporting 
these national stories, most of which, are based on what government officials have 
said or done, such officials are never asked any questions to throw more light on very 
pertinent national issues.467
A sample of some that were published throughout the period under study, starting first 
with the privately-owned newspapers, is:
“Akinyemi’s charge to new envoys”, ( Vanguard, 2/6/87), where the newspaper 
reported thus:
“The External Affairs Minister, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, yesterday in Lagos 
called on Nigeria’s Ambassadors to promote actively the country’s economic 
interests as well as its political, social and cultural interests . . .”
It was also typical of the federal government-owned newspapers to publish stories 
whose sources were government officials, as seen in one front page headline story:
“Economic survival: Fifth plan is the nation’s last chance”, which was attributed to
467 Read Interviewees: T. Momoh on pp. 188-189; O. Farouk Ibrahim and M. Haruna on p. 190 under 
the heading: “Misleading the reader: Bias, prejudices and editorial as fact”; also see Macebuh, 2001: 1 
& 2).
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Nigeria’s Minister o f Petroleum and Energy, Professor Tam David-West by the New 
Nigerian in its edition of 3/6/85 read as follows:
“The fifth National Development Plan is expected to be Nigeria’s last chance of 
transforming its economy to provide the last hope of the Blackman in a world of 
changing technology and cut-throat competition. The Minister of Petroleum and 
Energy, Professor Tam David-West, made this assertion in Port-Harcourt, while 
addressing ...staff of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) at a 
seminar ...”
Given the almost apocalyptic headline, no further points are made about the wastage 
of the country’s oil wealth hitherto. Nevertheless, the important point raised by 
Interviewees Haruna and Momoh above is that, most of the time; the newspapers do 
not ask these officials any critical questions. A typical case in point is the following 
story which appeared as the front page lead of the federal government-owned New 
Nigerian on 3/6/87 titled:
“ 105,752 died in road accidents in 15 years - Alhaji Abubakar”.
The story merely focussed on what the Nigerian Minister of Works and Housing, 
Alhaji Abubakar Umar, told journalists during a press conference in Lagos, to brief 
them about the activities o f his Ministry. Some passages from the story read as 
follows:
“A total of 105,752 persons died in this country in 469,178 reported cases of road 
accidents in the last 15 years, the Minister of Works and Housing, Alhaji 
Abubakar Umar, has disclosed. Ho also said 360,714 persons were injured. The 
Minister ... said that statistics available on road accidents within that period 
showed that in every four motor accidents, there was at least one death and in 
every recorded accident, there must be one injured person ... He said that 1976 
had the highest accident cases with 40,881, followed by 1982 with 37,094, while 
1971 had the lowest record of 17,584 cases.
Even then, the privately-owned newspapers do not fair any better, as the front page 
story of the National Concord edition of 15/6/85, quoted below shows.
“Gov wants civil service bodies amended”,
The newspaper reported that:
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“A military governor has advocated the restructuring of the civil service 
commission at both Federal and state levels in the country. Under the proposed 
exercise, emphasis should be placed on giving reward for merits. This was the 
suggestion of the Plateau state Governor, Navy Captain Samuel Atukum, Jos 
yesterday, while addressing a nine-man study group on the re-organisation of the 
Federal civil service. [He] said that the nation’s search for a resilient and result- 
oriented civil service would not stop until something positive was achieved ...”
The important point to stress here is that what is common to all these stories is their 
focus on mainly national issues. This comes through in the slant that these newspapers 
give to most of the stories that they run. Some of the other stories, whose contents 
were national that the newspapers published, during this period were:
Firstly in privately-owned newspapers:
“Police blamed for prison congestion”, Vanguard, 15/6/85;
“Industrialists advise leaders on national issues”, The Guardian, 4/6/85;
“Nigerians favour 2-party system”, National Concord, 28/6/87;
“Govt, civil servants to meet over purge order”, The Guardian, 14/6/87;
“66 executed in Nigeria - Amnesty”, National Concord, 6/6/85 (back page);
“21 draft laws before AFRC [Armed Forces Ruling Council] for approval”, The 
Guardian, 6/6/81.
And secondly, in federal government-owned newspapers:
“EPI468 children immunised in 17 states, New Nigerian, 7/6/85;
“Review pension tax - Directors urge govt”, Daily Times, 1/6/85;
468 Extended Programme on Immunisation (EPI), a national health initiative.
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“Enhance Nigeria’s image abroad - Tony Momoh [Nigeria’s Information Minister] 
appeals”, New Nigerian, 4/6/87;
“Can’t we brew indigenous beer?”, Daily Times, 3/6/85;
“Kalu [Nigeria’s Minister o f National Planning] wants indigenisation law reviewed”, 
Daily Times, 4/6/87.
8.3b “Senior Police Officer on suspension” and “Questions over payment to 
foreign creditors”: Government and its institutions are subjects of press scrutiny
A major difference between the privately-owned newspapers and the government- 
owned newspapers in Nigeria is in the manner that they each conduct their activities. 
So, even though they both implement a similar editorial policy that focuses on 
national issues, they still differ in the way that they present the news. This is why, for 
instance, while the stories in government-owned newspapers, in most cases, are based 
on what government functionaries are doing or saying with no critical questions 
asked,469 there is some evidence to show that the privately-owned newspapers do 
conduct some investigative journalism and publish stories that are attributed to 
independent sources, whether or not such would be damaging to the government. For 
instance:
“For alleged link with cocaine suspect - Senior Police Officer on Suspension”
The National Concord made this its front page lead on 4/6/85, and it could only be 
found in privately-owned newspapers as government-owned newspapers, which have 
to toe the official line, could hardly venture to publish issues that the government 
would want to keep away from the public. But the National Concord could afford to 
run the story thus:
“A very senior police officer at the Police Force Headquarters, Lagos was 
suspended from duty last Friday, reliable sources hinted in Lagos yesterday” 
adding that “the sources said that the top police officers’s suspension had 
something to do with his ‘personal relationship’ with one of the four suspects 
now being held by the police over illegal possession of cocaine.”
469 See Interviewees: T. Momoh, O. Farouk Ibrahim, and M. Haruna on pp 188-190.
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In the same vein, the privately-owned newspaper, The Guardian can expose the 
Nigerian government’s ineptitude by running a story to the effect that Nigeria was 
going to lose N1 billion on goods shipping following lack of scrutiny by the 
government. The thrust of The Guardian story was that, through its investigation, it 
discovered that as much as N1 billion losses will be suffered by Nigeria under a series 
of trade agreements that Nigeria had concluded with other countries. In explaining 
how it reached this conclusion, The Guardian, said:
“Trade pacts with 30 nations - Nigeria may lose N ib  on goods shipping”.
“Under normal circumstances, the agreements would have obeyed the national 
and international policy on shipping, which compels any country selling 
anything to this country, to transport at least 40 percent of it here aboard the 
Nigerian National Shipping Line (NNSL) . . .”
The newspaper added that:
“The policy initiated by the United Nations Committee on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) and ratified by Nigeria in 1975, is aimed at 
redressing the imbalance in the maritime trade, which was overwhelming[ly] 
against developing countries . . .”
The newspaper went into detail to highlight the fact that, through acts of omission by 
the relevant Nigerian government department and officials, this was not done.
Also through a detailed investigation, The Guardian on 14/6/87 reported some lapses 
that it had found in the way that the Nigerian government managed its foreign 
exchange earnings, in the front page lead story titled:
“Questions over payment to foreign creditors”
The issue that the newspaper raised in the report was that the Nigerian government 
was paying 50 per cent of its foreign exchange earnings to foreign creditors instead of 
“the target of 30 percent of total foreign exchange earnings” it had planned for in its 
1987 budget. The reason for this, according to what The Guardian said it was told by 
“financial experts”, was because the Nigerian government made a deal with foreign 
creditors which was not to its advantage.
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What has been sought to document in this chapter is how the Nigerian press generally 
behaves under an administration led by the Nigerian military. Using the events in June 
1985 and June 1987 as case studies, it is quite evident that the Nigerian press are 
nationally focussed. What the examination in this chapter has therefore established is 
that the newspapers are able to do this because they operate within the centralised 
nature of a military administration. But this chapter also shows that it is only 
privately-owned newspapers that are able to conduct investigative journalism. The 
important point here is that military centralisation more strongly inhibits government- 
owned newspapers publishing stories against government -  but rather offers a diet of 
puffs and non-critical items that do not address the real problems and concerns of the 
nation or its people. In the next chapter, the focus will be on how the press behaves 
when dealing with specific issues o f national relevance.
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CHAPTER NINE
Analysis of the activities of the Nigerian press under a 
military administration: Coverage of a specific issue -
the 1989 SAP riots
The main aim in this chapter is to focus on how privately-owned and government- 
owned newspapers dealt with a specific issue in Nigeria, during the period covered by 
this research. One of the points made in the previous chapter was that Nigerian 
newspapers, government or private, often have a national focus during a military 
administration, especially because o f the centralised nature o f military government, as 
earlier discussed. But it was also noted that both government-owned and privately- 
owned newspapers differ in the way that they approach such national issues, 
particularly when they are contentious. The riots were one such issue that trailed the 
introduction by the Nigerian military of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), 
to redress the parlous Nigerian economy in 1989.
9.1 June 1989: The anti-SAP riots engulf the Nigerian nation
In respect of how the newspapers reported the SAP riots that engulfed Nigeria in June 
1989, the government-owned newspapers (state and federal) took a different angle to 
reporting the crisis compared to the privately-owned newspapers. The government 
newspapers mainly took the editorial slant to publish the sort of stories that would 
favour the government and also explain the government’s position or the action that 
the government was taking on the issue. Jeter et al (1996: 31) note that African 
journalists working in particularly government-owned newspapers tend to adopt a 
careerist470 rather than a professional approach to news and consequently ensure their 
job security. In effect they are often very uncritical of government when reporting 
about issues that could be detrimental to the government.
The privately-owned newspapers, on the other hand, adopted the editorial policy of
470 Journalists in privately-owned newspapers also adopt careerist attitudes in some respects because of 
the limitations o f ownership control o f newspapers, whether private’s or government’s. Read the views 
of Haruna, 1987; also read the views o f fieldwork interviewees on p. 152 under the heading: “The 
impact of ownership on the press”.
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giving a wider and more multi-faceted coverage of the crisis. In other words, although 
their major pre-occupation during this period was to report what was actually 
happening, which was that the Nigerian public was anti-SAP and therefore engaged in 
what became very violent demonstrations against the policy and the military 
government that introduced it, they also reported what the government said about the 
SAP controversy (Jeter, et al, 1996: 27-32).
Therefore, to reflect these two different editorial approaches employed by the 
newspapers during this period, their activities are examined according to particular 
editorial slants on:
(a) The outbreak of the riots;
(b) The statement made by the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC);
(c) The official position of the government,
9.1a “Lagos burns” and “No cause for alarm”: Private and Government 
newspapers give a different spin to same crisis
When the Nigerian state was enmeshed in anti-SAP protests during the first week of 
June 1989, the differences in the way that privately-owned newspapers and 
government-owned newspapers report crisis against government policy, were 
particularly apparent. While the former concentrated on describing what occurred 
during the crisis, the latter chose not only to denounce the protesters but also followed 
the path of simply reporting to show that the situation was under control. For instance, 
read how the newspapers reported the crisis on the first day of June 1989.
The privately-owned newspapers ran front page headlines such as:
“Lagos bums ... As anti-SAP riots spread”, National C o n c o r d 1/6/89; 
“Demonstrators, police in fierce battle as protests spread to Lagos”, Vanguard, 1/6/89 
and;
“Dark Wednesday: Lagos writhes in chaos as protests spread”
• Four persons feared dead
• Public buildings burnt
• Telephone booths vandalised", The Guardian, 1/6/89.
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But while reporting the same incident on the same day, the government-owned 
newspapers splashed front page headlines like:
“Situation returns to normal ... No cause for alarm - Rasaki [Military Governor of 
Lagos state]”, Daily Times, 1/6/89 and;
“Hooligans exploit students’ demonstration”, New Nigerian, 1/6/89.
Some passages from one newspaper each from the two categories of newspaper 
ownership in Nigeria make the point clearer. Part o f The Guardian story titled “Dark 
Wednesday: Lagos writhes in pain as protests spread” read thus:
THUGS, urchins and idle hands held sway on Lagos streets yesterday as 
Nigeria’s capital city joined the roll o f university towns scorched by students' 
protests against government's economic policies.
A profile o f the riot, which began at about 6 a.m., showed that:
• no fewer than four persons died during clashes between security men and 
the mob;
• public buildings were partially burnt. Those affected included the Lagos 
State Development and Property Corporation's (LSDPC) head offices ... 
the Inland Revenue office ... and police stations in Ilasamaja, Ipaja and 
Oshodi;
• detainees freed from police cells;
• telephone booths were vandalised; and
• private and commercial vehicles, some owned by the Lagos State 
Government, were damaged.
By contrast, the government-owned Daily Times’ story, “Situation returns to normal 
... No cause for alarm - Rasaki”, reads as follows:
"THE situation in Lagos has been brought back to normal and there is no 
cause for alarm, Governor Raji Rasaki o f Lagos State has assured.
Reacting to the spate of mob actions in Lagos yesterday culminating in 
the destruction o f property in some parts of Lagos, the Governor said the 
security agents have brought the situation under control.
He commended the security agents for their restraint and discipline in 
handling the situation ...
The governor then assured all peace-loving people of Lagos State that 
there is no [need to] fear again as the situation has been brought under control 
and efforts is being intensified to completely rout those who seem bent in [sic] 
creating chaos in the state ..."
9.1b “NLC supports crisis” versus “NLC condemns looting”: The newspapers
276
make a stand on the statement made by the NLC
Another difference that becomes clear in the editorial directions during the SAP crisis 
was the slant that both the privately-owned and government-owned newspapers gave 
to the statement of the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) on the crisis. The main 
issues raised in the statement made on behalf o f the NLC, by its President, Mr Paschal 
Bafyau, were:
• That the Nigerian government should see the crisis in “its real social context” 
which is the “deep-rooted economic and social crisis which most Nigerians, 
especially the working people, the urban and rural poor are currently 
undergoing”;
• That even though the NLC did not support the destruction and looting of 
public and private property, the government should show restraint; 
government officials should stop extolling the benefits of government’s 
economic policies because their utterances ridiculed the “concrete hardship in 
which most Nigerians are currently engulfed” (see The Guardian story on the 
NLC on 2/6/89, back page).
To the privately-owned newspapers therefore, the statement meant:
“NLC gives support”, Vanguard, 2/6/89, front page lead;
“A natural reaction, Says NLC”, Daily Champion, 2/6/89, front page;
“NLC calls for restraint in govt’s handling of riots”, The Guardian, 2/6/89, back page.
However, the angle from which the government-owned newspapers reported the 
NLC’s statement was different. They were not only interested in following the official 
line but also ensured that its reports tended towards ensuring a possible diffusion of 
the tension rather than aggravate it.
The New Nigerian, on 2/6/89, led on its front page with the story:
“NLC CONDEMNS LOOTING, DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY”, and reported
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that:
THE Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) has condemned the destruction and 
looting of public and private property in Lagos last Wednesday.
The NLC President, Mr Paschal Bafyau in a statement in Lagos yesterday 
urged workers and their trade unions to exercise restraint over the current 
economic situation in the country.
He said that workers must exercise restraint 'in order to allow for a 
collective and responsible approach towards the present crisis'.
On the same day, the Daily Times made the story one of the two lead stories on its 
front page under the title: “Watch your words! NLC warns public servants”.
PUBLIC functionaries should desist from making pronouncements which 
tend to ridicule the hardship Nigerians are going through, the Nigeria Labour 
Congress (NLC) said in Lagos yesterday.
In a statement issued and signed by the NLC president, Mr Paschal Bafyau, 
the congress expressed concern over the reaction of Nigerian students to the 
deep-rooted economic and social crises, which most Nigerians, especially 
workers, the urban and rural poor are presently facing.
9.1c Reporting what the military authority said
Perhaps the best evidence that the privately-owned newspapers offered wider 
coverage of the crisis was in the way they reported the government’s pronouncements 
on the crisis. For instance, on 1/6/89, The Guardian and Vanguard still respectively 
found space on their front pages to report what the Lagos state of Nigeria government 
said as the crisis raged, under the headlines:
“Governor [Raji Rasaki, military governor of Lagos state] says situation is under 
control”; and,
“LASG [Lagos state government] issues statement on the protest”.
It was also in the same manner that the privately-owned newspapers treated what was 
said by the Nigerian President, General Ibrahim Babangida, during the crisis. This is
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seen in the headlines on the front pages of the privately-owned newspapers on 3/6/89:
“Babangida now speaks on riot - Every Nigerian has the right to make himself heard, 
he says”, Vanguard;
“President concedes students’ right to speak”, The Guardian;
“Babangida speaks on riots”, National Concord.
Again on 6/6/89, a day after the Nigerian President, Ibrahim Babangida (IBB) 
inaugurated the Nigerian Armed Forces Consultative Council (AFCA) - a 
communication channel between the Nigerian Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) 
and the military, the privately-owned newspapers made sure what the Nigerian leader 
said on that occasion was given coverage. Their front page headlines on that day read:
“Riots meant to ruin the nation, says Babangida; Detractors plan to humiliate military 
out of power; SAP, a smokescreen for the riot, will continue; Businessmen, politicians 
and commission agents blamed”, The Guardian;
“No going back on SAP - IBB”, Daily Champion',
“We are targets of public assault - IBB ... President tells o f growing animosity against
military men”, Vanguard',
“No alternative to SAP - IBB”, National Concord.
What has been covered in this chapter is how the Nigerian press covers an important
national issue, this time the riots that engulfed the Nigerian nation in 1989. Even 
though the event occurred during a military administration, when in most cases (as 
discussed earlier) the press is nationally focussed; there were major differences 
between the privately-owned and government-owned presses. While for instance, 
government-owned newspapers report the government*s side of events, to favour and 
protect the government, the privately-owned newspapers adopt a more balanced 
editorial policy by reporting stories that are not only critical of government but also
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the government's side.
What has therefore been established is that when a sensitive national issue 
degenerates into a crisis, the government-owned newspapers clearly behave 
differently. The issue is that the control factor comes into effect as the government 
uses its own newspapers to support and protect its own position. However, the 
privately-owned newspapers are critical of government’s position and adopt an 
editorial stance that is pluralistic.
While this chapter has examined the coverage of a clearly domestic agenda, the 
following chapter looks at subjects that place Nigeria in international contexts, and in 
which the press, whatever its ownership, may be seen to have a more closely aligned 
position. The contrast between the two chapters is therefore in sharp relief: division 
and unity.
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CHAPTER TEN
The Nigerian Press and Collective National Identity: 
‘Flagging’ of the Nigerian nation - World Cup 
Triumph and hosting of the OAU Summit in 1991
In Chapters Six, Seven, Eight and Nine, it has been shown that, under different 
circumstances within the context o f the Nigerian nation, the press (whether 
government or private), conduct and adjust their activities to reflect the particular 
issues that they are dealing with. And what is obvious from it all is that the type of 
administration and contentious issues are the major determinants of the kind of 
control that they are subjected to and therefore their editorial direction regarding 
various issues. In effect, on the evidence from the examination so far, it is safe to state 
that the Nigerian press adopts different editorial policies to deal with the various 
contentious issues which are the natural consequences o f a multi-ethnic and multi­
lingual society like Nigeria’s.
Consequently, they are hardly united on anything, irrespective o f the type of 
administration (military or civilian), in place. This tends to give the impression that 
the press is incapable o f promoting a sense of collective Nigerian national identity 
amongst Nigeria’s nationality groups let alone play any integrative role within the 
Nigerian state.
However, in this chapter, the focus is on those issues that tend to bring the press 
together and which in the process, enable them to ‘flag’ the Nigerian nation and 
consequently promote a sense of collective Nigerian national identity. The activities 
of the press in relation to two issues that are examined are:
• The press’ coverage of Nigeria’s triumph at the 1985 Under-17s world cup 
football tournament in Beijing, China, organised by FIFA; and,
Nigeria’s hosting of the 27th Summit o f the OAU, in the Nigerian capital city of Abuja
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in 1991.
10.1 Nigeria win Under-17 World Soccer Tournament
The Nigerian press’ reaction to the Nigerian team winning the 1985 FIFA Under-17 
World Cup tournament, held in Beijing, is aptly captured in the way that they covered 
that milestone in Nigeria’s soccer history during the week starting on Sunday 
11/08/85 to Saturday 17/08/85. The feel good factor and the general celebrations that 
followed Nigeria’s triumph at the tournament were phenomenal and unprecedented in 
Nigeria. Arguably, this was mainly due to the way that the Nigerian media in general 
and the Nigerian press in particular, covered the event. Starting from the day that the 
final was played till the day that the victorious Nigerian Under-17 national team (also 
known as Baby Eagles or Eaglets) returned to Nigeria, it was the Nigerian team’s 
escapades at the tournament that dominated the front and back pages of the Nigerian 
press.
It was not possible to get each of the newspapers used for this study in order to learn 
how they individually covered the event. Nevertheless, the way that four of the 
newspapers which were readily available for documentation, namely, The Guardian 
and National Concord (privately-owned) and Nigerian Observer and Nigerian 
Statesman (government-owned), treated the issue in mid-August, 1985, is argued to 
be broadly representative. They all celebrated and flagged the Nigerian nation, 
thereby arousing, irrespective of ethnic, cultural and social backgrounds, a collective 
sense of Nigerian national identity.
To ascertain how this was achieved, two “categories of newspaper materials” 
(Soderlund et al 1980: 317) were examined: the front page and the editorials. While 
the front pages clearly show the papers’ priorities, the purpose was to take further 
how the newspapers, in their editorial comments, interpreted the World Cup triumph 
and what it meant to Nigeria. The examination was under the following themes:
(1) The press’ coverage o f the final day o f the tournament;
(2) The press’ coverage after the Nigerian Under-17 national team defeated West
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Germany to win the World Cup; and,
(3) Editorial comments following World Cup victory.
Experts on the Nigerian press have noted the unity of purpose that the press exhibits 
when it covers issues or events that involve Nigeria (Read interviewees on pp.203- 
206; also see Dare, 1997: 543-4).471 They identify with the Nigerian nation, mobilise 
the populace and give support to the government of the day. They use specific events 
(Billig, 1995: Chapter 1), such as the World Cup triumph, to flag the Nigerian nation. 
The most effective way that they do this is through rhetoric and the manner in which 
they cast the story headlines (van Dijk: 1991: 50-1). This was clearly evident in their 
coverage of Nigeria’s Under-17 football team ’s triumph at the FIFA World Cup.
10.1a Selling Nigeria to Nigerians - It’s ‘us’ against ‘them’: “Nigeria versus West 
Germany” and “Nigeria to conquer the world”
It’s the little words - ‘we’, ‘this’ and ‘here’ - which the press employs to address and 
present news to their readers as members o f the nation that matters (Billig, M., 1995: 
11 & 94). This fires up ‘banal nationalism’ in the citizenry, but crucially promotes a 
sense of collective national identity. These were the characteristics that the Nigerian 
press exhibited on the 11th August 1985 when the final match of the tournament was 
played in Beijing (sometimes Peking in the Nigerian press). All the press were united 
in using the tournament to flag the Nigerian nation at every opportunity. In reporting 
the event, they portrayed it as being between ‘us’ (the Nigerian Baby Eagles) and 
‘them’ (the West Germans). Some o f the headlines on that day read:
“World Cup Final Day: Nigeria makes soccer history ... Baby Eagles versus 
W. Germany in Peking” (.National Concord).
In the story, the newspaper acknowledged that, even though:
“ ... West Germany is a country to reckon with in the world of football” 
[However, in this world cup final], “ ... the Germans will meet their Waterloo 
against the Baby Eagles” (.National Concord, 11/8/85, p. 15).
On that same day, under the caption: “Nigeria set to conquer the world” The
471 Read particularly the views o f Interviewees: H. Odukomaiya; T. Momoh, and Al-Bashir.
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Guardian, let it be known that there was no doubt that:
“The Germans have a reputation for getting their timing right ... [as] they get 
the results when it matters ... [yet] that reputation will however be debunked 
[as] the Eagles stretch their wings to the limits and fly before the Germans 
shoot” {The Guardian, lead, 11/8/85, back page).
And to The Nigerian Observer, under the caption: “World cup Finale: Give it to 
Eaglets”, it is a day that:
“Nigeria’s ... Baby Eagles will ... lock horns with their West Germany 
counterparts in the finals o f the Kodak-sponsored World Cup tournament in 
Peking China” {Sunday Observer, 11/8/85, p. 15).
As all the headlines on that final day o f the tournament suggest, the intention of the 
newspapers was to portray Nigeria as positively as possible to the public, make them 
feel Nigerian and whip up in them a sense of national pride and joy. This was clearly 
the angle from which The Guardian reported the event under the same headline for 
that day, as is evident in some passages from the story:
“Nigeria set to conquer the world”
Today is different. For the first time in the history o f a World soccer 
tournament, put together by the Federation of International Football 
Association (FIFA) ... Nigeria’s green-white-green flag will wave proudly 
against the Chinese skies in a rare showing in the nation’s short football 
history.
Who should not be overjoyed at the feat o f the young lads now dubbed 
Baby Eagles? Who will not marvel at their glowing display in this maiden 
FIFA Under-17 World Cup?
Expectations are high and Nigerians at home are gearing up for that moment 
when (the Nigerian team) ... will lift up the glittering trophy amidst the 
brilliant flash and glare o f television cameras {The Guardian, lead, 11/8/85, 
back page).
The Nigerian Statesman also noted in its own story titled: “D-day for Baby Eagles” 
the joy and pride that the Baby Eagles have brought Nigerians through their exploits 
at the tournament, and added that the final match to be played between Nigeria and 
West Germany was the last hurdle they will clear
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. on their way to making history - to put Nigeria on the world soccer map”, 
{Sunday Statesman, lead, 1/8/85, p .l).
10.1b A celebration of Nigeria: “A day of Glory: Nigeria conquers the world”; 
“World bows to Nigeria”; and, “Nigeria wins world cup”
In the Nigerian press, the term ‘Nigeria’ in this circumstance was elevated to the 
forefront of all the news items that they featured on their pages, while reporting the 
victory of the Nigerian team over their West German counterparts. Further, it was a 
celebration of Nigeria and anything Nigerian. This was particularly noticeable in the 
first paragraph of the report about the Nigerian team’s triumph at the final by virtually 
all the newspapers. For instance, The Guardian, on that day, screamed on its front 
page:
“A Day of Glory: Nigeria goes to the East and conquers the World”
NIGERIA’S soccer ambassadors, the U-17 Eagles, yesterday ended their 
historic and glorious campaign for world honours in flourish, defeating West 
Germany 2-0 in the maiden finals o f the FIFA U-17 World Cup decided at the 
Workers Stadium in Beijing, China {The Guardian, lead, 12/08/85, p.l).
The National Concord on its part, splashed across its front page the headline:
“SOCCER WORLD BOWS TO NIGERIA: Baby Eagles beat Germany 2-0”
NIGERIA made history yesterday in china by snatching the inaugural Under- 
17 World Youth Soccer Championship at the hand of an unbelieving West 
Germany {National Concord, lead, 12/08/85, p.l).
As for The Nigerian Observer, the front page lead was:
“NIGERIA MAKES SOCCER HISTORY ... wins world cup”
NIGERIA has won the U-17 World Cup football competition.
The Nigerian team otherwise called ‘Baby Eagles’ defeated their West 
Germany counterparts by 2-0 in the finals played yesterday in Peking, China 
{The Nigerian Observer, lead, 2/08/85, p .l).
The way that the newspapers reported the events after the victory, leading to the
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triumphant entry of the team into Nigeria with the World Cup trophy, also showed 
how the newspapers used the occasion to foster a Nigerian national identity by 
referring to the players, also referred to as ‘World Golden Eaglets’, as “Nigerian 
soccer heroes”. A state government-owned newspaper, the Nigerian Statesman, 
captured the character exhibited by the press on this occasion with its front page story 
on Wednesday, 14/08/85. Captioned: “Nigerians await Baby Eagles today”, the 
newspaper reported:
“The general mood in the country after last Sunday’s unprecedented 
spectacular World Cup victory by an African side, the Baby Eagles, in China 
can best be described as triumphant and festive.
Nigerians have been basking in the glory and pride brought about by the 
Baby Eagles who are now the best under-17 soccer lads in the world ...
What Nigerians are eagerly looking forward to is the arrival of the new 
football kings . . .”
In line with ‘the general mood in the country’, on the day that they were scheduled to 
return to Nigeria, all the other newspapers ran such stories as:
“Beautiful Babies, welcome”
“A clever child is the delight o f his father. Nigeria, proud of her little children, 
is going out in all her grandeur today to receive the under-17 Eagles ... (The 
Guardian, lead, 14/08/85, p .l).
The only story that the National Concord published on its front page that day, was 
captioned: “ALL HAIL BABY EAGLES”, and the first paragraph read:
“A unique reception awaits Nigeria’s newly-crowned world, youths soccer 
champions, Baby Eagles, when they return home today from their epoch- 
making campaign, in China”.
And when the team finally arrived in Lagos, Nigeria, the press used it as an occasion 
to celebrate Nigeria’s ‘soccer heroes’, as all the front page headlines published amply 
show:
“Bounteous rewards for soccer heroes” (The Guardian, lead, 15/08/85, p.l).
“HEROES WELCOME” (The Nigerian Observer, lead, 15/08/85, p.l).
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“Millions cheer in Baby Eagles ... Lagos in carnival mood as heroes ride in triumph 
through major roads” {Nigerian Statesman, lead, 15/08/85, p.l).
“HEROIC WELCOME FOR CHAMPIONS ... Renamed ‘World Golden Eaglets’” 
{National Concord, lead, 15/08/85, p .l).
Significantly, the occasion also presented the Nigerian press with the opportunity to 
show that sports can serve as a unifying factor, in a multi-ethnic entity like Nigeria. In 
this endeavour, they became the messenger and the ‘conduit by which’ (Billig, 1995: 
11) to report to the Nigerian public, any statement stressing how sports can be used, to 
instil in Nigerians, a sense of collective national identity. One of the team managers of 
the victorious soccer team, Mr Christian Chukwu, was so overwhelmed by the way 
that Nigerians, irrespective of their ethnic background, responded with one voice to 
celebrate Nigeria that he noted:
“Now I am convinced we are Nigerians” (‘Heroic welcome for champions ... 
Renamed ‘World Golden Eaglets’, National Concord, 15/08/85, pp. 1 & 13).
To complement the sentiments expressed by Mr Chukwu, the then Military Governor 
of Lagos State, Group Captain Gbolahan Mudasiru, stated thus:
“As we rejoiced [sic] at the historic achievement of our soccer heroes, 
Nigerians should seize this golden opportunity to reflect on the tremendous 
impact which sports victory in .the international scene could have on the image 
of a country and the role of sports as a unifying factor” (‘Educate the players 
to the highest level, pleads father’, The Guardian, 15/08/85, pp. 1&2).
For Nigeria’s then Head of State, General Muhammadu Buhari, the ‘Baby Eagles’ 
victory was a testimony to what Nigeria and Nigerians can collectively achieve. 
Addressing the ‘Baby Eagles’, he noted:
“Your collective achievement has amply demonstrated what we can do on 
our own given proper harnessing of our human and material resources.
I would therefore, like to commend your very splendid and exemplary 
performance to all Nigerians . . .” ( ‘Bounteous rewards for soccer heroes’, The 
Guardian, 15/08/85, pp. 1&2).
Indeed, the Nigerian federal military government also recognised the need to use the
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home coming event of the Baby Eagles to promote a sense of collective national 
identity among the jubilant and joyful Nigerian public. It granted its civil servants the 
liberty to miss about three and half hours o f work to enable them to participate in the 
welcoming ceremony for the nation’s soccer heroes. The Nigerian Observer, for 
instance, on 14/08/85, reported the government’s gesture under the title “Reception 
for Baby Eagles” on its front page:
“In order to enable public servants participate in the reception being organised 
for the members o f ...N igeria’s youngest national team, the Baby Eagles, the 
federal military government has directed that work will resume in all 
government offices, including federal parastatals in Lagos area at 12 noon 
today instead o f the normal resumption time of 7.30 am” (Emphasis added).
But when The Nigerian Observer added that “it is therefore vital for the public 
servants to seize the opportunity o f the free working period to express their 
appreciation by joining other Nigerians to welcome the victorious Young Nigerian 
World Soccer Champions” (emphasis added), it showed how on such occasion, the 
Nigerian press can mobilise the Nigerian populace and arouse in them a sense of 
collective national identity.
The sense of national feeling and national pride in the soccer heroes was so high that 
they were even declared the property o f government, as exemplified in The 
Guardian’s front page report o f 17/08/85:
“Golden Eaglets belong to govt, says Omeruah”
“No member of the World Golden Eaglets will be allowed to play for any 
clubside as they are the property o f the Federal Military Government of 
Nigeria”, said Sports Minister, Emeka Omeruah. He was speaking at a dinner 
in honour of the Eaglets on Wednesday at the National Theatre, Iganmu, 
Lagos.
The Minister, who described the victory o f the Eaglets as the greatest gift to 
Nigeria on the occasion of her 25th anniversary, said the Eaglets had brought 
home a shining light which every Nigerian had been experiencing.
10.1c Editorial comment: Press arouses a sense of national feeling, pride and 
identity in Nigerians
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Importantly, the Nigerian press’ interpretation of the success of the Nigerian youth 
soccer team at the World Cup tournament, in terms of their role in the promotion of a 
Nigerian national identity, was also very evident in their editorial comments 
afterwards. Typical was that in The Guardian, published on page 8 of its edition of 
Wednesday, 14/08/85. Most o f the Editorial is quoted below, because it is a clear 
illustration of the way that the Nigerian press uses some momentous occasions to 
arouse a sense of national feeling, pride and identity in Nigerians:
“A magical moment”
“TODAY in Lagos, the shine of the Nigerian sun will be different. The 
streets, already swept clean by our new environmental consciousness, will 
evince a polished dignity. Even if  it rains, the skies will bear no significant 
clouds.
Today, austerity does not exist. There is no unemployment. No crime. No 
harsh decrees. No injustice. For the first time since we danced on [sic] the 
streets on December 31, 1983.472 Nigeria is one.
Today is different, and it is good to be a Nigerian. PROUD is the word. 
We are thrusting our chests out at the world in self-acclamation, for Nigeria 
are world champions, the very first champions of the Kodak-sponsored Under- 
17 world soccer tournament.
At the Murtala Muhammed Airport in Lagos, the heroes will stroll into the 
ecstatic embrace of their government and countrymen. The boys of 
Sebastian Brodericks, Christian Chukwu and Bala Shamaki, who stunned the 
world in China with smooth and confident palm-wine soccer, will meet 
Nigeria worshipping at their feet.
It is an unusual, magical moment, and the boys have earned all the accolades 
they will be presented with. Theirs is a unique achievement for Nigeria and 
for Africa.
Naturally, Nigerians - ever anxious to win - are asking: what next? They 
are even more anxious to know what is being arranged to ensure that this, 
indeed, is remembered as Nigeria’s arrival in the big league ...
To the Baby Eagles, we say: Keep at it. The challenge before you is to 
surpass your own record. But you have shown Nigeria that you have the 
heart to perform as Eagles in fu ll flight. And you know your country best: 
we do nothing in halves. You cannot look back now.
Congratulations.” (Emphasis added).
The highlighted parts show how newspapers can address their readers, in the words of
472 This was the day that the military overthrew the civilian administration that had been in place since 
1979 when Nigeria’s second republic commenced. Nigerians were so over-joyed that the military 
terminated the rancorous and destabilising activities o f the politicians that they danced in the streets.
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Billig (1995: 11 & 94),473 “as members of the nation [and] ... present news that takes 
for granted the existence o f the world o f nations”:
“Today in Lagos, the shine of the Nigerian sun will be different”;
“ ... the heroes will stroll into the ecstatic embrace o f their government and 
countrymen”;
“Theirs is a unique achievement for Nigeria”; and,
“We do nothing in halves”.
Such “rhetoric” is always used with a persuasive intent (van Dijk, 1991: 209). So, The 
Guardian used them as a reminder to Nigerians to not only savour the victory but to 
identify with it, “for Nigeria are world champions, the very first champion of 
the.. .Under-17 world soccer tournament”.
This is banal nationalism and, as emphasised by Billig (1995: 11 & 94), it occurs in a 
situation where, for instance, newspapers employ a routine ‘deixis’474, which is 
continually pointing to Nigeria as the homeland of the reader . . .” It was no surprise 
then that The Guardian told its readers that the success of the Nigerian team has 
created an atmosphere to make Nigerians think and believe that:
“Nigeria is one”;
“It is good to be a Nigerian”; and that the victory signals,
“Nigeria’s arrival in the big league.
But Billig (Ibid), as indicated above, also stresses that it is the “little words”, often 
overlooked, that are “the crucial words of banal nationalism”. The Guardian, for 
instance, let it be known that “‘we’ (Nigerians) are thrusting ‘our’ chests at the world 
...”; “‘we’ (Nigerians), say: Keep at it” ; and “‘we’ (Nigerians), danced on December 
31, 1983 . . .”
473 See p.38-39 above for a fuller discussion o f this.
474 The Chambers Dictionary (1994) defines ‘deixis’as: “The use o f words relating to the time and 
place o f utterance, e.g personal pronouns,demonstrative adverbs, adjectives and pronouns.”
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10.2 The 27th OAU Summit in Abuia
Beyond using the Under-17 FIFA World Cup tournament to ‘flag’ the Nigerian nation 
and promote a sense o f collective Nigerian national identity, the Nigerian press also 
used the hosting of the 27th Summit o f Heads of State and Governments of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1991 to serve the same purpose.
Earlier, we noted that a fundamental characteristic of all Nigerian newspapers, 
whether private or government, is their common editorial policy of showing support 
for the government when dealing with international events or issues involving 
Nigeria. In 1991, the Nigerian military administration, under the leadership of General
tHIbrahim Babangida, hosted the 27 Summit of Heads of States and Governments of 
the OAU in the city of Abuja, the capital. How the newspapers covered this event, 
vis-a-vis the way they celebrated the Nigerian nation, is the subject examined here. 
The hosting of the OAU Summit by Nigeria in the Nigerian capital city of Abuja in 
June 1991 saw all the Nigerian newspapers exhibit a common sense of purpose, which 
was to showcase Nigeria to the Nigerian public and the delegates from other parts of 
the African continent attending the conference... They did this by giving clear support 
and coverage to the President, General Ibrahim Babangida, who, as a result of Nigeria 
hosting the Summit, was elected Chairman of the OAU. How the press ‘flagged’ the 
Nigerian nation during this period will form the basis of this part of this chapter.
10.2a Coverage of the opening ceremony of the OAU Summit
When the 27th summit of the OAU opened on 03/06/91, it was all pomp and pageantry 
and the Nigerian press seized on the occasion to advertise Nigeria. There was little 
variation in their approach. The agenda for the press was to sell Nigeria to the world 
and, on this; they were united in making Nigerians feel a sense of pride and 
belonging.475 Both government-owned and privately-owned newspapers shared this 
sentiment and were reflected in the ‘style’ and ‘rhetoric’ they used to report the news.
The privately-owned National Concord screamed on its front page:
475 See Dare 1997: 543-544; see also pages 203-206 for the views o f the Interviewees on this.
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“Abuja hosts Africa ... as historic summit begins”
The federal government-owned Daily Times followed suit and splashed on its front 
page:
“OAU in historic rebirth today
• Leaders to sign Economic Treaty
• IBB becomes chairman
As for the state government-owned The Observer, the front page headline was: 
“OAU to discuss sit-tight leaders”
These headlines, apart from drawing attention to the fact that Nigeria was hosting the 
OAU, their content also extolled Nigeria as a nation for being the first to attract so 
many heads of State and Governments to attend a Summit, a feat that was 
unprecedented. To underscore this point, the National Concord, for instance, reported 
under its headline, thus:
“NIGERIA’S nascent capital, Abuja, is the proud host today of no fewer than 
35 African leaders as the 27th summit of the OAU takes off.
A near full house is expected at the International Conference Centre, Abuja 
as President Ibrahim Babangida assumes the chairmanship of the continental 
b o d y ...”
This was a
“ ... diplomatic success recorded by Nigeria in bringing a record number of 
African heads of state to an OUA summit.”
The Daily Times, on its part, reported that:
“The Federal Capital Territory has moved from a quiet city to a bubbling 
one of beauty with banners, buntings and flags all over the place.
The imposing International Conference Centre has been retouched and 
further decorated with pieces o f Nigeria's cultural artefacts depicting the 
various civilisations of the kingdoms o f Benin, Oyo and Igbo-Ukwu among
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others ..."
Echoing the same sentiments, The Observer noted:
“... Abuja is enveloped in festive mood; African leaders will also have the 
rare opportunity o f witnessing one of Africa's largest and most ambitious 
experiments in city developm ent..."
10.2b Coverage of the activities of President Babangida
During the Summit, one of the objectives that they also aimed to achieve was using 
the occasion to show the African continent the virtues of the Nigerian nation and its 
leadership. In this endeavour, the press also elevated Babangida’s acronym (IBB), to 
the forefront of news reporting, for instance, in reporting about the Nigerian leader 
assuming the leadership of the OAU:
"IBB elected OAU Chairman", The Statesman, lead, 05/06/91, p .l;
“IBB takes over the chair", National Concord, 04/06/91, p.l 
"Babangida heads OAU", The Observer, lead, 04/06/91, p .l).
Similarly, stating what was said by the Nigerian leader during the Summit, it was 
obvious that the Nigerian leader was being portrayed as pre-eminent in Africa, 
someone setting the agenda for the continent and giving it hope, thereby uplifting the 
continent from its economic and political paralysis. For instance, the following front 
page leads stories:
"IBB sets agenda for Africa", The Observer, 05/06/91;
"IBB hopeful of Africa's future", The Observer, 07/06/91;
"IBB unfolds programme ... as OAU chairman", The Statesman, 06/06/91;
"IBB pledges to uplift Africa", Daily Times, 04/06/91;
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’f
"IBB to bear torch of democracy", Vanguard, 05/06/91;
"Don’t resist democracy-IBB urges African leaders", Daily Champion, 05/06/91;
"IBB releases action plan...A s OAU chairman", National Concord, 05/06/91.
It is perhaps no wonder that, at the end of it all, the Nigerian leader enthused:
"I'M PROUD OF NIGERIANS (emphasis added)", New Nigerian, 07/06/91, front 
page lead, where the newspaper reported the President as saying that:
"... the performance o f the (Nigerian) officials had shed more light on the 
mood of the nation to prove to the world that Nigerians were aware of their 
responsibilities . . .” (emphasis added).
Reflecting this, The Observer reported what the Nigerian President said at the end of 
the Summit, leading with the following headline on its front page:
"IBB hopeful of Africa's future", 07/06/91.
It then noted him as saying that his chairmanship of the OAU "was the beginning of a 
re-awakening, the re-birth of Africa determined to hold its own in the comity of 
nations."
In this chapter, it has been shown that the Nigerian press promotes Nigerian national 
identity through its employment o f special events and occasions involving the 
Nigerian nation, particularly at the international level, to ‘flag’ the nation. And this is 
in spite of the fact that contentious issues within the Nigerian nation create an 
atmosphere that tends to encourage the press to promote nationality and other group 
interests. This is an aspect of the Nigerian press that is mostly emphasised in the 
literature to denounce the press as partisan and therefore incapable of playing an 
integrative role in Nigeria. Nonetheless, the two events discussed here bring into 
sharp relief the way the Nigerian press -  whether private, state or federal -  can signal 
pride in, and reinforce, Nigeria as a united entity. In this sense, it is no longer what
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Billig calls ‘banal’ nationalism, but ‘is also to be understood as a form of life’ (1995: 
60). In these circumstances, Nigeria as an entity is real to Nigerians.
The next chapter offers the conclusions to this study, bringing together the many 
strands brought out in the chapters above.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
Conclusion
The task that I set out to do in this research was an enquiry into two major issues in 
Nigeria, namely:
• How can Nigeria be made out o f the different nationality groups that constitute 
the Nigerian state? Given the nature and character o f the Nigerian state, this 
question has triggered a debate about how to achieve national integration and 
unity.
• How can the different nationalities express their individual identity and at the 
same time have a sense of collective Nigerian national identity?
Having established these issues, the question then was through which institution, in 
the Nigerian nation, can they be actualised? To answer this question, this study chose 
the Nigerian press for two main reasons:
Firstly, because of its historical link with the evolution of the Nigerian state 
(Nnaemeka et al. 1989a);476 and,
Secondly, because the media in general, and the press in particular, can promote 
national identity in the way and manner it ‘flags’ and ‘reinforces’ the nation (Billig 
1995: l l ) 477
What I have tried to do towards the research objective was to undertake a detailed 
analysis of the context of the Nigerian press. The breadth of the issues involved was 
premised on the reasoning that any analysis aimed at evaluating the role that the press 
plays within the Nigerian state must be informed by the nature and character of its 
socio-economic and political contexts. Although there is literature on the role the 
press has played in national integration and unity none has looked at how the press, 
through its activities or content, promoted a collective Nigerian national identity.
476 See also Golding and Elliot, 1979: 21; and the views o f interviewees on pp.126-128 above.
477 See also Fitzgerald 1991: 193-211; Anderson 1991; Brookes 1999.
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To achieve the research objectives, two methodologies, namely: Intensive/In-depth 
Interviews and qualitative content analysis were employed. The interview approach 
was used to gain an insight into the Nigerian press’ background and how it conducts 
its activities. Accordingly, I sampled and interviewed thirteen experts, who are or 
have been involved and responsible for the press’ content, namely practising or retired 
journalists (see chapter four above)...I also undertook a qualitative content analysis of 
particular aspects of the coverage o f the press.to explore how such impact on the 
overall Nigeria’s quest for national integration and unity. In order to do this I 
examined ten days of its coverage in the sixth month of the year beginning from 1983, 
including the first seven days, followed by every seventh day till the end of the month 
(i.e. 1-7, 14th, 21st, and 28th), (see chapter four). To cut down on the amount of 
materials covering the ten-year period o f the study, the same procedure was applied to 
the sixth month of every other year after 1983, that is, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991 and 
1993
This chapter will therefore be analysed in six parts in the following order:
• Summary of the major findings from this research.
• Reflections on the key concepts and ideas used in this study as they relate to 
the Nigerian press.
• Reflections on my methodologies.
• Some suggestions for ways forward for doing research on the Nigerian press 
in the future.
• A coda, to look back and see whether there have been some major changes 
over the past nine and a half years to alter the major findings of this research.
11.1 The Major Findings
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11.1a Summary of findings from the Intensive/In-depth interviews
The interview was used to seek expert opinions on three main issues about the 
Nigerian press namely:
1. Its nature and the context within which it operates.
2. Whether the context has influence on the role it plays within it.
3. Whether through its role, it can promote a collective Nigerian national 
identity.
All the main issues in the literature on the Nigerian press, as they relate to national 
integration and unity, were confirmed by the interviews. Where there is a difference 
however is that, although much of the literature does portray the Nigerian press as 
incapable of contributing to Nigeria’s national integration and unity, the interviews 
show that the press’ role in national integration and unity is performed through, 
firstly, representing the diverse nationalities within the Nigerian state and secondly, 
promoting a collective Nigerian national identity, using some momentous occasions 
involving the state. But what was very useful from the literature for the interview 
analysis is the extent to which the Nigerian press’ national influence and effectiveness 
is linked with the socio-political and economic environment within which it operates. 
So to discuss the substantive issues that emerged from the interviews, the following 
themes are focussed upon:
• The nature and character of the Nigerian press.
• The context of the Nigerian press and the role it plays in its activities.
• The manner in which the Nigerian press promotes a collective Nigerian 
national identity and therefore national integration and unity.
The interviews confirmed that certain activities of the Nigerian press serve as 
obstacles in the way it can fulfil its constitutional role of promoting Nigeria’s national 
integration and unity. One of the enduring verdicts on the Nigerian press’ behaviours 
and activities from the literature is posited by Omu (1978: 248-250), who remarked
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that the Nigerian press provides ‘a remarkable example of overzealousness and 
irresponsible partisanship and recklessness’. From the interviews, the lack of 
professionalism in the Nigerian press has tended to exacerbate the press’ character, as 
Omu has described. This aspect o f the press is recognised by the interviewees as 
subjective and self-imposed but which has nevertheless blighted the press’ functions 
(Read interviewees, pp. 175-178 & 179-183)
But overall, certain patterns and behaviours in the press are identified in the 
interviews to explain its general nature and character. In the literature, mass media 
practitioners and owners are described as using media for their political objectives and 
motivations that detract the press from the objectives of national integration and unity. 
The interviews found that these manifest themselves in the form of (a) the press being 
established to serve selfish political purposes at the expense of national objectives 
(Read interviewees, pp. 175-178); (b) high levels of corruption that lead media 
practitioners to compromise professional standards (Read interviewees, pp. 181-183); 
and, (c) the press being divisive and promoting ethnic cleavages detrimental to 
national cohesion (Read interviewees, pp. 182-183)..
Most notably, when discussing the activities of the press which could negate national 
integration and unity, the literature particularly draws a link with how the press is 
limited by geographical, economic, social and political parochialism. This is what is 
said to generally account for the lack of professionalism in much of the Nigerian press 
institution (Read interviewees, pp. 184-188). The interviews confirmed this and reveal 
that the press is “very biased and prejudiced” because in its activities, it shows double 
standards and panders to ethnic sentiments and loyalties (Read interviewees, pp. 185- 
190).
This view aligns with one of the substantive findings from the interviews, which is 
that there is a relationship between the Nigerian context and the activities and 
behaviours of the Nigerian press. The literature focuses on how the historical 
development of Nigeria and the peculiarities o f the Nigerian context (see Chick 1971; 
Grant 1971) have impacted negatively on the press. Further, the interviews show that 
the lapses in the press are structural, a creature of the post-colonial nature of the 
Nigerian state, which has caused and continues to reinforce such press tendencies
299
(Read interviewees, pp. 157 & 162-168). Indeed, one of the features of a post-colonial 
state is the absence o f clearly defined state roles (Nnaemeka et al. eds. 1989a & b) in 
its institutions, thereby making them susceptible to the propagation of narrow and 
selfish interests. This is confirmed by the interviews and reveals that the Nigerian 
press merely reflects problems that permeate the fabric of the Nigerian state (Read 
interviewees, pp. 172-174).
The literature on the impact of the control factor on the Nigerian press (see Nnaemeka 
et al, 1989a: 111) are also supported by the interviews. Ownership control of the 
Nigerian press, be it government or private; during military or civilian administration, 
is another major determinant of the nature and character o f the press and therefore its 
editorial direction. The interviewees note that the newspapers are tools which their 
owners use to promote sundry selfish interests and therefore the journalists have to toe 
the proprietors’ line, irrespective of the damages that such might cause to issues of 
national integration and unity. Nevertheless, it should also be added that both the 
literature and the interview analysis show that ownership influence on press behaviour 
has diminished in certain respects as some newspapers, notably privately-owned ones, 
are being set up in response to new socio-economic realities (Omu, 1996: 9-12), 
which place the viability and survival of the newspapers above ownership interests or 
control, thereby making them more professional (Read interviewee, p. 179). The 
interview analysis stressed the benefits o f such a development to issues relating to 
national integration and unity (See “The control factor in the Nigerian press”, 191- 
194).
However, what is unique about the findings from the interviews is that it revealed 
what is generally lacking in the literature on the Nigerian press’ role in national 
integration and unity, which is through its role in promoting nationality interests and 
using specific occasions to promote a collective Nigerian national identity. In the 
main, both the literature analysis and the interview analysis acknowledge that the 
Nigerian press has been very much involved and engaged in promoting national 
integration and unity in Nigeria (read interviewees, pp. 158-161). Where they differ, 
however, is the process through which this is achieved. The literature associates 
national integration and unity with the ability to reflect Nigerianness and national 
character in all aspects of Nigerian national institutions. Typically, the press’ role in
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this endeavour is usually analysed against the backdrop of the classical view of 
national identity. In effect, national identity and therefore national integration and 
unity, is attained in a situation where the state is seen as a static and natural 
phenomenon to be reproduced and continued in a particular manner depicted in a 
national character that is historically associated with it (see Brookes 1999)
Not surprisingly, in the Nigerian case, the dominant issues in the literature when 
researching about the Nigerian press’ role in national integration and unity are seen 
from the point of view of what part it has played in the creation and upholding of the 
integrity of the Nigerian state and the maintenance of its national character (see, for 
instance, Momoh 1987; Dare 1985 and Ogunade 1982). And the verdict on the press 
is that because of its historical antecedents, it is very divisive and propagates some 
negative tendencies which are antithetical to national integration and unity (see 
Oyovbaire 2000: 99-112). In that case, any attempt to promote ethnic identity and 
nationality interests is viewed as detrimental to national integration and unity. But the 
interview analysis showed that the press is able to promote national identity and 
therefore national integration and unity by promoting nationality perspectives and 
interests (Read interviewees, pp. 158-161),478 and by ‘flagging’ and mobilising the 
different nationality groups to support the Nigerian state during special events 
involving the state in an international context (Read interviewees, pp.203-207).
This aspect of the Nigerian press’ function is in congruence with the view that 
national identity is not static but simply a process of identifying with the state, and is 
continually in process rather than being a synonym for the expression of a fixed and 
eternal character of the state (Brookes, 1999: 248-9).479 Understood this way, the 
interviews reveal that the press is actually very active in certain circumstances in 
fostering Nigerian integration and unity by promoting a collective Nigerian national 
identity. (Read interviewees, pp. 203-207 under the caption: “Where press reflects 
national outlook and promotes a collective national identity. Specifically, read the 
views of Darah; pp.204 & 205; Odukomaiya, 205 & 206; Momoh, 206 & 207; Al- 
Bashir 206; Amuka-Pemu 205) As noted, one of the criticisms against the Nigerian
478 Also read, specifically, the views o f Interviewees: Dr. G.G. Darah on pp.204 and 205; Mr Sam 
Amuka on pp. 172 & 205; and Chief H. Odukomaiya on pp. 205 & 206.
479 See also Schlesinger, 1991a & b, Hall 1991a & b; Billig, 1995.
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press is that because it promotes sectionalism or nationality interests, it destroys any 
sense of national identity in the different nationality groups within the Nigerian state. 
Yet the main thrust of the interviews is that the press that is sectional and able to 
represent nationality perspectives, can indeed still promote a sense of national identity 
amongst different groups within any socio-political context (Read interviewees, pp. 
162-164 under the caption: “Nigerian press reflects nationality perspectives”; also see 
Fitzgerald, 1991; Schlesinger, 1991a: 191).
This is what has been identified by the interviews as the inevitable path that the 
Nigerian press has to tread in order to promote Nigeria’s stated national objective of 
achieving unity within diversity. For instance, from the interviews, it is known that 
the Nigerian press is able to identify what is national and sectional and acts 
accordingly (Read interviewees, pp. 158-161 and 204-207). And within a 
multicultural context, the interviews confirm this to be one of the ways that the 
Nigerian press contributes to national cohesion. Billig (1995: 60) introduced the term 
‘banal nationalism’ to explain how the “nation is indicated or ‘flagged’, in the lives of 
its citizenry” and how, ultimately, the citizens “possess ways of talking about 
nationhood”. The way the Nigerian press ‘flags’ the Nigerian state when Nigeria is 
involved with another country falls into this category, and the interviews confirm that 
the Nigerian press uses mostly international issues480 to achieve this purpose and in 
the process promotes a collective Nigerian national identity (Read interviewees, 204- 
207).
11.1b Summary of findings from the qualitative analysis of the newspaper 
coverage
The examination of the press coverage was embarked upon in order to assess and 
evaluate what the Nigerian press does in practice vis-a-vis the literature as they relate 
to the press. I focussed on how the newspapers treated issues of fundamental 
importance to the overall national goal of integration and unity of the Nigerian state. 
For the purposes of this study, the subjects examined here concerned elections and 
related socio-political and economic issues.
480 Note in particular, the points made by Interviewees: Chief H. Odukomaiya on p.206; Tony Momoh, 
and Al-Bashir on pp. 206-207.
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Additionally, in order to do this effectively, I was particularly interested in knowing 
what determines the nature of the news or the factors that influence the news that is 
published by the newspapers (see the questions raised in Chapter Four, p.l 14).
With these as my points o f departure, the analysis identified four main characteristics 
common to the Nigerian press and each of them formed the subtitles under which the 
major findings were discussed:
1. Government-owned newspapers promote the interests of the ruling political 
party to the detriment of the opposition during elections and electioneering.
2. Many of the newspapers are non-partisan in their editorial policies when there 
is a military administration in place.
3. Newspapers campaign against any administration that tries to abort the 
democratic will of the people.
4. Newspapers use international issues/events and other non-contentious issues 
within the Nigerian state to promote a sense of collective national identity 
amongst Nigerians.
To analyse these themes as they relate to the activities of the newspapers, the 
‘philosophical contexts of Africa’s mass media’ as enunciated by Jeter et al (1996: 
11), was very helpful. In their study of the evolution of the mass media in Africa, 
Jeter et al concluded that there are four main issues common to them: Firstly, they are 
tools of political parties; secondly, they are used as instruments for legitimizing 
governments; thirdly, they can become instruments for demonstrating the disapproval 
of repressive political systems; and, fourthly, they can play a unifying role because 
African governments emphasise need for integration.
These, as broadly echoed by Ruijter’s (1989: 57-69) submissions on the 
characteristics of govemment-media relations in Africa, were also very useful to this 
study. For instance, based on his analysis, govemment-media relations in Africa are: 
Manipulative, because official sources constitute the news; Collaborative, because 
there is inter-dependency between state and media; Supportive, of the state; and, 
Preventive, because there are stumbling blocks in the media’s attempt to play the
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watchdog role.
11.1c Government-owned newspapers: A tool of ruling political parties
In 1983, when the civilian administration organised the general elections, the way the 
government-owned newspapers reported events during this period supported Jeter et 
al’s first point that they are mainly used as tools to promote the interests o f the ruling 
political parties, whether at the state or federal level. The editors had apparently no 
say in what was published in the newspapers because the government saw 
government newspapers as instruments for the ruling political party to use to promote 
its own interests at the expense of the opposition parties (Read interviewee Agbese, 
pp.153-154).481 This is also confirmed by Ruijter’s (1989) analysis to the effect that, 
in Africa, the mass media are ‘manipulative’ because what constitutes the bulk of the 
news is from government sources or officials. The activities of the press in June 1983 
show how the government manipulated the press to achieve its own ends, to the 
detriment of political opponents.
But how did the privately-owned newspapers fair during the 1983 general elections in 
Nigeria? The only privately-owned newspapers then were the National Concord and 
The Guardian. While Dare (1997: 544) notes that “when a newspaper is owned by a 
politician or political party, it will have to reflect the political preferences of its 
proprietor”,482 though this was true in the case of the first three years of the National 
Concord (1980-1982), when its proprietor (Chief Abiola) was a staunch member of 
the NPN, the ruling political party at the federal level during Nigeria’s second 
republic,483
However, when Abiola resigned his membership of the NPN in 1982, this research 
showed the National Concord, after that year, as an example of a newspaper used as a 
tool of a politically-motivated proprietor. The newspaper changed its editorial outlook 
by publishing: (1) anti-NPN controlled federal government stories, and (2) non­
partisan and other stories based on investigative journalism (see: Chapter six
481 See also Dare 1997: 543.
482 Also see Oyovbaire 2000: 103.
483 See, for instance, Nnaemeka et al, 1989a: 408.
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under”Privately-owned newspapers”, and appendix XV) On the latter point, The 
Guardian behaved the same way as the National Concord. But on the other hand The 
Guardian was different because it had no political loyalty as it was established at the 
time that new economic realities were beginning to evolve in Nigeria, and its 
commitment to those objective factors within the Nigerian environment made it 
relatively independent of political partisanship and associations. (Read interviewees: 
Jose, pp. 179-180; Odukomaiya, p. 161).
However, what is important about the way that the government or private newspapers 
conduct their activities, is that whether it is during the period of elections or when 
there are other significant socio-political developments, the newspapers are faced with 
‘preventive’ measures to block their attempts to play the watchdog role for the 
Nigerian nation. This characteristic of govemment-media relation in Africa, as 
identified by Ruijter (1989), was confirmed by the analysis (Read nterviewees: 
Odukomaiya, pp. 149 & 150; Ibrahim, 149; Darah, 150 & 152; Agbese, 153-154; 
Izeze, 152-153). Through various measures, the government affects the newspapers’ 
inclination to professionalism. Indeed, Jeter et al (1996: 30), note that because 
newspapers depend so much on government’s policy, regarding their instruments of 
trade, they exhibit careerist/job security moves, rather than professional tendencies.
Although the analyis of this period confirmed this to be the case, it could be 
misleading to base the evaluation of the press’ role in Nigeria on that argument, given 
the context within which it operates. It is an almost inevitable consequence of the 
legal and political context that hamstrings the press from being effective -producing a 
sort of vicious circle brought about by a self-serving elite, immature or weak national 
instititutions and divisive ethnic barriers (Read interviewees: Farouk Ibrahim, 139; 
Odukomaiya, 140; Momoh, 140; Muhammadu, 141; Agbese, 147; and interviewees: 
pp. 158-162; 162-163; also see Oyedele, 1994: 516; Ihonvbere, 1989; Nnaemeka et al, 
1989a; Ake, 1978). But in spite of these, this study also confirmed that such 
shortcomings of the press did not hinder its ability to instil in Nigerians a sense of 
collective Nigerian national identity by using international events and other non- 
contentious issues to ‘flag’ and ‘celebrate’ the Nigerian state.
11.Id Newspapers and Military Administration: a platform for national
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focus/policy
What the analysis has also shown is that there is a tendency by the newspapers, 
government or private, to be nationally focussed in their editorial policies when there 
is a military administration in Nigeria (see table four in Chapter Four and appendix 
XVI). Osuntokun (1989) attributes this to the centralised nature of the military 
administration. But on this issue, this study benefited more from Pratt’s (1991: 221- 
232) thoughts and Jeter et al’s (1996) point as they relate to the editorial contents of 
both private and state media in Africa. They both reason that there is a similarity 
between them because the media play a unifying role in accordance with African 
governments’ emphasis on the need for integration. This is always the military’s 
slogan after they seize power from a democratically-elected civilian government, who 
they usually accuse of perpetuating divisive tendencies and threatening the corporate 
existence of Nigeria because of their debilitating struggle for political power (see 
Odetola 1982). The Nigerian press is made to share the military’s promise to unite the 
Nigerian nation (Read interviewees under the title: “The Nigerian press and military 
intervention in Nigerian politics”, pp. 144-149).
The way that the Nigerian newspapers treated all aspects o f the 1993 presidential 
election organised by the military administration, as part o f its political engineering 
programme to usher in Nigeria’s Third Republic, falls into this category. The pre­
occupation of the newspapers was for the election to be successfully concluded, as 
part of the process to build a democratically strong and united Nigerian nation. On 
this score, Ruijter’s characterisation o f the media, as being ‘supportive of the legal 
and underpinnings of the state’, was confirmed.
l l . l e  Nigerian press: defender of democratic will of the people/instrument 
against oppression
In Jeter et al’s (1996), thesis on the philosophical contexts of African mass media, it is 
noted that the newspapers are used “as instruments for demonstrating the disapproval 
of indigenous repressive political systems” (p. 11; also see table 7, Chapter Four). 
Nigerian media experts (Ajuluchukwu, 2000; Macebuh, 2000) also describe the 
Nigerian press as instruments of protest against very repressive military governments
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in Nigeria. These were very useful to me in examining the activities of the Nigerian 
press before, during and after the June 12, 1993 Nigerian presidential election. (See 
how the press reacted against the annulment of the election in Chapter Seven under 
the title: “Reporting the annulment of the June 12 election: ‘Nigerians reject fresh 
elections’ and ‘The Peoples’ will must prevail’, pp. 251-255; also on anti-military 
feelings in the press’). The press’ behaviour during this period was against the 
military administration’s decision to annul the result o f the election, which was 
deemed to have been free and fair and won by the candidate of the SDP, Chief MKO 
Abiola (now late). The press saw the annulment as a repressive measure by the 
military to remain in the mainstream of Nigeria’s political system in perpetuity. Such 
a stance confirms that the press can be very active in protecting the will o f the 
Nigerian people, democratically expressed. This aspect of the Nigerian press’ 
behaviour is also confirmed by the views of the interviewees and the thoughts of 
Nigerian media experts, as noted above. Essentially, many of the interviewees 
maintain that the press acted as the political party in the absence of democratic 
government in Nigeria against the military and therefore defended the interests of the 
groups within the Nigerian nation. Referring to this circumstance, for instance, Darah 
(pp. 151-152 above), recalls:
The press in Nigeria is almost the last institution to hold on. It was so on 
December 31 1983, when General Muhammadu Buhari came, till 1993 when 
General Ibrahim Babangida messed up. There were no political parties. There 
were no non-governmental agencies. All the battles were waged inside 
Newspapers. It was the Military versus the rest o f  Nigeria. When General 
Buhari promulgated his draconian laws, the press was the first victim. 
Journalists like Nduka Irabor and Tunde Thompson, both o f the Guardian 
Newspapers, were the first victims. Did they relent because o f  that? No! The 
press has made life uncomfortable for governments that toyed with the issues 
o f development. The government o f  General Buhari couldn't last. (G.G. 
Darah. Interview in Lagos).
But what also came out clearly from the examination, was how the ownership 
influence was a crucial factor in the way that the Nigerian press reacted to the 
annulment of the election. There is a difference between what the government-owned 
press and the privately-owned press did in this regard. And it is that when a military 
administration takes a stand against the will o f the majority, in an important national
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issue like a democratic election, the government-owned newspapers are accordingly 
manipulated by their owners to tow the official line. The privately-owned newspapers, 
on the other hand, adopt editorial positions which are anti-government. So, while the 
government-owned newspapers were full of stories trying to explain and rationalise 
the government’s position on the issue (see table 3, Chapter Four), the privately- 
owned newspapers gave coverage to anti-government protests that demanded that the 
will of the Nigerian people must be restored (see table 7, Chapter Four).
So, in the main, it was the privately-owned press that galvanised and mobilised the 
populace against the military (Macebuh 2000; Ajuluchukwu 2000: 45) and the fall-out 
is still being felt more than ten years after. And according to Odukomaiya (see p.205 
above), the experiences of the Nigerian press under repressive military regimes are so 
bad that no matter how poor a democratically elected government would be, the press 
will mobilise the people against any attempt by the military to seize power again.
11.I f  Nigerian press and international issues: promoter of collective national 
identity
In examining the activities of the press in this respect, it was found that although
contentious issues within the Nigerian nation pitch the Nigerian press into different
camps, representing groups and other interests, it is very enthusiastic in making a
united stand on international events in the interest of the nation. This is confirmed by
the views of fieldwork interviewees as stated below:
On international issues, the Nigerian media are united. But on domestic 
issues, the Nigerian media can tear the Nigerian nation apart. (Al-Bashir. 
Interview in Kaduna).
When it comes to international issues involving Nigeria and other countries, 
you can trust all sections o f  the press to speak with one voice. (Henry 
Odukomaiya. Interview in Lagos).
National integration is reflected in only one aspect o f  the life o f our nation and 
that is when, for instance, Nigeria has a contest with other countries, like 
international football matches, international boxing, and so on ...(Tony 
Momoh: Interview in Lagos)
It is at the international level that the Nigerian press is able to promote the idea of a
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Nigerian nation and instil in Nigerians a sense of collective national identity (also see 
Dare, 1997: 544). This was the case in 1985 and 1991, when the Nigerian under-17 
team won the world cup in China and when Nigeria hosted the 27th Summit of the 
OAU, respectively. To know how this was done, this study benefited from the ideas 
of Billig (1995: 11, 60 & 94) and Brookes (1999: 261). The Nigerian press used the 
two occasions to ‘flag’ and promote the Nigerian nation. Brookes (1999: 261) has 
stated that, “through the evocation o f images and representations of explicit 
nationalism”, the press “encourages common-sense identification with the nation as 
the dominant form of identity”. The way the press cast the headlines, the prominence 
that they gave to the stories about the two events and the feel good factor about the 
Nigerian nation that was generated afterwards, brought about a sense of collective 
Nigerian national identity. For instance, after Nigeria’s world cup victory at the 
under-17 level, the lead headlines in the newspapers were about Nigeria as in:
"Soccer World Bows to Nigeria" {National Concord: 12 August, 1985); 
"Nigeria Goes to the East and Conquers the World" {The Guardian: 12 
August, 1985); "Nigeria Makes Soccer History ... Wins World Cup" {The 
Nigerian Observer: 12/08/85);
"Eaglets herald Nigeria's World Leadership?" {National Concord: 19/08/85); 
"God is a Nigerian" {National Concord: 5/01/84, p.3).
The fact that the whole nation was so caught up in a celebratory mood overwhelmed
one of the coaching crew of the victorious youths that he enthused:
“Now I am convinced we are Nigerians” (‘Heroic welcome for champions ... 
Renamed ‘World Golden Eaglets’, National Concord, 15/08/85, pp. 1 & 13).
And part of the editorial of The Guardian (Nigerian) newspaper read:
Today is different, and it is good to be a Nigerian. PROUD is the word. We 
are thrusting our chests out at the world in self-acclamation, for Nigeria are 
world champions {The Guardian, 14/08/85, p. 8).
The then military governor of ;Lagos state o f Nigeria (one of the thirty-six states that 
make up the Nigerian federation), Group Captain Gbolahan Mudasiru was also 
convinced about what such achievement meant for the psyche of Nigerians that he 
admonished them to:
“ ...seize this golden opportunity to reflect on the tremendous impact which
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sports victory in the international scene could have on the image o f a country 
and the role of sports as a unifying factor” {The Guardian, 15/08/85, pp. 1&2).
When Nigeria hosted the 27th OAU Summit in Abuja484 in June 1991, Nigeria’s then 
Head of State, General Ibrahim Babangida was impressed with encouraging mood in 
the state helped by the coverage in the press that he stated:
"I'M PROUD OF NIGERIANS”, (adding that)...’’the performance of the 
(Nigerian) officials had shed more light on the mood of the nation to prove to 
the world that Nigerians were aware of their responsibilities ..." (emphasis 
added, New Nigerian, lead, 07/06/91, p.l).
11.2 Reflections on key concepts and ideas on study of Nigerian press
The aim in this section is to reflect on the key concepts and ideas about the study of 
an institution like the press within a post-colonial state as Nigeria and their 
implications for the major findings o f this research. Three main issues that will be 
focussed upon for this purpose relate to the following:
• A partisan and sectional press;
• Military centralisation and its impact on press activities;
• Using Western theories to study and analyse African institutions.
11.2a The partisan and sectional press
The interview analysis showed that this is true of the Nigerian press. This verdict is 
mostly informed by the actions of the press, particularly during Nigeria’s first 
republic (1966-1970), when the press was manipulated by the ownership to promote 
narrow and divisive tendencies. The result was the destructive Nigerian civil war 
(1967-1970). Some of the fieldwork interviewees, for instance, note:
That appeared to have been the last straw that broke the camel's back for the 
Nigerian press, as they no longer had any pretensions o f  unity. It became a
484 Abuja city is the capital o f the federal republic o f Nigeria.
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case o f 'to thy tent Oh! Israel' (Chief Odukomaiya: Fieldwork interview in 
Lagos).
After independence... [the] newspapers saw issues from the point o f view o f  
their owners...as a result o f  ethnicity and the struggle for power by the 
political leaders... They all thought along the line o f  what they will gain 
sectionally, rather than nationally... And so the newspapers took their cues 
from there... (and) promoted narrow and parochial, ethnic and regional self- 
interests. " (Turi Muhammadu, Interview in Kaduna)
Based on that, critics of the press have often argued that it is not the vehicle for 
promoting a sense of national identity and therefore Nigeria’s ultimate objective of 
national integration. For instance, in the words of Farouk Ibrahim:
Overall i f  you ask me to rate the Nigerian Press in terms o f their contribution 
to national integration, I  would say that there is no Nigerian press. I ’d  prefer 
to refer to them as [separate] media houses ... [Thus] I  wouldn’t refer to the 
press here as an institution -  [However,] i f  there is a Nigerian nation, there is 
a Nigerian press. We are building a Nigerian nation; we are trying to build a 
[pan-national] press. (Interview in Kaduna),
This is also one criticism common to most of the literature on the Nigerian press. 
Typical is the argument advanced by Oyovbaire (2000: 99), to the effect that the 
Nigerian press in its agenda, is generally partisan in its target and objective.
However, this perspective generally discounts the impact of the Nigerian context on 
the behaviour of the press. Yet this is a crucial factor if the role that the press plays 
within the Nigerian nation is to be fully understood. But this cannot be done unless we 
are certain about the type of press we want. True, the press is sectional and partisan. 
But can a Nigerian press really avoid such tendencies? Wouldn’t it be more beneficial 
to focus on the different ways through which the press contributes to national 
integration in Nigeria? This research has shown that if one looks at different periods 
in the life of the Nigerian nation, it would be discovered that the press’ role is 
dynamic: it responds to circumstances, as is evidenced by the fact that it behaved 
differently between a military and a civilian administration, and the way it uses 
important occasions to ‘flag’ the Nigerian nation.
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Both the interview and the examination of the press’ activities achieved this objective. 
The interview analysis as already noted showed that the press perform various role 
within the Nigerian state, ranging from being tools in the hands of their respective 
proprietors to flagging the state and fighting for it to remain united and indivisible 
The typical way that the press has done this is mostly captured in the following 
remarks by some of the fieldwork interviewees:
... you have this regional emphasis. But overall you cannot find  a Nigerian 
newspaper that has on its own crusaded for dismemberment o f Nigeria... 
(G.G. Darah. Interview in Lagos),
The country is divided on ethnic, economic and social grounds. But none o f  
these divisions wants a separation. ( Sant Amuka-Pemu. Interview in Lagos).
There is partisanship in the Nigerian press. There is regional partisanship. 
There is ideological partisanship. (G.G. Darah. Interview in Lagos).
Regional attitudes dictate how newspapers behave. These are some o f the 
problems we have in Nigeria. Nigeria is [effectively] more than one country. 
(Mohammed Ibrahim. Interview in Lagos).
You can see the biases [in] ... the Nigerian media ... [but none] has come out 
to propagate the break-up o f Nigeria. (Al-Bashir. Interview in Kaduna).
Many of the interviewees agree that there are certain issues which the Nigerian press 
has often used to reflect a national outlook and therefore mobilise Nigerians and instil 
a sense of Nigerian national identity in them. Chief Odukomaiya’s description of the 
Nigerian press aptly captures this fundamental essence of the character of the 
Nigerian press:
The press has always done that whenever the issues at stake do not pertain to 
any particular ethnic group, whenever the issues involved are not contentious 
and do not border on the interest o f  a particular ethnic group, whenever the 
issues involved do not relate to any particular religion, whenever the issues 
involved do not border on, for instance, gender, the press could rise up and 
speak with one voice ... The press spoke with one voice when we were fighting 
for independence. But once independence was won, o f course everybody went 
his own way. When we fought against the Military, the press spoke with one 
voice... (Henry Odukomaiya. Interview in Lagos).
Evidence from examining the activities of the press also confirms this. In particular, 
while their partisanship is clearly obvious during elections and electioneering (see
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Chapter six), their quest to promote a collective Nigerian national identity is also 
evident in the way they use events involving Nigeria with other countries to flag the 
state (see chapter ten). These analyses are borne out by Jeter et al (1996: 11; Ruijter, 
1989: 57-69)...
So to evaluate the role of the press, there is the need to focus on the specifics so it can 
be obvious how different circumstances dictate what the press does and how these 
impact on the Nigerian national integration project. In other words, the success of the 
press is a function of its ability within Nigeria’s multi-cultural context to promote a 
sense of collective Nigerian national identity and consequently Nigerian national 
integration. The ability of the Nigerian press to perform this task is amply 
demonstrated by the examples of what it did when Nigeria won the under-17 World 
Cup and when Nigeria hosted the OAU Summit in the Nigerian capital city of Abuja 
in 1991 as on both occasions it promoted and ‘flagged’ the Nigerian nation. This 
tendency of the press to use such international issues to instil a sense of national 
identity in Nigerians is also confirmed by one of the major findings from the 
interviews (see pp. 198-200 above).
Given these realities, we can begin to ask whether it matters if  the press that is 
partisan and sectional through promoting nationality perspectives, for instance, lacks 
the ability to promote Nigerian national identity and national integration. The 
interviewees agree that the way to national integration in Nigeria is through 
recognition of nationalities to express themselves within the context of the Nigerian 
state; and see the press as a catalyst in this process. They therefore do not see the 
press representing the interests of particular groups or interests as necessarily partisan, 
sectional or divisive because this is the only way that the nationality perspectives can 
be heard in a multi-cultural set up like Nigeria’s. In an era of multiple identities (Hall, 
1991a & b), the press has been shown to be a ‘homogenizer’ (Fitzgerald, 1991), in a 
context where nationalities are not encumbered in expressing their identities and a 
recognition of that is a prelude to integration (Schlesinger, 1991a & b). In this respect, 
the role of the Nigerian press is not a negative and should be encouraged and 
reinforced.
11.2b Military centralisation and its impact on press activities
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One crucial impact of a military administration on the press is making it nationally 
focussed. We have seen how the military ethos of centralisation has contributed to 
this. For instance, during a civilian administration, the Nigerian press is 
overwhelmingly pre-occupied with carrying out the directives of its owners, 
irrespective of the damage that might do to the socio-political process (see Chapter 
Six). But they do not behave the same way during a military era (See Chapters Seven, 
Eight and Nine). This is not to say that the owners do not influence the newspaper’s 
editorial policies in a military regime. However, while partisanship dictates much of 
what the newspapers (whether state or federal) publish during a civilian 
administration, the centralised nature o f military administration ensures that each of 
the newspapers sees the entire Nigeria as its constituency, first and foremost. The 
press is made to share the military’s promise to unite Nigeria, which the civilian 
political class is unable to do due to the debilitating struggle for political power. This 
was very much the came during Nigeria’s civil war as attested to by Mohammed 
Ibrahim:
"The press supported the government (military government's policy to keep 
Nigeria one) during the civil war years. They ... propagated national unity, 
they propagated reconciliation and restructuring and so forth ... they 
campaigned for a strong central government” (Interview in Kaduna; also see 
Osuntokun, 1989).
But of what relevance was military centralisation, as a concept, to this study’s 
objective? My main interest was in finding out how the press, through its activities, 
ultimately contributes to the national integration of the multi-nationalities that 
constitute the Nigerian state. On this score, military centralisation was not very useful, 
since one of the central themes of this study is how the press contributes to national 
integration through promoting nationality interests. Although the analysis of the 
coverage showed that the Nigerian press is mostly nationally focussed during a 
military regime, it was however very detrimental to the concept of nationality or 
federalism, on which the Nigerian constitution is based because during military 
administration state government-owned newspapers tend to focus more on national 
rather than local news/interests... Experts on the Nigerian constitution contend that the 
Nigerian military destroyed federalism in Nigeria (Ezomon 2001), with all the 
consequences for the maturing of the major institutions of the Nigerian state, of which
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the press is one. With local issues determined nationally, that proved detrimental to 
the press’ ability to essentially articulate the interests of the various nationalities 
within the Nigerian federation A typical example, as revealed in the interview, is the 
case of the military government’s take-over o f New Nigerian which undermined the 
newspaper’s position as representing the northern Nigeria perspectives. According to 
Darah:
The New Nigerian was very critical o f government [from] 1975. From a 
nationalist point o f  view, it reflected the northern point o f  view, which was 
legitimate ...I t had a regional interest. It was not against national integration. 
It was conservative but it never said they didn’t want Nigeria. It was the 
Muritala/Obasanjo administration that appropriated the newspaper in 1975... 
Since then, [its] role as media fo r articulating... position [o f the northern part 
o f Nigeria], has been weakened almost irredeemably (Interview in Lagos),
Centralisation did not bring about objectivity because government newspapers 
operated within the confines of official lines (Osuntokun p. 113; also see Dare, 1997). 
This led to ethnic rivalry as ethnic nationalism erupted (see Ekeh 2001; Madunagu 
2000a ;). Indeed, the surge in the demand for autonomy485 for ethnic nationality 
groups, since the disengagement of the military from Nigerian body politic in May 
1999, (Madunagu, 2000b; Enahoro, 1996),486 is seen as one of the consequences of 
this military mode of administration. So in the end, military centralisation was 
counter-productive because it did not recognise Nigeria’s diversity which, as one of 
the major findings from the interviews also showed, is required to actualise the 
Nigerian state’s fundamental objective of unity and integration.
11.2c Using Western theories to study and analyse African institutions
What normally confronts anyone doing research on African institutions is the 
expectation that such research should be informed by theories and concepts based on 
African realities. Usually this means that they should be formulated out of the African 
values and needs. And so any attempt made to use western theories and concepts to 
analyse the African situation is frowned upon. With regard to doing research on
485 This is the reason behind the call for a Sovereign National Conference (SNC) to be convened to 
resolve the Nigerian question o f how to move the nation forward.
486 Also see the editorial in The Guardian (Nigerian) online edition o f 29/12/04, titled: “Organising a 
national dialogue”.
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African media institutions, for example, this is what is at the heart of the call for 
Afrocentric media. There have been some suggestions in Nigeria for a change to the 
journalism curriculum as a way o f ensuring that the media become more useful and 
effective to the Nigerian nation (Williams 2002). There is also the talk about the need 
for a development journalism model to replace the current practice, which is derived 
from a colonial legacy (see Jeter et al 1996: 39-41).
It has been argued that in the age of globalisation, it is impossible for the press to 
ignore issues of global significance whose ramifications, in any case, would 
determine the extent to which, for instance, the Nigerian press can reform and 
perform. And in spite of the critique o f post-modernism, there can hardly be any 
doubt that the world is linked together by common interests and values (Billig, 1995: 
128-153). These include human rights, climate change, refugee problems, wars, the 
environment, famine, and drought, etc. These are issues that determine and affect 
world events today. Indeed some African post-colonial experts have actually reasoned 
that the fact that the African context is post-colonial does not warrant a call for 
autochthonous culture because we are all linked together in an age o f globalisation. 
Even then, Smith (1991: 111-112) has acknowledged that Western colonialists created 
these states, that are expected to compete within the international arena in accordance 
with universal rules and regulations. We have seen, for instance, how the debt 
problems and Nigeria’s commitment to the free market economy have adversely 
affected the Nigerian press. And of course, there is the issue of colonial legacy with 
all its ramifications and impacts on the direction of the Nigerian media institutions 
(see, for instance, Golden and Elliot, 1979).
Quite justifiably, then, if any research about any African institution is to be complete, 
they have to be understood through a knowledge o f the African experiences of 
contacts with Western Europe that culminated in colonialism, neo-colonialism, post­
colonialism and now post-modernism (see, for instance, Muller and Tomaselli, 1990: 
302; Smith, 1991). Indeed, many prominent African researchers have acknowledged 
that it will be nigh impossible not to apply western theories to study African 
institutions, given the fact that they came about as a result of the African continent’s 
association with the western world. For instance, Tomaselli’s contention is that 
Westen “models, theories and paradigms” are useful for the study of the African
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situation as far as cognisance is taken of the African “local ways of making sense and 
doing things” (1998: 145). Other prominent African researchers have also argued 
along the same line (See, for instance, the ‘post-colonialism’ arguments in Ashcroft, 
et al. 1989; and Ashcroft et al. eds. 1995).
I felt quite comfortable therefore to employ some key western concepts and theories 
for this study. They were relevant as they sharpened my inquiries regarding what is 
useful in evaluating the press’ role in national identity. And it became obvious that 
national identity is hardly static, because specific events under different circumstances 
can be used to celebrate the nation and promote national identity (Brookes, 1999). 
Taking Schlesinger’s (1991a & b) and Fitzgerald’s (1991) postulations or Billig’s 
(1995), ‘banal nationalism’ and Brookes’ (1999) work on the British press’ role in 
British national identity also, it became clear to me that unity is possible within 
diversity and they were used to justify the idea that a Nigerian press representing 
nationality or group interests can also promote a sense of collective Nigerian national 
identity. With the benefit of their insightful studies, I was able to focus on specific 
events that occurred in Nigeria within the ten-year period covered by this study and 
how the Nigerian press, irrespective of the contentious issues that pitch them into 
various camps, used such events to ‘flag’ the nation and celebrate ‘Nigerianness’ (see 
Chapter Ten). With particular reference to Brookes’ work, it was beneficial in the 
debate about whether the location of most of the Nigerian press in the so-called 
Lagos/Ibadan axis-southwestern part of Nigeria (see Oyovbaire, 2000: 111 [end notes 
3]), jeopardises the press’ ability to reflect the various interests within a pluralistic 
society like Nigeria’s. It does not because what Brookes found was that even though 
the British press is mainly located in London, its ability to celebrate the British nation 
as the dominant form of identity is not diminished.
11.3 Reflections on Methodology
Conducting research in Nigeria created some peculiar problems. These have been 
discussed earlier (see Chapter Four). It is for this same reason that it is worthwhile for 
me to reflect on the methodologies employed for this study. Apparently, using 
intensive interviews and qualitative content analysis has its own strengths and
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weaknesses. The interviewee, for instance, recalls knowledge and is therefore 
selective in his/her choice of answers. In other words, what the interviewee says 
cannot be considered as the gospel truth for the simple reason that when people talk 
about the past, their memory is selective and also whoever is speaking is not always 
neutral.487 But one of the ways that this was dealt with in this research was the effort 
that was made to ensure that all those that were interviewed were experts (Lindlof, 
1995) on the Nigerian press, by virtue of being journalists in the past or having 
specialist knowledge about the press in one form or another. And the very fact that 
their views were borne out by the findings from examining the coverage by the press 
shows the immense benefit of the interview method to this study.
But interviewing only journalists also has its own downside. This was, however, not 
done deliberately. The non-journalists that I contacted saw the study as mainly a 
technical issue which required certain expertise. Even some academics in Nigerian
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universities, would not make themselves available for interview. The journalists, on 
the other hand, were clearly more forthcoming and ready to participate. This probably 
had something to do with the fact that I was once a practising journalist in Nigeria, 
which perhaps afforded me some privileged access, and enabled their insights to be 
invaluable.
A major weakness of my qualitative method used for analysing the content of the 
newspapers is that there were no archives where comprehensive activities of the press, 
to enable a complete evaluation of its contribution to Nigerian integration, could be 
found. Not all the newspapers in each period that was sampled were available for 
examination. This was also compounded by the number of missing pages in those 
newspapers that were available in the library or archive. This made it impossible for 
me to apply the scientific methods to sample not only the newspapers but the articles 
to be analysed. So on the basis o f convenience I could only use what was available. 
This strategy worked because the themes I was looking for were in the newspapers 
that I found. However, the shortcomings of my methodology were ameliorated by the
487 These ideas are based on the series o f discussions and tutorials that I had with my second 
supervisor, Dr Rod Brookes in September, 2001.
488 1 approached Professor Ralph Akinfeleye and Professor Luke Uka Uche, both o f the University of 
Lagos, and also Dr. Yusuf Bala Usman of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. None of them was 
forthcoming for interview.
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nature of the focus of this study - looking at the two patterns of ownership of the press 
in Nigeria. This entailed determining the editorial policies of government-owned and 
privately-owned newspapers over time. What I did then was to look for different 
themes that explain the press’ behaviour in private and government newspapers. And 
the fact that some newspapers were available in each category of ownership, 
throughout the different period that was sampled, is argued as sufficient for this 
purpose.
The examination of the coverage also made it possible to focus on specific issues and 
found that, irrespective of the type o f administration in Nigeria, the press uses 
particular events or occasions to ‘flag’ the Nigerian state and promotes a sense of 
collective Nigerian national identity amongst its constituent parts. These are the issues 
on which the press is not handicapped by divisive internal politics and narrow ethnic 
and ownership interests. However, the question could be raised that by looking at 
specific issues, events that happened before and after were omitted. But it is argued 
here that the issues examined in this study did not require follow-up regarding what 
happened after. With the specific issues, the focus was on how the editorial policies 
that the press adopted at a particular point in time instilled a sense of collective 
national identity in Nigerians and therefore the positive consequences that such had 
on Nigeria’s national goal of unity and integration.
11.4 Areas for further research
There are many dimensions to the role that the Nigerian press plays in the Nigerian 
state. In effect, to understand its role, every aspect of its activities and behaviours has 
to be examined. However, this study has covered only one aspect because the focus 
was mainly on how the newspapers, through their coverage, were able to promote a 
sense of collective Nigerian national identity, which is its contribution to the objective 
of achieving national integration and unity, as delineated in the constitution. However, 
to do that meant that no consideration was given to the production and reception 
aspects of the press. Yet it is argued that it would be impossible for such a study to 
cover all issues relating to the research objective here. Nonetheless, what goes into the 
production of press content is important, and I have touched on this indirectly earlier
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by dwelling in detail on how the Nigerian context influences the nature and activities 
of the press.
Future studies could be carried out to focus specifically on what the overall impact of 
press production is on Nigeria’s national goal of integration and unity. For instance, 
given the research period, this study covered mostly the role of the press in promoting 
Nigerian national identity during a military administration. One of the characteristics 
exhibited by the press during this period is its national focus - where the nature of 
military administration is responsible for this. Yet this cannot be used to gauge the 
activities of the press at all times. O f the ten-year period (1983-1993) covered; only in 
1983 was there a democratically-elected civilian administration in place. Therefore, a 
possible area of research is how the press will generally behave and promote a 
Nigerian national identity when there is a democratically-elected civilian 
administration in Nigeria.
As noted above, a reception study was not considered, despite their importance as the 
consumers of the newspaper content. It would have been poignant to learn their 
verdicts on the effectiveness of the press in promoting a sense of collective Nigerian 
national identity. I have indicated earlier that various studies have confirmed that the 
press does influence the way we think (see, for instance, Miller et al 1998: 211). 
However, while audience study is important, its absence does not necessarily diminish 
the result of a study that considered only press content regarding their activities. 
Nevertheless, a useful area of enquiry would be readership research about the way 
they see the role of the press in Nigeria’s quest for national integration and unity.
I also stated earlier that because of the problems of doing research in Nigeria, caused 
by non-availability of comprehensive research materials, it is not possible to conduct 
a really scientific research under such circumstance. Consequently most researches 
are carried out with an agenda to use what is available. There is the possibility that 
this situation might change in the future making it possible for scientific researches to 
be carried out within the Nigerian context. Without such studies it would be 
impossible to fully evaluate the contributions of a national institution, like the press, 
to issues that border on national integration/developments.
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Another area that could be of interest for further research is the impact of new media 
(web 2.0) on the way that the Nigerian press is going to interact with its audience in 
the future. There is a whole new development regarding citizen journalism and social 
interaction between the press and its audience is no longer a one-way street. 
Knowledge of these will be essential to determine how the Nigerian press can react to 
extant social realities in trying to fulfil its constitutional role.
11.5 Coda
I embarked on this project nine and a half years ago and it covers the period 1983 to 
1993. The aim was to use the period as a case study to determine the role that the 
Nigerian press can play in promoting a sense of collective Nigerian national identity 
amongst Nigerians, and in the process enhance Nigeria’s national integration and 
unity. Apparently, so many changes would have occurred since I started doing this 
study and there could be concern that most of its findings are dated and therefore less 
significant in understanding the Nigerian press’ role today vis-a-vis my research 
objective. This is what I intend to address in this section. But to do it successfully, it is 
important to commence against the backdrop of the factors / issues that defined the 
environment within which the press operated between 1983 and 1993. The main 
issues that have been identified in this study relate to:
1. Ownership control of the press and its effect on the general activities of the press.
2. Government policies which manifest in various ways to limit the effectiveness of 
the press.
Given these two factors, it was common during 1983 to 1993 for:
• Government to manipulate the press through its control of all the instruments 
that the press needs to ensure its continued existence, particularly with respect 
to the supply of newsprint;
• Government to deny freedom to press practitioners through harsh decrees to 
curb their activities;
• Editors to be sacked for failing to toe official line; and
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• Security operatives to arrest journalists and close down media houses.
The question then is, have there been any changes to such realities of the press since 
all these years? Having carefully observed the Nigerian press over this nine and a half 
years period, it is quite amazing to see how things have not only remained the same, 
they have indeed become worse. Sample the following recent headlines, as published 
in the online edition of The Guardian (Nigerian) newspaper, detailing the travails of 
the Nigerian press within the Nigerian context:
“NUJ wants govt to reduce cost of newsprint” (24/09/03).
“Chikelu,489 others list travails of media as NPAN clocks 40” (24/10/03).
“The rising cost of newsprint” (Editorial - 02/09/05).
“Closure of AIT and RayPower490” (25/10/05).
“VAT on newspapers and magazines” (Editorial - 24/03/06).
“Security Agents Arrest Journalists in Bayelsa, Rivers491” (18/06/06).
“The SSS Versus Newspapers” (Editorial -  14/01/07).
“Press freedom... Nigeria tops list o f violators” (22/01/07).
“Africa in search of stronger media, better society” (22/01/07).
Nothing confirms these more than the communique that came out of a three-day 
workshop organised in Lagos between October 18 and 20, 2005 by the World Bank 
Institute (WBI) in Washington D.C., in partnership with Media Rights Agenda 
(MRA), “to examine Media Institutions and Capacity in Nigeria”. Published, under
489 Chief Chukwuemeka Chikelu is Nigeria’s Minister o f Information and National Orientation.
490 Africa Independent Television (AIT) and RayPower FM (Radio) stations are private broadcasting 
houses operated by Daar Communications Limited (Nigeria).
491 Bayelsa and Rivers are two of the thirty-six states that constitute the Nigerian Federation.
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the title: “In Lagos, experts put the Fourth Estate of the Realm on the slab”, in the 
online edition of The Guardian newspaper on Friday, 28/10/05, it substantiates the 
notion that the context of the Nigerian press has remained virtually the same over the 
years. For our purpose, part of it is quoted extensively below:
“The present legal, institutional and regulatory frameworks for media practice 
in Nigeria inhibit media freedom and freedom of expression and should be 
reviewed. This should include the repeal of repressive laws which have been 
carried over from the colonial and military eras, the reform of regulatory 
institutions established under those laws, and the entrenchment of a 
philosophy which recognises that a free, independent and professional media 
is an essential element of a democratic society...
“In order to ensure the independence o f the media, all state-owned media 
outlets, whether owned by Federal or State Governments, should be 
transformed into genuine public service media with their independence from 
government, commercial or partisan interests guaranteed by law and in 
practice...
“Media practitioners require access to information to be able to effectively 
discharge the responsibility imposed on them by section 22 of the 1999 
Constitution to uphold the accountability o f the Government to the people.
The article goes on to discuss “various legal provisions and institutional practices of 
public bodies impede access to information” for journalists and citizens, suggesting 
that the government should therefore “immediately pass into law the Freedom of 
Information Bill, which has been pending before the Legislature since 1999 ...” In 
dreary, but all too familiar terms (seen in the period of this research), the article 
comments on how the “harsh economic climate in the country” has affected most 
Nigerians ability to buy newspapers. It then perhaps slightly simplistically points to 
the need for the government to adopt policies that “will improve the economic 
circumstances and purchasing power of Nigerians and consequently the fortunes of 
the media”.
However, although the press’ environment has remained largely the same, with 
respect to my research objectives, some o f the changes that have taken place since 
1997 are worth stating:
• Nigeria has been under a democratic civilian administration only since May, 
1999;
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• Some of the newspapers chosen for this study, most notably the National 
Concord and Daily Sketch, have folded;
• The Nigerian Federal Government has taken steps to privatise its own 
newspapers, Daily Times and New Nigerian.
But these developments are not significant to the overall objective of this study, for 
three main reasons:
• The first is because research was done to determine the role that the press 
institution can play in promoting national identity within a post-colonial and 
multi-cultural set up like the Nigerian state;
• The second is because my interest was in understanding what constitutes the 
Nigerian press, in terms o f the context within which it operates and its 
structure and ownership pattern;
• Following from that, the third reason is because the newspapers were chosen 
on the basis o f ownership and therefore the interest group they served, if any. 
In other words, they were not documented individually but divided into 
privately-owned newspapers, state government-owned newspapers and federal 
government-owned newspapers.
Typically, in which case, the fact that a privately-owned newspaper folds, like the 
National Concord or a government-owned newspaper, like the Daily Sketch, could 
not be a hindrance to finding out the role that the Nigerian press, in general, can play 
in relation to my stated research objective. The major findings from the qualitative 
analysis of the activities of the press between 1983 and 1993, was that the Nigerian 
press ‘flagged’ and promoted the Nigerian nation, using mostly international issues, 
irrespective of the context of the press during that period. The context has remained 
largely the same, so too has that role o f the Nigerian press. Nevertheless the point 
should be made that this was only in circumstances that allowed this because narrow 
sectional interests commonly intervened to inhibit this process, making the press 
sometimes to serve as mouthpieces for the military or civilian government or owners’ 
ethnic loyalty.
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APPENDICES
(I). A Sample of the open-ended questions for interviewees
The experts on the Nigerian media were asked open-ended questions which centred 
on the research question. The purpose for doing this was to ensure that they were not 
restricted to a particular set of questions that would make it impossible for follow-up 
questions to be asked. A sample of the open-ended questions that were posed is as 
follows:
1 What is the relationship between the historical development of Nigeria and the 
activities of the Nigerian mass media?
2. Do you think that the press can/should promote national unity? If “yes” why? And 
if “no” why?
3. What role did the public and private presses play in the pre- and post-independence 
era till 1983?
4. What would you suggest has promoted or hindered the presses’ ability to fulfil its 
constitutional role?
5. How, in your own view, have the presses responded to issues that centre on the 
formulation of Nigeria’s national identity? Or put differently, what is the relationship 
between the activities of the presses and their role in promoting a Nigerian national 
identity?
6. Have there been specific circumstances where the Nigerian press promoted and 
celebrated Nigeria, thereby instilling in Nigerians a sense of national/collective 
identity?
7. Does ownership impact, in any way, on the way that the press treat issues that 
border on national unity?
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8. How have government policies impacted on the development of the press and its 
performance in nation building?
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(II). This Editorial Comment was published on the front page of the SUNDAY 
Observer, Vol. XV. No. 833, August 28,1983. 
COMMENT
“WHERE WE STAND”
“SOMETIME last week two National Dailies co-incidentally ‘contrived’ a 
humour and unleased it on the OBSERVER GROUP OF NEWSPAPERS.
THE humour had to do with what they called the ‘U-Turn’ of the OBSERVER 
Newspapers since the results of the elections were declared and Dr. Osaigbovo 
Ogbemudia won the Governorship ticket in Bendel.
ANOTHER state-owned newspaper, the NIGERIAN HERALD was also a victim 
of this expensive joke -  the incumbent Governor in Kwara having been defeated
AS colleagues in arms however we take such jokes kindly and with equal sense of 
humour.
NEVERTHELESS, a few things need to be tidied up to complete this joke.
THE OBSERVER Group of Newspapers was founded during the military era, by 
Dr. Osaigbovo Ogbemudia himself,
THE paper grew, served the people of this state, Nigerians and the military regime 
itself, in consonance with the texture and demands of military rule
JOURNALISTS had to contend to understand and adjust themselves and their 
practice to the requirements of a democratic government with opposition etc and draw 
the line between that and the decrees, edicts etc of a military regime in which they 
were now to operate.
THIS was the time Dr. Osaigbovo Ogbemudia’s government gave birth to the 
OBSERVER Group.
THE OBSERVER Editorial policy was dictated by the Board of Directors and of 
course, it was left for the practising journalists to carry out their duty in accordance 
with this policy.
THE Level of journalism in the OBSERVER was high and the Head of State, 
General Yakubu Go won usually referred interviewers to ‘read everything about 
that.. .in the OBSERVER’.
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THE OBSERVER therefore won the hearts of the people, State and the Federal 
Government.
THE post-military era saw the arrival of the Unity Party of Nigeria with its four 
cardinal programmes and Professor Ambrose Alii as Chief Executive to preside over 
the implementation of these programmes in the state
THE people of Bendel state hailed these programmes and the OBSERVER Group 
lost no time in associating itself very closely with these programmes.
THE Group not only stood firmly with Governor Alii to publicise the activities of 
his government, but also did a lot to project his person as Chief Executive.
WHILE doing this, the journalist in OBSERVER did not lose sight of their other 
duty, i.e., that of being the people’s watchdog.
WE served Governor Alii, his government and the people faithfully and loyally.
NOW, Time And Tide Have Changed.
DR. Ogbemudia swept into victory at the polls in the August 13 Governorship 
elections.
IN His usual characteristic dynamism and administrative brilliance, he has given 
what political analysts saw as the core o f his government policy, come October 1, 
1983.
DR. Ogbemudia is not a stranger in Government, having ruled this state very 
successfully from 20th September 1967 to July 1975.
GOVERNMENT is a continuing process, but individual heads may change.
IT will therefore be a stupendous joke the other way round for the OBSERVER 
Newspapers to deny Dr. Ogbemudia the same hand of co-operation which it extended 
to Professor Alii.
THERE is no doubt that Dr. Ogbemudia’s acceptance speech had all the 
ingredients of a change which no sane journalist could afford to let go unpublished.
BESIDES, the OBSERVER must in all honesty pledge its belief in and loyalty to 
the in-coming administration.
TO do otherwise will amount to dishonesty.
DR. Ogbemudia, as head of the in-coming administration, is assured of our fullest 
support, co-operation, loyalty and dedication in giving maximum publicity to his 
Government’s programmes.
DR. Ogbemudia, as head o f the in-coming administration has our unalloyed 
pledge of projecting him to the satisfaction o f Bendelites, Nigerians and all good-
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spirited people wherever they may be.
ESI the various messages of congratulations already sent to the Governor-elect, 
some few concrete suggestions have been made, designed for good governance and 
the achievement of invaluable goals.
WE will, as time goes on, begin to sift these pieces of advice and suggestions for 
the attention of the Governor-elect.
FINALLY, the ‘U-Turn’ is very necessary in terms of our set objectives -  
publicising Government activities and educating the people.
FOR now, Dr. Ogbemudia has emerged the Governor-elect and no journalist, no 
matter his recalcitrant stance, should stand in the way of loyalty and dedication to the 
cause which this great son of Nigeria has set himself to fight for Bendel.
NO apologies for the ‘U-Turn’”
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(III). The Social Context of Sampled Newspapers at a Glance
STATE GOVERNMENT-OWNED NEWSPAPERS
A. Daily Sketch-1964
-Published by the Sketch publications
-Owned by four states: Oyo, Ogun, Osun, and Ondo that were carved out of the 
former western region, home to the Yorubas, one of the three major ethnic groups in 
Nigeria.
-A regional newspaper mostly read by the Yorubas.
-Conservative and popular among the older generation
-Appeals to Yoruba interests
-Dabbles into national politics every now and then.
-Others: Sunday Sketch (weekly)
B. The Nigerian Observer-1968
-Published by Bendel State Newspaper Corporation
-Owned by the Edo and Delta states that was carved out of the former Bendel State.
-A regional newspaper
-Conservative and appeals mainly to local interests 
-Others: Sunday Observer (weekly)
C. Nigerian Statesman-1976 (now The Statesman)
-Published by Imo State Newspaper Corporation
-A regional newspaper
-Conservative, serves the interests o f the Ibo ethnic group and appeals to local 
interests
-Others: Sunday Statesman (Weekly)
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT -OWNED NEWSPAPERS
A. Daily Times-1926
-Published by the Daily Times of Nigeria Ltd (DTN)
-Oldest and largest circulating newspaper
-Could be grouped as conservative. Popular with the older generation.
-Used to be very neutral but its credibility was seriously dented during the second 
republic when it was virtually made the mouthpiece of the ruling party.
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-Other publications of DTN: Sunday Times (weekly), West Africa (weekly news 
feature international magazine), Evening Times
B. New Nigerian-1966
-Published by New Nigerian Newspapers Ltd (NNL)
-Established by the then northern region government
-Very conservative and very forceful in its promotion of the interest of the 
predominantly Muslim North
-Popular with the northern elite and the older age group
-Read also by some southern educated elite because it is an authority on northern 
interest and also on the direction Nigerian politics is heading.
-Not a mass circulating newspaper but the few that reaches the public makes a lot of 
impact.
-Others: Sunday New Nigerian (weekly) and Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo (thrice weekly)
PRIVATELY-OWNED NEWSPAPERS 
A. The Guardian-1983
-Published by Guardian Press Ltd
-National daily read in all nooks and comers of the country 
-Revolutionised Nigerian journalism 
-Liberal and very popular among the educated elite 
-Read by both young and old and very influential
-Others: The Guardian, Sunday; The African Guardian (weekly news feature 
magazine), The Guardian Express (Evening), Lagos Life 
-Ethnic origin of the publisher: Urhobo (Delta state)
B.Vanguard-1984
-Published by Vanguard Media Ltd 
-National daily and widely circulated 
-Read by all age groups 
-Liberal
-Others: Sunday Vanguard (weekly)
-Ethnic origin of the publisher: Itsekiri (Delta state)
C. National Concord-1980 
-Published by Concord Press Ltd 
-National and widely circulated
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-Liberal and read by all age group
-Its national outlook has changed since 1993 when the general elections won by its 
publisher late Chief Abiola was annulled by the military. Tends to appeal more now 
to sectional interest of the Yorubas
-Others: Sunday Concord (weekly), African Concord (weekly news feature magazine) 
-Ethnic origin of the publisher: Yoruba (Ondo, Ogun, Osun, Oyo and Lagos states)
D. Daily Champion-1988 
-Published by Champion Press Ltd
-A national newspaper but does not also shy away from promoting the Ibo cause. 
-Reaches all parts of the country 
-Liberal and read by all age groups 
-Others: Sunday champion (weekly)
-Ethnic origin of the publisher: Ibo (Enugu, Anambra, Imo and Abia state).
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(IV ) Attempts made to secure an interview with Chief Alade Odunewu
EA (Speaking through an intercom installed on the gate in his house in the Surulere 
area of Lagos, Nigeria): Hello!
A voice from inside the house responded thus: ‘Who are you?
EA: I am Eghosa Aimufua, a PhD research student from Cardiff University in the UK. 
Voice: What do you want?
EA: Is this Alhaji Odunewu’s house?
Voice: Yes!
EA: Okay! I am here in Lagos doing the fieldwork for my project which is on the role 
of the Nigerian press in promoting a Nigerian national identity. I’d like to do an 
interview with you regarding this project, sir.
Voice (A pause): Oh! Chief is not in. This is his brother speaking.
EA: Right! But please do you know when he is going to be about, so I can book an 
appointment to see him?
Voice: I don’t know, but come back later.
The conversation stopped at that point. But I went back three times, within a week, 
and on each occasion was unable to secure an interview, either because ‘he is ill’ or 
‘he is out of town’. However, on my third visit, his ‘Butler’ came out and whispered 
something to me: “You know, ‘oga’492 does not like doing interviews. Don’t waste 
your time”.
492 The term “oga” is used to refer to a man of wealth, authority and influence in the Nigerian society
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(V) Profiles of Interviewees493
The next part of this chapter will be devoted to a brief profile of each of the fieldwork 
interviewees. The interviews were conducted in Nigeria, over a four-month period, 
from November, 2000 to February, 2001.
Mr Sam Amuka-Pemu
Veteran journalist, co-founder o f the Punch Newspaper and now publisher of 
Vanguard newspapers and Chairman of Vanguard Media Limited. He was the first 
journalist to own a newspaper, Mr Amuka is a member of the Newspaper Proprietors 
Association of Nigeria (NPAN). He is from a minority ethnic group (Itsekiris 
[Southwest]).
Prince Tony Momoh
The "Newswatch Who's Who in Nigeria", describes him as "legal practitioner, lawyer, 
journalist, and administrator". But more importantly, his inside knowledge of the 
mass media has made him one of the foremost commentators on most issues relating 
to the media in Nigeria. Apart from the books he has written on the Nigerian mass 
media, Prince Momoh has also contributed several articles to journals and magazines 
dealing with the media in Nigeria.
He served as editor of Spear magazine, 1967-71 and Daily Times, 1976-80. Between 
1982 and 1984 he was General Manager, Planning/Development of Daily Times. He 
became Nigeria's Minister of Information and Culture in 1986 and held the post until 
1990. Prince Momoh was President, Nigeria Guild of Editors from 1976-78 and 
Chairman, African Conference o f Information Ministers, 1988-90. A Fellow of the 
Commonwealth Journalists Association and member, International Press Institute, 
Prince Momoh also served as Chairman, Nigerian Press Merit Awards Committee in 
1997.
493 Additional materials used for compiling the profiles were taken from: Makinde, Bankole ed. 2001. 
Newswatch WHO’S WHO in Nigeria. Lagos, Nigeria. Newswatch Books Limited.and “A directory of 
the Nigerian Media: Media World Year Book, 1994. A publication o f Diamond Publications Limited, 
Lagos.
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Alhaji Babatunde Jose
Alhaji Jose is popularly referred to in Nigeria as "the doyen of Nigerian journalism". 
This is in recognition of the contributions he has made to the journalism profession. 
His wealth of knowledge of the Nigerian mass media is documented in one of his 
books titled: "Walking a Tight Rope", which was published in 1987 by the University 
Press, Ibadan, Nigeria. His career as a journalist started in 1941 when he was 
appointed Technical Trainee in Daily Times o f  Nigeria until 1946. He rose through 
the ranks and became Editor of the newspaper in 1957, a post which he held until 
1962. From 1962 to 1976 he served as the Managing Director of the newspaper. 
Alhaji Jose is also very knowledgeable about the electronic media in Nigeria, having 
served on the Board of Governors, Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) (now 
Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN), between 1965 and 1966; and as 
Chairman, Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) from 1977-80 and 1984-86.
His wealth of experience also stems from his posts as Director or Chairman of various 
companies and banks in Nigeria and also as member o f different committees that 
successive Nigerian governments have set up over the years to address various 
controversial issues. One of these was the "Presidential Committee on the 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) (from February 1986), established to 
douse the controversy that erupted after it was revealed that Nigeria has become a full 
member of the OIC, which is dominated by Islamic states.
Mr Emeka Izeze
Mr Izeze from 1999 till date has been the Managing Director/Editor-in-Chief of The 
Guardian newspapers, the flagship of Nigerian journalism. He is a member of Nigeria 
Guild of Editors and from 1997-98, he served as a member of "Vision 2010 
Committee" which was set up by the military government led by General Sani Abacha 
(late), and charged with the task of recommending the path of socio-political and 
economic growth for Nigeria. A career journalist, he has served in various newspapers 
and magazine outfits both in Nigeria and abroad. As recorded in "Newswatch Who's 
Who in Nigeria", Mr Izeze was "appointed News Editor, Sunday Graphic, Benin City,
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1982-84; Assistant News Editor, The Guardian, 1984-85; Associate Editor, New 
African Magazine, London, 1985; News Editor, The Guardian on Sunday, 1985-88; 
Editor, The Guardian on Sunday, 1988-92; and Editor, The Guardian, 1992-99".
Dr. Godini Gabriel Darah
Apart from being a journalist, Dr. Darah is also an academic and a politician. He was 
a member of the defunct Socialist Party Workers, Farmers and Youth. He has served 
as a lecturer in some Nigerian universities, such as University of Ibadan, University of 
Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo University) and Ogun State University. He currently 
holds a professorial post at Delta State University, Nigeria and has since 1992 been a 
"Visiting Professor, African Folklore, Department of African-American Studies, 
Northern University, Boston, Massachusetts, USA" (Author Year: pp. 415-416). Dr. 
Darah's interest in writing saw him serving as a member of the Editorial Board of: (1) 
Nigerian Academy of Arts, Science and Technology, from 1976-80, and (2) Ife 
Studies on African Literature and Arts; and Editorial Consultant, Daily Times of 
Nigeria PLC, from 1989-91.
But his stint as a practising journalist in Nigeria really kicked off in 1992, when he 
was appointed Chairman, Editorial Board, Daily Times of Nigeria until 1995 when he 
resigned to join The Guardian Newspapers Limited as Editorial Page Editor. He 
remained in that position until 1999 when he became Chairman of the Editorial Board 
of The Guardian Newspapers Limited. It was from this position that he left to take up 
his Professorial post at Delta State University, Nigeria.
Chief Duro Onabule
Onabule is a renowned journalist who began his professional career in 1961 when he 
was appointed a reporter with the now defunct Daily Express, Lagos. Between then 
and 1985-1993, when he served as the Chief Press Secretary to the President and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces, Chief Onabule worked in 
different newspapers in Nigeria. He served variously as Staff Reporter, 
Correspondent, Columnist, Editor and Editorial Board Member in such Nigerian 
newspapers as Daily Sketch, Daily Times and National Concord. He is not only well
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informed about how the Nigerian government operates, having been an insider, his 
career in journalism also makes him an informed commentator on the mass media in 
Nigeria
Mr Dan Agbese
Mr Agbese is a journalist who is held in very high esteem in Nigeria. Experienced and 
well grounded on issues relating to the Nigerian mass media, part of his resume, as 
recorded in "Newswatch Who’s Who in Nigeria”, reads as follows: “Staff Writer, 
New Nigerian newspaper, 1967-70; Chief Sub-Editor, The Nigerian Standard, Jos, 
1974-76; Assistant Editor, The Nigerian Standard, 1976-78; Editor, The Nigerian 
Standard, 1978-80; General Manager, Radio Benue, Makurdi, 1980; Special Adviser 
and Director of Information, Benue State, 1980-82; Editor, New Nigerian, Kaduna, 
1982-84; co-founder and managing editor, Newswatch Magazine, Lagos, 1984-86; 
appointed Deputy Editor-in Chief/Deputy Chief Executive, Newswatch, Lagos 1986- 
1994; Editor-in-Chief, Newswatch, Lagos, since 1994; Director, Nigerian Magazines 
Limited, United Kingdom”.
Malam Mohammed Haruna
Journalist and publisher, Malam Haruna served in various editorial and executive 
positions in the New Nigerian newspapers limited between 1975 and 1989. After his 
time as the Managing Director of the New Nigerian newspapers limited form 1985- 
1989, Malam Haruna left to become the Managing Director/Editor-in-Chief, Citizens 
Communications limited in 1989. He was appointed Chief Press Secretary to the Head 
of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, of Nigeria, 1998-99. He is a 
member of the Nigerian Guild of Editors and the Newspaper Proprietors Association 
of Nigeria.
Abdul Karim Al-Bashir
Al-Bashir as a journalist has had experience in the electronic and print media. He was 
appointed Editor, Federal Radio Corporation o f Nigeria (FRCN), 1974-75; Editor 1, 
FRCN, Kadunal975-77; Senior Editor, FRCN, Kaduna, 1977-78; Executive Editor,
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FRCN, Kaduna, 1978-80; Controller, Current Affairs, FRCN, Kaduna, 1980-82; 
General Manager, FRCN, Yola (Gongola State), 1982-84; Manager, News and 
Current Affairs, FRCN, Yola, 1984-86; Managing Director, Old Gongola Press 
Limited, Yola, 1986-88; Editor, The Democrat newspapers, Kaduna, 1988-89. He 
served as Editor-in-Chief of the same newspaper in 1989 before being appointed 
Chairman, Gongola Press Limited, now Adamawa Press Limited, Publisher of Weekly 
Scope.
Chief Henry Odukomaiya
Chief Odukomaiya is a veteran journalist whose outstanding contribution to the 
journalism profession in Nigeria includes his involvement in the establishment of two 
of Nigeria's most successful national newspapers namely, National Concord and 
Daily Champion. He began his journalism career in the then Gold Coast (now Ghana), 
moved to Nigeria in the early sixties and later in 1969, was appointed the Editor of 
Daily Times, a position he maintained till 1972, before he served as the Deputy Chief 
Executive of the Daily Tmes of Nigeria between 1973 and 1976. From 1979-1981, he 
was the Managing Director, Editor-in-Chief of the Concord Group, publisher of the 
National Concord newspapers. He left the Concord Group in the early eighties to help 
set up the Champion newspapers, where he remained as the Managing 
Director/Editor-in-Chief until 1995.
Alhaji Turi Muhammadu
Alhaji Muhammadu started his career in journalism in 1969 as Executive Assistant, 
New Nigerian Newspapers limited. He was made the Managing Editor of the 
newspaper's Lagos office in 1972 until 1973. Between 1974 and 1976, he served as 
Editor of the New Nigerian newspapers after which he became the Managing Director 
of the newspaper from 1976-80. Alhaji Muhammadu has recently authored a book 
titled: “Courage and Conviction. New Nigerian: The First Twenty Years”. His 
knowledge of the mass media in Nigeria also stem from the fact that he also served as 
Chairman, Implementation sub-committee for the Commercialisation of_the News 
Agency of Nigeria (NAN), 1989-90; Chairman, Daily Times of Nigeria, 1991; 
Chairman, Citizen Communication Limited, 1989-95; and Director, Nigerian
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Television (NTV), Sokoto, from 1976-77.
Alhaji Mohammed Ibrahim
Alhaji Ibrahim's area of expertise is in broadcasting. However, his inside knowledge 
of how the Nigerian government operates, having served in government for more than 
twenty years, makes him an invaluable source of information about the mass media in 
Nigeria. Before his post as the_Director-General of the Nigerian Television Authority 
(NTA) which, he held for more than three years, he was the Director-General, Federal 
Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN), 1989; Managing Director, NTA Network 
News, 1981-83. Alhaji Ibrahim has also served as President, Commonwealth 
Broadcasting Association and his major productions include "Radio as a Campaign 
Instrument", which he presented as a Convocation Lecture at the University of 
Maiduguri, in 1990.
Dr Omar Farouk-Ibrahim
Dr Ibrahim is a political scientist and his position as the Managing Director of the 
New Nigerian Newspapers, started, in 1999. His appointment by Nigeria's President, 
General Olusegun Obasanjo (rtd), was part of the government's plan to revive the 
newspaper which, over the years, as a result of government interference in its 
operation, has dropped in sales and become virtually economically unviable. As one 
former Managing Director of the New Nigerian put it, the New Nigerian, under Dr 
Ibrahim, "has become a good newspaper. I hope he will keep it up" (Muhammadu, 
2000: 365).
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(VI) Newspapers and dates available/unavailable for Analysis
Year Available Newspapers Dates Unavailable in June Dates Sampled
1983 National Concord 9 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,15,22,29
The Guardian 1-4,6-11,13-18,20-25,27-30 5,12,19,26
Daily Times 5,12 1-4,6,7,14,21,28
New Nigerian 26,28-30 1-7,14,21,28
Nigerian Statesman Nil 1-7,14,21,28
Daily Sketch 5,12,19,25 1-7,14,21,28
Nigerian Observer 25,29 1-7,14,21,28
1985 Vanguard 7 2-6,15,23,30
The Guardian 24 1-7,14,21,28
National Concord 9,28 1-7,15,22,30
New Nigerian 1,2,4,8,9,15,16,19,22-24,29,30 3,5,6,7,10,11,12,14,28
Daily Times Nil 1-7,14,21,28
Nigerian Observer 2,9,16,23,29,30 1,3-8,14,17,28
Nigerian Statesman 23 1-7,14,21,28
Daily Sketch 6 1-8,15,22,29
1987 Nigerian Statesman Nil 1-7,14,28
Daily Sketch 12 1-7,14,21,28
Nigerian Observer Nil 1-7,14,21,28
The Guardian Nil 1-7,14,21,28
Vanguard Nil 1-7,14,21,28
National Concord Nil 1-7,14,21,28
Daily Times Nil 1-7,14,21,28
New Nigerian Nil 1-7,14,21,28
1989 Nigerian Statesman 1,2,4,11,18,23,25 3,5-10,19,28,29
Daily Times 7,8 1-6,9,16,23,30
New Nigerian Nil 1-7,14,21,28
Vanguard 8 1-7,16,23,30
National Concord Nil 1-7,14,21,28
Daily Champion 1,4,11,18,25,29 2,3,5-9,17,27
The Guardian Nil 1-7,14,21,28
1991 The Observer 1,2,8,9,12,15,16,22,23,28-30 3-7,10,11,14,21,27
The Statesman 1-4,9,16,23,27,28,30 5-8,10,11,14,21,29
Daily Times 24,26 1-7,14,21,28
New Nigerian 1-5,9,16,18,23,24,30 6-8,10-14,21,28
Daily Champion 1-4,7,9,13,16,23,25,27,28,30 5,6,8,10-12,14,21,29
Vanguard 1-4 5-11,14,21,28
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National Concord Nil 1-7,14,21,28
1993 The Guardian 13 1-7,14,21,28
Vanguard 3,17,19,22,24,29,30 1-7,14,21,28
National Concord 13,22,28 1-7,14,21,27
Daily Champion 2,4-7,9-13,16,19,20,24-28,30 3,8,14,15,17,18,21,29
The Statesman 4-6,13,20,27 1-3,7-1014,21,28
Daily Sketch 1,2,4-6,9,12,13,15-30 3,7,8,10,11,14
New Nigerian 6,12,13,27 2-5,7,8,14,21,28
Daily Times 5,6,9,12,13,19,20,23,26,27 2-4,7,8,10,11,14,21,28
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(V II) Transcripts of Interviews
(VIIA) A CHAT WITH UNCLE SAM, LAGOS ON TUESDAY 19/12/00 
Q: The Nigerian press
The Nigerian Press is not pre-occupied with whether we have a country or not. There 
are many grievances about the present Nigerian structure. Various groups in the 
country are complaining that they are marginalised. These should be reflected and are 
being reflected in the Press. The present federal structure is not workable. The Press is 
in the forefront to change it.
The Press is predominantly Southwest. It is Lagos-based.
Q: On Ownership
Wherever the owners come from, whatever their experiences, whatever their purpose 
in setting up newspaper, they have one thing in common, they want to see it prosper.
If you take the Champion newspaper and see it as reflecting a particular bias or is 
promoting the interest o f the Ibos, that should not be seen as an abnormal position. 
Look, the Iboman is an Iboman. He has grievances and these are going to be aired by 
a newspaper owned by an Ibo because they feel they have been marginalised.
Q: On divisions within the country
The country is divided on ethnic, economic and social grounds. But none of these 
divisions wants a separation. Each one is opting for a better share of the cake. They 
now talk of national conference. These are the views that are reflected in the Nigerian 
Press.
Q: On the New Nigerian
It is only natural that New Nigerian has to speak for the North. It has always been a 
Northern paper propagating a Northern bias. The Federal government did not start the 
newspaper. It was the Northern government that started it.
Q: On the OIC
It did not affect our lives the way Sharia has done. When the OIC issue came up, the 
Press could not stop the Babangida government from going ahead with it. The 
administration was essentially Muslim. The Press spoke against the membership of 
the Organisation but the government was still sending representatives to attend the 
meetings.
The Press has not been instrumental to propagating any religion. It has only reacted to 
what politicians have done.
Q: On Revenue Allocation
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The Press is divided between North and South. If you get more you don’t complain. 
Until 1999 nobody heard the North complaining. They do now because they are not in 
power.
The Press will behave and react in accordance with what the situation calls for.
Q: On the census
Everything should be traced to sectional interest. What is national has become 
sectional. No people you will call national as such. People's lives are touched, 
depending on where they come from, by issues.
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(VIIB) INTERVIEW WITH M ALAM  M OHAM M ED HARUNA, FORMER 
MANAGING DIRECTOR, NEW NIGERIAN AT THE AUDITORIUM OF AREWA 
HOUSE, KADUNA ON SATURDAY 27/01/01
Q: The Contribution of the Nigerian Press to National Integration and their 
Ability to Foster a Sense of National Identity among Nigerians.
It's a tricky question because it's more like a mixed bag thing. The Press has stood up 
to tyranny in the sense that they reported freely and so on and so forth and put tyrants 
whether they are civilians or military on their toes. At the same time some of the way 
we have reported, if it were left to the Press, Nigeria would have gone to pieces. 
Because sometimes some of the headlines you see are really divisive headlines. They 
distort facts about whole sections o f the country. Sometimes they tell barefaced lies 
and so on and so forth. So you have this mixed bag kind of situation.
Q: What is Responsible for this in Your Own Opinion?
Well I think quite a number of things. I think the main thing is that we tend to be 
prisoners of our sources. I guess it's by definition the nature of the Nigerian 
media...We just report the political actors. If they are from our own side of the 
country we just report what they say without asking critical questions and so on. So 
it's basically prejudiced. And reporters ought to be able to overcome prejudice 
because everybody has his/her own prejudice.
Q: Does that have to do With the Nature of the Nigerian Society?
I am not sure it has to do with the nature of the Nigerian society because there is no 
society that does not have divisive elements within it. Every society, because societies 
are not monolithic, they have differences in religion, differences in language and so 
on and so forth. So it is not enough to say because those divisive elements are there, 
then you just merely reflect it.
As a reporter or as a journalist, you are supposed to go beyond that. You are supposed 
to overcome your prejudices .and be able to reflect as objectively as is humanly 
possible. Since we are prisoners o f our sources the only way the only way you will be 
able to report facts fairly objectively as possible is to report from all aspects. In other 
words, all the divisions in society, if  there is a crisis, talk to all sides on the crisis and 
so on. But you find that all too often we report from only one side of the issue.
Q: Is it that the Nigerian Journalists do not know that or just because of the 
Historical Development of Nigeria?
That's not enough. If you say you are a Pressman, you know the mission you have, 
which is not to simply reflect the divisions in society but to try and overcome them, 
amplify the good in society. We don't say don't reflect the bad in society, because then 
you will not be realistic. But the essence is to look at them and then try and find ways 
in which you can overcome them. So for me I don't think there is anything inherent in
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the nature of the Nigerian or inherent in the nature of the Nigerian society either as an 
individual or part of society that we continue to harp on things that are divisive. It's 
just that we are just, maybe lazy, I don't know.
Q: On the Whole How Would You Rate the Nigerian Press vis-a-vis it’s 
Historical Development?
I don't know about historical development because history starts today. I mean 
because if you say because things have happened this way previously, and so we 
should continue in that way. Then you will never change. But history is about change. 
Okay you had that kind of past- was it good for Nigeria, was it bad for Nigeria? So if 
we have been reporting our prejudices down the years, it's time that we stopped that.
So if you ask me, on the whole what is the performance o f the Press, it's not a black or 
white thing. It depends. In terms o f standing up to dictatorship they've done well. But 
in terms of bringing about a national cohesion, they've done very badly.
Q: But Some People would say that to have a Society is not to have the absence of 
Division.
It depends on how you report things. If you report things factually and objectively, I 
would personally have no problem with that. If you take for instance the issue of 
Sharia, if all the time you keep distorting things...you don't even understand what 
Sharia is all about. But all the time you see it from the negative point of view. It's like 
you have a brief, always look for the negative-so you just report only the negative 
sides. I mean that is not helpful for national integration or unity.
Because you are dealing with an issue, which is very central, which is the hardcore of 
somebody's livelihood, his beliefs etc. And all your approach to it is to tell lies about 
it is to ridicule it. Now if  you do that you are not helping national unity. But you can 
disagree with it; you can disagree completely with the value system of Sharia but at 
the same time report as objectively as factually as possible. Now you don't see that in 
the Nigerian Press.
So this is the point I am making. It's not that we shouldn't have a different point of 
view. That's why you are a Christian that's why you are not a Muslim that's why I am 
a Muslim. So I have no problem with that. I should be able to relate with you, respect 
your values as a Christian. You should be able to relate to me and respect my values 
as a Muslim. And the only way I know you would do that is if you report things 
factually.
Q: If You Look At Specific Issues Say Revenue Allocation-How would you rate 
the Nigerian Press?
It's the same thing. I am for revenue, which reflects the character... In other words, 
when you look at our constitution, when it comes to revenue allocation for example 
there are so many factors-derivation, population and so on and so forth. So all these 
are weighted and then it's a mix of this that finally informs the formula which you use 
in sharing revenue.
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But the central issue is this Derivation thing. I don't think anybody has any problem 
with Derivation. But it depends on how you define Derivation. Even among the 
Southern states, for instance, some o f them see resource control as oh! Let’s have 
Value-Added-Tax (VAT). Some of them see it as ah! It's oil. This again takes me 
back to the point I am making about the way the Press report from an ill-informed 
position.
Take this issue of revenue allocation for example. Everybody tends to focus on oil as 
if oil is the national economy. And if  reporters care to learn about elementary 
economics, they would know that inasmuch as it is important, it contributes about 
90% of our current account. But current account is just one aspect...When you take 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) o f the country; oil contributes only less than 
certainly 20%. Between Agriculture and Livestock, they contribute more than 45% of 
the GDP. And yet everybody is focussing on oil. And therefore you are distorting the 
whole national economy and you are reporting in such a way that people think oh! if 
you don't produce oil you have no right to certain things and so on and so forth. So we 
should report with balance, we should report with knowledge. And a lot of the time 
we don't do it. We don't even arm ourselves, as reporters, with basic knowledge about 
these things so that when you report, you will know that you are not just reporting 
sentiments.
Q: On Ownership.
Naturally there would be differences because everybody has his own perspectives. 
But at the same time you must realise that by now there is a common factor, which is 
that everybody is now agreed that the less government you have the better. Even 
people from the Northern part o f the country who fear that because they don't have 
enough resources and therefore may be short-changed in buying up all the assets, 
agree that there is no stopping privatisation. But it depends on how you go about it. If 
you go about it in such a way that at the end o f it all, the national assets are not 
cornered by one section of the country. I think this is something, which is shared by 
all.
This Federal Character thing for instance, you will find that people are always for it. 
The only thing is that, you see, in the armed forces you will say let's have Federal 
Character because I think the Northerners dominate that. But when it comes to other 
things you'd say, no, no, no let's not have Federal Character, let's have merit. And then 
the Northerners would begin to say, ah! When it comes to acquiring the assets you'd 
say let's have Federal Character but if  it is the armed forces, simply because you think 
we are in the dominant position which may be an illusion, then it's let's not have 
Federal Character.
But the New Nigerian which we are gathered here this morning to celebrate in the 
sense that we are telling its history in the last twenty years is the prime champion of 
Federal Character. It's one of the things it was able to succeed in doing because it 
championed the cause o f Federal Character and at the end of the day it was put in the 
constitution. At least there is a consensus that there is a need for Federal Character, 
the quarrel is about how you implement it.
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Q: Does Ownership influence the way the Press Perform?
You don't set up a newspaper and give it to somebody to just write anything he wants. 
There are certain interests you wanted to protect in the first place whether the owner 
is an individual or is government. So naturally those things would be there. But there 
is always the overall national interest. That's difficult to interpret because we would 
have our perspectives on what it is. But the important thing is that you should try and 
get all the perspectives when you are reporting and not just your own perspective. 
When you do that you then report it and allow the reader to be the judge of where to 
draw the line or the balance of all these things.
Everybody would always have a perspective. I have one you have one. But if you 
want to report you should reflect all the sides to an issue and let the reader be the 
judge. But when you want to come and write your Editorial or you want to comment, 
then it's clear that it's your perspective that you are now writing about. In that case 
you can write only your perspective. But invariably you find that among Pressmen all 
too often they even pretend that their comment is a fact.
Q: Government Policies and the Press.
For instance at a technical level, poor communication, even the cost of production for 
newspapers, all these are hindrances. But for me the greatest hindrance is prejudice. 
This is the one we seem unable to overcome. We are all too often blinded by our 
prejudices whether they are religious or ethnic and so on and so forth. They come 
right through in our reports. For me this is the greatest obstacle. There are other 
obstacles but they are easy to overcome. Even the prejudice is easy to overcome; it's 
just that we don't exert ourselves to overcome it. All it requires is balance.
Naturally the value system of the Press and the government is kind of antithetical. 
Whereas the Press' central value system is to report it all, the central value system of 
government is to keep our secrets secret. So to that extent that conflict could be there. 
But still if you look at the history of the Nigerian Press, it's one of the freest in the 
world. When people say it's the freest in Africa, I would say it goes beyond Africa. 
We have problems, we are jailed, and there are decrees that are anti-press and so on 
and so forth. But because of sheer practice, sheer experience of history, the Press, in 
spite of all these still tend to report.
If for instance you are to take every libel case to court, I am sure most newspapers 
would shut down because we report with such abandon that we seem to ignore all the 
rules. So we are free in spite of whatever government policies. The Government shuts 
down newspapers grab Editors etc yet the Nigerian Press still remains free.
Q: Going by the Policy Statement of the New Nigerian from its inception, how 
would you rate the Newspaper vis-a-vis our quest for national integration?
I would rate the New Nigerian very high. The central theme was, to quote the late 
Sardauna of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello: "Truth is the greatest weapon". That value 
nobody would quarrel with because it's a universal value. Now how you implement 
that value some may have quarrels with but the New Nigerian has stood true to that 
value, for at least the first twenty years.
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Q: Talking about the Northern Islamic values...
Absolutely no quarrels with that insofar as that do not denigrate non-Islamic values. 
And it doesn't. Some of the best staff we have had is Christians. In fact we have had 
Christian Managing Directors. We have had Christian Editors. Down the line we have 
had many Christians serving in New Nigerian and I don't think they had any problem 
with the contents of the New Nigerian because as much as possible it was balanced.
Q: What about National Integration when you are out to promote one value?
There is always a collection o f values. In any case let's face it tell me which 
newspaper does not have a value. Take the Daily Times for instance, is it not Federal 
government-owned. People perceive it as largely Christian and yet the Federal 
government owns it. People have no quarrel with that so, why do you have quarrel 
with New Nigerian if  it propagates an essentially Islamic value. The New Nigerian 
has not gone out of its way to say look! This Islam is our official religion.
But there is no newspaper in the world, which does not try to reflect what it thinks, is 
the core value of the majority of its readers. There is none. So it's the same thing with 
New Nigerian. So because I propagate my own standpoint of view that is not to say 
that I am saying it is either that or let's split. No I am saying, this is the value by 
which I live that is the value by which you live, let's find a common ground so that on 
certain common issues we will move together. And I don't think you would quarrel 
with that.
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(VIIC) INTERVIEW WITH CHIEF (PRINCE) HENRY O. ODUKOMAIYA,
FORMER CHIEF EXECUTIVE AND MANAGING DIRECTOR, CHAMPION 
NEWSPAPERS LTD, ON SATURDAY 17/02/01 IN LAGOS.
Q: How would you assess the Nigerian press during the pre-independence and 
post-independence period?
The role of the press prior to independence in 1960 was very significant. You must 
recall that Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe set up the Zikist Group of Newspapers. It started with 
the West African Pilot, then the Comet and a number of other newspapers, which have 
now gone into extinction but which at that time played a catalytic role of gingering 
people up to their rights. They made them aware that they were in bondage because a 
lot of people did not even know that they were in bondage. A lot of people took it for 
granted that the British were there and that they would be there forever. But with the 
arrival from the United Kingdom o f people like Herbert Silas Macaulay, Bode 
Thomas and also the advent of the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) and then Dr. 
Nnamdi Azikiwe, when he arrived from the United States in 1937, first going to the 
Gold Coast, now Ghana, they took the steps to sensitise Nigerians to their rights and 
the need for them to fight the British colonialists for independence. When Dr. 
Azikiwe came back to Nigeria after he had worked in the Gold Coast, he joined the 
political fray. Well it was not so much a political fray then as it was the NYM that 
was very active but Dr. Azikiwe thought that one way he could make his role felt very 
much was to set up the West African Pilot. And from the West African Pilot, he went 
ahead to set up some other newspapers in Ibadan, in the East and in the North.
So it was up to the press at that time to drum the beat of nationalism, to get people to 
be aware that the nation was in bondage, that Nigeria was not free and that the British 
had no right to be here. They nevertheless acknowledged that when the British came 
particularly towards the end of the 18th century and early in the 19th century as the 
Royal Niger Company (RNC) which later became the United African Company 
(UAC), they also brought Christianity in the year 1842. And that along with 
Christianity came some manifest signs o f civilisation as it was Christianity that was 
the precursor of Western education. Given this reality, the nationalists realised that it 
was only natural for people who had imbibed Christianity and Western ways of life to 
accept and admire the British, but they took it upon themselves to remind such people 
that the British still had no right to be here. As the number of people who were 
conscious of this fact was very insignificant, it behoved on people like Dr. Azikiwe, 
Sir Ernest Ikoli and the Odemo o f Ishara, who were all founders of the NYM, to be in 
the vanguard of Nigerian nationalism. They had mushroom presses with which to 
spread their ideas but the real nationalist press that they had was the West African 
Pilot, then later the Daily Service and not much longer the Nigerian Tribune in 1949.
So the role of the press lay principally in galvanising the people, getting them to know 
their rights, crystallising their views and letting the people know that, even though the 
British brought electricity, the railway etc, the fact that they still subjugated us was 
enough to neutralise all that they did. So it was up to the press to crystallise the 
nationalist instinct in the nation and the role o f the press in that regard was played 
very significantly by the West African Pilot and other newspapers set up by Dr. 
Azikiwe and the Daily Service which was set up by the NYM and then latterly the 
Nigerian Tribune in 1949. Now I joined the Daily Times in 1957, which was pre­
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independence, after I left Ghana that year. But by the time I joined the Nigerian press, 
most people were fully aware o f their rights and the fight for independence was 
getting to a crescendo, it was getting to its peak because the constitutional conferences 
had been held and a definite date had been fixed for Nigeria's independence. As a 
matter of fact, as at that time two Regions, the Eastern and the Western, had become 
self-governing. Only the Northern Region became self-governing at a later date.
Q: And then after independence what happened? No doubt, the nationalists co­
operated among themselves and used the medium of the press to conscientise the 
people against British colonial rule. But were there divisive forces within then?
Of course there were. You can trust the British people. But let me tell you that the 
various forces that combined to fight the British imperialism between 1946 and the 
1950s before independence were mainly the Labour Movement, which was set up by 
the British, the political movements and the press. Chief Michael Imoudu, who used 
the Nigerian Railway which was the biggest parastatal then, headed the Labour 
Movement. As a matter o f fact the Nigerian Railway pre-dated the Nigerian Civil 
Service, which was much smaller, but the Nigerian Railway was the unifying force 
for the whole country.
But when independence came in 1960, what you call the divisive forces naturally set 
in. These divisive forces were also there before independence because from the NYM, 
sprung up political parties such as the National Council of Nigeria and the Camerouns 
(NCNC), the Egbe Omo Oduduwa, which pre-dated the Action Group (AG). The AG 
was formed in 1949, while Egbe Omo Oduduwa came into existence in 1945. The 
Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) was formed in 1951. Now as much as possible, 
these major political groupings tried to cover up the chasm between them for the 
purpose of the struggle for Nigeria's independence. But as soon as Nigeria's 
independence had been won, it became obvious that each o f these parties had to go 
their own separate ways, particularly as each of them had different areas of the 
country under their control. The AG was in control of the Western Region and the 
NCNC controlled the Eastern Region while the NPC controlled the Northern Region. 
But by far the most dominant o f the three parties, was the NCNC because it had a 
substantial following in the North through the Northern Elements Progressive Union 
(NEPU), it also had a substantial following in the West through the Grande Alliance. 
And of course it was almost entirely in control of the Eastern Region. So after 
independence the first election that was fought was the one in 1964. For that election 
there were these three parties and some other minor parties. Each of the three major 
parties knew it was impossible for each o f them to win a dominant majority, so they 
tried to go into alliance. The NPC did not make any pretensions about it being a 
nation-wide party and the name o f the party said it all, Northern Peoples Congress. 
They were satisfied with winning the Northern States because they knew if they did 
that they would be in a commanding position to control the Central Government and 
all they tried to do was that. They would have done that successfully but for the fact 
that the AG had its own minority party in the North which was the United Middle Belt 
Congress headed by Joseph Tarka and the NCNC had the NEPU in alliance with 
Malam Aminu Kano.
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Q: My interest really is how the press fits into all these.
Yes it was through the press that the activities of the political parties became known. 
So the press by itself did very little but by mirroring public opinion, by reporting what 
was going on in the polity it made its impact felt. It was not supposed to do more than 
that anyway after all one o f the major functions of the press is to report what is going 
on and to inform and to entertain and to educate.
The Nigerian press did not do anything untoward until the first post-independent 
election in 1964 which was won, one must concede, by the NPC in alliance with the 
NCNC as they agreed to form a coalition government. Much as Chief Obafemi 
Awolowo tried to get the NCNC leader to form an alliance with him, superior forces 
were at play and it was not possible for that to happen. And in any case before that 
election Chief Awolowo had already been incarcerated. But as at the time of the next 
election which was in 1965, the Nigerian press consisted mainly of the Daily Times, 
the West African Pilot, the Daily Service, the Nigerian Tribune and the Morning Post. 
There were of course Regional newspapers, which confined themselves mainly to 
their areas. For instance there was the Taflki Kwabo in the North; there was also the 
Nigerian Citizen in Zaria also in the North. There was the Eastern Nigerian Outlook 
in the East and as I have already mentioned, the Niger/aw Tribune in the West, in 
Ibadan. There was a newspaper called the Echo in the area that later became known as 
the Mid-West. But the newspapers that were in evidence were mainly the Daily 
Times, the West African Pilot, the Daily Service and the Morning Post. The Morning 
Post, unfortunately, did not play a very good role. I remember the national strike of 
1964 or 1965 (Find out). Ebenezer Williams (Chief Abiodun Aloba) founded the 
Morning Post for the Federal Government. Now the role that Chief Aloba made the 
Morning Post to play at that time was unfortunately a very bad role. There was the 
Morning Post, which was to all intents and purposes reported that the workers had 
called off their strikes which, was definitely not true. So what the striking workers 
then did was to the Morning Post and set the place on fire. But because of the superior 
forces of the Nigeria Police Force, the fire was extinguished before too much damage 
had been done. But already because o f that situation the workers boycotted the 
Morning Post following which the days o f the Morning Post became numbered and 
so by the time the Army came in early 1966 the Morning Post had gone into 
extinction.
So the only newspapers that were in existence and which we could call the Nigerian 
press, were the Daily Times, the Daily Service, the West African Pilot, the Nigerian 
Tribune, the Nigerian Citizen in Zaria and the Gaskiya Tafiki Kwabo in Kaduna both 
in the North, the Nigerian Outlook in the East and the Echo in the Mid-West, 
combined in their various ways to mirror public opinion to the extent that every 
political party knew what was going on in the country. That was practically what the 
press was, as far as the first years of independence were concerned. At that time the 
Daily Times was still managing to play the significant role of independence because 
don’t forget that then, the Daily Times was still privately owned. As a matter of fact, 
by 1963/64 the Daily Times became the first Newspaper Company to be quoted on the 
Stock Exchange. The other newspapers except the Morning Post owned by the 
Federal Government were privately owned. Although the Northern Regional 
Government owned the Nigerian Citizen, it appeared that that Government didnt 
control the newspaper, as it was apparent that the Editors of the Nigerian Citizen
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allowed the newspaper to be run properly.
But by 15th January 1966 when Major Kaduna Nzeogwu-led coup d'etat took place, I 
must tell you that the first thing that everybody did was to welcome the coup because 
if consider the immediate happenings before the coup, everybody was happy that the 
Army had come to topple the politicians. For instance there was this Wetie (Explain 
what it means) in the West where election was unabashedly rigged and even the 
Federal election was alleged to have been rigged too; there was the incarceration of 
Chief Obafemi Awolowo etc. So it was no surprise that most people jumped for joy in 
1966 to welcome the Military coup. But that was short-lived because as at that time, 
Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi, who was the most senior officer in the Nigerian Armed 
Forces took over the leadership o f the Federal Military Government. At that particular 
time Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe the Governor-General of Nigeria, was away on holidays in 
England. The acting Governor-General was the Speaker of the Senate (Nwafor Orizu? 
Find out) but instead of the remnants o f the Federal Government rising up to resist the 
coup, they surrendered and allowed Major-General Ironsi to over the Government. 
What Major-General Ironsi did for the first six months was to run the Government as 
a Unitary Government.
It was at that time that the role o f the press became manifest because the ownership 
structure of the various presses began to show in the things that they published and 
printed. The Daily Times was trying to play a role between the various forces trying 
to pretend that it did not belong to any o f the groups. But there it was the Daily Times 
could not so much hide its pretensions. But because I was very much part of the Daily 
Times at that time, I can tell you that a lot o f people who knew what was happening 
thought that the leadership of the Daily Times had been bought over. The Chairman of 
the Daily Times at that time was Alhaji Babatunde Jose and a lot of people thought 
that he was pro-Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) led by Chief Ladoke 
Akintola. But when the Army came they killed Chief Akintola, they killed Chief 
Okotie-Eboh (Find out what his position was in the First Republic), they killed the 
Prime-Minister Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, they killed the Sardauna of Sokoto, Sir 
Ahmadu Bello and they also killed a number of Army Officers. So when Major- 
General Ironsi took over and started to roll out decrees, these decrees, unfortunately, 
had the effect of crystallising a lot o f discontent against the new Military regime all 
over the country. The Northern leaders began to meet secretly even though politics 
was banned and during their secret meetings they made it known that they were going 
to resist what appeared to them to be the discriminatory manner in which the first 
coup was executed. So there and then some o f the players in the current historical 
dispensation, who were in the Army at that time, like retired General Theophilus Y. 
Danjuma, who at that time was a Captain or a Major, went after Major-General Ironsi 
who was on a tour o f the Provinces as there called then, with Ibadan as his first major 
call. T. Y. Danjuma led a group of 31 Army Officers to Ibadan and rounded up the 
Military Governor Fajuyi (Find out his full name and rank) and demanded that he 
surrendered his guest the Military Head o f State, Major-General Ironsi. Fajuyi refused 
saying that whatever was going to happen to Ironsi should happen to him also. So 
they took the two of them and killed them.
That appeared to have been the last straw that broke the camel's back for the Nigerian 
press, as they no longer had any pretensions of unity. It became a case of to thy tent 
Oh! Israel'. During the period o f Military administration starting from 1966, the press
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had no freedom, well they had some freedom but the freedom was suppressed. So the 
role of the press at that time had to dovetail towards the ability to just managing to 
exist. It had to suppress its personality, it had to pretend to be loyal to the government 
of the day, and otherwise it would be closed down. That was what happened until 
1975 when General Muritala Muhammed overthrew General Yakubu Go won's 
regime. But not long after the new regime took over power, General Muhammed 
announced the Federal Government take-over of the Daily Times. I was still there. In 
fact he announced the seizure o f the Daily Times and said that the Federal 
Government was taking over controlling interest in the Daily Times. Of course that 
was done to muzzle the Daily Times, emasculate it and made sure that it did not have 
any independence. Don't forget that at that time the Daily Times was by far the 
strongest and the most viable o f all the newspapers in the country. So once that was 
done all the other newspapers had to take their cue. So it can safely be said that until 
1979 when the Military handed over power to a democratically elected Government 
led by Alhaji Shehu Shagari, there was not any measure freedom for the Nigerian 
press.
Q: Going by the various events that you have highlighted and which have 
apparently shaped the Nigerian press over the years, would you say that the 
press should have avoided being sucked into that kind of situation given the fact 
that their role in society should be unity and not disruptive and destructive 
regional or tribal politics? In other words, would it have been possible or not for 
the press to have risen above that level of partisanship?
Well yes but you have to look at the structure of ownership of the press itself. As I 
have already told you, even though the Morning Post newspaper which was set up by 
the Federal Government lived for only a few years from 1960-1964 and died a 
premature death, there were some Regional Governments which also had their own 
newspapers. So it was natural for such newspapers to support the ownership. But at 
the Federal level during the time that we are talking about, the West African Pilot was 
still in existence and it was still somewhat vibrant. The Nigerian Tribune was still 
very vibrant and it has always been within certain degree of limitations. The New 
Nigerian was set up in January 1966 and it was as if it was planned to coincide with 
the Military take-over o f Government few days after in January 1966, but I can tell 
you that it was merely propitious, it had nothing to do with coup at all.
So all the newspapers were there all right, but because of the various degrees of 
schisms that existed in the various parts o f the country, they could not play many roles 
by way of integration. They could not play any integrative role because each of the 
newspapers had its own limitations. So the reason the Nigerian press could not play 
much integrative role was because Nigerian politics itself was sharply divided along 
ethnic lines. Don't forget that by 1963, the Western Region was split into two when 
the Mid-West was carved out o f it. Then by 1967, at the commencement of the 
Biafran war, the Military Government led by Gowon also created 12 more States in 
order to emasculate the Eastern Region which, was trying to secede from Nigeria. By 
that action he removed the carpet or rug from under the feet of the Biafran leader, 
Colonel Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu. But when the war ended the way it ended in 
1970, there were so many cleavages in the Nigerian political system and the various 
Nigerian presses acted along that line. Not even the Daily Times could be immune 
from partisanship and in any case the Federal Government had already acquired the
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Daily Times by then. Indeed the restructuring o f the Daily Times by the Government 
became effective in 1976 when the topmost 15 Officers, Managers and Directors 
including myself, were swept off the scene. The Managing Director, Alhaji Babatunde 
Jose, was forced to go on retirement together with the rest of us. I think it was the 
thinking of the Federal Government that if  the top 15 Officers were allowed to carry 
on they might do things that might not be pleasant to the Government. So we were all 
retired. These were some o f the things that made it difficult for the press to play any 
major role towards national integration.
Q: As someone who has always been involved in the ownership structure of 
newspapers like the National Concord and the Champion, what would you say is 
really the motivation for setting up newspapers?
I can say something about this because, as you have already acknowledged, I have 
been involved in the setting up o f at least two national newspapers and I have worked 
with their proprietors. The motivation for Chief Moshood K. O. Abiola (National 
Concord Proprietor) was first and foremost political. Chief Abiola set up the Concord 
Press in 1979, the Company was incorporated in 1979 but the newspaper itself came 
into being on March 1, 1980. Now the major ambition, the major aim of Chief Abiola 
was, as I have already stated, political. He wanted a newspaper that would be able to 
spotlight and highlight the political activities o f the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) 
which was the ruling party during that period, of which he was a very staunch 
member. The NPN thought that it needed a newspaper to fight its cause and Chief 
Abiola offered to set up that newspaper. So although the newspaper was set up 
principally or should I say initially to support the NPN, within a matter of months, he 
himself and the leadership o f the NPN fell out and he relinquished that aspect of his 
control over the Concord newspaper structure. Then from that time onward, the 
newspaper became a mouthpiece for the propagation o f whatever the philosophy of 
Chief Abiola was. Indeed it was only between three to six months that Chief Abiola 
really used his newspaper to support the NPN.
And your question was what was their motivation for setting up newspapers? The 
motivation of people setting up newspapers at that time was first to be relevant and in 
being relevant they had in mind political calculations. Some of them might not have 
had the intention of going into politics but they wanted to be able to be reckoned with 
as Kingmakers. In the case o f Chief Abiola, he wanted not only to be a Kingmaker; he 
wanted to be a King himself if  the opportunity offered itself. And the other newspaper 
that was set up at that tim e...
Q: Like the Guardian newspaper by Chief Alex Ibru?
Very good and thank you for bringing in the Guardian. Well, the motivation for Chief 
Ibru was certainly not political at all. Chief Ibru was not political. What was apparent 
at that time that the Guardian was being set up was the Daily Times had already been 
taken-over by the Federal Government, the Nigerian Tribune, of course belonged to 
the Awolowo group, the National Concord belonged to Chief Abiola, the New 
Nigerian was supposedly owned by the Federal Government but it was still fighting 
the Northern cause and so Chief Ibru saw that there was a very, very good opportunity 
for a newspaper which, did not play any partisan role to succeed. So the first 
newspaper in modem times in Nigeria to really come out as an independent
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newspaper w as the Guardian.
Q: It had no interests to protect, economic or otherwise?
Well I can't vouch for that at all because even though the Guardian does not belong 
to the Ibru Group as such but because the proprietor of the Guardian of the Ibru 
family that owns the Ibru Group, naturally it has some economic interests to protect. 
But the protection of these economic interests was not the raison d'etre for setting up 
the Guardian newspapers.
Q: On the whole one could say that there is hardly any newspaper established 
without any ulterior motive. But the point I am interested in actually is how can 
the Nigerian press play an effective role in society without being encumbered by 
whatever interest lie behind their establishment?
Well if you look at the issue o f integration, everybody starts from a nucleus. Even if 
you are thinking o f integrating the whole o f Nigeria you have to start from a place, 
you must have a root. Therefore, if  you have a root, you can then shoot out from the 
root and go ahead to start playing the integrative role. The only newspaper that I can 
tell you was probably set up to do that was the Guardian. The other national 
newspaper, the Champion, which I also helped to set up, has as its proprietor, Chief 
Emmanuel Iwuanyanwu. You know as at that time, the West African Pilot, which had 
an Iboman, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe as its proprietor, had already gone into extinction 
and so Chief Iwuanyanwu thought that the Ibo race stood to be marginalised if there 
was no voice to speak on their behalf. The only voices that were available to them at 
that time only existed in their own part o f the country, which was the East. For 
instance newspapers like the Nigerian Statesman and the Daily Star were published 
from Owerri in the East and so they were regional or local newspapers. So Chief 
Iwuanyanwu wanted a newspaper which would be a nationally accepted newspaper 
but which would start off by protecting the rights of the Ibo nation, the Ibo cause. So 
to the extent that the Champion Group o f newspapers was set up by an Ibo man, in 
Lagos and not in the East, where the proprietor comes from, you can say that the 
Champion newspapers had some integrative tendencies, unlike the Nigerian Tribune 
which was set up by a Yoruba man in Ibadan and has always remained in that Yoruba 
part of the country, and unlike the New Nigerian which was set up by the Northern 
Regional government in Kaduna. The philosophy had to do with the intention of the 
proprietor to use the newspaper to integrate the Ibo man into the Nigerian society.
Q: Was that clearly stated in the Mission Statement?
Yes, it was. It said: 'Starting with the Ibo nation.' In effect the Champion newspaper 
was set up by an Ibo man, using the newspaper to promote the interest of the Ibo 
nation within the context of the Nigerian State. The newspaper first came out on 
October 1, 1988 and that Mission Statement is there for you to read and understand. 
So to that extent you can say that the Champion and also the Guardian had their own 
role and they did play the role o f national integration and even now they are still 
doing so.
Q: What Government policies do you think have aided or hindered the Nigerian 
press?
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Within the past 15 years the restrictions placed in the way o f newspapers, are very 
subtle. For instance newsprint has become a very scarce commodity even though the 
Federal purported to have set up a newsprint firm at Oku-Iboku in Aqua Ibom State in 
1980, that industry has existed only in the breach. It is there and even when it was in 
its full bloom, what it was producing was not enough for the Nigerian newspapers to 
consume. Over the past twelve years, Oku-Iboku has gone, perhaps not into 
extinction, but has become moribund. The present Federal Government, according to 
President Olusegun Obasanjo, has come up with a substantial sum of money to 
resuscitate Oku-Iboku, but as we are talking now, it has not been resuscitated. Now as 
if that was not enough, the Federal Government is imposing a very high and 
prohibitive duty on the importation o f newsprint. Well there is nothing discriminatory 
or in favour or against the press but the imposition of prohibitive duties on the 
importation of the raw materials used by the press by the Federal Government, is 
bound to have a very deleterious effect on the press.
The Federal Government also has passed very draconian Nigerian press laws. In 1988, 
(Check the proper year) for instance, when Prince Tony Momoh, a former journalist, 
was the Minister of Information, the Government passed the Nigerian press law. You 
see, unfortunately, the Government always finds it convenient to use journalists to 
pass some of these draconian laws against the press. But the Nigerian press law is 
now being reviewed. So these are some o f the direct and subtle ways the Government 
has tried to restrict the press. I wouldn't say that any of the laws has aided the press in 
any manner; rather they had tried to emasculate the press.
Then also you think o f what they have imposed on anybody wishing to set up a 
newspaper. They have passed a law to the effect that anybody that wants to set up a 
newspaper must pay an amount close to one Million Naira (Nlm) to the Federal 
Government and to the Government of the State from which you want to set up and 
operate the newspaper. I can tell you that no newspaper has obeyed that law. They 
have been waiting for the Government to take them to court so they could fight their 
cause but the Federal Government even during the dark days o f General Sani Abacha, 
have not had enough courage to enforce the law.
Q: So there are no laws that one could say have aided the press in the 
performance of its duties in this country?
I don’t know of any.
Q: Would you say that Nigeria is a nation-state yet?
We are trying to be one
Q: Could that be affecting the press too?
It could be affecting the press. But the answer to your question is that Nigeria is on 
the verge of becoming a nation-state and the Nigerian press is rallying to the support 
of the Government in this respect.
Qi How would you rate the role of the press on such issues as the Organisation of
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Islamic Conference (OIC), Revenue Allocation, Census and Federal Character 
vis-a-vis what they are supposed to do in terms of promoting national 
integration?
OIC, Sharia, Revenue Allocation, Census, Federal Character etc are all issues on 
which it is impossible for the press to really speak with one voice. It is not possible 
because the press is representative o f all sectors o f the Nigerian community. The press 
for instance speaks for the Ibos, speaks for the Yorubas, and speaks for the 
Hausa/Fulani, Kanuris and the ethnic minorities. If you are talking of a specific 
segment of the press, yes, I can tell you what they have done. But talking of the press 
as a whole, the press as a whole cannot speak on any o f these issues with one voice 
because the issues are very contentious. OIC, Sharia, Revenue Allocation, the Census 
or even the Federal Character or come nearer home, the issue of Sovereign National 
Conference or National Conference, all o f these are issues for which it is impossible 
for the Nigerian press to speak with one voice.
Q: But they are supposed to rise above ethnic or regional sentiments and see 
issues on the basis of how it is going to benefit us nationally?
We haven't reached that stage and I do not see which society has reached that stage 
where the ideal is the one that is preached and implemented. So it is not yet in 
Nigeria. Every newspaper has to have its own standard and also its own limit- 
limitations of its authority and limitations o f its vision. So because of this it is almost 
impossible to find a situation in which all the newspapers will agree to decry or to 
disclaim or to applaud any particular matter. Of course there have been some 
instances. For instance when General Abacha died, it was convenient for everybody to 
shout that that 'Goggled one' was a tyrant, he was a dictator, he was a thief, he was a 
common criminal, all o f that, but when he was alive nobody had the courage to do 
that. When his successor, General Abdusalam Abubakar was there too nobody had the 
courage to disparage him because discretion is the better part o f valour. So I won't say 
that it is possible to see the press or use the press as one unit.
Q: When then could the press come out as one for the nation? Are there specific 
issues you cite?
Yes, there are. I mean, for instance, the press spoke with one voice when we were 
fighting for independence. But once independence was won, of course everybody 
went his own way. When we fought against the Military, the press spoke with one 
voice. For instance now the press would rise up against any coup, no matter the 
section of the press, even including the New Nigerian. They would rise up to 
condemn the coup if ever there was any attempt. But if  the coup succeeds, of course, 
they will not be able to. However while the coup is in the making, they would 
condemn it. Soldiers have often told us that they are wise enough to know that when 
they won't get a favourable reception from the population, they do not stage a coup. 
So for now, if any group of soldiers tries to stage a coup, they will not get a good 
reception from the press. They will not, I can tell you that.
Q: Would you also say that is true when it comes to issues between Nigeria and 
other countries?
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Of course the press would speak with one voice. That is still another variant of 
nationalism, isn't it? When it comes to international issues involving Nigeria and other 
countries, you can trust all sections of the press to speak with one voice.
Q: Would you say, in summary, that the press has instilled in Nigerians, a sense 
of national identity in any way?
The press has always done that whenever the issues at stake do not pertain to any 
particular ethnic group, whenever the issues involved are not contentious and do not 
border on the interest of a particular ethnic group, whenever the issues involved do 
not relate to any particular religion, whenever the issues involved do not border on for 
instance, gender, the press could rise up and speak with one voice.
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(VHD) INTERVIEW WITH ALHAJI MOHAMMED IBRAHIM, FORMER 
DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF FEDERAL RADIO CORPORATION OF NIGERIA 
(FRCN) AND NIGERIAN TELEVISION AUTHORITY (NTA) ON SATURDAY 
27/01/01 IN KADUNA.
Q: The Nigerian press and their role in national integration. Let’s look at the 
press in pre-independent Nigeria and then post-independent Nigeria. Their role 
then, what happened after independence and the role that they are playing now.
The Nigerian press pre-independent was largely under-developed. Under-developed 
in the sense that there weren't many o f them. We had the Tribune, the West African 
Pilot, the Daily Times, and the Nigerian Citizen as it was then and the concern was the 
struggle for independence, supporting the political leadership, the political parties, 
promoting regionalism rather than federalism as a matter of fact.
But the only common denominator at the time was to kick the British out in a most 
peaceful manner. They highlighted developments but their concern was largely more 
from the regional perspective. One could say that there was only one national 
newspaper, which was privately- owned, the Daily Times, which was circulated to 
every part of the country along with the sister, the Sunday Times. They were the best 
known newspapers. Paradoxically, they were partly British-owned and partly 
Nigerian-owned.
But coming over to independence, after they have succeeded in getting rid of the 
British as peacefully as possible, the issue now was national unity, national 
integration and national cohesion. We had a situation whereby the political structure 
of Nigeria was largely based on regionalism. People identified more with their regions 
than being Nigerians in particular. But the newspapers played a responsible role. And 
I think it had to do with nature o f the Nigerian society-magnanimity, compromise, 
understanding, so that brinkmanship was largely avoided. They never promoted 
disintegration.
The political parties attempted to own newspapers-if you remember the Northern 
Peoples Congress (NPC), had a newspaper published in Kano and the Federal 
government owned a newspaper- the Morning Post. These newspapers never really 
survived but the changes that were taking place in the country gave room for more 
newspapers to be established. The Tribune became stronger and the Daily Times 
became widely circulated. The Morning Post was really in difficulties. Circulation 
was less and the quality of the printing was not particularly good for people to buy. So 
there were more concentrated on those that were circulating largely within and outside 
the country. In the Northern part o f the country, we saw the demise of the Daily Mail 
owned by... we saw the demise o f the Nigerian Citizen owned by the Northern 
Nigerian government which later gave birth to the New Nigerian newspaper, which 
remained a very strong voice, a very veritable source of information because of strong 
editorial, and a strong advocate o f national unity and protecting the interest of the 
North, in the context of one Nigeria.
Then we saw attempt by people to set up a privately-owned newspaper. Unfortunately 
such attempt did not succeed. So other than the Tribune and the Daily Times, there 
weren't any other Nigerian newspaper which was not government-owned. We knew
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that when the Morning Post was dead, the Federal government did not venture into 
owning newspaper until after the 1975 change of government when the government, 
led by Muritala-Obasanjo decided to take-over the Daily Times and the New Nigerian 
newspapers.
Now after this, what role was the press playing? We saw how much they supported 
the government, during the civil war years, how much they propagated national unity, 
how much they propagated reconciliation and restructuring and so forth. How much 
they campaigned for a strong central government, especially under the 1979 
constitution.
The greatest credit o f the Nigerian media is the fact that they fought the military. They 
tried as much as possible to get rid of the military to handover power to the civilians. 
Now the 1979 constitution because of the outcome o f the election some found it very 
difficult to accept Shagari as the elected president of this country because of the 
nature of the victory. Some newspapers were looking at that government as a lame 
duck government, weak and not enjoying the support of the overall majority of 
Nigerians. But the press enjoyed some relative freedom. They criticised the 
government's extravagance, they criticised the government's recklessness, they 
criticised the government's inaction in some direction but they also agreed with the 
government in its programme o f Green Revolution which led to a massive action in 
the Agricultural sector. We very well knew that that government popularised farming 
in every part of the country. No other government did better than that in terms of 
bringing people to participate in a particular government policy. But because of the 
nature of the divisiveness, the Shagari government did not enjoy the kind of support 
from the Nigerian press.
So when Buhari took over in, they applauded the take-over. Then they suddenly 
realised that, after all, Buhari was not a friend of the press, bringing draconian 
measures to instil discipline. And one o f the most difficult things to achieve in this 
country is to discipline the Nigerian press. We are reckless, we find it difficult to 
conform and we think that we are perfect and everybody is wrong. This is one of the 
major problems of the Nigerian press. Now having said that Buhari went away, he 
was overthrown; Babangida took-over the government. There were changes, major 
structural changes in every aspect of human life in this country, in the economy etc. 
The government introduced the structural adjustment programme but still the Nigerian 
press did not find it easy to be hostile to the Babangida government. It was after the 
June 12, 1993 election, that the Nigerian press really fought that government and 
contributed to the demise and the exit o f President Ibrahim Babangida. They 
campaigned against the Interim National Government (ING) of Ernest Shonekan. 
They proclaimed that one illegitimate. They showed their annoyance against the 
annulment of the election. They showed their annoyance against some of the 
repressive measures, which the government o f Babangida was pursuing against the 
press and other Nigerians.
What became worse was also, Abacha came, applauded by the military because there 
was instability in the country. And they felt, well Abacha has now come, at least there 
should be some element o f stability. But instability continued until such a time when 
we realised that Abacha had dug in and there was nothing anybody could do except to 
conform to the wishes o f the government o f the day. So the Nigerian tolerated
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Abacha s government not because they wanted to but because they were afraid of 
what might have happened or what could happen to them. Detention was rampant, 
even journalists were not spared; other anti-government forces were also not spared. 
They were able not to be too critical because they the consequences were there. So we 
continued limping on.
We have a veritable press, it has expanded, and more newspapers have come on to the 
streets. If you look at the last twenty years, more newspapers have come into the 
street in Nigeria-claiming to be national newspapers, projecting themselves as 
champion of Nigeria's democracy, Nigeria's national integration and pretending to be 
the champions of the common man. And you cannot deny that role to the press. You 
have to give them credit, they have done well, they are doing very well and I am sure 
they will continue to do well.
Today, I think Nigeria has the largest circulation of newspapers and magazines in the 
whole of Black Africa. This is a credit to us. What we require now is the expansion of 
the readership. They have a problem o f circulation. It's not easy for a newspaper to 
cover the whole o f Nigeria, to print in Lagos and reach Maiduguri or Sokoto or even 
Calabar the following day. It's not their fault; it's the fault of the system. 
Transportation in Nigeria is still underdeveloped. We do not have a good rail system. 
We do not have good air services that they can pick the edition at 9.00pm in Lagos; 
drop it in Kano, Maiduguri, Sokoto Calabar or Enugu. So generally the newspapers 
are delayed until the following day. If  we can get over that weakness, I think the 
circulation of newspapers will improve tremendously.
Q: Why did you say that the newspapers pretend to be national newspapers?
Everywhere in the world there is a fine dividing line between the quality press and 
tabloid-the popular newspapers or magazines or whatever. In Nigeria today you don’t 
find that fine dividing line. You can distinctly draw a line between the London Daily 
Mirror, The Express, and the Mail on one side; the Guardian, the Telegraph, the 
Times on the other. These are quality presses; these are tabloids, which are more 
concerned with sensational issues, human stories more than anything else. In Nigeria 
we don’t have that fine dividing distinction.
If you take the Guardian (Nigerian), for instance, it attempts to be a national 
newspaper. But if  you take the Triumph, for instance, it's a newspaper based in Kano, 
the circulation, probably does not go beyond Abuja. The Kano State government 
owns the Triumph. So that you find all o f them are struggling to be at the centre. We 
do not have what you call regional newspapers, which you can develop to cater for 
regional interests or local interests. Everybody is struggling to go into the centre. 
Everybody is discussing national issues instead of concentrating on regional or local 
or state issues, which are relevant to the people of that particular area. So we don’t 
have that fine dividing line and I am sure it will take sometime before we develop that 
kind of press-where we can have the Guardian, the New Nigerian, maybe the 
Champion, Tribune probably are quality newspapers; Vanguard, Punch, and others 
are tabloids, which are more concerned with human interest stories and so on.
But unfortunately, all the newspapers, you can take them-Guardian, Champion, 
Tribune, Vanguard, Daily Times, Sketch, National Interest- they are all, as I said,
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pretending to be national newspapers.
Q: Is that a plus or a minus?
I think its  a minus because we are neglecting certain specific aspects where those 
newspapers ought to play. Such aspects of our lives which they could concentrate on. 
Such aspects of our policies and politics which they could concentrate on and leave 
the rest to others.
Q: Like what?
Let's say out of each geographical zone that you could have one strong national 
newspaper. If you take the Guardian for instance, it could emerge as a strong national 
newspaper. If you take the Champion, it can also emerge as a strong national 
newspaper. If you take the New Nigerian, you can develop it to be a major national 
newspaper. So you can select some o f these newspapers and say alright-the owners of 
these newspapers ought to be able to develop them to be the national newspapers of 
Nigeria-three, four five of them instead o f everybody-it's just like jumping into a 
swimming pool with the same kind o f incompetence, the same kind of players, 
everybody is there but really there is nobody who has perfected the way and manner it 
should take.
Q: But why is that so?
I think it's the nature o f the Nigerian society and also the nature of the ownership. 
Nature of the ownership in the sense that if  you look at the-only in the last twenty 
years were we able to get privately-owned newspapers other than the Daily Times 
which was taken over later by the Federal government. The Guardian came up as a 
private initiative. Vanguard, Punch, Champion, This Day, National Interest, all these 
came out as privately-owned media organisations. ThisDay is a direct competitor, I 
would say, to the Guardian. In terms o f the quality of contents, in terms of objectives, 
in terms of mission statement, they are basically at par. So these can develop as two 
major national newspapers in Nigeria New Nigerian can join them, Tribune can join 
them, and Champion can join them. So at the end of the day, you have something like 
three, four or five newspapers which are really national. Pick up the Guardian, read 
their editorial on this particular national issue, compare it with what New Nigerian is 
saying, compare it with Champion is saying etc.
So it depends on the way you look at it. Regional attitudes dictate how newspapers 
behave. These are so9me of the problems we have in Nigeria. Nigeria is more than 
one country.
Q: Is it a deliberate thing that they are all striving to be national newspapers to 
the effect that today, there is not what one could call regional or local 
newspapers?
Let me put it to you this way. There is the general belief that any newspaper, which is 
not published in Lagos, will not enjoy the kind o f circulation it should enjoy, will not 
have the advertising revenue it requires etc. So this is one o f the considerations, which 
they have described to show that, yes! -They publish in Kano, it should circulate also
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in Lagos; they publish in Kaduna but it also circulates in Lagos; they publish in 
Calabar but it also circulates in Lagos. This is where the pretension is as I keep 
saying. That they pretend to be national newspapers because of advertising revenue, 
no more, no less.
If they are able to develop the market within their locality, generate as much revenue 
as possible, diversify their printing business, then they will no business going into the 
national platform. They will survive as regional newspapers. Everywhere, regional 
newspapers survive. In the United Kingdom, the Glasgow Herald is there; the 
Yorkshire Post is there, Sheffield Telegraph etc. These are regional newspapers. They 
have developed compared to The Guardian (London), The Independent, The Times, 
The Telegraph, or The Mail. So this is what I'd like to see in Nigeria. Newspapers that 
are clearly national, newspapers that are clearly regional, newspapers that are clearly 
State or local. So if you want to place your advertisement, you know exactly where to 
go. If I am selling a Car in Kaduna, I want a local newspaper to place my adverts. I 
have a house to rent out; I don’t want to put it in a newspaper, which will carry the 
advert to Lagos. I will look for a newspaper in Kaduna.
So these are some o f the issues the newspapers themselves have to concentrate on. 
Concentrate, in the sense that struggling to go into the national circulation is not easy. 
They don’t have the distribution network to be able to do it.
Q: If we have newspapers to promote certain interests-regional, State or local- 
How will that affect their role in performing national integration or unity?
There is no harm. Any newspaper, whether regional, local, State or Federal, can still 
promote national unity. The issue is you don’t have to sit down here and say, alright, 
we don’t need Nigeria as a country. Nobody would do that. But there is a fine 
dividing line. Because of the peculiar nature of our country, the enormous size, it's not 
easy for every newspaper to be a national newspaper.
Let me give you one typical example. In 1984, I was invited by the then Governor of 
Cross River State, Don Archibong, to come and take a look at the problem of The 
Chronicle. I went and looked at the problem of The Chronicle. It was costing him two 
hundred Naira a copy to print at that time even though the newspaper sold for about 
20 Kobo and they were only printing five thousand copies. They had an office in 
Kaduna; they had an office in Lagos, an office in Ibadan, Enugu, Port-Harcourt etc. I 
said look, you have no business covering those States, concentrate as a regional 
newspaper-Enugu, Port-Harcourt, Calabar-don’t bother about Lagos, about Kaduna 
and the other far places. When you acquire the wherewithal, when you acquire the 
national clout, you can gradually, automatically move into Lagos. Only then you will 
survive. But the moment you continue to operate in Calabar and hope to sell in Sokoto 
because you have people over there, it doesn't make sense.
So we looked at the newspaper, looked at the company, restructured it and worked out 
a strategy for them to follow, so that by the second year of their operation, they ought 
to be able to succeed, and then the third year they should be able to say that we are 
doing fine, the commercial and printing department is doing well, we think we can do 
without your subvention. Now this is government-owned newspaper. But if you are a 
private initiator and you run the newspaper in such a manner, the newspaper will
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collapse. The Reporter, which was set up by the late Musa Yar' Adua around 1992, 
has closed down. But since then The Weekly Trust started operation. It has done well. 
They have now started a daily newspaper, printed in Kaduna. But it takes time to 
develop, but they cannot continue pretending to be national newspapers, they are not. 
They can continue as regional newspapers, it’s healthy, and it's good for the country.
Q: Are there some dynamics that we don’t know about that influence the way 
the press operate in Nigeria?
Well, he who pays the piper dictates the tune and this is as true as ever in this country. 
Let me give you an example. Nobody can write in the Guardian to condemn the Fish 
industry or the shipping industry. Nobody could write in the National Concord of 
those days condemning the telephone services in Nigeria. It's not possible. So that's 
the reality. There are certain dynamics; there are certain underground, subterranean 
pressure here and there, watchful and remotely control how these newspapers operate. 
We may not know them but certainly they are there. If you tell me the New Nigerian 
is not remotely controlled by some other forces, I will say you are a liar because I 
believe it is. The same with the Times, the same with the Tribune. There are certain 
interests that they look after. The moment they begin to abandon those interests, then 
it is no longer New Nigerian, it is no longer Tribune, or it is no longer Champion.
Q: To what extent do such undercurrents affect the ability of the press to 
promote a sense of national identity or unity among Nigerians?
You have to consider the interest o f the owner, whether we like it or not. Time was 
when the ownership structure was entirely government. Today it is not. The 
newspapers that are government-controlled are not doing well-The New Nigerian, the 
Daily Times, the Sketch, and the Nigerian Observer etc.
Q: Why are they not doing well?
Because they are not given the freedom to operate. Time was when the Daily Times 
was the Daily Times. The moment it became Federal government-controlled and 
Federal government manipulation, people abandoned the Daily Times and went 
somewhere else. At a time the Daily Times circulated over three hundred thousand 
copies per day. Today I am sure the Daily Times is not able to circulate up to twenty 
thousand copies simply because it is a megaphone of government.
Q: Are there other reasons why people will abandon government newspapers?
They see the Daily Times as the propaganda arm of the government-whether popular 
or unpopular. It is the role of newspapers to educate, inform and entertain. It is not 
their role to propagate. They can propagate for instance a national course-national 
integration, national unity. But when you can't even criticise government for whatever 
it does, then people are not interested. People want to see a newspaper that is 
independent New Nigerian made a name at the time it made a name, because it was 
strong, it was authoritative, it was independent o f government. Even the government 
was afraid of the New Nigerian and the Nigerian public was protected. But the 
moment it became a megaphone of government, people abandoned the newspaper, the 
same with the Daily Times etc. They went for the Guardian, they went for the
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National Concord, they went for the Champion, and they went for Vanguard. Once 
you lose your readership, it is difficult to bring them back. It is not easy.
Q: But even the private newspapers, as you have mentioned, also have special 
interests that they protect...
Yes they have special interests but people feel more attracted when you attack 
government. Believe you me, Nigerians feel more impressed when a newspaper 
confronts government, whether privately- owned or government-owned... And that is 
why people say when you start a newspaper, make sure there is a controversy and that 
controversy will sell the newspaper. Nigerians are looking forward to sensationalism. 
That is why newspapers like the Tempo are selling.
Q: Are they doing the right thing?
Well whether they are doing the right thing, it's not for me to determine. It's for the 
readership to determine. This is not the problem with the newspapers; it's us 
Nigerians. People generally tend to believe what they read and see on the pages of 
newspapers and that's our problem. We find it difficult to draw a distinction. They 
cast a sensational headline and you read the body of the story, it's a different story 
entirely. But because it would sell, the newspapers continue in that fashion.
Q: That's not the problem of the Nigerian people but that of the journalists that 
sensationalise issues. Isn't it the role of the press, for instance to ensure that what 
it publishes is a true reflection of what is happening and not just to 
sensationalise?
No! No! No! No! Many o f them do not publish what they think is a true reflection of 
what is happening.
Q: Why that?
Because their main concern is to sell the newspapers. Selling the newspapers is much 
more important than publishing accurate reports.
Q: Isn't that a hindrance to their ability to promote national integration and 
identity?
It is, it is. Under normal circumstances, in any normal country, sensationalising issues 
in order to sell is not the role of the press. But what do you do?
Q: Why did you say "in any normal country"?
Nigeria is not a normal country. We believe in sensationalism. We believe in half- 
truths and there is no sincerity. So people just play to the gallery. Whatever is 
published, people will buy it, whatever rubbish is published, people will buy it. They 
are there; the junk magazines are selling.
Q: So would you say that, going by what the press has done, the Nigerian would 
readily identify with the country Nigeria?
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We certainly identify with Nigeria. We like Nigeria.
Q: Has the press promoted that? Or is the press responsible for that?
Yes, they have. Nobody, no newspaper in this country has ever promoted 
disintegration. They may criticise the structure, they may say we like adjustments here 
and there but no newspaper in this country has concentrated on how to break-up this 
country. The question of national unity is uppermost in the eyes of every newspaper 
in this country. Of course they may express their displeasure to say that either one part 
of the country is not being treated well, either we need to concentrate no such and 
such area, either it should be so and so, but really national unity, national integration, 
has always been uppermost in the minds of Nigerian newspapers. The moment they 
begin to talk of disintegration, there will be hues and cries of condemnation. People 
will condemn them because nobody wants it.
Q: Let us look at specific issues like the Organisation of Islamic Conference 
(OIC), Sharia, Revenue Allocation, and Census and rate how the Nigerian press 
has performed as they affect national integration and national identity.
OIC has nothing to do with Sharia. OIC is an organisation. Whether you are 100% 
Muslim or not, you are free to join OIC. It is the Nigerian media and the Nigerian 
people who made it look as if  it is whatever... Successive governments of Nigeria 
realise that it is an added source of soft loan for development without any strings 
attached. Sometimes, the loans are interest-free. It has nothing to do with religion. It's 
just because a group of Islamic countries came together and said that, each country 
with a Muslim population, no matter how small is free to join. Uganda is a member of 
OIC, Kenya is a member of OIC, and South Africa is a member of OIC. These 
countries are predominantly Christian. So these are the distinctions the Nigerian press 
has failed to make on this issue for their own reason.
Q: Why then did President Babangida take Nigeria into the OIC, in a rather 
surreptitious manner, in 1986?
No! No! No! No! Let me put it this way: Babangida did not make Nigeria a full 
member of the OIC. There are two categories o f membership: - You can be an 
observer or be a full or be a full member. In the same vein, if you want you can keep 
an Ambassador in the Vatican. Nigeria has a mission in the Vatican. There is no 
reason why it cannot become a member o f the OIC. Government as at the time 
Nigeria became member o f the OIC, failed to explain to the people. They should have 
said, 'being a member o f the OIC does not mean you will be called upon to accept 
anything or whatever. It's an avenue for soft loans etc'.
Now the Sharia issue, I must admit, has been over-dramatised. Over-dramatised in the 
sense that, yes, we had Sharia before independence. After independence, Sardauna of 
Sokoto set up a committee to advise him on how to fashion a harmonious relationship 
between Christians, Muslims, and Animists. Before we use to have three systems of 
law: -The Common law, which was done by the Magistrate court; the Sharia law, 
which was administered by the Alkalis; and the Mixed courts, which catered for those 
who may not wish to go to the Alkali courts or the Magistrate courts but more like a
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traditional court.
So the Sardauna set up that committee to examine what kind of legal system which 
will cater for the variety o f our people because of our diversity, because of our 
religious differences etc. They came up with a penal code and they invited Jurists 
from Pakistan, from Sudan, leading Jurists from the United Kingdom and our own 
Jurists here. And they sat down and came up with a penal code which became 
effective in the Northern state from 1962 up to 1999, when some states to think of 
introducing Sharia in their domain.
Now, in any society, change is difficult to accommodate. So it is not easy to change 
from penal code to Islamic Sharia law in any part of this country because you are 
bound to face resistance, either from Muslims or from Christians or from both. There 
is a growing number o f Muslims, who believe that there is no need for any state in 
this country to introduce the Sharia legal system, that whatever they are going to 
introduce, is well taken care o f by the penal code. But we are talking of politics. The 
Military did introduce the Sharia legal system because they didn't have any mandate. 
It is the politicians. Ahmadu Bello the politician rejected the Islamic legal system, I 
told you, because he thought this was not in the interest of the entire Northern states. 
Individual states in the new dispensation, some of them campaigned that they will 
introduce the Sharia legal system, it was part o f their manifesto. This is the problem.
Q: The role of the Nigerian press in all this...?
The Nigerian press has a duty to criticise, to appraise, and to educate so that those 
who are non-Muslims will understand what the Sharia is all about. They are free to 
criticise which I think they have, but sometimes sensationally.
Q: Are they then promoting disunity by so doing?
I wouldn't say that they are promoting disunity. They are criticising the 
implementation of a particular policy in some states by certain governments. It's quite 
legitimate for them to do that. As far as I am concerned, they are free to criticise, to 
condemn, to analyse, but in some cases, there is over-sensationalism. And I can recall 
very well, one of the leading legal luminaries in this country being interviewed by the 
BBC African service on the Sharia issue, giving specific example of a woman who 
was fined or imprisoned in Niger state, because she was selling Beer against Islamic 
legal system. Now what my respected legal luminary forgot to remember was that 
even in a Christian state, selling Beer or selling alcohol without a license is illegal. 
You can't go anywhere in this country or anywhere in the world and just begin to sell 
liquor without a license. You have to have a license, whether off-license or on- 
license; you have to have it. The fact that that woman was taken to court and 
penalised for selling Beer doesn't mean that because she is a Christian, she should not 
be penalised. She required a license to sell and that was what the legal luminary failed 
to point out, when the BBC interviewed him. So these are some of the misleading 
criticisms which normally come out. Yes, the law says, you can't sell unless you have 
a license.
Q: Was she jailed because she didn’t have a license or because the state says, 
there is Sharia, and so you are not allowed to sell alcohol?
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She was jailed for two reasons: one, she contravened the law because the Sharia legal 
system says you can't sell Beer in that area; and two, she was selling without a 
license.
Q: What about the role of the press on the question of Census and Revenue 
Allocation?
The computerised system employed by the National Population Commission (NPC) 
seems to have taken care o f some o f the objections in the 1991 census. It is not easy to 
count the Nigerian population. A typical example is where people leave home as early 
as 5.00am or 6.00am to go to work and may not come back until 9.00pm or 10.00pm 
at night. So many children are growing up without knowing their fathers. They see 
them only at weekends. And it is not easy to count such people. Nigerians are market 
people.
Q: Would you say that the Census has been politicised?
The press politicised the issue. It was not done by anybody. I don't think anybody 
should waste his time talking about that. The issue is politicised by the press and not 
by anybody else. Let us take a typical example: Census has been conducted in Nigeria 
since 1911. In those days, our people were running away because the more people you 
had in your household, the higher the tax that you were supposed to pay. In that case 
it was always like that. And even when our people were running away, there was 
never a time when the Southern part o f  the country had more population than the 
Northern part. The press is showing total ignorance of Nigeria. Let me give you one 
typical example. We are looking forward to the day when the National Identity Card 
will be introduced. We are not against it. And I can tell you that it will confirm 
whatever census figures we have in this country. A lot o f people in the Riverine area 
areas are never properly counted. They are always over-counted, always over­
counted. Rivers State does not have the kind o f population they are talking about. So 
does Bayelsa. That I can tell you.
Q: So the National ID will reveal everything?
Yes! Keep this date, the 27th day o f January 2001 and say that I interviewed Alhaji 
Mohammed Ibrahim and he told me this.
Q: Government policies and the press?
I was a practitioner. I was in the system for over 30years. Let me tell you this: All 
governments are liars, whether military or civilian. All government, at any given time, 
would want to use the press for their maximum advantage. All government would 
want to ride on the back of the press to reach the population. All governments would 
want to manipulate the press for their objectives. And Nigerian governments, in the 
last forty years, have behaved in this manner. Even today, President Obasanjo is using 
the press to reach the people. Our main concern now should be to encourage the press 
to remain the watchdog of society, the eye of the Nigerian society, the defender of the 
under-privileged, the protector of the weak and to ensure that democracy, the rule of 
law, justice and fairplay are really established in this country, and become the norm in
409
the society.
Q: Any formula by which the press can achieve that?
There is no need for any formula. We have a responsible press. We have an over- 
zealous press. There is exuberance, youthful exuberance on the part of the press. 
Really there is no need for any agenda, for any guidance. They understand their role 
to protect the integrity of Nigeria, to promote cohesion and understanding, to promote 
peaceful co-existence. Nobody is preaching violence. The presses know their role. 
The only thing I would say is, let them reduce or minimise sensationalism. I think the 
Nigerian press is on the right track. There is variety. Objectivity, in some cases is out 
of the question. Partisanship in some cases, yes, you cannot deny them that right 
because of the structure and the ownership of the Nigerian media. So I believe they 
are on the right track.
Q: What role does external factor play in all this?
Well it's difficult to say. There are those who think that some of the media is being 
manipulated from outside. I don't have any evidence to suggest that there is external 
influence or manipulation. I will hate to believe that there is, but I hope there isn't.
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(VUE) INTERVIEW WITH PRINCE TONY MOMOH, FORMER MINISTER OF 
INFORMATION, ON MONDAY 12/02/01 IN LAGOS.
Q: Could you assess the Nigerian press pre-independence and post-independence 
in terms of their contribution to national integration and in effect their ability to 
instil in Nigerians a sense of national identity?
The Nigerian press was about a hundred years old when Nigeria became independent 
in 1960. If you look back, Reverend Townsend published the first newspaper in 
Nigeria, which was not really Nigeria then, in Egba land in 1859. So from 1859 to 
1959 was a hundred years old and one year after Nigerian press was a hundred years 
old, Nigeria became independent. So I always say that the Nigerian press is one 
hundred years older than Nigeria as an independent country and therefore should be 
able to tell Nigeria what it is that make for successful integration. But in 1914, we had 
the amalgamation of the North and the South and that geographical space has 
remained substantially the same. 97,000 communities occupy this geographical space, 
more than 370 nationality groups or national groups. But officially we say 250 
nationality groups, out of which we have the major three-Hausa/Fulani, Ibo, and 
Yoruba. These major three have tried to dictate what Nigeria should be. Unfortunately 
they have not come to a recognition from experience that its’ impossible to reduce the 
number to less than three. The civil war proved it; we could not wipe out Biafra. The 
Action Group (AG) crisis in the West proved it, we cannot undermine the Yoruba nor 
is it possible to undermine the Hausa/Fulani who themselves have been trying to 
undermine the other people and make them play a second fiddle. When we talk of the 
potentials of all the others put together, they have as population more than the three. 
So these groups or nationalities have more in common with themselves as 
nationalities, as ethnic groups than with a nation. We have not really developed a 
national outlook.
So in looking at Nigeria recently, in a paper on the “Media and Democracy” in May 
2000,1 argued that we must look at Nigeria through the media from a perspective of 
the reflections o f nationalities rather than the national group. I have also argued at 
some other fora that Nigeria has fourteen years to be one hundred years a 
geographical space, not as integrated people because we are not an integrated people. 
Nigeria is not a nation in the sense o f Nigerians automatically and involuntarily 
reflecting and manifesting a national outlook. We don’t have it. Everybody, every 
national group is looking at Nigeria from its own nationality window. I am an Edo 
man and if I seek to be more national in outlook than the Yoruba man, it is because 
that is consistent with a minority group. A minority group cannot reflect its minority, 
status in a huge market place where it has no voice. So its objectivity is reflected, 
defined and dictated by that minority status, so you have nothing to be proud about 
(Laughter). So the Yoruba man automatically sees Nigeria from the Yoruba 
perspective, the Hausa man sees Nigeria from the Hausa perspective and the Ibo man 
sees Nigeria from the Ibo perspective. In other words, by perspective I mean the 
worldview and if  you now look at the press, the press is a medium and a medium is a 
channel and this channel bears a message, it reflects a message.
A newspaper is a newspaper just like any other newspaper but it is what it carries that 
gives it the status that gives it the clout. ThisDay is ThisDay because of what is in 
ThisDay. The Guardian is the Guardian because of what is in the Guardian. The
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Nigerian Tribune is the Nigerian Tribune because of what is in the Nigerian Tribune. 
I have a television set in my house; however, you cannot call my television set the 
Nigerian Television Authority (NTA). The fact is that my television set is a television 
set but when you press a button, you see NTA and you define NTA by the 
programmes of the NTA. You define Channels by the programmes of Channels. You 
define AIT, MINAJ, DBN and MITV by their programmes. So when now you see 
NTA, you even tend to associate the television set with NTA, unless you change the 
channel. So we shouldn’t see a medium from an angle than it really is, which is that it 
is a medium, a channel and therefore that channel has a bias and it is a bias dictated 
by ownership. The ownership pattern of the media in Nigeria is constitutionally 
grounded. Section 39 of our Constitution (1999), which was section 36 of the 1979 
Constitution, says that you can own, establish and operate a medium to impact 
opinion and ideas and information, only that Broadcasting will be owned by 
Government and then private involvement will be dictated by Government and the 
National Assembly. That’s what the Constitution guarantees.
But having guaranteed ownership o f a medium, you can go back to Chapter 2 of the 
Constitution, which defines the duties of the polity, and it says that that chapter, 
which deals with the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, 
is not justiciable. But that does not mean it is a useless part of the Constitution 
because no part o f the Constitution is useless. Every part of the Constitution defines 
what should happen to that part and Chapter 2 which defines what Government must 
do says that the media must monitor governance on behalf of the people. That’s 
section 32. So how do you now marry ownership structure which says you can own 
you can own, establish and operate, technically do what you like with the medium, 
how do you reconcile that with the responsibility that as a medium you must monitor 
governance. There seems to be a contradiction but when you read them together there 
is no contradiction. If you want to establish a limited liability company, for instance, 
you look at the Companies and Allied Matters Act and it tells you the procedure, what 
to do. So too our Constitution tells you what to do when you want to establish a 
medium called the newspaper, which is that you must be for monitoring governance. 
So that monitoring of governance subsumes the right to own, establish and operate. 
However you do not just operate a medium to terrorise everybody, as there are rules 
you must abide by. That’s where ethics o f the profession comes in.
So while you have the publishers and the owners taking charge of ownership and 
running it as a business, the ethics o f the business will be protected by the 
professionals of the business and that’s the journalists. So the journalists ensures that 
the road is travelled by vehicles that are road worthy, in other words all the rules of 
publications are maintained. What appears in newspapers is not a love letter where 
you can write anything but there are rules of publications and those rules must be 
obeyed. Ownership structure in Nigeria is exercised through the right to own and you 
have private ownership- the Guardian, ThisDay, National Concord etc and public 
ownership, like the Daily Times and Broadcasting station although since deregulation 
in 1993, there have also emerged private Broadcasting stations. Of course now that 
we are back to politics there will emerge more political party ownership of the media. 
So those are the ownership patterns that we have in the polity. But the control pattern 
is through ownership because when you own you control as he pays the piper must 
dictate the tune. Control also is through patronage as for instance if I put adverts in 
your newspaper or if I give you subventions, you must reflect my perspectives. So
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you can see the business angle to control. Then the final control is through policy, 
which is you must obey the laws o f the land. For instance in Nigeria we have the 
newspaper Acts-The Newspaper Ordinance 1917, Amendments 1964, Newspaper 
Registration Decrees, the Nigerian Press Council Decree etc. These are the laws of the 
polity. There is the law of Defamation, the law of Sedition, the law of contempt and 
the Official Secrets Acts etc. These are all control through policy because they 
regulate publications. One can also talk about control through ethics or professional 
control, which is that you must do it through ethics. Indeed, ethics is not a national 
thing; it is an international thing because the media now has international status. 
There is a basic minimum of performance of media men which no country has a right 
to undermine.
So having looked at all these, now what do you see in the Nigerian situation? The 
Nigerian situation is that the media reflects the nationality perspective because they 
are owned and owners have put nobody in doubt that they are in control and so it must 
reflect their perspectives and the perspective that is being reflected in Nigeria is the 
so-called Western perspective which is called the Lagos/Ibadan worldview. That 
worldview is a function o f the outgoing nature of the Yoruba people, the business 
enterprising nature o f the Yoruba and, of course, the Ibo and the Southerners 
generally. But the fact is that the Northerners are not extroverts, their religion has 
affected their way o f life and so theirs is reflected in silent manifestation of life and 
their religion does not even encourage singing your praises. Their belief is that you 
should not let your right hand know what your left hand has done and that is their 
perspective to life. They do not even see anything good in investing in newspapers. 
Their philosophy is: “My work will speak for itself or it will speak for me.” But that’s 
not what should happen. At least 5% o f what you put in a project should be used in 
publicising it. So the Nigerian situation is dominated by the Western view which is 
exhibitionist. So if for instance you want to give somebody ten thousand Naira (N10, 
000), you will not give it to him by post, you come to the public and paste it on his 
forehead and let the cameras click and that is the worldview that has affected the 
Nigerian press.
The Nigerian press therefore is not a national press although laws have been made to 
make it so. For instance bringing all the Television stations in Nigeria together into 
the NTA in the 1970s was meant to promote a national perspective. But all that 
changed when the Military handed-over power to the civilians after the general 
elections of 1979 which saw different political parties Federal Government and the 
various States. So in order for each o f these States to have a voice and also to ensure 
that their own perspectives were expressed in the country, they had to establish their 
own Television stations. That was how the law that Television Broadcasting is a 
monopoly of the Federal Government was breached. But the fact is there was no 
doubt about it that if  you look at the NTA Act, it was meant to ensure that 
broadcasting became a national issue that would promote a national perspective. So 
that was the only attempt, I could see that really positively gravitated to promoting a 
national outlook. But the fact is that tried as we had done, all the newspapers have 
always reflected the worldview o f their owners or the environment in which they 
operated and that is the Lagos environment, the business environment, the Yoruba 
environment. So we have no national press. We have nationality presses
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Q: What implication does that have for national integration?
The implication is national disintegration. That’s why I have been shouting that we 
have just fourteen years to integrate Nigeria and to integrate Nigeria, you must 
develop national institutions. I have even preached Nigeria at that point of 
convergence where you can identify the cultural and the constitutional, which is the 
senatorial level. The Senatorial level is the only effective level where the nationality 
perspective can be undermined because it is sub-nationality level. For instance you 
see that as an Edo man the only thing that will make me undermine Edo is Afemai 
and if you are Ishan, Ishan; then if  you are Bini, then Bini. So you will love Bini Edo 
south, more than Edo State. It’s as simple as that because there is nothing on earth that 
would make you love Nigeria more than Edo State, you will never do it. When there 
is a challenge to Edo State, all o f us will go home. I was the Assistant Editor of the 
Daily Times when the Biafran Army entered the then Mid-West State (Of which Edo 
was a part) in 1966 and I said I was going home to fight. People were amazed that I 
said that because, to them, I was just a journalist and so I should remain in Lagos and 
be publishing what was happening. But I said no that the Biafrans should not enter my 
State and I can tell you that a whole Battalion of Auchi (Afemai) people joined the 
Army at that time to ensure that the Biafrans were routed from the State. The Army 
Officers, who led the war against the Biafrans in the State, included Samuel 
Osaigbovo Ogbemudia, a Bini (Edo) man.
This is also true o f other tribes in Nigeria. The Egba love Egbaland more than 
Yorubaland, the Ijebu people love Ijebuland more than Yorubaland. The people of 
Ogun State will love Ogun State more than Yorubaland. Abia State loves Abia State 
more than Iboland. So these are the worldviews within the country. Even when you go 
back to the family level where for instance you have different mothers, the children of 
the same mother will team up against the children o f the woman even though they are 
of the same father. A nation is a family writ large but the largeness of the Nigerian 
nation had not exceeded the nationality level.
Q: I would still like to explore this issue of national integration further. When we 
talk about national integration, does it mean the absence of quarrels, agitation 
etc among the different groups within the polity?
No, no, no, no, no. Incidentally, the national that we are talking about is achievable 
through defining those things that will bring us together as a nation. In other words we 
must recognise diversity, the diversities o f the nationality groups in the Nigerian 
nation. We should reflect those diversities but we must also recognise that there are 
overriding interests that define us as a nation and respect those interests. Since the 
Republican Constitution of 1963, we have only had a Constitution with a Federal 
structure and therefore the integration the integration o f the Nigerian nation will be 
reflected when we successfully float a Nigerian dream which, I must add, is already 
documented but not yet articulated. That is why I have always said that the media 
have a responsibility to articulate the Nigerian dream which is Chapter two of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria which is known as the “Fundamental Objectives and 
Directive Principles of State Policy.” That is what constitutes the Nigerian dream and 
it is our own definition of the Nigerian interests. It defines what everybody must do. It 
says that sovereignty belongs to the people o f Nigeria and not to one part of it. It says 
that through the Constitution, the people o f Nigeria have delegated power to those in
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Government and that these powers delegated must be shared among three, which is 
those who make laws, those who interpret laws, and those who execute the laws. In 
other words, the powers are shared among the Legislature, the Executive and the 
judiciary but the people are saying that these powers are being delegated to those who 
find themselves in that and according to Section 13 of the Constitution, they must 
succumb to, abide by, and embrace the Fundamental Objectives and Directive 
Principles of State Policy in the area o f education, in the area of social policy, in the 
area of the polity, in the area of the economy, in the area o f the environment, in the 
area of culture, in the area of foreign policy, they are all there. That is the Nigerian 
dream and that is what the press must promote to have a national perspective to 
issues.
Now the Nigerian press is pre-occupied with such terms as: ‘It says’; ‘They say’. The 
press is not pre-occupied with calling people to order or calling people to do what 
they promised to do. How much does the Nigerian press look at the previous budgets 
to see that the commitments in the budgets have been met? How much does the 
Nigerian press go after the projects that have been awarded in contracts to see how the 
contractors are performing in the different fields? How much has the press pursued 
the legislators to take them on, on the regulations that they are passing? How much 
has the Nigerian press studied the Constitution themselves since they are supposed to 
hold everybody accountable to the people in the performance of the duties imposed on 
those in Government by the people through the Constitution? How much has the press 
looked at the Code o f Ethics? That Code, for instance, provides that no public officer 
should have a foreign account and yet everybody has a foreign account. The Attorney- 
General of the Federation, Chief Bola Ajibola, (Confirm if  he was the Attorney- 
General then) said recently that the British Parliament was not with the Nigerian 
Government in accessing the money deposited in British Banks, amounting to about 
Four hundred billion Naira (N400billion), by corrupt Nigerian leaders. Well, Britain 
says that nothing could be done from its own end unless there are criminal charges. 
But the press does not need criminal charges. All you have to put before Britain is that 
these corrupt public officials in Nigeria have no right to open foreign accounts and 
that the breach of the Code of Conduct in the Constitution, which is also a law, is 
forfeiture. So if any official has a foreign account, it is forfeited to the Federal 
Government and you point to the section in the Constitution. But the fact is that the 
Nigerian press, believe in selective disclosures, selective justice. All of them have 
foreign accounts but they only want the accounts of those who are no longer in 
favourite position, those who are no longer in Government. But why shouldn’t 
everybody's accounts be opened? So we are in a dilemma.
Why can't the press pursue all these things? They are all documented. If we pursue 
these things, I believe we can achieve national integration. But national integration is 
reflected in only one aspect o f the life o f our nation and that is when, for instance, 
Nigeria has a contest with other countries like international football matches, 
international boxing, war with Cameroun over the Bakassi peninsular and so no and 
so forth. So it's not that it is totally absent when stages of contest occur in the polity, 
it's inevitable that all those areas o f control through ownership of the press will take 
its place. If it's a political party, in those days (The First Republic), you couldn't have 
expected the West African Pilot, whose proprietor, Dr Nnamdi Aziwiwe, was also the 
leader of the National Council o f Nigeria and the Camerouns (NCNC), to start 
congratulating the Action Group (AG) or its leader, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the
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Opposition leader. Likewise too, you couldn't have expected the Nigerian Tribune, 
which was owned by Chief Awolowo, to support the NCNC or Dr Azikiwe. That 
wouldnt be objective because objectivity is defined by how much you reflect your 
mission statement. The Nigerian Tribune, for instance, was there to protect the AG 
and the Awolowo family. If  it was protecting Dr Azikiwe to the detriment of Chief 
Awolowo then it was no longer objective. There is no other way of defining 
objectivity. If I give you ten stories to choose from and I have the same ten stories, 
another have the same ten stories, the rules o f objectivity demands that we sought 
them out to see how they reflect balance and so and so forth. But our choices will be 
different because there is subjectivity in assessing objectivity.
Q: You have talked about the nation being a family writ large... (He interrupts)
Incidentally, as long as you see the nation as a family writ large, you can argue that 
there is no nation on earth. So it is in that context that Nigeria is not a nation. But if 
you look at a nation from the perspective of the integrative role of the press, such as 
would reflect in the ways of life o f the people, then you will see that unless you look 
at the contest between Nigeria and other countries, you cannot say that Nigeria is 
nation. It is only at that level of Nigeria versus others that you can say that Nigeria is 
a nation because all Nigerians are one in protecting the interest of Nigeria against 
other countries. But when it comes to contest o f States within Nigeria, you cannot be 
talking of a nation because each o f the 36 States of the Federation will reflect their 
own interests. It's inevitable; you cannot be talking o f the nation at that level. Then 
when it comes to contests within the States, each Senatorial District (Three in every 
State) will fight for its own interests because at that level you cannot be talking the 
interests of the nation or even the interests of the State. Then within the Senatorial 
Districts each division will be fighting for its own stake. Edo North in Edo State, for 
instance, we have three Divisions, Akoko-Edo, Etsako and Owan. You have to see 
how the representatives o f each Division, do battle to put forward the interests of their 
respective divisions. Then when you come to the Divisions, take for instance the 
Etsako Division, it has within it 36 Clans, each with a Clan Head and you have to see 
how the Traditional rulers fight for their respective Clan interests. Move on to the 
Clan level and then take the Auchi Clan where I come from; we have 42 villages and 
each village fight for its own interests. Then go to each Village, you have families 
who will be fighting for their own interests. Go to the families, then each of the 
children will be fighting for their own interests. So you cannot really define the 
interests of the nation from the family unit’s level because you can only talk of the 
interests of the families at the family unit level, interests of the States at the State unit 
level but interests o f Nigeria at the level o f the country.
So at that level, yes, the Nigerian press is even very patriotic. Therefore, we must look 
at the level from which we want to define national reflection or from which we want 
to know how Nigeria is reflected. But once you start talking of integration, I am 
saying that we have not really worked hard at integrating because the institutions are 
not working to integrate Nigeria. The divisions are still there. The three major ethnic 
groups (Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba) that are in control, still even want to reduce the 
number to less than three. They don’t even believe that we are more than 300. They 
think they are one. The Ibos think that there is no other apart from the Ibos, the same 
thing too with the Hausa/Fulanis; they don’t feel guilty cheating others. Even look at 
the Yorubas now; they didn’t even vote for Olusegun Obasanjo during the presidential
416
election yet they don’t feel guilty taking most of the positions. That's the problem.
Q: Is that why the press is behaving the way it is behaving?
That’s exactly what I am saying. It is behaving the way it is behaving because of the 
ownership. The Nigerian press is being controlled through ownership and my point is 
that the press can overcome it by looking at the role the press is to play and that is 
clearly spelt out in Chapter 2 o f the Nigerian Constitution. Let the professionals tell 
the owners and be successful in telling the owners that there is a conditionality for 
their owning which is that the press must monitor governance on behalf of the people. 
In other words the press becomes the press becomes the people's voice. Even at that 
level it is relative but if we have national newspapers, then each of them must work to 
ensure that what is there in Chapter two is what advises their perspectives and 
worldview.
Q: But would you say that there is anywhere in the world, where the ownership 
is detached from the activities of a newspaper?
No, no, no, no but the fact is that the impact on ownership is the ethics of the 
profession, the business customs and habits then policies of Government and of 
course the environment itself. For instance, as a professional, if you say I should run 
someone down, I would say, no, I am not going to do that until I hear from him. 
That’s the impact o f ethics. It is drawn up and it tells you what you must do which is 
that you are to publish facts because the law of Defamation, protects the man I am 
being asked to run down. The same thing if I am asked to run down a government. I 
would respond, as a professional by saying that there is the law of sedition and that 
the things I am being asked to publish, is covered by Official Secrets Acts. Of course 
there is also the law o f treason. So you see that all these impact on exuberant 
ownership.
Q: But what could the journalist do if he is not able to influence any change at in 
that respect?
But he can, he can. You see that’s why I'm saying that the Nigerian journalist, 
although constitutionally an agent, must be a professional. I have always been calling 
for that but whenever I meet the journalist they tell me that there are other people 
willing to their jobs if they insist strictly on being professional in their duties and as a 
result they are sacked. Take the Republic newspaper which had about three Editors 
within six months because what the proprietor wanted them to do, many of them 
didn’t want to do. After one month they just revolt because of the journalist in them 
and he would change them. He was changing them and of course the Republic 
newspaper died. Some people are willing to answer the name of Editor but the fact is 
that the journalist in them will emerge one day.
Q: It seems to me that you are placing the onus to change on the journalists 
themselves... (He interrupts)
Yes!
Q: But it is the owners that I think have to change if we are going to make any
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headway as far as the press* ability to contribute to national integration is 
concerned.
I am placing it on the journalist because the Constitution places it on the journalist.
Q. But then there is the issue of job security and of course, the environment. So 
how does he live up to the standards of his profession within a country like 
Nigeria?
What you are saying is that if  you cannot help it, steal.
Q: No, no, no, no.
That’s what you are saying. I don’t know if you read my column yesterday (Sunday, 
11/02/01). Please go and read it. I write a column every Sunday, for the Vanguard 
newspapers. The one for yesterday {Sunday Vanguard, 11/20/01) was titled: 'Watch it 
Mr Journalist'. There I discussed the complaints about journalists now especially 
those on beat journalism like the National Assembly Correspondents, the Sports 
Writers Association of Nigeria etc. For instance people are complaining that 
journalists demand for such things as brown envelops (Bribes/Monetary rewards) as 
they perform their duties. But then the journalists' argument is that a labourer is 
worthy of his hire and that if  the proprietor doesn’t pay them, then someone must pay 
them. In fact some o f the proprietors don’t pay well and some don’t even pay at all for 
months. But the proprietors are saying that if the journalists are accusing them of not 
paying them for two years why then are they still there? In other words if they are not 
gaining, why can't they resign and go away?
These are the complaints; these are the criticisms against the journalists. The point I 
am trying to make is that this is not good for the press. Constitutionally, the press is 
the Fourth Estate o f the Realm and it is not because the press is a business, it is 
because the press is a profession and the pressmen are professionals. If the other three 
Estates collude as they normally do, the press cannot do the same because it is the 
agent of the people. So the press has a job to do and the journalists cannot do their job 
professionally, they don’t have to remain in the profession. It is a very tempting 
profession and a journalist can easily be corrupted but at the end of the day he loses 
his credibility. Now what is happening is that many Nigerian journalists go after 
contracts and they favour anyone from whom they can get the contracts. Even the 
proprietors champion these things and they set up newspapers in order for them to get 
contracts. They feature you so that you will give them contracts. So what we are now 
witnessing in Nigeria is that the newspapers that should monitor governance have 
become the clout for the contractor to get contracts.
Q: But isn't that a reflection of the entire society?
It is a reflection of the entire society but we are talking of the press. I have said that 
we have no right to undermine the international image of the media because the media 
has an international image. It has an international code pattern and you must accept 
that you are a professional. Why is it that you have enemies of the press world-wide? 
Why is it that anything happening to a journalist is published world-wide overnight? 
It's because every journalist is the neighbour of every other journalist; he is his
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brother s keeper. More than any other professional, the journalist is protected world­
wide. So why shouldn’t the Nigerian journalist behave? In some places or countries, 
you cannot even take a gift or take a ride from a politician but here in Nigeria the 
journalists are demanding it. It's unfortunate that there are lots and lots of problems 
but the fact is that we have to see how we get over them. Even if we cannot get over 
them, we must recognise them rather than make them part and parcel of our lives 
otherwise what is the difference between them and us? Why would the people say, 
through the constitution that the courts cannot exercise all the powers? Section 6, sub­
section 6C says that the court can do anything except looking into what is happening 
in Chapter 2. Then section 32 says that the press will monitor what is happening in 
Chapter 2. Go and read Chapter two o f the Constitution; it's a joy; it's so rich; it's the 
richest part o f the Constitution. I call it the Bill of Duties. It says monitor the 
performance of duties and the implication is that you are not entitled to any rights 
unless you perform duties in our polity. So the Constitution should remind us of what 
we are supposed to do. The journalists should perform duties and call everybody to 
order on behalf of the people. The day the press does that, that will be the day we will 
be on the road to national because that would mean that then press is leaving up to its 
constitutional responsibility which, is the national dream of Nigeria as reflected in 
Chapter 2. That is the safest way to integration and we have 14 years to do it 
otherwise we will be a hundred years old as integrated space without integrated 
people or country.
Q: If that doesn’t happen in the next 14 years, what would be the implications 
for the corporate entity of Nigeria?
It would affect the corporate entity o f this country and that is why I am saying that 
failure to achieve integration will lead to disintegration
Q: How much has foreign influence got to do with the developments within 
Nigeria now and therefore the consequences for the Nigerian press?
I have just written my column for the Vanguard newspapers and it is titled: "Deny the 
Debts". Basically what I am saying is that Nigeria should deny the debts because no 
capacity to make them. We had no legal capacity, we had no economic capacity and 
we had no social capacity. We were not told what the implication of what we were 
signing was before we signed the agreement for the loans. But as it is now obvious to 
us, the implication for signing such documentation, which was meant to be shorthand 
loans, was that our children and their children would be paying debts. We borrowed 
$3.5billion dollars in the 70's and at that time the rate of exchange was $2 dollars to 
N1 but since then we have been paying through our nose. In fact we have paid 
$13.6billion dollars; we still owe $28billion dollars and the going exchange rate of the 
Naira is more than N 100 to $1 dollar. That is the Western world for you. They made 
us sign the documents without telling us the implications and so we didn t have the 
legal capacity and indeed, they even drafted the agreement, our own was to sign. We 
did not have the economic capacity to pay because we were on the receiving end. We 
were expected to meet the basic needs o f our people but because of the debts we had 
to pay back we didn’t have enough for our people. Yet and at the same time, our 
creditors were threatening us that unless we paid, they were not going to give us spare 
parts for our machines etc. Then when we now paid the debts what happened? They 
devalued our currency before they gave us the next loan and as a result of all these,
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our economy is now completely messed up. This is affecting every facet of our lives 
including the press. So to that extent I would say that foreign influence is very real.
Q: Specifically, I would like to know what your thoughts are on the Nigerian 
press, before and after independence in 1960?
The orientation of the Nigerian press has been British; adversarial. The press' own 
mission before independence was to work and drive out the British from Nigeria, 
which they did because it was a nationalist press. The press has striven to be 
nationalist since independence and it has seen itself to be successful only when it is 
opposed to Government and Nigerians seem to be interested in opposing Government. 
Nigerians seem not to believe Governments because of the corruption they have come 
to associate with Government and the fact that we have lots of things to hide because 
of failure of accountability. But the press has not really helped in sustaining 
accountability and then the Government in newspapering and broadcasting or rather 
the Government in ownership has not really helped matters because if you look at the 
Edicts or the Laws establishing these presses, you will be surprised that they are 
meant to promote the activities of the same Government. In effect if any Editor wants 
to be a journalist and does not promote the activities of the Government, he loses his 
job.
So the press has not been focussed to see issues from a national perspective and 
institutions in Nigeria have not entrenched that type of training. Educationally, we are 
not trained to love Nigeria. What we have in our educational setting is not a 
continuation of our cultural upbringing. What we learn in the family is not what we 
sustain in the school system; a brand new thing comes when we go to school. For 
instance, they tell us not to speak our language and if you speak your language which, 
they call vernacular, you are fined. I grew up not being fluent in Auchi and I am not 
quite sure if you can speak your own language Bini for five minutes without using 
English. So we are discouraged and yet we are authentic when we speak in our own 
native dialect. If we speak in a language that is foreign, we cannot think deeply. So all 
these things do not get us focussed. But if  we had based our own upbringing in the 
family system through the school system, we would be more genuine today and we 
can now reflect certain perspectives.
So we inherited opposition from Britain because the British person is opposed to the 
British Government and we are sustaining it through independence. Therefore we 
have not really helped to build institutions that are native to Nigeria and those 
institutions that are native to Nigeria and can be sustained are traditional institutions. 
We have not managed the traditional institutions very well. What did the political 
system do instead? Take the AG, for instance, it reduced the Obas (Traditional rulers) 
in the Western region to one-penny Oba and undermined the whole traditional 
institutions. We don’t have a democracy as it is known in the Western world in our 
traditional institutions. You are bom a ruler and you can be there for forty years. If 
you do well you are there and if  you don’t do well the people have a way of 
eliminating you which is even more authentic than the way we vote people out in a 
democracy. In fact, in our own case, people we should vote out in a democracy are 
even rigged into power. So many o f these things are not sustaining; we have had a 
very, very questionable heritage from our colonial past. We have been sustaining an 
illusion, the illusion o f freedom since independence. There is nothing like freedom;
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it's been w ho pays the piper dictates the tune.
Q: What then can the press do?
The press is only a reflector and the reflector is reflecting a reflection. The reflector is 
the journalist; he is reflecting a reflection and that reflection is what the British had 
bequeathed to us in the educational system, which we imbibed. We even go abroad to 
reinforce these things and bring them here and perpetrate them. So we are reflecting 
mirrors still reflecting. In other words, we are no substances that are reflected in 
mirrors. We should be substances; we should be palpable people, touchable people 
and not illusions.
Q: How are we going to do that in the present circumstances, not just nationally 
but globally?
We have to refocus. The type o f leadership that should be given should be one of self- 
reliance; use what we have to get what we want. But the fact is that we want to get 
what we want even by borrowing. I have already talked about the exhibitionist culture 
that we have here. For instance you go to the Bank, borrow money, you don’t pay the 
loan but you go and paste it on the forehead of a musician. When the people see you 
in a big flashy car, they see you in a big house, they see you with women, they see 
you flying all over the place, then they say you have made it and that you have 
money. But the fact of the matter is most of these people don’t just have the money. 
In fact their way of life is even reflecting at the national level. Most of the things we 
spent our money on in the 80’s were consumer goods.
Q: What should the press do in such a situation?
The press can do something to change the situation. All we need is education. You 
know there is the saying that if  you want to build the City, first build the man. If you 
want change in the polity, first build the professional and the professional is part of 
the polity. So first build people of the polity. The journalist must build himself on the 
basis of what the society builds. So the society must build itself. I mean independence 
must be meaningful in the Nigerian polity.
Q: In which case there is nothing the Nigerian journalist can do as far as the 
Nigerian situation remains in the current situation?
You cannot say because everybody failed then that is your defence for failure. For 
instance, nobody thought me this perspective; I sat down to read and arrive at the 
conclusions I am drawing. If I had based what I am saying on the basis of my degree 
in journalism, I won't be saying all these things. They will be meaningless because 
that's not what I was thought at school. This is what I have come to know based on 
my own self-development. Many o f the things that we are thought in school are 
rubbish; they are reflecting a perspective strange to us.
Q: How would you rate the newspapers that I am looking at in terms of what you 
have been saying?
The most genuine of them was the New Nigerian because it reflected a Northern
421
perspective and did not deny it. It said: "We are Nigerians from the North". That is, in 
the debate in the Nigerian polity, it will represent the North, but where Nigeria is with 
any other country, it will represent Nigeria.
This is the point that I have been making which is that you must recognise the 
diversities as a basis for promoting national integration. It is inevitable that each of 
the newspapers should do so to reflect their own diversities. You can only talk of 
integration internationally. Or let us put it this way; you don’t see a particular State 
newspaper running down the Federal Government but you can see a particular 
newspaper running down another State in competition with another State but only 
opposing the Federal Government when the Federal Government undermines the 
interest of the State. For instance many States have taken the Federal Government to 
court over the issue o f Revenue Allocation and the Derivation Principle. But that is 
not national disintegration; it is simply addressing the issue. If you ask me about the 
newspapers have each responded to other issues such as Census; Organisation of 
Islamic Conference (OIC), I would say that their own stand had been a reflection of 
the nationality group that dominate their place of operation. For instance, you see that 
in Lagos area, what the Yoruba view is what dominates the presses in Lagos area in 
spite of ownership. The Vanguard, the Guardian, ThisDay, Champion, even the Daily 
times, all reflect the Yoruba worldview by and large because the readership is Yoruba 
(Western Nigeria). The Yorubas read newspapers more than any other group in 
Nigeria. As Editor o f the Daily Times, the copies we were circulating in the Mushin 
area of Lagos were more than all the newspapers we were selling in the whole of the 
Northern part o f the country. When I was Editor of the Daily Times, the print run was 
about 350,000. We were not circulating up to 30,000 in the North.
Q: So what you are saying is that it is good for national integration if the 
newspapers address the different issues from their own regional or nationality 
perspective?
It's inevitable; it's good for national integration. It is important that we address the 
issues as they affect the components of the nation. National integration does not mean 
unanimity of opinion. National integration means recognising all the component parts 
of a nation and attending to their needs and they too making sacrifices in the interest 
of the nation. Each of the nationality groups is its own brother's keeper but you can 
only be your brother's keeper, when you know where you have brothers. However, 
what is happening now is that the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria don’t even 
know that they have brothers; they are even creating enemies o f the other two.
Q: Can you identify issues in which the Nigerian press has been united 
particularly when they involve other countries?
ECOMOG (The fighting Armed Forces of the Economic Community of West African 
States [ECOWAS]) readily comes to mind. Nigeria spearheaded ECOWAS' military 
effort to bring peace to Liberia, through the ECOMOG and so when it comes to that 
issue, Nigerians are in support of Nigerians. If you also take the issue of the Bakassi 
Peninsular, which is the border dispute between Nigeria and the Camerouns, 
Nigerians are always united in their support of the Government. In sports it is the 
same. There is no unanimity on the OIC issue because it reflects the religious 
perspectives of nationalities and of course there is a division between the Christian
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perspective and the Islamic perspective on this issue. There is no newspaper in 
Nigeria that supports the debt burden of Nigeria. They are in support of Nigeria in this 
area. There is no newspaper in Nigeria that is opposed to the price of oil at the 
international level because we are interested. There is no newspaper in Nigeria that is 
opposed to Nigeria's place in the Commonwealth and in the United Nations. There is 
no newspaper in Nigeria, no medium in Nigeria that is opposed to our Nigerian 
President or Government in relation to any other Government in the world.
So if you look at the social area, the cultural area, and the economic area, you will see 
that we have national focus. Even educationally, bad as our schools are, it's more 
difficult to enter a Nigerian University than any other University anywhere else in the 
world. But unfortunately, in the area of consumption, we still prefer foreign goods and 
the Nigerian press is not helping in that regard maybe because they cannot even 
sustain themselves without importation as everything that they use, ranging from ink 
to newsprint, are all imported.
Q: So in your own view there is no national newspaper in Nigeria?
No, you have nationality newspapers.
Q: Would you call the Guardian a nationality newspaper, for instance?
No, I think I am being too strict when I say nationality newspapers. The Daily Times 
is a national newspaper; the Guardian is a national newspaper; ThisDay is a national 
newspaper; Concord is a national newspaper; Champion is a national newspaper; 
Vanguard is a national newspaper; Post Express is a national newspaper etc. But the 
fact is that they reflect certain worldviews. The Champion and the Post Express, for 
instance, reflect the Ibo worldview. The Vanguard and the Guardian do not reflect 
Delta worldview for the simple reason that the minority worldview is of no 
consequence in a place as large as Nigeria and it does not pay to reflect a minority 
worldview. Another thing is that these newspapers are more of businesses that will 
give clout than newspapers set up to express a particular point of view or worldview 
of the owner. So they provide clout for contracts for the owners. For instance, the 
Champion newspaper provides clout for Chief Iwuanyanwu, it's proprietor to gain 
access. Or take the proprietor ThisDay newspaper, who would normally invite Nduka 
Obaigbena to a place? There are many o f Obaigbena's colleagues who can't get an 
invitation for anything but bechuse he owns a newspaper, that makes a difference. It's 
as simple as that.
What this therefore is that the journalist has more work to do when someone uses the 
medium as a clout, because where his own interests or survival are involved, he will 
simply tell the journalist not to publish the story.
Q: But it will be difficult for the journalist to come up with a newspaper that will 
be professionally run. It will almost be impossible to find anywhere in the world 
where a newspaper is going to be run that way without certain interests being 
protected?
That is very true. It is not even there in the United States (US). What was common to 
all the African-American newspaper houses I visited in the US in 1978 was the
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absence of advertisements because it is the Jewish establishment that has money to 
advertise. They didn’t advertise in African-American newspapers so they all looked 
anaemic, no resources, and no money, denied and deprived.
Q: That is what is likely to happen to any group of journalist who would want to 
run a newspaper professionally and based on the requirements of Chapter 2 of 
the Nigerian Constitution. So how will they survive?
The fact is that was how Newswatch magazine came out; that was how TheNews came 
out and that was how Tell came out. What are they doing today? They are surviving 
not because they are professionals but because they have an approach to doing 
business. Once you become a businessman, to that extent, you compromise your 
professional status.
Q: So there is always going to be the issue that people will compromise in order 
to survive instead of doing a strictly professional job?
It's always there. What are you looking for then? What you are looking for is a utopia. 
You can only give guidelines just like Chapter 2. What's in Chapter 2 cannot be 
achieved; it's only a guide to activity in the polity. For instance, some people believe 
that we are working here on earth so we could go to heaven. But the fact is that we 
cannot be in heaven on earth; you must die before you go to heaven. However, you 
must work for heaven right here on earth so that when you die, you can then start 
going there. So this thing is a heavenly dream. What you are talking about is a 
heavenly dream. How much of it can we do below as it is done above? We can only 
try; it becomes a dream, an ideal you must strive for. You can't achieve an ideal 
otherwise it's not an ideal. An ideal can never be achieved.
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(VIIF) INTERVIEW WITH AL-BASHIR ON SUNDAY 21/01/01 IN KADUNA.
Q: On the background of the Nigerian press.
Up to 1937, the media in Nigerian politics-we had about eight seasoned newspapers 
and none of them survived up to the time the West African Pilot came on the scene 
around 1937. Then between that period and 1960, and of the newspapers that 
appeared since this period, the one that lasted longer, are the newspapers within the 
Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe's newspaper empire. And they all collapsed. Dr. Azikiwe had 
about twelve titles or so and they all collapsed by 1967. Chief Obafemi Awolowo had 
more but you see people never gave prominence to them, because they were 
regionally based. But the Awolowo media empire also had fifteen or more titles and 
there are only two of them now-that is the Nigerian Tribune and the Yoruba version.
So I looked at the collapse of the Nigerian media and I discovered that between that 
period 1857 roughly to about 1970, about 370 Dailies and Magazines, none of them 
could survive and I was trying to look at what was responsible for that and there are 
quite a number of reasons. And you know we have had also the same kind of 
turbulence in the growth of the media during that period. So briefly, that has been the 
state of the Nigerian press and I think they have something to do with the perception: 
What do they want? What do they establish newspapers for? Is it for political 
purposes or as an economic venture? If you establish a newspaper as an economic 
venture then you know what is involved. If you establish a newspaper as apolitical 
venture, then you know also what you are into.
And you'd discover, for instance that up here in the North- I'll give you an example: 
Typical is The Democrat. You know the man is in business, he is a contractor, and he 
is a building contractor. Now a lot o f the percentage of his earnings or of his activities 
comes from the government. And because he depends on the government, he doesn't 
want anything bad written about government. So the newspaper relied too much on 
government. From the very beginning, the journalists were not given very free hand to 
operate and I think when I got there the circulation was just about twenty-something 
thousand. But within six months or one year of our coming, we were able to raise 
circulation to about one hundred and eighty thousand. But then again, you see, 
pressure was put on me to favour government and all that. And I said if we continue 
on that path, the newspaper was going to collapse and it collapsed. You can see also 
the same pattern when C hief MKO Abiola started having disagreements with 
government, even during the time o f President Babangida. And you will agree with 
me that Chief Abiola was not a manufacturer, he was a service provider in the sense 
of the contracts he had with the Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL). So 
government was threatening him and things like that. And in the process he was 
appealing and preaching to his Editors. That was why those who established 
Newswatch, Tell, and TheNEWS, left him. They discovered that the pressure being out 
on them was such that would compromise their professional duties. So they left and 
that was how National Concord became what it is now.
What I am trying to say is that these are some of the causes of the failure of the 
Nigerian media, particularly those established for political purposes. They established 
it because they were looking up to government. They were 100% dependent on the 
government for the success of their business and because of that, they would always
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want the newspapers to sing the praises of government and the moment this is not so, 
government would clamp down on them. I remember particularly what happened to 
The Democrat during the time of General Sani Abacha. They even wanted to arrest 
the publisher and jail all o f us particularly when we wrote a critical Editorial, which 
we tagged: "The State of the Nation". It was very critical of government. In fact they 
took out a paid advertisement to condemn that Editorial. Yes, the Federal government 
did that. It was in the New Nigerian, it was in the Daily Times, and it was in all the 
newspapers. And we knew that that was going to be the end of The Democrat. And so 
they refused to pay the publisher for the contract he got from the government. Indeed 
the contracts were executed during the time o f President Babangida. So when General 
Abacha came in, he saw the publisher as a Babangida man. And secondly, when we 
wrote that Editorial-you know one thing about government is that, you can be singing 
their praises ninety-nine times, but the moment you don’t sing their praises, one time, 
that one time will count more against you than even the ninety-nine times.
So these are part of the reasons for failure. You know when you lean on government, 
that is to say, when you are running a newspaper and the source of finance of that 
newspaper is from the amount of money you get through contracts from government 
and particularly when you are not in productive service but rather supplying services, 
you are going to face problems because they are going to tie down your money. In 
those circumstances hardly can a newspaper survive. And that was part of the problem 
we had with the General Abacha regime and consequently we had to close down in 
September 1997. In the case o f the Tribune, it was essentially established as a political 
organ, and to a large extent Tribune had come to be accepted amongst its core readers. 
I do remember Bola Ige once made a statement saying whatever you read in Tribune 
is the correct position. So it has come to be accepted. And there are some people when 
they see Tribune collapsing; they give Tribune some money to assist it because of the 
position it is occupying. So Tribune is a very distinct newspaper. We've seen the 
newspaper survive in the sense that it is not only the owner that actually supports it, 
but other well wishers, you know, what they call the Awoists. They won’t like the 
Tribune to go down. And to the best of my knowledge they have never challenged 
everything that the Tribune says.
By the time we closed down in the Democrat, we were not able to collect our... 
revenue from the Northern government amounting to about seventy-eight million 
Naira (N78m) [inaudible sound -the amount not so certain]. Then we had greater 
problems with the advertisers in Lagos. It was about fifty-seven million Naira (N57m) 
[inaudible]. Each time we go to them, they would prefer to go to court. So we had 
almost about one hundred and forty million Naira (N140m) tied down.
Q: Why did advertisers in Lagos not pay you?
You see the problem with them is that once they collect this money, they want to 
invest it say in a fixed deposit account. And then when you go to them, they will give 
you a lot of problems. We had to go through the Newspapers Proprietors Association 
of Nigeria (NPAN), to get some of them to pay us. But up to the time we closed down 
we were not able to collect sixty-seven million Naira (N67m). Why, because the 
moment we go to them, they will say take us to court, take us to court, take us to 
court. And it is not only the Democrat that is facing this problem with the advertisers. 
Virtually all the newspapers have the same problem. That was why the NPAN at one
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stage decided to patronise people like me who are not within the mainstream of the 
advertising agencies. They give this people, the agencies, 15%. However they give us 
10 /o, so they prefer coming to us because they we pay them directly before they even 
carry our products or whatever. That is not the case with the advertising agencies 
because most of the times they will like to keep the money in a fixed deposit account, 
and then they will be giving excuses that they have not collected the money from the 
person who placed the advertisement. You cannot go to the person direct because you 
are not dealing with him. But we discovered that. And when we contacted some of 
these people, they said look, this is the game this advert people play. So this was 
another problem we faced.
There is also the issue of, well let me use the word poverty and let me illustrate to 
you. In 1997 when we closed down I think the average worker was receiving one 
thousand, five hundred Naira (N 1500m), per month. At that time the cover prices 
were between thirty Naira (N30) to forty Naira (N40). Now if you are going to buy 
one newspaper, you are now going to put down about nine hundred Naira (N900) per 
month for one newspaper. And here is a person earning one thousand, five hundred 
Naira, spending nine hundred Naira (N900) a month for one newspaper. If you check 
the average Nigerian, By I mean those on level 10 to 12 and... So the low earning 
capacity of the average Nigerian affected the sale of newspapers. And what were they 
doing, they would go to the vendor, you know, they even formed an informal 
Newspapers Readers Association (NRA). So they will go to a vendor in the morning, 
sit down there with him, go through all the newspaers, then at the end of the day, they 
will give the vendor thirty Nara (N30) or twenty Naira (20) and he will accept it 
because the vendors have no liability for unsold.
So because of the poverty level of the Nigerian, the low capacity earning of the 
Nigerian, the newspapers were not selling. The few that the government buys for its 
top civil servants were even reduced. There was a time the Federal government issued 
a directive that only permanent secretary and above should be supplied with two 
newspapers. Before then they were given ten to fifteen newspapers maximum. That 
was no longer the case. Government itself could not afford it because cover prices 
were going up. And cover prices were going up because the raw materials for the 
production of newspapers were going up. In 1988, when I joined the Democrat, I 
think a ton of newsprint was selling for about four thousand (N4000) or five thousand 
Naira (N5000). I think it was seven thousand Naira (N7000). But let us put it roughly 
at seven thousand to ten thousand Naira (N7000-N10000). By the time we closed, a 
tonne was seventy thousand to seventy-five thousand Naira (N70000-N75000). So 
within a period of nine years, you can see how the price has jumped and that also was 
the case with all the other raw materials. So we had to increase the cover price.
And at a point I was arguing, in one of our editorial meetings and management 
meetings, that if we increase the cover price we are not going to get a lot of people to 
buy the newspaper that the best we could do was to increase the advert page. But the 
argument they advanced was that only few people advertised and so if you dot 
increase your cover price and expect something from adverts, the newspaper was 
going to collapse. But then again if you increase your cover price, the very person 
whom you hope will be reading your newspaper will not be doing so. So there was 
this kind of the impact of the economic situation in the country which reduced the 
circulation of the newspapers.
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I do remember, as a graduate after my National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) in 
1974, I started on a salary of one hundred and twenty Naira (N120), a month. I was 
buying all the newspapers. Each sold for about three kobo (3k) or so. At least then I 
could afford about four or five newspapers. But even as Editor-In-Chief of the 
Democrat, I could not afford that much because I realised that a sizeable percentage 
of my money was going into the newspapers. Yet I had responsibility for my children, 
I had responsibility for feeding the family and what was my salary-Twelve thousand 
Naira (12,000). That was the salary then. And you have to take your child to the 
private school because the public schools are virtually doing nothing. I know for 
instance, that I spent one hundred and twenty thousand Naira (N 120,000) between 
November last year and this year, on one o f my children, who is reading medicine in 
Jos. So where will I get the money to buy a newspaper? She in fact phoned me 
yesterday (27/01/01) to say that she has two more books to buy and one is twenty- 
seven thousand Naira (27,000). Yes, there was one I bought recently also, that one 
was thirty-seven Naira (N37, 000).
So you can see how the economic status o f the Nigerian situation undermines the 
purchase of newspapers and consequently the closure of some of these newspapers. 
As much as possible, in order to survive, you have to establish a separate venture like 
a commercial printing exercise to support the newspapers. Basically, these were part 
of the problems. The readership in the North is very, very, low and it has not been 
able to match the listenership of radio. In 1997/98, the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) released a report and said that after Tibet in China, the highest 
listenership of radio in the world is Northern Nigeria. If you wake up in the morning 
and see the people going to the Mosque or wherever, you will see them stick to the 
radio. You go to the market it's the same thing. The Boloro man, who is following his 
cattle, in fact, he makes a dress for his radio and he slings it over his shoulders and he 
moves with it. So the listenership o f radio is very high. They can hardly miss any 
radio programme-Voice of America (VOA) Hausa service, BBC Hausa service, 
German Hausa service, and China Hausa service. All these Hausa service stations 
have audience in Northern Nigeria. So when it comes to discussing international 
issues with these people, particularly the traders, you will be surprised at their 
knowledge of what is happening in the world. It is not from the newspapers that they 
get their information, it is from the radio. So there is a very, very powerful radio 
listenership in the North to the extent that newspaper has become more or less an elite 
kind of media of communication.
Ask the elite themselves, those who are on level 10 and above, ask them and they will 
tell you that. I'll give you a typical example again. I do commentary on Federal Radio 
Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) Kaduna and of course, I manage newspapers. Now I 
will write an Editorial for my newspaper and then the Sunday Editorial for FRCN, 
Kaduna and they will say, oh, my God, we listened to your Editorial, how can we get 
a copy? And I'll say, buy the Democrat. So a lot o f them do not even buy newspapers. 
Even the so-called elite, the educated elite, very few of them buy newspapers, unless 
there is a controversy-election result are coming, yes, -ministers are going to be 
announced, yes-policies are going to be given, yes. Apart from that, no, they don t 
care about newspapers. So that attitude also impact on the newspapers produced here 
in the North. And I say a newspaper attracts its immediate environment, if you know 
what I mean. And so when it does not attract its immediate environment, you don t
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expect it to be more influential outside its own environment. These are some of the 
factors militating against the Nigerian press.
Q: How would you rate Nigerian Press' efforts or role in promoting national 
integration or national identity?
To the best of my knowledge, except for pre-independence era and during the 
Nigerian civil war, there has not been concrete evidence of the Nigerian media 
deliberately striving to build, what I call, the national effort. There have been pockets 
of instances. I remember, for instance, during the drought in the North, the Daily 
Times then under Alhaji Babatunde Jose, established a Fund to assist drought victims 
and it was a very successful enterprise which involved everybody from various parts 
of the country. Over the years the tendency o f the Nigerian media has been the 
construction of, what I call ethnic cleavages or regional cleavages. Unfortunately, that 
has been the case and particularly with the rising tide of ethnic nationalism, the 
situation has become pathetic in terms o f the media injecting in terms of the media 
injecting a sense of national unity. I'll sight an instance for you: When I left the 
Democrat in 1992,1 joined the Ciroma campaign organisation as National Director of 
Publicity and when the 23 first eleven was announced by Babangida, Alhaji Tofa who 
was then competing with Chief MKO Abiola, was asked the question, whether he has 
appealed to Ciroma for support, he made this remark: Let me quote him-He said: 
"With or without Alhaji Adamu Ciroma, I will win the election". So we assembled all 
our directors from the various parts o f the country and said all of us are going to 
campaign for Chief Abiola. That is we would use the Ciroma political machine to 
campaign for Chief Abiola, which we did. Now after the annulment of the election, 
Ciroma made a remark. He was asked: Did Abiola win or not? And he said Abiola 
won fair and square and to deny Abiola his victory is to deny the electorate their 
choice. Prominent members of the Ciroma camp also came out to things in the same 
vein. So I was contacted through my friend, Dr. Bala Usman, to use my influence in 
FRCN Kaduna, to write articles and other things, you know, to support the national 
course of the Abiola victory. I said that is not an issue; after all I was a member of the 
Ciroma campaign organisation. And I said one thing I would advice, is that they 
should get some prominent people from the South to please talk to our media friends 
in the South because once they start seeing this thing as a Northern agenda and start 
insulting Northerners, we can never have our way on FRCN, Kaduna. Why? Because 
some of these people will be coming back and using the same media here to say, this 
is what we are saying, in spite of what we have done.
So they agreed and they told me they have met with Chief Bisi Onabanjo and some 
other prominent figures in the South. One week after, the harassment started coming, 
not against the Military but even against the Northerners that stood behind Abiola. 
And I went to Dr. Bala Usman and said look: This is the problem, the FRCN has 
started saying now that aha, this is what they are saying and we are using the FRCN to 
promote Abiola. So Dr. Usman promised me that he was going back to tell Chief 
Abiola that if  they continued in such an aggressive manner, insulting, inciting people, 
left, right and centre, you know, including those who stood for Chief Abiola, then 
how can we now guarantee their continued support. Because this people will say: To 
hell with you, we did this, we did that for Chief Abiola and all we are getting is insult. 
And that was the beginning of the collapse of June 12. They could not control what 
they were saying. And here in the North, we became incapacitated by the anger o f the
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people against what the newspapers were writing in the South. And we know in the 
case of Alhaji Bashir Tofa, for instance, he lost even in his own Ward and Chief 
Abiola won everywhere through the efforts of people like General Yar'Adua (rtd) and 
Alhaji Adamu Ciroma as I have already told you, of whose campaign organisation, I 
was an inner member.
So we had wanted to use the political machine to build Chief Abiola up as a national 
figure. And all o f a sudden, because o f the attitude of our colleagues in the South, 
who saw it differently and misinformed the public. Late General Hassan Usman 
Katsina, I remember at one time said to me: I commend your effort for writing for 
writing for the FRCN consistently and calling for support for Chief Abiola, please 
continue. So we were getting this goodwill and then this national goodwill was broken 
down painfully, by the attitude of some of our colleagues down there in the South. 
They started attacking not even the Military, but the very people that supported Chief 
Abiola, even the Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Dasuki. One of the reasons why General 
Sani Abacha dethroned him was because of his insistence that Chief Abiola should be 
given his mandate. But look at what they were saying about him. If you knew what 
they were saying about Alhaji Dasuki and what he did...Even Alhaji Dasuki actually 
wrote a letter to President Babangida but the letter was intercepted by the Abacha and 
Diya group, who pretended that they were the ones who were actually in support of 
Chief Abiola when in fact they were not. Now they started insulting people like Alhaji 
Dasuki whom we knew actually did everything possible to put pressure on President 
Babangida to give Chief Abiola his mandate.
That was one of the mistakes that we (Press) made. If we had rallied together... I told 
Dr. Usman that all he should do was to organise a meeting of prominent Editors from 
the North, prominent Editors from the South and let us meet and adopt a common 
strategy to support our cause. I don’t know whether he did it or not but I think that 
could have saved the problem. Because of the misconceptions we were having, they 
could have told them the actual thing on the ground here. So you see, in a way, I 
always say that they are responsible for the downfall o f June 12 because of their 
attitude, because of the way they were carrying on and it made some of here who 
were in support of June 12 to go back to our shell. Even at a point, Alhaji Balarabe 
Musa said that 'because of the attitude o f these people who are now in support of June 
12, that he himself now decided to become quiet. So you see, even Alhaji Balarabe 
Musa whom they knew has been so consistent in his support of June 12 was being 
insulted. So he too fell back. I am saying these to illustrate to you the false steps the 
media has been taking to regionalise a lot of things. They have never seen these things 
from the point of view of you and from the point of view of me.
Let me give you a typical example o f the Sharia. There was an unfortunate incident 
that happened when some young boys went into a house and lashed an Ibo person 
who was selling Beer. In the first place it is against the law of the Sharia. I am a 
Muslim. If I smuggle a Beer into my parlour and start drinking it, nobody has a right 
to enter my house. If you knock at my door and say Asalaamalekun and I refuse to 
answer, you have no right to enter. So you cannot go into somebody's house to try and 
find a fault. So even on that basis these boys were wrong. This man was selling the 
Beer inside his house; they had no right to go there. So what they did was wrong. 
Then there was a case in the same newspaper where they described how the Bakassi 
Boys caught a supposed thief and then they started by cutting his two hands, cut his
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two legs, throwing out his eyes, slashing his throat and then they burnt him. The story 
about the lashing of the man in Kano and the story about the Bakassi Boys appeared 
in the Post Express. But they described what happened in Kano as barbaric and not 
what happened to the man who was slashed into pieces. You can see the biases that 
militate against the Nigerian media playing a unifying role because they see things 
from their own perspective rather than from the national perspective. That is part of 
the problems that we have. There are other occasions and particularly the matter 
became worse with June 12.
Now we know for instance that some newspapers, when Northerners were attacked in 
1994, they wrote commending, you know...the Tribune from the West for instance... 
for attacking the ordinary Northerners. What was his own on June 12? I am giving 
you these as instances as to why the Nigerian media is becoming difficult. And when 
ThisDay, went on a familiarisation tour of the country recently (January 2001), they 
were surprised at what the people in Kaduna, Kano, Jos were saying. And the blame 
had been the media. We have not been out actually to promote a Nigerian image. The 
only time we do that is when Nigeria is externally attacked. On the Bakassi Peninsular 
border dispute with Cameroon, we are united. No doubt about that. When anybody 
threatens Nigeria, like when our people were mistreated in Libya or in South Africa, 
the Nigerian media is united. There was a time people said our people were being 
attacked in Libya and I said yes, because the Libyans know that we attack ourselves 
here. And that because they think we attack ourselves here, we cannot be united to 
defend a Nigerian person. On international issues, the Nigerian media is united. But 
on domestic issues, the Nigerian media can tear the Nigerian nation apart. That has 
been my own honest observation of the Nigerian media, except on very few 
occasions, like I said.
There was no doubt about their role during the pre-independence period. We carried 
the war against colonialism to the post-independence era. And the division became 
worse particularly since 1952, when the division between the East and the West 
started. But I can even go further to say that the break-up of the National Council of 
Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC), which was started by Nigerian students way back in 
1944 or thereabout was the beginning o f this division within the Nigerian political 
milieu, which was copied by the media. Because at that time the independent media 
were politically motivated, they were not able to get out of the shell of their 
controllers, they saw themselves as the megaphones of their owners. Even post­
independence, the media came bn the stage creating this kind of division. That break­
up of the NCNC came up when one o f their members who was a member of the 
Lagos State Council was going abroad. And so there was a contest between 
Adesanya, who later became an Oba and Ernest Ikoli. Zik's faction supported 
Adesanya and Awolowo's faction supported Ikoli. Ikoli won and the Zik's faction 
walked out, citing electoral rigging. That was the beginning of the division within the 
country. The various newspapers took sides along that line. That was the beginning. 
NCNC then was the only uniting political movement established by Nigerian students 
and Zik and Awolowo joined later. Then because of this quarrel, they broke up. So 
Nigerian students again went back to these people and said: Please come back, but it 
was never to be. But because the media were following more the dictates of their 
owners, they went further to knife the NCNC. So at the end of the day, when NCNC 
came to contest election, it was more or less an Ibo outfit rather than the national 
outfit which it was before. If we remember, the NCNC was able to travel to all parts
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of this country to mobilise money, to go and meet with the officials of the colonial 
government, and everybody subscribed to that. They were in the North, they were in 
the East and they were in the West. So it was a national movement at that time. 
Suddenly, because of this division within the political leadership, the media failed, 
despite the efforts of the Nigerian Youths and the Nigerian students to unify the 
political forces. The media fuelled the division between Awolowo and Azikiwe, 
fuelled division between the Ibos and the Yorubas at that time.
During the 1953 constitutional meeting in Lagos, over the proposal by Chief Anthony 
Enahoro, for self-government in 1956. Then the Northern delegation said yes, we 
appreciate that, we will support the West on self-government in 1956 and also the 
East in 1956. But they said please, it would not be possible for us because we don’t 
have the manpower to run the administration. And they disagreed. Then the media 
again came in. Instead o f trying to see the position of this people and harmonise it, 
what we they did was to cause severe division again. So temporarily, they brought 
Awolowo and Azikiwe together against the Northern delegation. Professor Adesanya 
said something in his book to the effect that there was a delegation sent by the Action 
Group (AG) just about three weeks after the Northern delegation, was stoned in Lagos 
and police had to be brought to protect them .. .Then the AG sent a delegation to Kano 
to campaign in 1953 and the media again followed with the insults. And so when the 
AG delegation got to Kano, before they were even allowed to campaign, they were 
attacked. Consequently about seven people became victims in 1953.1 am narrating to 
you this episode in order for you to know how the Nigeria media gas been causing all 
this kind of things.
Division was in the Nigerian political system. I have already told you about the 
NCNC episode. Then what happened in 1966? In 1966 after the coup, the Drum 
magazine carried a caricature of the Sardauna of Sokoto kneeling before Major 
Chukwuma Nzeogwu (Major Nzeogwu led the first Nigerian coup on January 15, 
1966) and that was at a time when there was tension in the country and they wrote so 
many other things. The painful thing was that the Nigerian media was able to promote 
this kind of thing when people thought this coup was... (Inaudible) We could have 
resisted the Army at that time but we thought otherwise and the Nigerian media 
supported the Army. When Alhaji Shehu Shagari was re-elected President in 1983, 
the Nigerian Tribune, for three months after October 1983, kept on its front page and 
more or less calling on the Military to overthrow the administration of President 
Shagari because they believed' Chief Obafemi Awolowo to have won the election. 
When the Military struck again on December 31, 1983, the Nigerian Tribune again 
carried an Editorial commending the Nigerian Military for overthrowing the 
democratically elected government of President Shehu Shagari. And then Chief 
Awolowo issued a statement, and that is why I always commend this man (Chief 
Awolowo), and said that the Nigerian Tribune made a mistake because we don’t 
know where the Military take-over will lead Nigeria to and in fact where it is going to 
end. Then the Punch again carried the same Editorial supporting the position of the 
Nigerian Tribune. The new Military ruler, General Muhammadu Buhari was asked on 
the BBC, when he was saying that the Nigerian politicians were messing up, whether 
he brought it to the attention of the politicians. He said no, because the Nigerian 
media, according to him, had told them everything. So in other words, the ground had 
been softened for them (the Military) before they struck.
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Now these are some of the things that the Nigerian media has been doing to make it 
difficult for our people... Go to the market: By God if  you go to the market, the 
people live happily together and help one another. The Ibo man will tell the Hausa 
man to look after his wares while he out somewhere in the market and the Hausa man 
will do it and vice-versa. The same thing too with the Yoruba trader or other traders 
from the various ethnic groups that make-up Nigeria. These are the ways these people 
interact in our various markets. But we, the so-called elite shout and cause divisions 
because of our selfish interests. Just go to the market either in Kano, either in Aba, 
either in Enugu, either in Lagos; you will see the unity of the ordinary Nigerian. But 
the Nigerian media will continue to cause disruptions among our various peoples. So 
there have been deliberate attempts by the media to cause crises.
I will cite another example again. There was a report about an incident, which I 
witnessed, carried in one of the newspapers. I went to the Kaduna market on that very 
day in 1996 and the Muslims were having their afternoon prayers when somebody 
sneaked into the market and stole something. Luckily one Ibo trader who was there 
got hold of him and other Ibo traders in the same market also came around and helped 
him apprehend the culprit. After the afternoon prayers, the Ibo traders handed him to 
the Hausa traders saying the man was caught trying to steal their wares while they 
were praying. Some traders said beat him and some others said, no, let us hand him 
over to the police. Eventually they took him over to the police. Four days after, I read 
in the Nigerian Tribune that the police saved violence between the Ibos and the 
Hausas in Kaduna. Then I met the reporter who is from Southern Kaduna and asked 
him: 'Why did you file the story in that way?' You greeted me in that market, you saw 
what happened, the Ibo man, in fact, assisted the Hausa man in catching that thief and 
they took him to the police. So, why did report that it was about a clash between the 
Ibos and the Hausas in the market? And he said to me: 'Sir, by God that was not the 
report I sent'. He said that after he sent his report his Head Office asked him to slant 
the story in that way but he declined and said he could not do that because it was not 
true. He said they even promised him additional two hundred Naira (N200) at that 
time should he slant the story in that way. He refused. But they went ahead and wrote 
the story the way that they wanted anyway.
Another recent example involved the Punch. And this was about the appointment of 
an Imam for the big Mosque here in Kaduna. And this is a man who has a Masters 
degree in Islamic studies. So the youths were very happy because he is a very young 
man just over thirty years old; They were happy that such a knowledgeable person 
and a young man, for the first time, has been appointed an Imam. And so when the 
Sultan of Sokoto came to Kaduna, they marched to him to praise him for appointing a 
young and educated man. Then in reporting that story, some of the newspapers stated 
that some youths went and harassed the Sultan of Sokoto. Now the reporter of the 
Punch was there and so wrote about exactly what he saw, which was that, the youths 
went to praise the Sultan. But the other reporters put pressure on him to write in the 
same way that wrote stating that these people went to attack the Sultan...But the 
Punch reporter refused...
So these are some of the instances of how we in the media... (Inaudible). From 
Kaduna here for instance, the slightest thing that affects the North, we will not look at 
it from the point of view of other Nigerians. No, but from the point of view of interest 
of the North and promote it along the same line without even caring about what will
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happen to our brothers down there in the South. When I left the FRCN Kaduna, well, 
I still maintain a very good rapport with them...In 1994 there was a report that was 
sent in from Lagos by their correspondents, and the Managing Director called me into 
his office and he was narrating how some Northerners were killed in Lagos. And I 
said to him, if you carry this story- at that time a lot of Northerners were moving away 
from Lagos, a lot including the soldiers were sending their families home. When 
soldiers start sending their families away from where they are, then you can know 
how grave the situation really is. So I said to the Managing Director that if  he carried 
the report as it is, then we couldn't guarantee the safety of the Southerners here in the 
North. I added that left to me, what we should do is to get the FRCN correspondent in 
Lagos and let him deny the story because the rumour was already in town. So we got 
him on the line and we told him how he should present the story to say that this is a 
lie, there is nothing there, all the Northerners are all right, and nobody has been killed. 
But we knew for sure that some Northerners had been killed. So you see we had to tell 
lies in order to save lives, which is against the ethics of journalism. But I insist that 
where a report will lead to the killing of one life, I would prefer that I tell a lie 
because I will save the life.
Now we are so much attached to the political enclave to which we belong and this 
blurs our minds towards issues o f national cohesion. I commend, for instance, 
ThisDay and National Interest and Daily Trust. They are giving us a kind of vital 
image of what the Nigerian nation is. I can commend them so far. Newswatch 
magazine is in the same position with these newspapers. These are the first 
newspapers that I buy before I consider other newspapers, yes. They are making us to 
see light at the end of the tunnel. You can know their biases, which is all right. I am 
not saying that they should not be biased. Naturally, human beings are with all types 
of biases whether we like it or not. That is natural. But then let your biases not 
overrule your mind or your judgement as a professional journalist. Because one thing 
that many of us, professional journalists, don’t understand is the responsibility that is 
placed on our shoulders. It is so much. You can kill thousands of Nigerians, using 
your pen as a journalist. You can destroy the reputations o f individuals using your pen 
as a journalist. That, we don’t seem to appreciate. We delight in say if there is a 
problem in Kaduna; we magnify it to the extent that it becomes something else in the 
eyes of the public.
There is also this newspaper, Champion. One thing that impresses me about 
Champion is that even when its proprietor, Chief Emmanuel Iwuanyanwu, was 
contesting for the presidency in 1992/93, the newspaper never went all out to promote 
Chief Iwuanynawu over the other contestants. If you check the Champion during that 
election period, you will be impressed with the Champion because they saw Chief 
Iwuanyanwu as any o f the other presidential candidates. They didn't give him any 
prominence over the others. Very, very few newspapers you can see in the manner 
that the Champion did it. My problem with the Champion is that its print size is so 
small. That was also why I dropped the Guardian (Nigerian). Their print size is so 
small and if I want to read them, I'll have to strain my eyes etc.
So when we are talking of, like I said, the Newswatch, National Interest, ThisDay, 
Daily Trust, Champion, I have tremendous respect for the fairness of these 
publications. I rate them as one of the fair publications. The Guardian is there but the 
Guardian is very trickish. Anybody reading the Guardian will have to be a little bit
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clever to be able to understand the meaning of one word between another. But the 
above-mentioned publications, I rate as the best we have so far in terms of trying to 
see the opinion of the other side. They will carry what you write. If you write 
something Islamic, they will carry it. If you write something Christian, they will carry 
it. That is fairness in a way. I am just giving this as an example. But not the others, I 
mean somebody will deliberately tell lies against you even if  you tell them what 
exactly the true position is. Take the case of General Muhammadu Buhari (former 
Military Head of State 1984-1985), for instance. When General Buhari said that the 
Sharia issue was never discussed at the level of the National Council of State (NCS), 
they insulted him saying he is a Muslim zealot. Two weeks after, General Yakubu 
Gowon (former Military Head of State 1966-1975), who is also a member of the NCS, 
came out to say that, yes, General Buhari was right and that they never discussed the 
issue of Sharia at that meeting, the discussion was between the Vice-president and the 
Governors. None of the newspapers carried it. So you can understand what I mean.
So we have hope that there are some newspapers emerging, as I have already told 
you, that can see the Nigerian as a Nigerian. They look at you not in terms of your 
own tribe but in terms of your humanity, in terms of you as a human being, in terms 
of me as a human being. And also as a human being belonging to the Nigerian nation. 
There are these newspapers coming out and I think, over time it is going to grow. 
Because, at the moment, everybody knows that. Go out, find out for yourself, and ask 
some people here: Which newspapers do you buy? Which newspapers do you read? 
Even if you are walking along the street, ask them and they will tell you. As recently 
as one week ago, there was a meeting here, they wanted to gather some newspapers 
and take it upon themselves to be buying and be burning these newspapers in Kaduna. 
We said no, we want the newspapers; we want those ones you think you don’t want 
because they carry false stories. We said, we want them because we ant their 
perspectives. We had to persuade them. And it was a meeting of very serious minded 
people. They said they were going to organise and be buying and burning these 
newspapers because o f what they perceive these newspapers to be. When ThisDay 
came during their familiarisation tour, the number of prominent people that greeted 
ThisDay here at Arewa House (Kaduna) was extraordinary. I can tell you that if it was 
some other newspapers, they will hardly get that kind o f reception, except if people 
would like to tell them what they fill about them. But they perceive ThisDay as a 
newspaper that is at least fair to them.
So there is no doubt, as much as we can see some of the defects of the Nigerian media 
in terms of their willingness to build national bridges across the Nigerian terrain, there 
are definitely a number of newspapers that are coming up that are dedicated to this 
cause and they have been doing their best to really see the other point of view. If you 
look, I don’t know whether you were in the country then, the controversy between 
President Olusegun Obasanjo and the National Assembly. Virtually all the 
newspapers, except these ones that I have told you about, were against the House of 
Representatives. They saw everything that the Executive did as the right thing. But 
these other newspapers were able to see the point of view of the House of 
Representatives also. They came out to say that we are undermining our democracy 
by not presenting the point o f view o f the House of Representatives in a fair manner 
because as they explained it, the only difference between democracy and dictatorship 
is the National Assembly. All other structures are there. If the Military comes today, 
the Executive will remain, the Judiciary will remain, but the National Assembly will
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go and that is the end of the matter. So these other newspapers were able to see the 
perspectives of the National Assembly. They discussed and condemned the excesses 
of the Presidency; they condemned the excesses of the National Assembly and blamed 
the two sides for their lapses here and there. But not most of the newspapers that saw 
the National Assembly as an institution to be crucified at all cost. So you see a bias on 
one side without the willingness to listen to the other side.
Q: Would you say any of these newspapers, in spite of their biases, have called 
for the dismemberment of the Nigerian nation?
No, no. Well, there is one, there is one, not directly but it said it would prefer Nigeria 
to be ruled by the English. That it would be preferable for the English to come back.
Q: Which newspaper was that?
The Nigerian Tribune. Yes!
Q: When was that? Recently?
Around 1994/95.
Q: Really?
Yes, around 1994/95. They said we'd prefer the English to come back than for 
Babangida to rule for even one day.
Q: Abacha? Abacha was there then. (General Sani Abacha was Military Head of 
State from 17th Novemberl993 to 8th June 1998).
Yes, Abacha was the one in power at that time. That was 1994. Either 1994 or 1995. 
You see I have some of these newspaper cuttings, I don’t know whether they are in 
the office or not. Most of these things I am telling you are in newspaper cuttings, 
which I filed or stored. But most of these files I am only just beginning to sort out and 
I will bind them so that if  you people like you come around I can pinpoint the 
newspapers. But let me say that the Nigerian Tribune published that statement not as 
a policy. It was a columnist that actually wrote that and it was published in the 
Nigerian Tribune. Now you cannot take the position of a columnist to mean the 
position of a newspaper, except if  you read the same in the Editorial of a newspaper. I 
will appreciate if you can get the Megaforce column of the Nigerian Tribune. That 
was the name of the column. It was an anonymous column but we knew from the very 
beginning that Adewale Thompson wrote it. Quite recently he admitted that he was 
the one who was actually writing the column.
Q: Who is Adewale Thompson?
He is one of the prominent members of the Alliance for Democracy (AD) Afenifere 
group. And he was writing this column in the Nigerian Tribune. It would be very, 
very interesting if  you can get copies of the Megaforce in the Nigerian Tribune.
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Q: Was it published everyday?
No, it was a weekly column. It was published every Sunday. That column will give 
you an idea to the very question that you have asked me. To the best of my knowledge 
the need for Nigeria to remain united has been emphasised by all the newspapers. To 
the best of my knowledge, this need has been emphasised by all of them in different 
perspectives. There has never been any Editorial in a newspaper calling for the break­
up of Nigeria. But they have been encouraging certain elements to say it without they 
themselves saying it. I made a distinction between what the newspaper says and what 
the newspaper carries. There are some newspapers that tend to encourage the break­
up but then at a general level, all the newspapers have come to agree that it is not easy 
for us to call for the dismemberment o f Nigeria without even talking about the 
consequences. The consequences of breaking up are more serious than the 
consequences of remaining together. That has been agreed generally by all Nigerian 
newspapers. That is why they are calling for restructuring-National Conference, 
Sovereign National Conference (SNC) etc. But what people are saying is that: What 
do you mean by a SNC? We can have a Conference but at the end of the day, and I 
must admit that is my own position, so long as we have allowed ourselves to go by the 
provisions of the 1999 Constitution, then we have to follow the provisions of that 
Constitution in order to change the Constitution itself. Because whatever comes out of 
the SNC, will have to become part o f our national law, which is the Constitution. The 
decision from there can now be taken to the National Assembly for adoption. But 
when you say Sovereign National Conference, indirectly you are saying that President 
Olusegun Obasanjo will not have a say or the elected people will not have a say. Now 
we are going to have a super-structure above and over the present structure, which we 
have on the ground. So to answer your question, in a nutshell, no Nigerian newspaper 
has come out to propagate the break-up of Nigeria, no. What they have done is to 
propagate the weakening o f the Nigerian structure.
Q: How would you rate their treatment of such issues like Revenue Allocation, 
the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), and Federal Character etc?
Let me talk about the issue of Revenue Allocation. The thing is that it is quite 
appropriate for a fair formula to be applied. That would make all the components of 
Nigeria to wake up and do what they are supposed to do. If you look at, for instance, 
what we have here at the moment in the North-I was discussing with the Israeli 
Ambassador to Nigeria and he' was telling me that about 70% of the newsprint in the 
United States (US) was manufactured from the raw material ... (inaudible). And that 
raw material he talked about is formally grown here in the northern part of Nigeria. So 
what I am trying to say is that when certain people are pulling themselves back, it is 
because they don’t want to revive their own economic potentials. So that was why I 
was praying for the US to impose sanctions on Nigeria in those days in order for 
Nigerians to realise their potentials. When you are pushed to the wall and you have 
nothing doing, you will know how to survive. So this principle of revenue sharing, of 
resource controls, honestly, personally I believe in it. Because it will now make every 
part of Nigeria to gear itself up, to start producing its own revenue resources. I believe 
every part of the country should contribute to the central fund, based on what each 
has. But my fear is this: If this resource control issue comes up and that is the general 
feeling here, the tendency at the moment is for the Northern people, the Northern 
government to say, well, what are the resources that we have? The resources that we
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have are our agricultural resources; we are going to impose tax on any product leaving 
here to the other components o f the Federating States. That again is going to affect the 
economy; it is going to affect the economy of the individual. The tendency will be 
that we are going to have buffer zone, say for instance, along the routes. So that any 
goods coming out of Adamawa State, the Adamawa state government will say we are 
going to charge because these are the only resources that we have. The same goods 
will move to Plateau State, the Plateau state government again will say we are going 
to charge you. Then by the time it gets to Benue State and cross over to Lagos, you 
can imagine what the price o f the goods will be.
That is exactly what the issue of resource control is going to lead to. That is my fear 
and consequently, it is going to have a kind of negative effect on the ordinary 
Nigerian, who now will have to pay so much for one product or good. Say for 
instance they are selling a cow at say fifty-five thousand Naira (N55, 000), by the 
time it gets to Lagos, it will be in the region o f about ninety thousand Naira (N90, 
000). In 1994, when the crisis started I was invited to deliver a lecture at Otta, Ogun 
State (Southwest, Nigeria) and I met some of my colleagues. At that time I have 
ceased to be the General Manager o f FRCN, Yola, but I met my colleague who was 
also General Manager from Ondo. And he said to me: You Northerner, Al-Bashir, 
where have you been? You Northerners, do you know what you have done to us? I 
said no. And he said that by God a chicken is now selling at fifteen thousand Naira 
(N15, 000), because the Northerners refused to move Cows, refused to move their 
goods down to the South. And he added that he had to use one thousand Naira 
(N 1,000) to buy tomatoes to cook just a meal for his family. Now my illustration is 
that if you go to the extent of this resource control and those people who are now 
dependent on agriculture and they know that they supply almost 70% of the grains 
and other agricultural products to other parts o f the country, they will say: Well, we 
have no alternative but to impose tariff on agricultural to the other components of the 
federation. And the likely consequences are that the Northern States will say; we are 
going to establish a buffer zone along the corridor and all the charges will be made 
there and will be distributed among the Northern States because that is what they are 
going to depend on. Now for instance, they will say in the Benue border, in the Kwara 
border, we are going to have representatives from each to be collecting taxes from all 
the products that will be moving across the borders to other parts of the country. This 
is my only worry about this resource control issue. And they are likely to embark on 
that because they have to find the means to sustain themselves. Of course the other 
good advantage is that now they will have to gear themselves up. If it becomes 
resource control the Federal government will no longer have control over the 
minerals. And according to statistics 70% of the mineral deposit is here in Nigeria. 
For instance we know of the coal in Enugu and the people of Enugu will say than God 
we are going to develop our resources, others will say they are going to develop their 
own resources etc. The internal trading system at the end of the day will develop the 
economy but it will collapse because you are going to import products from other 
parts of the country at exorbitant prices. But by and large it will be good at the end of 
the day for us to try and see how it will work. That is one.
The second thing that is going to impact on the system is the landmass. 72% of the 
landmass we have in Nigeria is in the North. Now in the area where they are talking 
about resource control, for instance, which is alright, the problem between the Ijaws 
and the Itsekiris, is land. The Itsekiris are no more developed than the Ijaws and the
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Ijaws are no more developed than the Itsekiris. But their common enemy is not the 
Ijaw, is not the Itsekiri, and is not the Oil Company that they are talking about. Ask 
them: Why are you now fighting yourselves when neither the Ataman nor the Itsekiri 
man is oppressing the other. The simple reason is this: It is over the scarcity of land. 
That is the only reason why they are fighting themselves. The Oxonian knows that 
when he was killing his Ogoni brother, that his Ogoni brother was not the one 
oppressing him. Now when the Itsekiris and the Ijaws have been busy killing 
themselves, it is not the Itsekiris that are oppressing the Ijaws, it is not the Ijaws that 
are oppressing the Itsekiris, the only reason why they are fighting themselves is over a 
piece of land. You will go there and you will find a very small space between Ilaje 
and Ijaye. (Names inaudible), in Ondo State, the land is not as big as my house but not 
less than one thousand five hundred (15,000) people, were killed in one day over that 
land. So you will also find a situation where there will be massive movement at the 
end of the day, whether you like it or not, because population explosion is already 
taking place in the South. Then you think of the Ibos. Someone made a statement last 
year that after the so-called Hausa-Fulani, the Ibos are the second largest group in 
Northern Nigeria, which is true. If  you combine, for instance, the population of the 
Kanuris who are two million, and the population of the Tivs who are three million, 
there are definitely more than five million Ibos in the North. So the Ibos have come to 
stay in the North and what are you going to do with them? Now those who see land as 
their only resource might say: Well this land belongs to an Ibo man and so instead of 
paying land tenement of one hundred thousand Naira (N100, 000), he is now going to 
pay land tenement o f one million Naira (Nlm). These are the issues that I have been 
trying to make Nigerians understand-that is the dynamics and some of the 
consequences of how some o f these things are going to play out.
Q: You mean the press is not playing that role?
No they are not. They are looking at it from only one point of view. They have failed 
to go into greater details o f what are going to be the consequences. If you ask any 
Northerner in Yoruba land or in Enugu to come to the North he will tell you he does 
not know anybody in the North. It is the same answer the Ibo people here or the 
Yoruba people here in the North will give you if you ask them to go to their 
respective areas in the South. Go to Funtua, go to Kano, some of them became 
Commissioners or Permanent Secretaries-they don’t know anything about that place 
you call West or East, they only know Kano. And by God when you speak to them 
you will never know that they have Yoruba blood or Ibo blood in them. One of them 
became the Managing Director o f Arewa, one of the biggest conglomerates belonging 
to all the Northern States. Yet he became a Managing Director there. What are you 
going to do to all these people? But consequently they are going to be affected by this 
resource control issue because somebody will start tracing their history and say: These 
people came here so and so years ago, they don’t belong to this area and so we are 
going to charge them for our resources that they are using. In fact the greatest 
resource that God has given the human being is land.
Q: So what are you trying to say regarding the Nigerian press and the Nigerian 
question?
What I am trying to say is that the media has not been able to highlight the dynamics, 
the salient points involved in some of these issues. For instance what are going to be
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the reactions of those people who don’t have oil, not only in the North, but also 
people in the South who don’t have oil?
Q: How would you describe the relationship between the press and the 
government?
Are you talking in terms o f legal policies or in terms of administrative policies?
Q: Both really.
Well, the press laws are there. During the time of General Muhammadu Buhari those 
press laws were really very harsh. But I think on a general note that the press laws 
have never hindered the Nigerian media from operating. They have that latitude to do 
a lot of things. During the Buhari era it was entirely a different matter. It was actually 
a very harsh situation. But I think the Nigerian governments have not been relying on 
the press laws to take hold of the Nigerian media. They have been relying on what I 
call "ethnic incentives" to get control o f the Nigerian media.
Q: Could you expatiate on that?
The way the governments use the press is to exploit the ethnic sentiments of the 
Nigerian media. They will get people from your own area to support their own person, 
they will get people from my own area to support their own person and then they will 
make the Nigerian media get involved. After this they will sit back and watch as if 
they are not aware of what is happening. We know for instance when some of us were 
approached to sing certain songs that will favour the government. The Nigerian 
government has been engaged in this kind of practice.
Q: Say for instance that you have a newspaper in Yoruba land...
Yes they will say that everything about President Obasanjo is right. Now when the 
Ibos are talking about marginalisation, they will be kicking against it. They have 
never sat down to ask themselves the question: Why are the Ibos saying that they are 
being marginalised?
Q: Are you talking here about the entire press?
Yes, the entire presses. They are all engaged in this. But once their man is there, 
automatically, they believe that they are there also, which is not the case.
Q: You mean the presses from the Yoruba area are campaigning against the Ibos 
for talking about marginalisation?
Yes, because they know it will affect President Obasanjo. They will now be insulting 
people from this part of the country (North), grouping everybody together as Hausa- 
Fulani, saying that they are responsible for everything. By the way, I am not Hausa- 
Fulani man. I belong to the smallest tribe in Nigeria, very, very far in the northern part 
of the country. I am from Adamawa. I belong to the Kigi (Inaudible) tribe, which is 
not Hausa. 90% o f my people don’t speak Hausa. Now they will say this Hausa 
people etc. And to the best of my knowledge, about 70% of my people are Christians.
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There was a time I told Dr Doyin Okupe, the former spokesman for President 
Obasanjo that he normally goes to Lagos and meet his brothers there (Dr. Doyin 
Okupe is from one of Nigeria’s majority ethnic groups, the Yorubas) and that because 
of the concentration of the press down there in the South, they tend to forget the 
smaller newspapers here in the North. But like I have already told you because some 
of these newspapers from the South are biased, the smaller newspapers here in the 
North have become the gospel for the people because they reflect fairly their own 
views. So there was a time I told him to move around in this part of the country to see 
the Editors of these other smaller newspapers. And that he should not just go to Lagos 
or Ibadan and think that newspapers do not exist in other parts of the country like 
Kaduna or in the Ibo areas of Enugu or Aba etc. So there has been this kind of ethnic 
sentiments and loyalty in Nigerian newspapers. Now take the issue of democracy. 
Former military ruler, General Ibrahim Babangida, has been the object of insults by 
some of the media in recent times. Their grouse against General Babangida is that he 
is allegedly planning to stand as a presidential candidate in the 2003 general elections 
even though the man himself has never said that. But they say General Babangida has 
no right to contest and yet the media say they are promoting democracy. The best they 
could do if they so dislike the man, is to campaign against him and ensure that he is 
defeated in the election. It is not for the media to say that General Babangida must not 
contest when there is no law banning him. But they are campaigning against General 
Babangida because he might contest the presidential election against the incumbent 
President Obasanjo.
But overall there is no deliberate government policy to hinder the operations of the 
press. There was an attempt during the Babangida era to make sure that a newspaper 
produced in Kaduna must not circulate beyond the Kaduna border. And that also a 
newspaper produced in Lagos must not circulate beyond Lagos, must not circulate 
beyond Ibadan. And we said no; we will never subscribe to that.
Q: And you say this was during the Babangida era?
No, I beg your pardon; it was during the General Sani Abacha era. That regime came 
up with a draft which, tried to limit the circulation of the Nigerian press. And Prince 
Tony Momoh, former Minister of Information under General Babangida, wrote on 
that particular issue, condemning it. I remember the title of his article was: "The 
danger you face." The Abacha regime wanted a new law that would control the press 
and limit its power to circulate within certain zones. That was the time that they 
wanted to curtail cross-border movement o f the Nigerian press. But the Military could 
not go to the extent of promulgating the draft law into law because we kicked against 
it and they could not even enforce it. They were not in a position to enforce it and no 
Nigerian press was going to enforce that. To that extent, yes, there was an attempt to 
actually muzzle the circulation o f the press along that line. So by and large, I don t 
think there has been any law promulgated, apart from Decree 4, under the regime of 
General Buhari, to hinder the press in its operation. But the Nigerian press itself was 
muzzling itself up internally and playing to the gallery of those in power. That was the 
mistake they made.
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Who is Al-Bashir?
My name is Abdukarim Al-Bashir. I was bom in Baza, in Michika Local Government 
Area in 1947. Briefly, I went to ABU, Zaria and graduated in 1973 with a Political 
Science degree. In 1973/74, I did my NYSC. Then I joined FRCN, Kaduna in 1974. 
That has been my period in journalism. I was there for 18 years. I rose to the rank of 
General Manager, FRCN, Yola. I later went to the Democrat newspaper to become 
the pioneer Editor of the Daily. Apparently at the moment, I can describe myself as 
the acting Managing Director of the newspaper, because virtually the MD is not a 
media man, he is a businessman. I have been to Israel to attend Advanced 
Management course. I also attended Advanced Administrative course ASCON and 
some other courses in various institutions.
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(VUG) INTERVIEW WITH CHIEF DURO ONABULE, FORMER CHIEF
PRESS SECRETARY TO FORMER PRESIDENT GENERAL IBRAHIM 
BABANGIDA ON THURSDAY 15/02/01, IN LAGOS
Q: My research interest is in the area of the Nigerian press and how their 
activities over the years have impacted on issues of national integration and 
national identity. I wouldn't say that I have specific questions to ask in this 
regard but I am going to rely on your experience and what you have observed as 
somebody who has been in Government, as somebody who has been outside 
Government and of course as somebody who has been in journalism. So you 
have a wealth of experience as the performance of the press is concerned and 
which I'd like to tap into. But if you don’t mind, I would prefer you to start by 
looking at the Nigerian press pre-independence and also post-independence.
A: In colonial Nigeria, the press was at least to some extent, a popular sector. It was 
very nationalistic maybe at that time we had what I call a common foe, the 
colonialists. There was not much trace of ethnic or regional divisions maybe because 
Lagos was the capital and virtually the entire press was based here in Lagos. At some 
stages there were fissures, sectionalism but the West African Pilot was at that time 
nationalistic in some of its postures whereas the Daily Service had no qualms in 
championing Yoruba cause. In the case of the West African Pilot, it had the semblance 
of nationalism but at the end o f the day, whether you like it or not, as Papa Awo (Late 
Chief Obafemi Awolowo) once said, you are from your local Government area first 
before being a Nigerian. And whatever your nationalist instincts are, there comes a 
time when if your own group is having difficulties, you just have to abandon your 
nationalistic fervour to defend your people as I did in 1994/95, at the height of the 
June 12, 1993 presidential election crisis. Top Yorubas were in disarray either in exile 
or in detention and at that point a top Northerner; Mamman Nasir (Confirm the exact 
name) who was then Chairman of the Constitutional Committee charged that the 
Yorubas are always the cause o f the problems in Nigeria that the Yorubas brought 
down the Interim National Government (ING) led by Chief Ernest Shonekan. I had to 
abandon my nationalism and come in at that point to defend the Yorubas because I 
couldn't take it. Yorubas are noted for criticisms, as they believe that you don’t just go 
out and accept everything. I am not saying that the Yoruba people are perfect but on 
the average when they feel very strongly about anything, they are far, far better 
standing up for what they believe in than other groups in the country.
What was the issue involved? He said that we brought down Chief Shonekan. We 
have no regrets about that because the issue is that Shonekan was not the one voted 
for. The man we voted for was Chief M.K.O Abiola and unlike other ethnic groups in 
the country, only the Yorubas can adopt that position even though Chief Shonekan 
himself is a Yoruba man. Other ethnic groups, if Chief Shonekan belonged to them, 
would have forgotten about Chief Abiola because they will say that he, Chief 
Shonekan was still their own. So if it affects other individuals or someone else in the 
future, if we did that against Chief Shonekan we will do it against anybody. The 
Yoruba group is about the only group in the country that does not shy away or does 
not loose any chance to react to any situation. Somehow we also have the advantage 
of the media being in our own part o f the country. Even when the newspapers are not 
owned by Yorubas, like the Guardian, like the Vanguard, you will notice that most of 
the contributors are Yorubas because they cannot shy away from reacting to any
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situation. At times they are misguided in their response but the fact remains that they 
air their grievances. On the other hand our brothers in the North, because of their 
culture, because of their subservience to whoever is at the top, don’t query authorities. 
We don’t do that in Yorubaland, we query authorities and to some extent the 
Easterners (The Ibos) also do it, they now query authorities. Right from the days of 
Chief Awolowo and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the Yorubas and the Ibos have reacted to 
situations. The views were not very entrenched along ethnic lines until after the 
elections in... The situation was not also helped by the fact that those who inherited 
power at independence were those I call our Northern brothers who don’t normally 
react to situations. So they are always surprised that the other groups do that. So 
because of that unchecked freedom o f the other groups in the country to make their 
views known, gradually the press became, even if unconsciously, tribally inclined.
Prime-Minister Alhaji Tafawa Balewa had no voice until the Federal Government, 
which he headed, set up a newspaper called the Morning Post. But then it’s not 
enough to set up a newspaper, unless you have overwhelming circulation and of 
course, this day supported by advertisement revenue, no newspaper can survive. So 
Prime-Minister Balewa did not have that with the Morning Post and the newspaper 
had to collapse while the Nigerian Tribune, set up by Chief Awolowo while in the 
Opposition as the leader of the Action Group (AG), was making headway. Other 
private newspapers like the Punch, the Vanguard, and the Guardian were set up but 
they still remain at best Southern voice and that is always against the North. But the 
National Concord came in on the nationalist scale because even though a Yoruba man 
set it up, it did not come out to support the Yoruba cause. In fact the newspaper was 
defending a Northerner, President Shehu Shagari. But because it was owned by a 
Yoruba man and based in Lagos, it was considered a taboo for the Concord Group of 
newspapers to oppose the Yoruba mainstream. The emergence of the Concord Group 
of newspapers, therefore, substantially eroded the erstwhile seeming impregnable 
leadership in Yoruba land but at a higher price. The place was burnt down, vehicles 
were attacked and the staff also were harassed, abused, alienated and defamed in other 
sections of the press. But the Concord Group maintained its posture and because of 
the financial strength o f the publisher, it survived that period until he himself quit 
politics and that provided sudden expansion, influence, increased circulation and then 
patronage for the newspaper. To a large extent the newspaper maintained its national 
status but then on politics, they took sides. Not that it supported the other side but it 
abandoned its original ally. So I would say that the newspaper survived by refusing to 
support or stand by its original position which was to support the activities of the 
National Party of Nigeria (NPN) and the President, Alhaji Shehu Shagari
The press also had a lot of impact on Nigeria particularly on the eve of Military 
intervention in the Nigerian political system in 1966 and the subsequent civil war 
against the declaration o f the Republic o f Biafra by the Ibos. The press had an impact 
because the other side o f the civil war, the Ibos who were fighting for the actualisation 
of the Republic of Biafra were so handicapped in terms of their to the press to put 
their own views through to the rest of the country. Suddenly because of the pattern of 
the coup, the pattern of the killings as a result of the Military coup of January 15, 
1966, a section o f the country felt aggrieved while another section was indifferent, 
that the Western part o f the country. Meanwhile, the Easterners (Mainly the Ibos) 
somewhat tactlessly believed that it had conquered what it believed was the major 
political obstacle in the country, that is the Northern leadership. In the process, a
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section of the Nigerian press, that is the New Nigerian, really inflamed the situation. 
They inflamed the situation to such an extent that the repercussions of the earlier coup 
were inevitable. The newspaper whipped up sentiments, whipped up emotions, 
whipped up anger among the Northerners against the Ibos with result that there were 
tribal killings and then the counter-coup of July 29, 1966 (Check the proper date). 
With that tension in the country it appeared that the country was going to go into 
pieces with two outright enemies (The North and the West) now found suddenly a 
common enemy in the East. Meanwhile because of the crisis and the mass exodus of 
Easterners from Lagos and from other parts of the country, they had virtually no 
medium to put across their own side of the story. In the process the media in the other 
parts of the country, particularly in Lagos, and in any case, the New Nigerian also had 
a base in Lagos, and they all simply suffocated the East's side of the story so that they 
had no medium. Whether such imbalance influenced the outcome of the war is what I 
don’t know but in any case, the press coverage here in Lagos, largely determined the 
stand of the outside world towards the civil war at that time.
There is also the aspect o f how the press influenced Nigerians to favour Military take­
over of Government in 1966. That's another long story because after the coup and 
counter-coup and the civil war, the press, in the absence of politicians, now suddenly 
or gradually built up anger against Military rule, either because of prolonged Military 
rule without the prospect of returning to civilian rule again or because of the 
misconduct of some Military officers which alienated public sympathy. That went on 
until 1979 when the Military returned power to a democratically elected Government. 
But suddenly all the hopes of those who fought and campaigned for civilian rule that 
they would be in control o f Government after Military rule in 1979 became frustrated 
again either by fate or through manipulations by the Military. The Army returned to 
the barracks in 1979 but the rivalry among politicians, that is those who lost the 
elections and those who won became so intense that it was inevitable that something 
must happen. That was how General Muhammadu Buhari came to assume power after 
the Military coup o f December 31, 1983. Again prolonged Military rule from that 
time until 1993 also eventually alienated the media and the public.
All along the media will always create the atmosphere or the tension for the Military 
to intervene rightly or wrongly. The tension, the atmosphere is always there for the 
Military to use as an excuse to intervene and the media were always guilty at that time 
of believing that they will use the Military to change Government. Either, one, 
because they believed that eventually, their own will be there or two, that they 
probably believed that having invited the Military in, the new leaders will just be 
there for a short time, organise elections and then hand-over power to the civilians. 
But none of these materialised for obvious reasons. One, in the case of the Military, 
any coup is high treason and any soldier involved in any would have to be sure that he 
would succeed because if  he failed, he would be executed for treason. So because of 
that I think it was always unrealistic o f the press to expect that any officer, who 
organised a coup to change a Government, would then shortly afterwards hand-over 
power to the next person. He cannot risk his life for nothing hence they were always 
staying long with series of unending transition programmes. That has been the 
weakness of the media.
But the one weakness of the press that has been surprising, if not disappointing, is the 
either double standard or partiality in the press. In 1986, there was this crisis about
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Nigeria's membership of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). There were 
so many agitations against what was called the sneaking in of Nigeria into the OIC the 
General Babangida administration to such an extent that the then number two in the 
administration was asked by journalists at the airport in Lagos about the issue. He just 
said that for all he knew the issue of Nigeria's membership of the OIC was not 
discussed at the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), the highest ruling body of 
that administration. So you see even if  they did not discuss the issue at the AFRC, the 
man was ready to say so openly, although I believed he should have been more 
tactful. He should have raised the issue at the AFRC that why was the issue not 
discussed there first before Nigeria became a member of the OIC. And to some extent 
that ordinary statement that Commodore Ukiwe made to reporters at the airport, 
destabilised the country. He may not have meant it that way. Maybe he thought he 
was being blunt but whether a Military officer can be blunt to disown the action of his 
superior officer is what I don’t know. When he said it the Nigerian press hailed him as 
a hero. They saw him as a man o f principle because the press is largely Christian- 
controlled and is based in the South.
Then last year the Sharia matter came out. Obviously the issue was not discussed at 
the National Council of State (NCS) [Remember to indicate what the NCS does and 
those who are members] meeting which, in any case is not a legislative body but a 
purely advisory body. So they met, we were not there and therefore we couldn't have 
known what they discussed but events later happened. However before the NCS met 
President Obasanjo described as unconstitutional the introduction of the Sharia, by 
some States in the northern part o f  the country. So he got the Vice-President Alhaji 
Abubakar Atiku, to hold another meeting with the State Governors on the issue and I 
think the Vice-president pleaded with the States concerned to play down the Sharia 
issue or abandon it altogether. You will agree with me that anyone's reaction to the 
Sharia issue would be influenced by what part of the country you are from. So while 
one part of the country might consider it taboo, another part would see it as an article 
of faith. Therefore for some Governors, abandoning or playing it down might not 
create problems for them, there were substantial other Governors, who if they 
abandoned the Sharia in their States, meant trouble for them. So in their meeting with 
Vice-President Atiku, they simply said all right, since the Sharia issue is not in the 
Exclusive Legislative List and therefore a State matter, the States were acting legally 
by introducing Sharia law in their own jurisdiction. The idea after their meeting was 
that although they would not object to any advise offered by the Vice-President, they 
would nevertheless still go back to their own States and do what they felt was within 
their jurisdiction to do.
So when the NCS met on the Sharia issue, President Obasanjo sought to know from 
the Vice-President what the outcome o f his meeting with the State Governors was. 
The Vice-President then replied that the Governors had agreed that the Sharia issue 
should be played down or abandoned. As I have said, for the Southerners or the 
Christian members o f the NCS, there was no problem with such a feedback from the 
Vice-President to the President on the outcome of his meeting with the Governors. 
But for the Muslim members of the NCS, most of them did not see such conclusion 
reached with Governors as equivalent to a general decision approved or discussed by 
the NCS. To them and rightly too, the NCS did debate and come up with a decision 
on the Sharia question. So General Muhammadu Buhari, a member of the NCS came 
out and admitted before the media that the issue was not discussed by the NCS.
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Another member, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, also said that any decision reached by the 
NCS was not binding on the States as its role was merely advisory and which is the 
truth under the Constitution. The NCS is not a legislative body because you cannot 
call former Heads of State to come and legislate for the country, they can only advise. 
So Alhaji Shagari and General Buhari were both correct to say that the NCS did not 
discuss the issue. Now the entire media that only in 1986 hailed Commodore Ukiwe 
as being principled, now turned round to condemn General Buhari and Alhaji Shagari 
for the same thing obviously because o f their own part of the country.
Still on the double standards of the Nigerian press, I’d like to talk about the way they 
have treated the current President, Obasanjo, since the day he handed-over power to a 
democratically elected civilian Government, while he was still a Military Head of 
State in 1979. When he left office in 1979, the Nigerian press took Obasanjo, a 
Southerner and Yoruba, as the darling o f the Nigerian press. He spared none of his 
successors as he criticised almost every move that they made every policy that they 
introduced. He did not spare President Shagari, he did not spare General Buhari and 
he was most devastating towards General Babangida. All of them ignored him. Then 
he thought he could continue it with General Sani Abacha and, of course he had his 
problems with General Abacha who incarcerated him. But through God's divine the 
same Obasanjo, maybe God had judgement on him, is now back in Government. First 
of all, when he was going to contest the same Nigerian press opposed him saying that 
he was being sponsored by the Military, that he was being sponsored by the North and 
that he was even being sponsored by General Babangida. The Nigerian press as a 
whole came out against him and supported his fellow Southerner, Chief Olu Falae. 
(Do not forget to indicate the names o f the political parties that contested the election 
in 1999) Indeed the press saw Chief Falae as the representative of the South as against 
Obasanjo whom they saw as a stooge of the Northerners.
But as soon as he won the election and assumed office as President, he started running 
into problems as he encountered criticisms on various issues. Now he was being given 
just a little dose of the poison he gave his successors after he left office as a Military 
Head of State in 1979 as people were criticising him and talking about the 
marginalisation of the North and the marginalisation of the Ibos in the current 
political dispensation. However the same media, the same Nigerian press that opposed 
his candidacy for President, have now made a U-tum and embraced the same 
Obasanjo that they dismissed as a stooge o f the Northerners, as their own man. To the 
Nigerian press, nobody should criticise President Obasanjo and that nothing should 
happen to him. In fact they have even gone as far as saying that President Obasanjo is 
being criticised because he has stepped on the toes of powerful Northerners. That is 
the Nigerian press for you. When Obasanjo as ex-Head of State, was criticising 
Northerners in Government, the Nigerian press did not say Obasanjo was criticising 
those Northerners because they stepped on his toes. But in any case, even if it was 
true, then those on whose toes he too has stepped, on should be equally right to 
criticise him and if  it was not true, then it shouldn't be true also that Northerners are 
criticising him because he stepped on their toes. The Nigerian press should realise that 
President Obasanjo is being criticised just like every other Government anywhere else 
in the World.
Q: Why do you think the Nigerian press is like that? Why do they have this 
double standard that you’ve talked about?
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Again I think it is a character issue. Most of the young ones now writing in the press 
were bom in the era of tribal politics and so there is hardly anything nationalistic 
about them. They are so narrow-minded. They cannot view any issue from a national 
perspective. They only view issues from a very narrow and tribal perspective. Always 
one part of the country is wrong and that is the North or the East while the other part, 
the West, is always right. Even within the Western and Yoruba part of the country, 
only the Awo group (Those who were the followers of the late Chief Obafemi 
Awolowo and who still believe in his philosophy) or the Awo idea is the correct one 
and anything different is wrong. Like most people already know, the press is based 
and operated from a particular area or part of any country. In the United States, (US) 
for instance, the press is mostly based in New York, in England or the United 
Kingdom, (UK) it is based in London and equally in Nigeria the press is based in 
Lagos. Fortunately for the Americans, even though there are divisions within the 
country, there is not much of ethnic politics, not even along race lines like Blacks and 
Whites. The same thing in the UK where you have the Welsh, the Scots and the Irish, 
yet on every issue it is always the UK first. For instance, the two major political 
parties in the UK are each supported by newspapers sympathetic to their cause but 
they do not hesitate to criticise them whenever they do anything they regard as not 
being in the best interest of the people of the UK.
But unfortunately for us in Nigeria we don’t have that kind of press. As I have already 
stated, the press in this country is mainly based in Lagos, in the South, particularly in 
the Yoruba area and unfortunately it is that Yoruba area that has continued to 
determine the character of the Nigerian press. Some of us who are from the Yoruba 
area have tried to write from a national perspective because number one, we have the 
advantage of age and secondly we have got a sound education.
Q: How can the Nigerian press rise above the level of tribal sentiments etc?
From my experience with the Concord Group of Newspapers, the entire Yoruba press 
before the Concord newspapers hit the newspaper stand in 1980 was just personality 
through Chief Awolowo. Most, if  not all the people in the Yoruba press, belonged to 
the Awo group. But when the Concord newspapers came out, we were able to curtail 
that substantially and were able to balance the political arguments in Yoruba land. If 
we are to extend that to the North then there will be a balance in the Nigeria press. 
Well like I have said, culturally, it will not be easy to achieve. Easterners and 
Westerners are by nature self-critical, either it is one group against the other or within 
the same group, there are people against one another and it is strongest in Yoruba 
land. It is not entirely the same with our Ibo brothers but they are building up to it 
gradually. But nationally, I don’t see the possibility of the same level of self-criticism 
becoming a feature of both the North and the South. Maybe it will take some time for 
the North to imbibe that culture of self-criticism. These are some of the issues that 
have shaped the Nigerian press.
But also for any medium to succeed in Nigeria, particularly the print medium, certain 
factors are very essential which are one, readership; two, advertisements which, of 
course the readership will generate; three, and very important, the location. You may 
not like it but there is nothing you can do about it because God has made it so. Lagos 
is the place for any print medium in this country. Unfortunately, our Northern
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brothers, because of the way they grew up, not just this generation of Northerners, 
they hardly move out of the North to invest outside. In any case, for a print medium to 
succeed you have to invest also and people in the North don’t seem to have the culture 
of long-term investment. For them, it is cash and carry business: Do the business 
today, sell the newspapers today, make your ten million Naira (NIOm) that's what 
they do. Long-term investment, they don’t do it and that is what the media industry 
requires to succeed and they won't do that.
Chief Emmanuel Iwuanyanwu, the publisher of the Champion Newspapers Limited, 
who is from the Eastern part of the country and an Ibo man, dared to invest in Lagos. I 
advised him and I told him that if  he established his newspaper in Owerri, the capital 
of his home State, it will never succeed and won't take-off. He has tried two or three 
provincial newspapers in the past and they did not make it. But the very fact of 
locating the Champion newspapers in Lagos gave it the status of a national 
newspaper, even if it sells only five thousand copies. However if he had located it at 
Owerri and sold one million copies a day, nobody would reckon with it and nobody 
would know that it exists. That's the problem with for our Northern brothers because 
they hardly move out to invest elsewhere. Maybe they might choose to invest in 
Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) but again, if  you locate a newspaper in 
Abuja, it won't make it. Lagos is the place. Secondly, our Northern brothers don’t 
have reading habit. As long as they do not have reading habit, as long as they don’t 
invest outside the North, particularly in Lagos and as long as they do not want to 
invest in the media industry, they will continue to be handicapped. Their literacy level 
is also very low compared to the South. This affects them too and as far as one can 
see, there seems to no prospect of that position changing for a very long time to come. 
Their priority is Koranic studies while Western education is secondary. Whereas in 
the Southern part of the country, the quest for western education is unquenchable.
Q: If the press has to operate within the context that you have just described, 
what then is the prospect for the press to play the role of national integration?
Even if the press makes a genuine effort to play that role, there is still the need for the 
prospect of education to improve in the North so that more people could read and 
write. In fact there is not much a newspaper can do to integrate a country if the people 
to be integrated cannot read and write.
Q: Those issues have to be resolved first?
Yes and the situation is not even helped by the low purchasing power of most of the 
people in the North. The cover prices of newspapers are now so high that most 
Nigerians are not able to buy them. There is poverty everywhere in the country and 
our brothers in the North are more poverty-stricken than most Nigerians. So no matter 
what effort the press makes towards national integration, unless our brothers in the 
North improve their prospect for higher education and acquire reading habit and then 
have the purchasing power to buy the newspapers, there is not much the press can 
achieve.
Q; Are there instances of efforts aimed at promoting national integration that 
you can identify with the Nigerian press?
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Unfortunately, I can't really say that there has been any because those that man the 
press now are largely young, inexperienced and unenlightened boys and girls. Their 
whole world starts and ends in Lagos. Many of them have never even been to Abuja 
for example. And the thing is somewhat incestuous. They acquired such 
misinformation that they peddle and such ignorance from their lecturers on the 
campus. Those lecturers do not teach the boys and girls what are necessary and what 
the true situation in the country really is. So the situation in the Nigerian press now is 
that most of the journalists are very ignorant and they don’t know and even refused to 
know that they don’t know. They need to be well educated because as a journalist, if 
you are going to be making judgmental statements, you must be very versed in 
history. If you want to make an assertion, you have to be sure of what you are saying.
Q: Your experiences in Government particularly as they relate to the Nigerian 
press. You dealt with the press for eight years as the Chief Press Secretary to the 
President of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria and so what was your 
experience with the Nigerian press from that position?
In my early years in Government, I had what I call matured people in charge of the 
press. Chief Segun Osoba, now Governor of Ogun State, was not only the Managing 
Director of the Daily Times; he was also the president of the Newspaper Proprietors 
Association of Nigeria (NPAN). So I had the co-operation of the publishers as at that 
time. If for instance, there was any journalist in trouble with the Government, I will 
call the publisher of the newspaper o f the journalist in question and ask to be given a 
few days to allow me sort out everything, using my connections in Government. 
Some newspaper used to whip up public sentiments against the Government by 
publishing on a daily basis on their front pages, stories about detained journalists. It 
was very common to see them publishing things like: 'First Day in Detention'; 'Second 
Day in Detention'; 'Third Day in Detention' etc. I told them that as long as they 
continued to publish things like that, they will enrage the authorities more and that the 
journalist they thought they were fighting for will not be released.
There was the case of a publisher whose Deputy Editor was being detained and when 
I called him, he banged the telephone on me saying I should not ask him to stop his 
Editor from publishing stories, on a daily basis, highlighting the plight of his Deputy 
Editor in detention. Well, I simply called the wife of the detained journalist to tell her 
what transpired between me and the publisher of her husband's newspaper. I went that 
far to make it known that the publisher did not take cognisance of the fact that we 
were dealing with a Military regime and not a democratic Government. The Military 
only knows and adopts iron tactics. On hearing from me the wife of the detained 
journalist went to the publisher herself and said she didn't want any more stories about 
her husband's detention carried in the newspaper anymore. The day after this incident 
the newspaper stopped carrying the story and when I intervened within Government 
circles, the journalist was released in no time. So you see you have to employ human 
relations and connections etc.
But in the latter part o f my years in Government, there was this enormous growth in 
new publications, particularly magazines, in the country whose owners became 
Editors-in-Chief overnight. There were publishers without maturity, without 
experience but whose only interest in publishing was mainly to confront Government 
and defame public figures. The junk magazines in particular can defame anybody.
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They pick on anybody and concoct stories. Anybody, including an armed robber can 
just get up, set up a newspaper and calls himself Editor-in-Chief and be defaming 
people. Even the so-called trained journalists, those of them with University degrees, 
are also misguided into believing that press freedom is a license to defame people. If 
you attempt to cause public insurrection using your newspaper, that is not allowed 
under the press law anywhere in the World. There are laws regulating our profession 
and 90% of the journalists and publishers in this country do not know that there are 
laws regulating the profession and once they are called to order, they will shouting 
there is no press freedom, the journalists are being harassed etc. Even in the UK, if a 
journalist commits contempt he will be charged to court. If you are charged to court to 
disclose the source of your information and you refuse, which is a professional ethic, 
you will be jailed and if you go to jail for it your colleagues will hold you in high 
esteem as a hero. The issue then is not that you haven't broken the law or that the 
court that sent you to jail is harassing the press; it is simply that you have been jailed 
for contempt of court. So we have to educate our people, our journalists to know what 
the law regulating the profession is all about. Whatever a journalist publishes, he has 
to prove that it is the truth. You don’t just publish anything in the name of press 
freedom. That is not journalism.
My own colleague in the National Concord was (Name not given) was not doing 
anything wrong until they started publishing stories against her. Then she said: "Why 
are they doing this to me, after all I am one of them." But I said to her that that was 
how it feels like to be defamed. I said that 80% of what was being published in the 
National Concord is not true. I said until it affects you, that you don’t know the 
blunder being published by these newspapers and magazines. So that is the situation 
in the Nigerian press today. Largely ignorant journalists who believe that there is no 
law regulating the profession dominate it. There is nowhere else in the World where 
that is true.
Q: On the whole how would you assess the ownership of the Nigerian press and 
its impact on the press’ performance?
We have some publishers who use the press to blackmail Government and Ministers. 
Most of them are contractors, they are businessmen and they use their newspapers to 
blackmail when they want a particular contract. If they don’t get the contract they use 
their newspaper to blackmail or sponsor another newspaper to do it for them. What 
they normally do is to cry foul that so and so has been awarded contracts against all 
regulations whereas when they were also awarded contracts against all regulations, it 
was all right. I am still looking for that publisher who has set up a newspaper for 
patriotic reasons. I don’t know of any yet unlike in the colonial days. But the more 
worrying thing about the Nigerian press now is the high level of corruption. It is 
staggering. For all I know, as a journalist, if you have your daily assignment, the 
employer pays you transport money. Therefore you don’t have any reason to start 
asking the hosts of wherever you go to cover assignments for transport money. But 
that is what the journalists do now unashamedly. It is so disgraceful. In fact this man 
Chief Ebenezer Williams (Aloba) who died recently, alluded to it. The first person to 
blow the whistle was Alhaji Babatunde Jose, on e o f the doyen of Nigerian 
journalism. He asked the journalists who demanded money from him whether they 
knew who he was. You see if anybody could ask Alhaji Jose and Chief Williams for 
bribes, you could imagine the level to which Nigerian journalism has sunk. So to
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some extent that has allowed even non-joumalists to claim to be journalists because 
they now invade anywhere a press conference is being held and demand for bribes. 
You cannot organise a press conference today in this country and expect not to bribe 
journalists. But if I organise one and they demand for bribes, I won't give it to them.
Q: Maybe they won’t publicise you...
Too bad and even at my level, I don’t need to be publicised. Fortunately, I can write.
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(VHH) INTERVIEW WITH ALHAJI MUHAMMADU TURI, FORMER 
MANAGING DIRECTOR OF NEW NIGERIAN NEWSPAPERS IN KADUNA ON 
SUNDAY 28/01/01
Q: If you look at the Nigerian press pre-independence and post-independence, 
how would you describe the press?
As you know, the Nigerian press pre-independence was more interested in fighting 
the colonialists and more interested in making Nigeria become independent an 
independent nation. The question of national integration was not much the focus. But 
of course at the same time ethnicity was not the critical issue as it became after 
independence. So this is the way I see the press, pre-independence. Of course the 
press in the South, as even today, was in the majority. They were more critical of the 
colonialists than the Nigerian Citizen, which was the only newspaper really in the 
North then. There were other smaller ones, but it was the Nigerian Citizen that was 
very prominent and it was a government-owned newspaper.
After independence, the attention was turned to other various issues that arose. There 
were more regional considerations then than before independence. I think after 
independence, there was the issue o f what should be the relationship between the 
regional governments and the Federal government. The Western regional government 
led by the Action Group (AG) was very critical of the Northern Peoples Congress 
(NPC), which was in control o f the Federal government. Later on the AG split into 
two. There was the Awolowo faction who wanted a thoroughgoing opposition against 
the Tafawa Balewa government. There was the Akintola group, which said that it was 
even better for the West to cooperate with the Federal government led by the NPC. 
Tafawa Balewa wanted to continue with the national government which came into 
effect following the coalition between the NPC and National Council of Nigerian 
Citizens (NCNC) led by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe that was starting to take form then. But 
the AG was very critical so the press took their cue from there to fuel the controversy.
Q: How did they do that? Were they leaning on one side or did they try to see the 
issue from a national point of view?
I wouldn’t say from a national point o f view. But I would say that they saw it from an 
ideological point of view.
Q: What ideology are we talking about?
Well, the ideology of opposition. The Daily Times, which though was a leading 
newspaper, was Yoruba-biased. Then there were AG's own newspapers, the Nigerian 
Tribune and the Daily Express. Then on the other hand there was the West African 
Pilot, which was in support of the NCNC, and of course there was the eastern 
newspaper called the Nigerian Outlook.
Q: So what you are saying is that all these newspapers saw issues from the point 
of view of their owners?
Yes, exactly.
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Q: Would you say then that as a result, they were not contributing to national 
unity and integration?
I think you should read the first chapter o f my book where I discussed this in detail. 
(Give full details of the book in the note section)
Q: These newspapers were not able to carry over to the post-independent period, 
that singular purpose of co-operation that ensured the successful prosecution of 
the independence struggle?
Yes.
Q: Was there any particular reason for this?
Yes, it was as a result of ethnicity.
Q: Why ethnicity?
Let me put it this way. It was as a result o f ethnicity and the struggle for power by the 
political leader. After independence, unfortunately, the political leaders were not as 
united as they were in their fight for Nigeria’s independence. After independence 
every region kept to itself and whatever issues arose were seen from that narrow point 
of view. They all thought along the line o f what they will gain sectionally, rather than 
nationally, particularly on the issue o f the sharing of the national cake. And so the 
newspapers took their cues from there.
Q: Apart from these aforementioned issues, do you think there are other 
hindrances against the Nigerian press when it comes to the question of 
promoting national integration?
In my opinion, there were no hindrances, particularly in terms of government policies. 
During the Tafawa Balewa era in the First Republic, the freedom of the press was 
very much upheld. And then there was the coup in 1966 when Yakubu Gowon took 
over. But even after the coup, Gowon's government was quite fair to the press. So if 
there were hindrances, it was not as a result o f deliberate government policies. Rather 
the newspapers promoted narrow and parochial ethnic and regional self-interests.
Q: If I say that one of the roles of the press in society is the promotion of national 
integration, how would you respond?
I think it is the role of the press to promote national integration. This is what we try to 
do in the New Nigerian newspaper. I would like to believe that the New Nigerian, at 
least during the period that I have studied, did strive for that goal. In its first Editorial, 
the New Nigerian promised to tell the truth all the time. It stated that it was not 
ashamed to be a Northern newspaper but that it would be so within the context of one 
Nigeria.
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Q: Why should the press promote national integration?
Because up here in the North, we believe that there should be a united endeavour to 
develop the country while at the same time we should ensure that the national interest 
comes first.
Q: How will the press be able to identify the national interest when there are 
various interests ranging from ethnic, regional to religious interests in the 
country?
Well the national interest was well articulated after independence in 1960. There was 
the first national development plan, which articulated the national interest very well. 
Even the independence constitution spelt out very clearly what ought to be the 
national interest, like for instance unity, development, freedom, human rights etc. All 
these were in the constitution. There was also the provision for the States to develop 
at their own level because of the peculiarities in each of the regions. In fact the 
independence constitution was truly a Federal constitution. Even after the coup of 
1966 it was because of the need for national unity that the then Yakubu Go won 
administration went to war to bring the East into line with the common national 
aspiration of national integration. After the war, the administration came up with the 
second national development plan, which spelt out the various principles to be 
pursued by the Nigerian government, which included the promotion of a virile 
democracy etc. So there was never any doubt at all about what the national interest is 
or what ought to be the national interest.
Q: Would you that the ownership of the Nigerian newspapers played a role in 
the way that both private-owned and public-owned presses performed their role 
in society for instance?
Well all I know is that there is a difference in the way each of them operates. The 
government-owned newspapers like the Daily Sketch and the Nigerian Observer etc 
were established to look after the interests of the respective government that 
established them. But the New Nigerian was an exception. It is still one of the things 
that you researchers should find out about the newspaper. The New Nigerian, in the 
first twenty years, for instance, had a very national outlook. Indeed people were even 
surprised that even though it was a newspaper owned by the then Northern regional 
government, it expressed very pungent views, independent opinions and focussed on 
national issues and interests. Towards the end of the Gowon administration, the New 
Nigerian published a petition against Governor J. D. Gomwalk of Benue-Plateau State 
even though the Benue-Plateau State government was one of the owners of the New 
Nigerian.
But the privately owned newspapers operate in a different fashion. They have to 
survive first of all because they don’t subsidies from the government. And so they 
should be free to publish independent opinions for people to buy them and also rely 
on them as carrying balanced views.
Q: If the New Nigerian performed its role creditably in promoting national 
rather than narrow or parochial interests in its first twenty years, when and how
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did things start going wrong?
You see what happened was that in 1975, the Federal government took over the New 
Nigerian Newspapers. Nevertheless they still managed to keep their heads above 
waters in spite o f its take-over by the Murtala/Obasanjo government. But during the 
regime of General Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993), he appointed his own men to sing 
his own praises although one could argue that government interference with the New 
Nigerian did not actually start under General Babangida's government. Indeed the 
interference became manifest after Alhaji Shehu Shagari became President in 1979. 
However it was under the government o f General Babangida that government 
interference with the New Nigerian became very clear and open. From then on people 
began to abandon the newspaper and the circulation really went down.
Q: And you think that the newspaper can still be revived?
Yes, of course. Under the current Managing Director, Dr. Farouk, the newspaper has 
been doing really well indeed. The circulation has gone up.
Q: But it is still a Federal government -owned newspaper?
Yes.
Q: So they don’t appoint their own men anymore?
They do. President Olusegun Obasanjo appointed Dr Farouk. But it is your own 
integrity that you will bring to bear on the newspaper
Q: How would you rate the Nigerian press in their treatment of issues like the 
Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), Revenue Allocation and Census etc?
In order for you to understand how the press treats these issues, you have to go back 
to the period 1960-1966. In my book I tried to analysis of this period. Negative ethnic 
politics and sentiments overwhelmed it. Once you are aware of what happened during 
that period then you can understand all the reactions to the OIC issue. As far as I am 
concerned there is nothing new in the positions taken by the various newspapers on 
this issue. The newspapers reacted in accordance with the ownership interest. Their 
reactions were determined by their own geographical locations.
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(VII I) INTERVIEW WITH DR. G. G. DARAH, CHAIRMAN, EDITORIAL 
BOARD, THE GUARDIAN NEWSPAPERS, LAGOS, NIGERIA ON 
WEDNESDAY, 13/12/00.
Q: What is the Nigerian Press?
The Press is older than the country. The Press was not just a factor in the making of 
the country, it was a contributor. It was the Press that helped to define what you can 
call the Nigerian interest vis-a-vis colonial interest. At a point, in terms of historical 
epoch when it was required to distinguish between what the Nigerian people want and 
what the British imperialist wanted, it was the Press that articulated the Nigerian 
viewpoint.
So the Press grew up in the context of the evolution of the Nigerian State. It has a 
very close link to the Nigerian system. From the early 20s to the 60s, it was the Press 
that fought the British much more than you will find anywhere else in Africa where 
the leading lights were also politicians, a role exemplified by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe 
who came from Ghana to Nigeria. The first thing he did was to set up a Newspaper. 
So he announced his own partisanship into the Nigerian struggle in 1937.
So the story o f the Press and politician is unique. I don’t think it is so in Kenya or 
anywhere else. The Nigerian one was peculiar. All major political figures were also 
major media figures. In the 19th century when there were Newspapers owned by 
Nigerians, they were very nationalistic. The Newspapers were very strident on the 
African question, economy, culture and the need to emancipate the African. These 
things were the real ideas o f the time.
The first Editor of the Daily Times was Ernest Ikoli. In 1936, he was a member of the 
Nigerian Youth Movement. People like Herbert Macaulay were media figures while 
he was also a leading politician in the country. So there has always been this link 
between the Press and the political process in Nigeria.
Q: The Press pre-independence and post-independence
The historical moments are different, so the issues and the challenges are also 
different. Up to 1960, the boundaries were fairly well drawn. It was the period of anti­
colonial struggle; it was Nigeria versus Britain essentially. So the terrain of combat, 
of clash of ideas was fairly well defined. I have not read the account of the Press in 
other African countries, but on a comparative note what you discover is that the most 
revolutionary; the most courageous involvement of the Press in anti-colonial struggle 
was the Nigerian Press. It was unprecedented in Africa. The Nigerian elite, the Lagos 
elite was sufficiently articulate to generate the readership or the reading public for the 
Newspapers. The Newspapers kept the politicians on their toes.
Q: On the civil war
It was the Press that saved Nigeria. We were all young then, but that period o f '66, '68, 
'68, '69, the Press backed the Nigerian government. Not without criticism, but 
essentially, it stood with the Nigerian government in the interest of a united country.
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In a way it was doing what the Press had done also during the anti-colonial period. 
When the various constitutions (Richardson, McPherson, Lyttleton), were trying to 
weaken the Nigerian State, balkanise the people, the Press was fighting to make 
Nigeria remain united; fighting the British and challenging British legislation that 
tended to weaken the country.
The Press in the colonial period took on a national unity outlook. If you look at the 
history of the Press in Nigeria, it has never compromised national unity. If it did the 
country would have gone to blazes. It is almost the last institution to hold on. It was 
so on December 31, 1983, when General Muhammadu Buhari came till 1993 when 
General Ibrahim Babangida messed up, it was the Press. There were no political 
parties. There were no NGOS. All the battles were waged inside Newspapers. It was 
the Military versus the rest of Nigeria.
When General Buhari came with his draconian laws, the Press was the first victim. 
Journalists like Nduka Irabor and Tunde Thompson, both of the Guardian Newspapers 
were the first victims. Did they relent because of that? No! The Press has made life 
uncomfortable for governments that toyed with the issues of development. The 
government o f General Buhari couldn't last. Uptil now he still has not been able to 
interact with the Press. He sees the Press as a thorn in his own flesh.
Q: National Integration
There is no section o f the Press that is indifferent to the issue of national integration. 
We don’t have the Press divided the way you find in the United Kingdom, for 
example- Scottish national Newspaper just on its own- who is going to buy it here.
Although the Nigerian Press is very critical and almost irreverent, but when it comes 
to national integration, what the Press does is to combat the government for not doing 
it properly. Like you would find that the theme of national conference has been 
featuring since 1995. In fact it started in 1990 when Aka Bashorun was the President 
of the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA).
The main trend in the Press is uncompromising on national integration. But their 
divisions or regional variations or attitudes- national integration as you would find in 
the Guardian, or the Tribune, or the Vanguard, or the Punch, is not synonymous with 
unitary dictatorship, is not synonymous with hegemonic superiority.
The Press wouldn't say we don’t need Nigeria. But it will tell you that Nigeria will do 
better if you arrange it in this way or that way. So the main trend is for national 
integration. If the Press were to concentrate on and orchestrate the break-up of 
Nigeria, the politicians cannot hold it. From what I have seen, I was not in the media 
in, I was in the University system but I was a unionist, so I was partisan...since 1989, 
when I came, all the turbulence o f June 12, 1993, I have integrated with the Press a 
lot.
I have told you that in general the Press fought General Buhari; we never gave him 
any more chance. The Press also fought second Republic President, Alhaji Shehu 
Shagari because the Press saw Shagari as one who didn't really merit the position. So 
from day one it was a hostile media that the government confronted. They never
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allowed the government to rest. Perhaps it helped the government to do better.
But the Press was not advocating any division of the country. It was not asking for a 
break-up of the country. It was just saying that they wanted a more competent 
manager and that has remained constant. Buhari they fought. The Press welcomed 
President Ibrahim Babangida. He warmed his way to the Press because they saw him 
as a substitute to Buhari. Buhari's high-handedness was dividing the country; became 
irreconcilable and so the Press initially saw Babangida as somebody who would 
reverse that trend and they gave him full support until he himself betrayed that trust. 
And when he did, if  you go back to the Newspapers and Magazines in 1993 from 
June, it was criticism. Uptill now he cannot attend media event.
So what was the Press interested in? It was not because Chief M.K.O ABIOS was the 
owner of National Concord. Concord was already weak by 1993. But the Press 
interpreted Abiola's victory as a process o f national integration for breaking the myth 
that only some people from a part o f the country can produce the President. Abiola 
broke that myth. It enhances the process of national integration that merit could be 
rewarded.
That was the way the Press handled it. Abiola may have spent money in public 
relations; I think the essential thing was that his own victory was reflective of ftirther 
evolution of a more cohesive and a more balanced federation. That anybody could 
win election if he had the merit and a manifesto that would serve the interest of the 
country. That was what brought the Press into the fray. And it had never looked back 
since then.
Q: The Role of New Nigerian
It started as a private Newspaper called the Nigerian Citizen. A top politician owned 
it... It has never compromised national integration. It was partisan. It was very critical 
of government uptill 1975. From a nationalist point of view, it reflected the northern 
point of view, which was legitimate. The Tribune was not representing the northern 
part. Daily Times was not doing it effectively. There was no National Concord then; 
there was no Guardian.
The New Nigerian was the voice of the North. It had a regional interest. It was not 
against national integration. It was more conservative it in some interest. It never said 
they didn't want Nigeria. It was Murtala/Obasanjo administration that appropriated the 
Newspaper in 1975. The same they did with the Daily Times. Their role as media for 
articulating position has been weakened almost irredeemably.
So there is partisanship. There is regional partisanship. There is ideological 
partisanship. But from your general theme of national integration, you cannot say that 
New Nigerian do not play a role in it. During the civil war it was blast against Ojukwu 
about the secession.
From my own ideological position, I see all of them as currents tending toward a 
media river. The Tribune may take the position that Awo is never wrong. It may say 
that it's Western Nigeria or nothing but in doing that it is not saying it will supplant or
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replace Nigeria with Western Nigeria. It's only saying that in view of the Nigeria that 
we want to stay in, it should favour Western Nigeria.
So you have this regional emphasis. But overall you cannot find a Nigerian 
Newspaper that has on its own crusaded for dismemberment of Nigeria. You won't 
find any. Newspapers have written very angry editorials but they all point to one thing 
that the fact that this government is taking so and so position is wrong. That this 
government should do better than it is doing. That is what Newspapers have been 
doing or engaging in.
Q: Government Policies
Government policies have always had a very negative effect. During civilian 
government after the British colonial era they the Press law in 1964. So the State has 
always wanted to handcuff the Press. They know the power. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe said 
the greatest fulfilment he had was that their editorials should make govemors- 
general's breakfast go cold. That while reading it, they should abandon their breakfast.
Even during the civil war there were restrictions as to what to report. So the Press has 
operated in defiance o f government policies. From what we have seen in the past ten 
years, even when regulations are made trying to suppress it, it goes underground.
Under General Ibrahim Babangida and General Sani Abacha, they thought the Press 
how to operate without premises. Journals were published with no address. It has 
mastered working in a very hostile environment. It remains powerful any day. 
Governments can ignore it but at their own peril.
But the most important obstacle is the policies of government, which have made 
publishing a very hazardous and economically ruinous undertaking. Only few papers 
are able to survive on sales and advertisements. The others have to be supported by 
their owners with money. Inflation, the underdevelopment of the nation's 
infrastructure, the technological backwardness to the extent that except for the English 
we write, most o f the things we use in the newspaper are sourced from abroad- 
newsprint, ink, every single item, the vehicles we use for conveying it etc. The 
business is excruciating, but the Press remains the irrepressible institution of civil 
society in the country, which everybody has to contend with.
I am of the view that because of the Press and the media in general that tyranny in 
Nigeria was contained. It is the cultural environment, which helps the multiplicity of 
the media. There are many ethnic groups, interest groups so you cannot put all of 
them in one position. That diversity helps the Press because there is always the 
legitimate point o f view to hold and you would have audience.
No class in Nigeria has consumed all the other classes thoroughly as it is in Britain. 
No ethnic group has overcome the other ones. Everybody is still a contender. So this 
gives enough room for the Press to find operational terrain and to hold diversity of 
views which will be read. So it is not confusion but a multiplicity of voices and all the 
voices do not compromise on the question of national integration.
But because of different position as to what that integration would mean- since Ken
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Saro-Wiwa and the Niger- Delta, you have found a new trend in articulation of 
national integration. Niger-Delta area has become a focal point both for local media 
and national media. And a new sense o f militancy and radicalism has developed. And 
for anybody in the Niger-Delta now national integration should include equity, should 
include justice. The way national resources are being distributed now that's not 
national integration the way they want it.
So the Press too is responding to the evolution of these new ideas as they relate to 
social justice, democracy and freedom. Without those issues, the Press cannot exist. If 
there is no freedom, there is no expanded market the Press is restricted. So it always 
needs a stable national entity, stable national environment from which to practice. 
That's why it is intolerant o f government that operates policies that hinder that market.
Q: Their Treatment of Issues (Census, Revenue Allocation etc)
There is sensationalism. But that is part of the gimmick of the Press for sustaining its 
own market. We cannot afford to be neutral. Take the census. Why should census be 
conducted and the figures are disputed? It is a statistical exercise. Objects that are 
accountable. But is... (manipulated) by those who have a hegemonic interest in the 
Government. So the Press will never agree with government on that How can we have 
a census and we don’t have accurate figures. That one of 1991 is not true. When you 
walk in the streets o f Lagos you will know that this place is not six million. But the 
figures are politically comfortable. So the Press is unforgiving on that. Newspapers 
may see the issue in different ways because we are coming from different national 
perspectives.
The fact that different newspapers handle it from different perspectives does not 
weaken the nation. If we don’t have these debates how can you put government in 
check. The census started in 1931 when the British were rigging it. We cannot plan in 
this country. We don’t know how many people who are going to be five years next 
year and that is already a matter settled in every country including Iceland.
So you begin to wonder, why does Nigeria not have an accurate census. Is it to 
safeguard national unity? Which unity are you safeguarding when the figures of the 
census are mischievous?
If there are different perspectives, it shows that there is dynamism in the country that 
the government has not been able to purchase the entire Press as to want everybody to 
say what the government has done is right. Division is necessary for the country to 
make progress. What does the U.K Parliament do? Is there a consensus between the 
Sun, the Guardian, the Times o f London, and the Scottish newspapers? All of them 
are divided trying to find a consensus. After a long debate, they compel government 
or policy makers to take a course that is beneficial to more people. That's the role of 
the Press.
If the New Nigerian does not condemn the census that cannot be credited as a 
responsible journalism simply because it suits who? If the government of Zamfara or 
Sokoto does not know the number of people they have, how is it going to plan the 
hospital and the school system? And if  a newspaper is supporting that, that is not 
responsible or professional.
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Q: Organisation of Islamic Conference
The newspapers in the South and so on which are mainly Christian territory, saw the 
OIC as an affront on the sovereignty of Nigeria because Nigeria was smuggled into it 
by General Babangida in 1986. It was not featured in any meeting. Commodore Ebitu 
Ukiwe, the then Chief of General Staff, said it was not featured in the Armed Forces 
Ruling Council (AFRC), and Ukiwe was sacked.
So if Nigeria wants to be a member o f the OIC, it should publicly so declare. It is the 
manner of doing it that raised suspicion.
Q: Can New Nigerian's support for OIC create tension?
New Nigerian is free to support it because Islamic religion, which the policy follows 
or promotes, is the primary constituency of the New Nigerian.
Q: The Role of the Press
When we talk about the role o f the Press, it doesn’t mean the Press should behave like 
claptrap. The Press should reflect the dynamism and the divisiveness that is inherent 
in the multiple interest o f the country. It must reflect it otherwise we won’t be able to 
find the quality o f thought, the quality of ideas in the country, if  you are looking for a 
consensus all the time. The Press should reflect the dialectics and the controversies. It 
should not shield them because it becomes the mirror through which we evaluate the 
energies in the country.
Governments don’t fall as a result o f that. Countries don’t collapse as a result instead 
they get strengthened. Nigeria is in that sense the America of Africa in terms of the 
media diversity. Nigeria is the United Nations of Africa because it has over 394 
languages and each language is an interest group, each has its own heroes, its own 
leaders, and its own religion. We don’t have enough newspapers in the country to 
cater for these interests. The more we have the merrier.
Q: Promoting a Sense of National Identity
During the moment o f crisis in the country, 1959 election, there was polarisation- 
North, South, East. Then during the 1965/65 election there was a similar polarisation. 
It was not ethnic it was mostly regional. Then during the civil war, then the June 12 
Abacha era-people took the position of "we” and "they" not in the sense of denying 
identity because this identity as I see it is made up of many colours. You can see 
Ohaneze now as a recent phenomenon representing elite interest or Afenifere or Odu'a 
Peoples Congress (OPC), these are only in recent times.
In the past the Press will always try to stand behind the people. The "we" "they" thing 
is usually people and government but sometimes it takes on ethnic or regional 
configuration when issues are at stake.
But Nigerian identity is never in question. On such matters there is no doubt. But 
political identities, cultural identities-there are other levels of identities sometimes
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which come to the fore depending on the issue at stake.
Take the issue o f OPEC, the Press will not compromise. If Charles Taylor of Liberia 
is showing ingratitude, read every Editorial. Identity is not one. It has many colours; it 
changes from time to time. Issues help to define it. But the overall interest of the 
country is not compromised.
Q: On Ownership
It does affect the Press. They are enterprises first and foremost. It cost money. People 
invest in them for different purposes. So ownership position is a factor because people 
who established them have their own ideological orientation.
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(VIIJ) INTERVIEW WITH DAN AGBESE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF NEWSWATCH 
MAGAZINE ON 24/01/01
Q: The Nigerian Press Before and After Independence
Whatever I would say about the Press pre-independence would be almost eclectic 
because I was not in the Press then. I came into the Press during the military regime. 
But what I know about the period is that it is not vastly different from what we have 
now because each o f the four regions owned a newspaper and the competition was 
among the political parties.
What role did each play in terms o f national integration is not really very clear to me 
because it seems that each of these newspapers fought for the interest of the political 
parties and the governments that controlled them and so one would say that 
immediately after independence or before independence, the colonial masters were 
the enemies and it was easy then for the Press to have a single voice on issues 
affecting the nation. It was therefore to, if  you read the Daily Times or the Sketch or 
the Nigerian Citizen, it was possible that in spite of the fact that they were attacking 
political opponents, they found a common ground in the sense that there was a 
common enemy that is the colonial master and everybody recognised the need for 
independence. So they were able to speak with one voice in of independence for the 
country.
Q: After Independence?
Well after that, the first fourteen years of military regime, what then happened was 
that the Press was subjected to a great deal of military indoctrination. And the 
indoctrination took the form that the civilians having been kicked out of office for 
various offences among which was corruption, nepotism and their inability to settle 
their own political rifts in the interest o f the nation, the military were able to turn the 
Press more or less against the political class. And so the political class became the 
enemy of the nation.
So progressively the Press imbibed military indoctrination and began to act as if it 
was a natural thing to do that there was nothing good in the civilian. And that was the 
way the military could establish their own legitimacy, I believe. And so the Press was 
more or less a very strong instrument in the war against the political class waged by 
the military for a very long time.
And when we returned to civil rule in 1979, it took a very long time to re-orientate the 
Press to begin to look at the civilians as the new masters. So even though the military 
was no longer on the scene, they cast a long shadow over the nation. For the first four 
years of the civilian regime the military psyche was still very strong in the Press. And 
so it manifested like this: whatever disagreements however minor among politicians, 
was exaggerated and used as evidence that the politicians have learnt no lessons and 
they were still behaving the same way and therefore, they were not competent to rule 
the country.
By 1983 when we were going into the second term elections, the propaganda was 
very strong. And the propaganda was about corruption, blatant corruption in the
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political establishment. It was therefore easy by the end of 1983 for the military to 
come back because the same problems were played up very much by the Press. It was 
played up in this way: the newspapers owned by the political parties fished in the 
ponds of their political opponents and whatever was wrong with the country was 
found in the backyard o f other political parties. So it was terribly exaggerated. There 
was corruption but it was terribly exaggerated. And there is enough fact now to show 
that even if there was corruption the first and second republic, there was more 
corruption during the military regime.
But at the time it was easy to play these sentiments up because we expected that after 
the military, after the return to civil rule that everything would be totally different, the 
politicians would behave differently. But we didn't reckon with the fact that after 
fourteen years o f being in the political wilderness, the new political class had a lot to 
learn plus the fact that there was a new political system the executive presidential 
system which was being grafted on to the parliamentary system.
And so the oldest politicians had experience in the parliamentary system and this was 
a new experience for them. The new politicians had no experience to fall back on and 
so nobody knew exactly how to behave. For the first four years there was a problem 
about that. But the Press did not understand that. That's my view. The press did not 
understand that because at the time there weren't many people in positions of 
responsibility in the Press who had gone all the way from the first republic through 
the military and all the way to the civilian regime. So nobody was guiding anybody. 
That was the problem we had.
Q: Would You Say Then That The Press Has Aided National Unity?
Well, the Press, yes in a way. But it seems to me that over the period of time the Press 
has not been able to muster the same voice in defence of national interest however 
defined.
The Press is very much playing the tune of not necessarily the owners but more 
importantly about sectional and regional interests. And it has hindered in some kind of 
way because when the Press is blatantly partisan, when the Press sees nothing wrong 
in a particular environment and sees everything wrong in another political 
environment, there is a problem. I thought we had come to a point where we should 
be able to look at statements made by politicians maturely and say to ourselves, would 
this be in the national interest? But we haven't reached that point at all. Maybe we 
think the more incendiary a politician is, we think the more radical that he is, and the 
more the Press favours him. So there is a problem.
Q: Any Particular Reason for That?
I suppose the reason is that although there is a new structure of ownership, in other 
words, you have more newspapers, radio, television owned by private individuals than 
we had in the first and second Republic, the ownership system is grafted, if you like 
an old system of looking at issues in our country.
In other words an Ibo man who owns a Press is still looking at basically the interest of 
the Ibo community and the same thing with the yoruba community and the same
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thing, I suppose with the Hausa community. So they are unable to look at what things 
unite us and move at things that divide us.
Now under a military regime, it was easy to miss this point because the focus was 
against civilians wherever they came from. Now if you remove the military all of us 
find ourselves in different camps and playing the role that we think is expected of us 
in different camps.
Q: Let’s Go To The Issue O f Public And Private Ownership Of The Press. How 
would you rate them in the Area of National Integration?
Except for Newswatch o f which I am part owner, I haven’t had the privilege of 
working for a privately owned newspaper. But it does seem to me from what I know 
that there isn’t anything dramatically different. In the Government Press where I 
worked for a very long time during the military regime, it was relatively more 
comfortable in that environment than during the political era because... I’ll give you 
an example: -
When I was in the New Nigerian, I think it was during the campaign of the 1983 
elections and Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe came to Kaduna for his presidential campaign and I 
sent a reporter and a photographer to the airport. They brought the story and with the 
photograph, I made it the back page lead. And it caused, shall I say a consternation 
within the ranks of the National Party o f Nigeria (NPN), the then ruling party because 
nobody had done that before. I remember somebody writing and saying “Yes!” there 
is a change in the leadership and the direction of the New Nigerian.
And so, it was like... and my own defence had always been that the New Nigerian is 
publicly-owned newspaper and a government is different from the political party in 
control of the administration at any particular point in time. I have read the mission 
statement of the New Nigerian and nowhere does it say that you cannot give voice to 
a different political view. But it didn’t go down too well.
Q: Why That?
Because they saw the New Nigerian as not merely a Federal Government-owned 
newspaper but because the NPN controlled the Federal Government, therefore, it was 
essentially a NPN newspaper and that an Editor of the Paper should recognise that. 
Unfortunately, I couldn’t recognise that.
Q: In August 1983, During the Electioneering Campaign when you were The 
Editor of the New Nigerian, Only Adverts from the NPN Were Published. Why?
Well my own assumption, and I base it at what I knew at the time because I have no 
hard evidence for this since I was not involved in the advert department... but I 
assume the other political parties also assumed that since it was “a hostile territory , 
whatever they put out would either be submerged or be treated in a way that it would 
make it ineffective. So they didn’t bother to place adverts there at all. There was no 
case of any advert being rejected from any other political party that I knew of. But I 
think it was based on assumption of “Why go there, they wouldn’t treat you well 
anyway.”
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Because each time there was a Press conference by another political party, it was like 
at first when I got there, they were not involving the New Nigerian. When I opened 
the doors of the New Nigerian they felt happier and they did invite us and they came 
to my house to discuss with me.
Q: The Editorial Policy of the New Nigerian.
The Editorial policy o f the New Nigerian was primarily to promote the interest of the 
North, to project the culture o f the North within the context of a Nigerian Federation. 
In other words it’s obliged to look at national issues through, if you like, the eye of 
the culture and politics of the North.
Q: Did That Hinder Your Job?
No it didn’t, maybe because I am from the Middle Belt, I am a Christian and therefore 
I understood my conscience to be slightly different from a Moslem from Kano or 
Katsina. So I interpreted the policy as I thought it should be.
Q: How Would You Rate The New Nigerian In The Context Of What We Are 
Talking About-National Integration?
One of the strongest points o f the New Nigerian has always been its Editorial. It’s 
always been more objective than other newspaper. I was in the New Nigerian before 
the Federal Government took it over. So the New Nigerian saw itself immediately... 
because a few days after it was launched, the military struck... It therefore took on 
itself a new role as the voice o f Nigeria. That’s what happened and it maintained that 
all through until sometimes in the 80s when things weren’t going too well for the 
Paper. But it maintained that strong voice because it was the strongest newspaper in 
support o9f the Federal Government during the civil war and it maintained that 
posture throughout the military regime.
And it was the first newspaper to insist that Gowon must handover. I remember when 
Gowon went back on his promise to handover in 1976; the New Nigerian began to run 
excerpts from Chinua Achebe’s “A man of the people”. So if you compare it with the 
Daily Times, or the Daily Sketch owned by the Western region, the Tribune owned by 
Chief Obafemi Awolowo and the Eastern Nigerian Outlook, it was much more 
nationalistic than all o f them. Its posture was entirely Nigerian.
Q: Why the Change? Take OIC for Instance.
Well there must necessarily be a difference because the OIC is an Islamic religious 
issue and the New Nigerian is always looked at as the voice of Islam up there in the 
North. It’s part of the culture the New Nigerian is supposed to promote. And so 
anything that affects the interest o f Islam is supposed to be stoutly defended by the 
New Nigerian. It must take unapologetic position on the side of Islam.
You must understand the Muslim religious culture, which is that a Muslim cannot in 
public oppose whatever is done in the interest of Islam. He may have a private view 
but he must not express in public in opposition to it. That’s the cultural background to
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the Muslim society.
So in other words if  the New Nigerian believed that the process of going to the OIC 
was wrong, the result has been achieved, that is Nigeria was in OIC, and so that was 
all it was concerned with and not the process of reaching there.
Q: Issue O f Revenue Allocation: Your Views on the Nigerian Press vis-a-vis 
Their Role in National Integration.
You see what happens anytime there is a major national policy... what happens first 
of all is a suspicion; it creates a suspicion in the mind of some. Gowon introduced the 
quota system by which it was supposed to help the less educationally advanced states 
not necessarily to catch up with the rest but to create opportunities for them to 
develop.
The South immediately put it under a heavy suspicion. And the suspicion was that 
Gowon was trying to hold back the South so that the North could catch up with it. But 
that was not the aim of the quota system.
And so Federal character is another name for quota system. So the Federal character 
was now introduced by the Obasanjo administration and put in our constitution. And 
it’s supposed to do exactly what the quota system was supposed to do. In other words, 
everybody, at the Federal level, must be represented; every state must be represented. 
At the state level every section must be represented. At the local level every section 
must be represented in order to create some sense of belonging in all these levels of 
government.
But when there is a suspicion particularly a suspicion by the vocal minority, they tend 
to take over the views of the Press. And they hammer on it and such views more or 
less become the view of the Press at any particular point in time.
Now if you look at the application o f the Federal character- we’ve done a series of 
stories on it holding the Federal Character Commission to the provisions of the law 
saying, this is what the law stipulates, this is the way the Federal character is 
implementing for that law and that we didn’t think it was the right thing to do. But 
nobody outside of us and I am not being immodest about this, but nobody outside of 
us has been able to try to 16ok at the implementation, the law setting up the Federal 
Character Commission and to look at its implementation.
They've always based their comments on suspicion that since the Federal Character 
Commission is headed by a Northerner it therefore follows that the law would 
necessarily favour the North and hold down the South. And then it's like why do you 
hold down the South, they are well empowered so you can't hold down them down.
But that's not what the Commission is supposed to do. What the Commission is 
supposed to do is to find opportunities for less educationally abundant states to have 
the opportunities to have their own people. In other words, even if you say bring ten 
people from each state o f the Federation; there are some states that cannot produce the 
ten people that you require.
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The Press would do well to first o f all look at the law establishing or backing up the 
policy. The Press has a duty to look at the law to understand the law before it can 
understand the interpretation. So in every situation, including the revenue allocation, 
all that we know in the Press is simply that certain things are not right, you give more 
money to the states. Now it was so before the military regime. In the First Republic, 
we had the revenue allocation formula in favour of the states. The Derivation 
Principle was introduced by the military later on to redress the fact that more money 
is coming from certain sections of the country and they must be entitled to part of that 
money.
But there is a lot o f ignorance on the part of the Press when you look at issues such as 
the Federal Character and Revenue Allocation formula. And because there is so much 
ignorance, the Press is unable to promote or either promote what is deemed to be in 
the interest of the nation or to even point out the flaws in the law or the application of 
the law. That is the problem that we have.
The level o f education is a fact o f historical development. It is not a fact of inability or 
Incapacity on the part o f the individual. If you don’t make conscious efforts to bring 
this people up then you are creating a problem. And the problem in the future will be 
greater because supposing some radical groups come up in a few years time and say 
this is not on, we are not going to accept that, you have a problem. So there must be a 
conscious effort to bring this people in at every level of government.
In 1986 or 1987 there was a mass retrenchment in the Police and about 30-35 of those 
who were retired came from the old Bendel state and people were arguing about that 
saying that there was ethnic cleansing. But the fact of the matter was that there were 
more of them at that level than people from other states of the federation. So 
necessarily it must affect more of them than it would affect other people. It was the 
same thing in 1975/1976 when they retired a whole lot o f federal permanent 
secretaries. A whole lot o f them came from that part of the country, so more of them 
were affected.
In other words this is something that goes on-it's a historical fact we cannot ignore. 
They were there, they were educated, they had opportunities and so they got in there. 
And the others you must haVe to bring them up in some kind of a way to give them a 
sense of belonging. There is no ethnic cleansing. Why is there cleansing where there 
is not ethnic subjugation. If ethnic cleansing makes a sense, ethnic subjugation would 
make greater sense because you are keeping this people down not because of their 
own fault but because o f historical development that affects them in this kind of a 
way.
Q: What about the Census?
Again you have to look at it... In 1963 the desperation of the politicians to ensure that 
their region was seen to be highly populated-remember the East suddenly discovered 
a cluster of villages somewhere within its region. You may find it laughable but it 
underlined the degree o f desperation. And I know that in 1963 and even during the 
last census, people were trying to bribe census officials in order to return a higher
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mark than they found on the ground. In other words because we believe and this is the 
problem, that some degree of revenue allocation is tied to population, everybody 
wants to get a large chunk of that and so there is this kind of competition. If we had 
had some experience in education know that the census is merely a statistical guide 
for planning purposes, I believe our reaction to it will be totally different.
We won't get near the point of getting a correct census figures for the country for so 
long as it is seen essentially as a political issue. And the press is not helping because 
the Press understands it also as a political issue.
Q: How Has Government Policies Affected the Press’ Performance?
I find this surprising. But the fact of the matter is the problem of the Nigerian Press is 
lack of government policies on how the Press can perform. Because there are no Press 
laws in the country more or less guiding the behaviour of the Press. And so we are 
subjected to arbitrariness on the part of those in power.
In 1987, when we {Newswatch) published stories based on the Cookey Report on 
what was supposed to be the political orientation for the country, we were proscribed 
for six months. It made sense to them. They then made a law; they brought out a 
decree backing the action. In otherwords before that we didn't breach a law but having 
taken the action, they had to legitimise it, they had to make a law backdating it. And a 
whole lot of things like that were done in a military regime. An action was taken first 
and then the action was criminalised and then the law was brought to back the action 
of the government.
It was the same thing when the army came in, in 1983/1984. A whole lot of politicians 
were put into jail for spending security votes. The vote was under the law, it was spent 
under the law and yet they criminalised it and made a law backdating it all the way to 
when they were in power. In other words if you look at that law, it was like we didn't 
have a government from October 1, 1979 to December 31, 1983. But nobody appears 
to look at the implication o f that. The thing was that these guys were guilty therefore 
we have to deal with them. That is part o f the problem.
And so it is not only the Press that this affects. It affects the Press more because in a 
situation, where as we all say in our Editorial "you seem to be juggling in the jungle"; 
there is a problem. If there is a law saying to you: this is what you can do and this is 
what you can't do, it's a lot easier to deal with because you know the law and you can 
skip around it. And it strengthens your hands because you can find a way of breaching 
the law but not doing so blatantly.
I'll tell you o f decree 4 o f 1984. Decree 4 of 1984, a lot of people didn't know this, 
derived from decree 11 of 1976 under Obasanjo and it's word for word. And decree 4, 
everybody thought it was obnoxious and all the rest of it, it was to protect public 
officers from being embarrassed. Some of the things the Press says was in the law 
were not in the law. But they didn't even see it. It was enough for them to say we 
cannot take it. They did not look at the law itself because if  they did, it says no more 
than what the ethics of the profession prescribed that is, you must check your facts, 
you must give everybody a chance to have a say if the story affected them. That s all it 
says.
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Q: W hat about Proscription?
It's arbitrariness. I mean what did the Guardian do? Or what did the Punch do? They 
didn't commit crimes and they didn't breach any Press law. But somebody simply 
said: what you are doing is offensive to me and so don't publish. If there is a law and 
if it says I am doing it under this law then they will go to court and say: no I have not 
breached the law. It will be a lot better.
But the problem is the absence o f a law. And I would personally want to have a law to 
guide my behaviour so that if  somebody challenges me I could challenge him in the 
court. The court can decide who is wrong and who is right. But in the cases just cited 
nothing of the sort. They criminalise your action and bring the law backing it up and 
you have no defence. That's the problem.
Q: The Press and June 12,1993 Elections, etc.
They did a fantastic job in supporting June 12. I believe that. We were the first in 
Newswatch to write Editorial saying that the election must be upheld. But after the 
initial period the politicians now took over- because June 12 now became not 
necessarily a matter o f principle fight or struggle, it became shall we say a "meal 
ticket". And so a whole lot o f people got it there using the Press, trying to make us 
believe that they were fighting for the actualisation of June 12, whereas they were 
trying to reap where they did not sow. That was what was oddly about it.
And we gave in to too many sentiments about it instead o f standing on the facts of the 
matter. For instance the June 12 was a principle and as I understood it and have 
always said, as far as I am concerned, it was a principle that when the people express 
their will through the ballot box no authority can annul that will. And that's the only 
principle by which we thought o f June 12.
We should have stood on that. In other words, whether Abiola was alive or not, 
Abiola was a symbol of it, a beneficiary of it but Abiola was not the principle of June 
12. The principle went far beyond Abiola so whether or not he was alive, June 12 
ought to be actualised. But as soon as Abiola died nobody talked about June 12 
anymore. That's the tragedy of it.
And so whatever role the Press played, the Press did not play that role to a logical 
conclusion. I would have liked to see a situation where we must say: look, these guys 
have been elected by the people they must be there, no matter the intervening 
variables, no matter who was in power from June 12 or even with Shonekan or an 
Abacha. If that was what we were fighting, even if  it took ten years or twenty years, 
we must bring this people back just to ensure that this was the will of the people and it 
must be respected.
The Press did not appreciate the dynamics of June 12. They did not look at the 
principle of June 12. They looked at more or less the sentiments of June 12.
Q: How Would You Summarise the Press’ Role in National Integration?
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On the scale of perhaps a hundred, I could give the Press 60% in favour of that. It is 
not to say that they didn't have some failings. We did but overall we played a role that 
should be commended and must be remembered because the Press was operating 
under different circumstances. If somewhere along the line the Press lost its head, we 
must also appreciate the circumstances under which it operated.
Secondly, for instance, all through the military regime the Press was one institution 
that everybody looked up to. Unfortunately, although they looked up to the Press, they 
did not support the Press in the way they ought to support it. They saw it as an 
instrument that could be used by individuals but they did not think of supporting that 
individual and making it stronger.
Q: Foreign Influence?
I don't think there is much foreign influence on the Nigerian Press. You must know 
that foreign influence cast a shadow on our nation at every level. Our government 
tends to believe that they must seek foreign approval for their policies and actions. 
And so the Press tends to behave that way because during the bad days of Abacha 
administration, foreign organisations specifically awarded prizes to Nigerian 
journalists. And those prizes appeared to be thought of essentially for Nigeria, not 
prizes available to other journalists even in other difficult situations.
In other words, it was a tendency on their part to patronise the Nigerian Press and I 
found out that some of those awards were rather patronising-saying that okay you are 
doing a great job. Immediately that disappeared, you never heard of those prizes 
anymore. I think it was patronising.
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(VIIK) INTERVIEW WITH ALHAJI BABATUNDE JOSE FORMER 
MANAGING DIRECTOR OF THE DAILY TIMES, ON WEDNESDAY 14/02/01 
IN LAGOS
Q: Your thoughts on the pre-independence and post-independence press.
The pre-independence press was very active in mobilising the public in the crusade 
against British colonial rule and for independence. They were owned almost largely 
by politicians, individuals and political parties who were nationalists. But they were 
unanimous that British rule was unacceptable and that the country has to become 
independent. I was part of that campaign. They were in three stages. The first stage 
was the pre-Zik nationalist press: The Egerton Shyngles, the Jacksons etc, they all 
started newspapers on their own, with their own money. They were the publishers, the 
Editors and sometimes a one-man Weekly newspaper. Not much news but opinions, 
editorials and articles all directed against British rule. That was at the beginning the 
last century.
The second stage was the advent o f Herbert Macaulay's Daily News followed 
immediately by the Daily Service. Herbert Macaulay was the leader of what was then 
known as the National Democratic Party. The Daily Service was owned by the 
Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) formed by young intelligentias, professionals from 
British universities. They'd not gone far when Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe arrived from the 
United States o f America (USA) to the Gold Coast (Ghana) and then to Nigeria where 
he started the West African Pilot whose motto was: "Show the light and the people 
will find the way." Dr Azikiwe's nationalism was of a different kind; it was not 
localised among the intelligentsias. They targeted the workers and tribal organisations 
all over the country. Herbert Macaulay's Democratic Party was Lagos-based. The 
NYM'S Daily Service was Lagos-based. But Dr Azikiwe targeted the whole country 
and appealed to the people regardless of their ethnic group or ethnicity and it was 
proper nationalism.
So, although the presses were united on the need for Nigeria's independence, they 
differed depending on the ownership. That is they were unanimous on the demand for 
independence and differed on the method to employ and the means to achieve that 
objective, Then certain events took place on the pursuit of that objective. They started 
to look at the means in terms of their tribes and the role and part which their tribe will 
play in it. The Yorubas felf that because they started early contacts with the British, 
they should reach the goal post first. Dr Azikiwe who had entirely a new idea was 
being pushed and urged by the Ibos that they should play a leading role and be the 
first to reach the goal post. The Northerners had no newspaper that can be talked 
about. They started Tafiki Kwabo , which was a vernacular newspaper and later they 
had the Nigerian Citizen, which was in English language. But they were not desperate 
for independence as the Southerners were. They realised their limitations in terms of 
human resources or the manpower to take the place to be left vacant by the British 
administrators. They were not opposed to independence but they were concerned 
about the timing. When we had the constitutional conference in Ibadan in 1950/51, 
where the political and traditional leaders of the three regions met, the Northerners 
said that they were not opposed to independence but that they didn’t even have the 
manpower to man the public service. And whereas at that time the East and the West 
had Deputy Permanent Secretaries etc, the North didn’t have any. And therefore they
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said that they would want to slow down until the time that they would be ready. 
Consequently they said that the East and the West should start with self-government 
and that they would then start rapid manpower development of theirs by sending them 
to universities abroad and thereafter ask for self-government when they were ready.
So it was at that time also that tribal organisations emerged ostensibly to strengthen 
the political parties. The Egbe Omo Oduduwa was the forerunner of the Action Group 
(AG) political organisation. There was the Ibo State Union, which almost 
metamorphosed itself into the National Council of Nigeria and the Camerouns 
(NCNC). There was the Ibibio State Union. Then we had the Northern Peoples Party, 
the Aminu Kano’s Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) which was formed 
by the radicals and followed by what later became the Northern Peoples Congress 
(NPC) which was made up of the Aristocrats, the middle class and the holders of 
traditional offices in the Native Authority administration. The Sardauna of Sokoto, Sir 
Ahmadu Bello and Alhaji Tafawa Balewa were senior officials of the Native 
Authority administration when they were elected into the Northern House of 
Assembly and to the Federal House of Representatives. That was the pattern and that 
was what was going on.
Q: I would like to explore further, the events that you said occurred during that 
period which apparently set in motion subsequent developments within the 
Nigerian socio-political landscape and which therefore affected the press.
Yes, there was the constitution that made provisions for three regions. The election 
was not to be on party basis rather it was to be conducted through electoral colleges 
from the town to the regional centres. In the South it was based on age while in the 
North it was through... (Inaudible). In the Yoruba West, and the West at that time 
also included the States now known as Edo, Delta, Ogun, Oyo, Osun, Ondo and Ekiti. 
So under that constitution people were elected to the Regional Assemblies through the 
Electoral College. Although once they were elected, they could declare for their own 
political parties. In the Western region elections were conducted. Lagos was then part 
of the West and late Dr Azikiwe, late Dr Olorunibe and late Prince Adedoyin were the 
three elected members to the Western House of Assembly on the platform of the 
NCNC. The constitution also provided for election to the House of Representatives 
using the Regional House o f Assembly as Electoral College. So under that 
constitution three people have to be elected into the Federal House of Representatives. 
When the motion was called for, the Action Group (AG) subverted some members of 
the Nation Council of Nigeria and the Camerouns (NCNC) not to vote for Dr Nnamdi 
Azikiwe to go to the House o f Representatives-Naked tribalism that an Ibo man 
should not represent Lagos in the Federal House o f Representatives. That was the 
beginning o f naked tribalism in Nigeria. And so Dr Azikiwe was denied the chance of 
going to the House of Representative because he was an Ibo man and not a Yoruba 
man. That led Dr Azikiwe to seek accommodation in the East through the NCNC. The 
party in the East that time was the United Independent Party (UNIP) and so the 
NCNC started a campaign to dislodge the UNIP. That was how Dr Azikiwe had to be 
elected into the Eastern House of Assembly in order to become elected into the 
Federal House of Representatives.
And so tribal politics became pronounced and that reflected in the Editorial policies of 
the newspapers owned by the political parties. The only newspaper that was not
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affected was the Daily Times because it was then owned and controlled by the British 
that is the Daily Mirror o f London. So all the newspapers in Dr Azikiwe's group also 
took the stand of tribal politics although that was moderated by the fact that the Zikist 
Movement, which was an offshoot of the NCNC, was made up of young men of all 
tribes. It moderated the effects o f tribal politics in the newspapers but not enough to 
counter-balance it. So that was the beginning of multi-ethnic newspapers. When the 
Federal government of Prime-Minister Tafawa Balewa found that it was being 
attacked right, left and centre by the Nigerian Tribune owned by Chief Obafemi 
Awolowo, attacked by the Eastern Outlook owned by the Eastern regional 
government, attacked by the West African Pilot owned by Dr Azikiwe, he decided to 
set the Nigerian National Morning Post. He used the Government Press based at that 
time in Ajegunle, Apapa to publish it. But the people did not and still don’t trust 
Government newspapers and so the Morning Post died because it was ineffective. 
That has been the pattern.
But another pattern emerged later. You find that a number of proprietors, rich 
Nigerians set up newspapers to advance their own political aims. And so you found 
that the Federal Government o f the Second Republic, headed by Alhaji Shehu 
Shagari, tried to and indeed influenced the Editorial policy of the Federal 
Government-owned Daily Times’ new reports. The Government made sure the Editors 
bent to the wishes of the Federal Government. What was happening then was a 
situation in which the Federal Government was constantly being attacked by the 
Nigerian Tribune because that newspaper, which was owned by Chief Awolowo, 
believed that Alhaji Shagari cheated Chief Awolowo to win the 1979 Presidential 
election (The Second Republic was from 1979-1983), which is not true. (Alhaji Shehu 
Shagari contested the 1979 Presidential election under the platform of the National 
Party of Nigeria [NPN] while Chief Obafemi Awolowo did under the platform of the 
Unity Party of Nigeria [UPN]) It was at that point in time that Chief Moshood K.O. 
Abiola came to the rescue o f the Federal Government when he established the 
National Concord and used it to boost the Alhaji Shagari's Government. The Federal 
Government-owned New Nigerian was also supporting President Shagari. But the 
Daily Sketch was supporting Chief Awolowo (The Daily Sketch was founded by Chief 
Ladoke Akintola who used it as the mouthpiece of his Democratic Party, which was a 
breakaway from the Action Group, led by Chief Awolowo in the First Republic. The 
First Republic was from 1960-1966). So you found that the National Concord was 
backing the NPN-led Federal Government of President Shagari although where Chief 
Abiola's personal interests clashed with that of the Government, the National Concord 
would support Chief Abiola. That has been the pattern.
Q: So this is the context within which the press has to operate in Nigeria?
Yes, yes.
Q: Now would you say that that in a way is affecting national integration?
Oh, it's affecting national integration although now it is not pronounced because 
newspapers are now many and they have to find the support and the loyalty of 
readers. They can no longer publish newspapers just for the promotion of their 
proprietors. They have to make money and the cost of production is very high. So 
they have to amend their Editorial policies in a way that will be acceptable to their
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readers. And that is why you find, for instance that even though the Guardian is 
owned by the Ibru brothers, they have to publish not to manifestly promote and satisfy 
the economic interests of the Ibru dynasty. It must target the Middle class. Chief 
Abiola, since his death or since before his travails, the National Concord too had to 
look after the interests of not only the Yorubas, in whose target area it is published but 
to also have a wider acceptance in circulation and to attract the advertisements and 
therefore get a good return for their investment. That has been the pattern.
Q: What would you consider as Nigerian national integration and how should 
the press promote that?
Well, Nigerian integration should be based first on the fact that we are not yet a nation 
and that we are only trying, we have been trying but we have not yet built a nation. 
During the time of Prime-Minister Balewa in the First Republic, when I was midway 
in my career in the journalism profession and ethnicity was not pronounced, I could 
travel to anywhere in the country and felt at home anywhere I went. I f  I was 
travelling near Nnewi or Enugu, for instance, I would have a friend there, I didn’t 
have to stay in a rest house. I would have a friend there who will say: 'Ah, Baba I saw 
you at the post office, what were you doing there, where are you resting, come to my 
house, come to my house.' And when they came to Lagos, they will also visit me. 
Tribalism, even at the end o f the civil war in 1970, was not very much pronounced. I 
was at the head of the Daily Times before and during the civil war and we made 
provisions that our friends who were working in the Daily Times but who had to leave 
for the East because of the civil war and as a result became trapped there, should be 
paid their full salary when the war ended. And we paid them. Some of my very good 
friends in the years I served as the Eastern regional representative of the Daily Times 
came to Lagos to stay with me.
But tribalism in Nigeria is, when leaders fail at the national level, they pander to their 
ethnic sentiments. I believe that we have to accept the fact that we are a group of 
nations. I t is a difficult challenge but each, each nationality should be developed 
within their ability. In fact at independence we had a constitution which gave the 
centre power, but not too much power, and defined the functions of Federal and 
Regional Governments. The residual powers were with the Regions. We had three 
Regions in 1960 and later four in 1963 when the Mid-West Region was carved out of 
the Western Region. But now we have thirty-six States. It is unwieldy. They cannot 
sustain themselves and that as a result gave an all too powerful Federal Government. 
That was alright for a Military Government to have one chain of command where you 
have the General Officer Commander (GOC) and the Head of Government and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, who will give instructions to the Governor 
of a State. That simply cannot happen in the present democratic dispensation. We are 
still being ruled now as if  we are still under a Military regime, although the 
constitution does not say so. But under the Independent Constitution, the Regional 
Governments had their legislatures, they had powers to disburse funds, and revenue 
allocation was based on derivation and need, and they could fund their own 
development using their own resources. But today, the State Governments are poor, 
they cannot run their governments, they are inefficient in generating internal funds 
and what they get on their won is not enough to pay even staff salaries. And so they 
have to wait for grants, for allocations from the Federal Government and that makes 
some of them irresponsible.
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And so I believe that we should return to six geographical zones. I think we have 
come to accept now that there are six geo-political zones and that should be the unit of 
Government. We should have a constitution that should place the States under a geo­
political zone to make them manageable. These zones will be the second tier of 
Government and they will deal directly with the States and then the fourth tier of 
Government will be the Local Government. By then we will have tribes that cut 
across zones, there will be overlapping and then there will be less stress on tribal 
units. It will take some time but ultimately we shall reach there.
Q: So that is how we are going to build a nation?
Oh yes, that is how we are going to build a nation 
Q: How does the press come in here?
This is the thinking. People are thinking along that line. It is my own thinking. There 
are others who don’t think this way. There are others who will tell you that the State 
system should continue. I don’t believe that it should continue.
Q: You’ve talked about how the press became involved in ethnic politics in 
Nigeria. Given its position in society, how do you think that the press should rise 
above that level?
Oh, the press will be obliged in their own interest to rise above ethnic loyalty because 
the bigger the circulation, the more it will attract advertisement. And the more 
advertisement that you can attract, the more all other things will follow. Therefore, a 
newspaper that panders to the loyalty of its own ethnic group will be a small 
newspaper, will be a Regional newspaper. Although if a Regional newspaper could 
mange itself within its own area, with a smaller readership, it could still make a small 
profit. But a newspaper that wants to be national and make a much bigger profit will 
have to appeal to readers outside its own area. Well in the United States, they don’t 
have national newspapers as such. Maybe there are three or four but they still have the 
names attached to a State. And because o f technological development, they can print 
simultaneously in New York, in Seattle; the same newspaper and they are more 
powerful. The State newspapers still make money because literacy is very high. In our 
own case, literacy is poor of very low. If  you publish an English language newspaper, 
you want to sell not only within your own catchment area, but also outside your 
catchment area where English language newspaper will sell.
Q: What role has Government policies towards the press played in the press’ 
ability to promote national integration?
I will talk about my own experience, The Premier of the First Republic Alhaji 
Balewa, tried to build a nation in many ways. Because he presided over a coalition 
government that was controlled by the NPC, North and the NCNC, East, he realised 
that Nigeria is rested on a tripod, which included the West. And so, even though it 
was the Federal Government that had to raise grants to the West for developmental 
purposes, he still encouraged the West to go at its own pace o f development. In effect, 
even though the Federal Government was formed by a coalition between the NPC,
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North and the NCNC, East, it still affected, in a positive way, the lives of the people 
in the Western Region, which was controlled by the AG. So it seems to me that what 
we need is a Head of State, a Head o f Government, that is manifestly detribalised and 
who will make appointments that will reflect the geographical zones and therefore not 
sacrifice efficiency and competence on the alter of tribal loyalties. If we started on 
that basis over the years and were allowed by the Military to make mistakes, I think 
we would have by now been on the move to national integration.
Q: What influence, do you think, the outside world, is having on the activities of 
the Nigerian press?
I will not underrate the interest of the outside world in our affairs because, 
economically, we are the biggest markets in Africa and they want to capture that 
market. And because of our history, because of our tendency for self-criticism which 
can be carried to self-destruction, we play into the hands of the outside world who 
want to exploit that for their own benefit. For instance I believe that we should 
carefully handle how to resolve the grievances o f the Niger Delta areas because if it is 
not properly handled it might to other negative consequences. Seizing oil rigs, 
capturing workers, insisting that oil explorers must employ their own people, not just 
as catchment areas for general services, but that they need to put them in positions for 
which they are qualified or not. If it is carried too far, it can threaten the unity of the 
country because what might happen is that they will find supporters outside the 
country who will encourage them and in the process we will have another Biafra in 
our hands (The Republic of Biafra was declared in 1966 by the aggrieved Ibos of the 
Eastern Region, in the First Republic).
Q: How does the press come in here?
Well, if that happens, you will find that the presses outside that area will campaign for 
secession and some other presses will back them up.
Q: Now let’s move on to issues like the Organisation of Islamic Conference 
(OIC), Census, Revenue Allocation and have your opinion about how the presses 
have conducted themselves in treating them.
The OIC, for instance, is no longer an issue. We are already a member, just like any 
other non-Islamic countries.'
Q: I am, for instance, particular about the presses treated the OIC issue knowing 
full well how sensitive an issue it is within the Nigerian context.
The ownership pattern affected the way each of the newspapers responded to the 
question of OIC. I believe that the Guardian was opposed to it, the National Concord 
was for it, the New Nigerian was for it, the Champion was against it and I think the 
Vanguard was also against it. So you found that their reactions were determined by 
the political stance or the political ambitions of their owners. In that respect it 
impacted negatively on the move towards national integration. The thing is whatever 
issue we have in Nigeria; it is a delicate game that we are playing.
Q: From what I have heard and read about, it is not the joining of the OIC that
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is the issue. But rather it was the surreptitious manner it was done under the 
Babangida regime that has attracted suspicion and criticism. For instance, it has 
been suggested that if joining the OIC was for the good of the country, why was 
that regime not open about it. That was why the presses took the Babangida 
administration to task for making Nigeria a member of an Islamic organisation, 
without the consent of the majority of Nigerians. Even now it is even not still 
clear, whether or not; we are a member of the OIC.
Oh, it is taken for granted that we are a member of the OIC. General Babangida set up 
a Religious Affairs Committee, o f which I was a member, to look into the matter and 
make recommendations...
Q: What was the report of that Committee? Was it published?
You won't find any report because in the end the Committee didn’t work.
Q: Why did it not work?
Well, because both sides held very strongly to their strong views. For instance, the 
Muslim members o f the Committee said that they saw nothing wrong in Nigeria's 
membership o f the OIC. And the Christians said, well, if  you see nothing wrong in 
Nigeria's membership of the OIC, then they saw no point in sitting down to discuss 
with the Muslims.
Q: And what did the Federal Government do about that?
They just laughed it off. And now, I think President Olusegun Obasanjo has set up 
another Committee. I don't see what will come out of it. And the matter has been 
compounded now or even made unworkable by the Sharia issue.
Q: A religious committee was set up and it could not reach a compromise, do you 
sense a time-bomb here, particularly given the way that the presses have 
reported and commented on the issue?
Time bomb, yes, but Nigeria is good at brinkmanship. When the Sharia issue started 
in Zamfara State, we all thought it was going to explode. I am a member of what is 
called the Concerned Citizens Committee and we have people from the South and the 
North and we decided that there is need for dialogue, a forum at which we will 
present various views on Sharia, starting from the fact that Sharia has been with us 
before and since the amalgamation in 1914 (The Southern and Northern protectorates 
of Nigeria were amalgamated in 1914 by Lord Lugard). The late Premier of Northern 
Nigeria, Sir Ahmadu Bello, when he found that the Northern minorities were 
complaining about Sharia, set up a Committee of eminent Jurists form Muslim 
countries, to look at the Sharia as enshrined in the Holy Koran and to look at how it 
can be modernised and codified. This was in response to the pressures from the ethnic 
minorities in the North, who complained that they were being harassed, victimised 
and jailed for offences that were not coded. There were arguments that under the 
human rights law, people cannot be dehumanised like cutting off their hands and their 
heads etc. So the Northern region's Premier (Who was also the Sardauna of Sokoto) 
set up that Committee to look at all the issues and it was that Committee that
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produced what is now known as the Northern Penal code. In fact the criminal side of 
Sharia was codified and we have been using it since then and nobody complained. In 
1978, when we had the Constituent Assembly, of which I was a member, the Sharia 
issue was raised again. And there came a compromise that any State that wanted 
Sharia in court of first instance should have it but that once they had it they should set 
up Shana. Eventually after that, when Alhaji Shehu Shagari (A Muslim) was elected 
the Executive President o f the Second Republic in 1979, there was no trouble about 
Sharia. General Muhammadu Buhari (A Muslim) succeeded President Shagari in 
1984, after a Military coup, and there was no problem about Sharia. After General 
Buhari, General Ibrahim Babangida (A Muslim) ruled for eight years, beginning from 
1985 to 1993, and again there was no Sharia. Also, when General Sani Abacha (A 
Muslim) ruled from 1993 to 1998, there was no Sharia. General Abdusalam Abubakar 
(A Muslim) succeeded the late General Sani Abacha in 1998 and ruled till May 29th, 
1999 when the newly democratically elected President Olusegun Obasanjo (A 
Christian) was sworn into office. And now that President Obasanjo is the country's 
ruler and people are talking about Sharia again. It has now become a crisis. And some 
people are saying why Sharia now? Sharia doesn't need to cause crisis. What has 
exacerbated the issue? What is not in the Penal code that should be there? Let us look 
at the Koran, the Sharia itself, what are the things in the Penal code that are not there? 
Let us consider it and see if we can make any addition to the Penal code. Nobody 
wants any crisis. And at that time when Zamfara State made Sharia a State law, 
everybody thought the country was going to blow up. But somehow, as I have already 
said, we are very good at brinkmanship.
Q: As a former top man of the Federal Government-owned Daily Times which is 
one of the newspapers I am looking at, what would you like to say about how 
government ownership impacted on your performance?
Well, there are two stages. The first stage was when I was a reporter at the Daily 
Times and later became its Editor. At that time the Daily Times was owned largely, 
and the Daily Mirror o f London held majority of the equity. When I became the 
Managing Director in early 1963, I said to the Daily Mirror of London that look, it is 
now three years since Nigeria's independence, they should set the motion in motion to 
divest their interest so that the Daily Times could be independent and they agreed. 
And we went to the Stock market and gradually we sold off the shares of the Daily 
Mirror. By 1973, we have sold them off completely and the Daily Times was owned 
entirely by Nigerians.
Then during the Murtala/Obasanjo administration in 1975, the Federal Government 
compulsorily acquired 60% of the shares. And now the same Federal Government in 
the year 2001 has discovered that it made a mistake by taking over the Daily Times 
and so it is talking about privatising it. And I guess that sometime very soon that will 
happen.
Q: Is that going to happen to the New Nigerian too?
The Federal Government has stated that the New Nigerian is one of those to be 
privatised. But the Northern Governors have said that the New Nigerian was founded 
by the then Northern Regional government in 1966 and that when the 
Murtala/Obasanjo administration took it over in 1975, it did not pay compensation.
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And therefore, the Federal Government cannot now sell the newspaper because there 
will be the problem of who will get the money. They have therefore said that they, the 
Northern States, should be left alone to run the New Nigerian. Personally, I don't think 
that that will work.
Q: What was your own personal experience with the owners of the Daily Times 
in terms of editorial policy?
During the time that I was there nobody interfered.
Q: After the Daily Mirror divested its interests, the Daily Times came under 
private investors and after that it was taken over by the Federal Government. So 
under private investors and the Federal Government, what was the editorial 
policy of the Daily Times respectively?
Under private investors, the newspaper prospered. The readers trusted it and it was 
profitable. It had considerable power and influence.
Q: The newspaper was committed to national integration and national unity?
Oh yes, yes. As the Chairman/Managing Director, I made sure that my team was 
committed to the ideals of national integration. For instance I made sure the Editor of 
the Daily Times was Peter Enahoro, from Edo, that the Chief Accountant was from 
the East, that the Advertisement Manager was Mr. Alonge from Edo, that the position 
of the General Manager, Times Press was filled by a Yoruba man. And I went to Zaria 
and brought in Haruna Adamu, as the Political Editor. He had a first degree from Yale 
University in the United States of America. So we made sure that at our Editorial 
meetings, the nation was represented.
Q: And that too was reflected in the editorial policy of the newspaper?
Yes.
Q: What about the time when the newspaper came under the control of the 
Federal Government?
The Murtala/Obasanjo administration did not intervene. I can testify that it did not 
affect the editorial content and the editorial opinion of the newspaper. But after the 
Murtala/Obasanjo administration ended and the politicians came in 1979, the Federal 
Government started to interfere in the editorial policy of the Daily Times.
Q: On the whole how would you the Nigerian press in terms of their contribution 
to national integration?
On the whole, I think they have tried to gear their editorial policies towards fostering 
national integration within the context of the Nigerian environment. They realise that 
it is a united Nigeria that will make them prosper.
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(VUL) INTERVIEW WITH EMEKA IZEZE MD THE GUARDIAN (NIGERIAN) 
NEWSPAPERS, ON TUESDAY 23/01/01 IN LAGOS.
Q: How Government Policies Have Affected the Press
The policies of government must invariably affect any newspaper. How has it affected 
us? I don’t think it has affected the media negatively as such. If anything it probably 
was aimed to affect the media negatively but it turned out making the media to find 
other means of survival.
Are we talking about the decrees of the military in those days? Are we talking about 
decree 4 or decree 2? What they did was to make the media grow more radical or 
become very more engaged in the political process. It then meant that anytime the 
government was seeking to enforce those laws, clamp down on the media, it became 
not a matter of law and order any longer. It becomes an issue of human rights and the 
violation of the freedom of people to express themselves and to publish newspapers 
and so on and so forth.
Yes it impacted on the Press in that, o f course, it threatened a few people. We didn't 
have many newspapers emerging that time for obvious reasons. Nobody wanted to 
come publish a newspaper at a time when there were so many laws restricting the 
publication of newspapers. If you notice, not until recently did we start having many 
newspapers emerging. Actually it's become rather traditional that each time we have 
democratic rule, we have more newspapers emerging. And people who say that 
newspaper is an index o f development in that sense are not far from the truth.
I can also say that some of the laws they made were also made in vain. The media 
council that the Babangida government came up with in 1988, the media just refused 
to respect that law. And because that government was in a quandary as to how to 
respond it didn't implement that law. That law died naturally. A new law had to come 
up and that new law was the draft of journalists and government together. What media 
practitioners said was that we don’t want another court for journalists; we just want a 
Press council that will duel mostly on moral suasion, just as it is in Britain.
Q: What about Newsprint?
The easiest way to actually control newspapers was simply to get rid of newsprint. I 
said if they were smart enough they would never have to seal up any newspaper 
house, they would never have to arrest any journalist. They could have made it 
absolutely impossible for newspapers to publish by squeezing newspapers on 
newsprint. They didn't have that patience. Even what they did, they did it generally. 
So if they imposed tariff, they didn't impose any excessive tariff. What happened was 
that foreign exchange became scarcer and once it became that, people couldn't source 
foreign exchange to get newsprint. And even those who made it their business to 
import newsprint, they were unable to import as much as was needed in the market. 
And once supply is not meeting demand, the cost the cost will be going up. That was 
what happened.
Basically government did not go out of its way to squeeze newspapers using 
newsprint. But newspapers as o f that time because the Naira was depreciating rather
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fast and the revenue o f newspapers were not improving significantly. Cover price 
even if you raised it wouldn't have gone too far. They couldn't raise advert rates 
because many newspapers are not surviving on adverts. Actually now only just a 
couple or so are surviving on adverts.
Q: Is the Duty of the Press to Promote National Integration/Unity?
It is part of the duty o f the Press to promote national unity. And you do that not by 
becoming an accomplice with those politicians who have ulterior motives but by 
doing what you are meant to do. National unity is like a goal for all sections of 
society, that the Press happens to be one. It should foster national unity not in the 
sense of collaborating with those in power in order to foist it on the rest of society but 
by ensuring that anybody who belongs to this particular nation feels that his interests 
are being fairly represented. And that is what the Press should be doing.
Of course sometimes it tends to lead the Press in being one-sided and sectional or 
being tribal depending on what issue you are dealing with or which newspaper you 
are dealing with. In the long run what the media actually seeks to do is to foster 
national unity.
Q: Even When They Promote Tribal Sentiments?
Newspapers all over the world have their own political leanings. It doesn't matter 
where. The absence o f ideology in our environment had made people to align with 
certain worldview, which may well be limited to their own ethnic area. Otherwise if 
we were in a society where you have very clear ideology, you find newspapers will be 
differentiated purely on the basis o f ideology. Issues tend to dictate the reactions of 
people.
Let me give you an example. When we started talking about the issue of 
environmental degradation in the Niger Delta, what I told our people here was that I 
am surprised that whenever it came to that, all the three major ethnic groups tend to 
agree. And I think until recently, they have always agreed that nothing should happen 
to the revenue allocation formula.
If you check, the people who actually seized the revenue from the states or the regions 
were people predominantly from the Southwest. They used it to fight a war and after 
fighting a war they kept it at the national level by which time oil had already been in 
ascendancy. They knew oil was going to make a lot more money for the nation. So the 
people producing oil, those in the periphery, they suffered for so long. And so when it 
became the issue o f "what do you do to the issue of resources in your own 
environment", someone was beating his chest and saying if you people want to 
negotiate your oil you should come and negotiate with us.
So I said to them whenever it comes to them whenever it comes to the issue of oil, 
you find that the Hausa/Fulani, the Yoruba, and the Ibo, they all agree. And until 
recently I think what has happened is a political watershed in the sense that the East 
and the West have agreed to resource control. The South-South have only now 
managed to trade off and assert their own views-the other people who want 
decentralisation of power, the other people who want some form of confederation-
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whatever arrangement that appears to have been accepted. So for that they themselves 
have accepted revenue control as a basis for negotiation at the federal level.
If you look at the media really, I agree with you entirely that the media is issue- 
specific. If you are talking o f the issue o f Sharia, you know where the Muslim people 
would lean on partially because the understanding of the Sharia still remains 
something that you don’t find. I don’t even see most people in the North themselves 
understanding what this Sharia particularly means.
Q: The OIC Issue Is Related To This Sharia Question
The OIC in my view, again, it was the surreptitious manner in which Nigeria got into 
it. Otherwise ordinarily you would have been able to explain it as an economic 
organisation but they appear to be using it for other purposes.
So the surreptitious nature of our entry into the OIC created all the hoopla that we 
have. And I think that the people who got us into it doing it surreptitiously meant that 
they did not have the best of interest. So you ask: have we examined what this is all 
about? If we haven't done so then it's too bad.
Q: The Press Reacted in Different Ways to the OIC Issue. That in a Way is a 
Recipe for Disunity in the Country. New Nigerian was for OIC, The Guardian 
tried to report all sides, the Nigerian Tribune was totally against etc.
Countries are not just built merely on the absence of disputes. In fact disputes tend to 
strengthen countries. People should disagree. It is in disagreement you tend to find a 
consensus. National unity is not necessarily damaged by disputes. People tend to look 
at it in such narrow prism. In fact you tend to strengthen the unity of the nation when 
you are able to eventually disagree so that you all end up forming a consensus.
Q: Des Ownership Affect their Ability to Expected Role in Society?
Oh yes. If government owns you invariably know how you are going to perform. And 
if a private company owns you, you will definitely not operate like a government 
newspaper. You operate on the basis of a private company which means primarily you 
are there as a company you want to make profit. The owner sees it as business not 
necessarily as a charity. But if  you find some people who are philanthropists who 
don’t care about making money then they would also end up telling you how to 
publish, what to publish, where to publish, who to attack and who not to attack.
The Press tends to be a vanguard o f opinion. It gives voice to the voiceless or people 
who would otherwise have been voiceless. And what newspapers push out are baskets 
of ideas. The Press has helped to build the kind of ideas that have got us to where we 
are now which is accepting democracy as a legitimate and appropriate system of 
governing ourselves. There was also a time when you found in the Press people 
calling for very strong leaders.
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Q: Foreign Influence and the Nigerian Press
Nigeria is not an island unto itself. What it means then is that invariably you can’t live 
on your own. It is not just only in the physical aspect even at the level of ideas you 
still have to keep borrowing from outside. So foreign influence invariably affects how 
the Press behaves.
Q: The Guardian Profile
The Guardian is read by decision-makers. We want people to make up their minds 
about us. And I think they have invariably done that. Guardian is read by decision­
maker in business, politics, and academia mostly. It's the newspaper meant for 
decision-makers, whether they are businessmen, professionals and aspiring decision­
makers. The whole idea is to be able to help them in performing their assignments 
wherever they are. That is the audience we target. We call them the attentive 
audience.
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(VIIM) INTERVIEW WITH DR OMAR FAROUK IBRAHIM, MANAGING 
DIRECTOR, NEW NIGERIAN NEWSPAPERS IN KADUNA ON SUNDAY 
28/01/01
Q: How Would You Rate the Press vis-a-vis the Issue in Question?
Every Press is a product o f its milieu, the society and it defines itself in respect of 
what it finds itself in. In pre-colonial period the Press essentially saw its duty as that 
of fighting for Nigeria's independence. Having got the independence the Press really 
has not re-defined its role clearly. I think in the last dozen or so years there has been 
some refocusing. Most of the 60s, 70s and even in fact up to the 80s, the Press carried 
on with that anti-establishment position. It is the watchword of society because it 
fights for the common man, ensures that the government is run well and so on.
Post-colonial Press is supposed to be development-oriented, to assist the government 
run their administration better, define what is in the best interest of the country. I am 
not sure that the Nigerian Press really has been able to define its role in this respect. 
But again nobody establishes the media for nothing. Whether it's Radio, Television or 
Print, whether established by the Government or private entrepreneur, there is always 
an objective. It's almost always the case that if  the objective of the proprietor is to 
benefit from the Government of the day you'll find that the Press is less critical of the 
activities of Government. If he thinks that he is not then the Press will be more 
critical.
Q: So because of that the Press has been unable to define its role in post-colonial 
Nigeria?
I believe that in the course o f your discussion with people on the Nigerian Press, you 
must have been told somewhere that there isn't the Nigerian Press as such. We talk in 
Nigeria about the Southern-based Press and the Northern Press-their orientation is 
radically different. Our perceptions of the same national issues are different and it's 
not anything unnatural let's face it. Your location determines exactly what you see 
with most issues. It's the rule of thumb in journalism. You are located in the North 
where generally the culture, tradition and perception of Government are different 
from that of the South. So you can't fail to get these reflected on the pages of your 
newspapers.
You find that the difference is not really fundamental in the sense of their mutually 
exclusive interest. I think it has to do more with approach and method and tactics of 
getting across. I think that generally the Press in the South is not just aggressive but 
sometimes really less responsible. You can criticise public officers, you can disagree 
with people, in and outside of Government, but there are many ways of doing that. If 
you are criticising to ensure that mistakes are not repeated then that's fine. But if you 
are criticising simply to ridicule somebody, then I think it wouldn't help the Press' 
public image.
The Press is supposed to criticise with the objective of getting things done right. If 
you criticise and you don't get it done right then the purpose for which the criticism 
was made is not achieved. I think generally up here (in the North), yes the Press 
criticises but I think the language and the presentation is a lot more matured, a lot
486
more refined and a lot more responsible.
Q: You say that there is not what one could call ’’the Nigerian Press”. I'd to 
explore that a little bit further. What would be ’’the Nigerian Press” in your own 
opinion?
You see you talk o f the Nigerian Press when you have the Nigerian nation. Okay you 
talk of the U.S Press generally whether you are from the South, from the West or from 
the East. In such a situation there is always a common strand around every issue...
In Nigeria for now I think most journalists would say that well, if I have to use this 
information, if  I have to withhold this information to destroy an opponent, fine. It 
doesn't really matter to them whether at the end of the day; such action would be 
against the national interest. I don't see this as something that will be there forever. I 
believe that as the nation matures, Nigerians will come to understand each other 
better. Then we will be able to have a Nigerian Press. But for now I think we have 
newspaper houses various media houses. When it comes to talking about the Press, 
there is so much difference between what the philosophy o f the Press should be and 
what the practitioners in Nigeria do. There have been so many occasions when our 
newspapers and magazines have published blatant lies. They feel, well, we have to 
sell.
Q: Can you name them?
There are a few o f them. A few years ago one of our respected newsmagazine wrote 
and published stories that it interviewed one of the 1990 coup plotters. And that it 
travelled to London to interview this person. It was splashed on the cover.
Then some other newspapers said! Bullshit that's not true. You didn't go anywhere. 
This guy came around all the newspaper houses saying and we didn't believe him.
So you see they didn't go to London to interview this guy. Somebody came around 
and said I am this, I was part of this, and I did this etc. He went to four different 
newsmagazine and they all said no! We are not going to publish this story. Eventually 
when he went to the Newswatch they agreed. They didn't want to say he came. They 
said their man in London interviewed him.
Now at the end o f the day the credibility of the media, not just the Newswatch, is at 
stake. The people can say now, if Newswatch can say this and it is not true would it 
also be true what other newspapers or newsmagazines say. There are some things that 
you don't do in terms o f blatant lies. Sometimes journalists sit in their newsroom, 
conjure things and write. Again for as long as we continue in this way people will be 
sceptical about what they read.
The trouble is that the government has after so many years failed and therefore 
anybody that attacks the Government or criticises the Government, the people identify 
with him. And also any institution that does that they identify with. Therefore the 
more of that you say the more readership you get.
Q: Let’s go back to what you said in respect of a particular section of the Press
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publishing falsehood irrespective of whether the issue will destroy the country. 
Are there particular issues you have in mind that could cause such destruction?
You see democracy allows for discourse, fight for what you believe is right. 
Governance in itself really is a question of authoritative allocation of values, what do 
you get and so on. There are many issues over which some parts of the country would 
say this is in our interest and other parts would say no, it is not in the national interest. 
Well this applies to every section of the country.
I'll give you an example- the Sharia issues. A number of States in the North that are 
predominantly Muslim argue that the common law that is practised in Nigeria is 
basically a canon law taken from the British and the British is essentially a Christian 
State. They can say that they are secular but the fact is underlying the whole system is 
the Church etc. It's a Christian State and the laws have their foundation in Christian 
foundation.
The Muslims say no, this is what our laws say. But 60 years of colonialism had 
ensured that those laws either have been removed completely or tampered with so 
much that they have lost any semblance of it. When they found out and say well 40 
years after colonial rule if  we disagree with the colonialists, now we are ruling 
ourselves how could we disagree with ourselves.
If one is a Muslim and wants to be ruled according to the Sharia, provided he doesn't 
go against the constitution or even if he goes against the constitution, does the 
constitution allow for the fundamental rights of the people to be ruled and judged 
according to their beliefs.
The Press was really the most hostile institution against the introduction of the Sharia. 
You sit and ask why did the Press do what it did? One, I think it's simply because we 
don't seem to understand the Constitution itself. If we do then we don't seem to think 
that others have a right to express their opinions and demand for what they believe is 
right and that the Nigerian state should be taken for what it is- a secular State.
Instead of the Press sitting down to address these issues it's like condemnation and 
condemnation all the time. The Southern Press has done this. The Northern Press 
generally, whether it is private or public has been more sympathetic basically because 
like I said earlier every Press is affected by its environment not necessarily because it 
wants to be its megaphone but because they share the same environment.
Q: The Ownership Question and the Impact on the Press' performance.
This newspaper (New Nigerian) is a government newspaper. Nobody establishes a 
newspaper, without Government or Private entrepreneur, without a purpose. That 
purpose or objective will be to inform or to sell some ideas to canvass an idea and so 
on. Of course those objectives would change from time to time. You may establish a 
newspaper essentially as a business to make money and if you go into politics you 
may end up having to use the newspaper for your political campaigns even if it is not 
making profits.
I think generally a Government-owned Press is perceived as a megaphone of the
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Government all the time, it doesn't criticise Government and less than objective when 
it comes to presentation of facts and policies of Government. The key thing is that 
Government is still a critical factor in everything and therefore in each of these things, 
people want to know how the Government-controlled Press react to and report these 
issues.
In the past the New Nigerian although Government-controlled, Government-owned, 
had been very critical o f Government when it had cause to think that the Government 
was wrong. You find that it's not true that Government ownership automatically 
muzzles the Press. Now I think that how Government-owned newspapers report or 
take sides on matters concerning Government is essentially a function of the persons 
running the newspapers. And sometimes Government-owned newspapers over-censor 
themselves. I can tell you sincerely since I came to this house (New Nigerian), 
nobody has ever asked why did you use this story, even though we have carried things 
quite critical o f Government. Nobody has ever questioned our activities because it's 
believed that we are doing it in the national interest. And it's simply because we have 
our reasons and our facts. We say that Government is right here and Government is 
wrong there. I have said in the past that people feel uncomfortable that they don't 
want to be seen to be criticising the authority. Luckily at least since this regime came 
into power we do what we have to do to run a very good newspaper. In order to bring 
back the credibility o f the newspaper if  it means you have to say that the Government 
is wrong, wrong and wrong then say it as many times as is necessary.
But the difference is that when we criticise, we watch our language, we try to be a lot 
more responsible and a lot more mature. That's part of the tradition of this newspaper 
house and we have maintained it. Just outright condemnation we don't do that. In the 
past before government had say in 1975/76 and so no, this newspaper criticised 
Government over matters like Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board (JAMB), the 
posting o f vice-chancellors etc. But we did so in a language that said yes! With the 
Government we disagree but it couldn't but respect the constitution.
Q: The New Nigerian is a rather unique newspaper going by its mission 
statement- to pursue the interest of the North. Wouldn’t that lead to 
disintegration since other newspapers would also want to promote the interest of 
their areas etc?
That explains the decision of the Government to takeOover the Newspaper in 1975. If 
you talk about the mission statement, first it was issued in 1966. By 1975 the Federal 
Government took over and the mandate was broadened because the Murtala/Obasanjo 
regime, at that time, said that this newspaper was too powerful to be a regional 
newspaper and that its mandate should be national. And of course since then it has 
changed and that is why we cover the whole country.
Q: Has that affected your ability to promote a particular agenda? Or how are 
you combining that with the regional agenda?
Even when the mission statement was released in 1966, I think the question of 
national unity and national interest was given great prominence. The North felt that it 
needed a voice. Most of the newspapers in the country then were produced in the 
South and the North felt it needed a voice so that both people from the North as well
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as from the South will be able to know where stood on various issues.
You see in a Federal system, there is this contention almost always between the
component units- people look at it first as what is in the best interest of my region. In 
a democracy it is the media that you use to fight and wage your battle for the 
allocation of various resources. You need for example, a newspaper to be able to 
show that between Sokoto and Maiduguri there is no road, between Maiduguri and 
Yobe the road is a death trap and so on and so forth.
No matter how many memos and circulars and letters you write to the Federal
Government, in a democracy it is what becomes an issue, a national issue that gets 
immediate or priority attention. Therefore if all the newspapers are from the South 
and they are pointing at the problem o f the South they would be seen as the only 
problems the other ones are not seen. To that extent I don't think that what they are 
doing is mutually exclusive.
Q: In your own view has the Press been able to foster a sense of national identity 
among Nigerians?
Well to the extent that each of these media organs report events across the country, it 
helps to kind o f weld the Nigerian people. First of all you cannot talk of unity or a 
nation if people do not understand each other. You need to know, understand and 
appreciate your compatriots before you can have unity.
Q: And the Press is doing that?
Well to the extent that I can pick up any newspaper today and know what is 
happening in other parts of the country and empathise with them. On many occasions 
disasters have occurred in some parts of the country it's been projected as a national 
issue etc. It's the media that has done this.
Q: When will Nigeria become a nation?
When? We are getting there. There are, at least, among the younger generation of 
Nigerians a lot o f interactions, a lot of coming together, a lot of integration and a lot 
more inter- ethnic marriage today than there were many years ago.
Q: Is there any document guiding us as to how to get to that goal?
I will make it very clear; no nation is built on documents. But our constitution makes 
it very clear that this is our aspiration- to build a nation. I think just like I said earlier 
that you don't just don't write that we are a nation and then we become a nation. We 
aspire; we work to become a nation. In working to become a nation the political 
leadership of any country has an important role to play. The Press has equally an 
important role to play.
My position on this matter is that in Nigeria, I think that media practitioners need to 
be educated to understand. First o f all you have to accept that there is a need for the 
existence of the Nigerian nation. Sometimes some of them tend to write, let’s go our 
separate ways. It's been written in the newspapers so many times.
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Q: Which newspaper?
So m any new spapers are invo lved  in this practise.
Q: Are you talking about the newspapers or the columnists'?
Very good. When you talk o f newspapers you cannot distinguish between the 
columnists and the reporters etc.
Q: Why do you think so?
You see if you go to the United Kingdom for example, take the Economist, it has a 
tradition. In the next 30, 40 and 100 years or so people know exactly where it stands 
on matters. To keep a column there, to report there, there is some giving. Let me tell 
you something; if  you want to understand the American Constitution, you cannot do 
justice to it without going to read the Federalist papers. These two documents are very 
critical to an understanding o f the American Constitution and the building of the 
American nation. The Constitution is a summation of all the arguments.
In the Nigerian context there have been Constitution Drafting Commissions, 
Constituent Assembly and so no. What is unclear is whether the amount of debate and 
the level of discourse were as wide. When people begin to question some things in the 
Constitution, for example, sometimes journalists are lazy, they need to go back and 
look at the documents that preceded the Constitution and see the arguments that 
informed that aspect of the Constitution. When you do that we don't have to be 
revisiting issues every now and then.
Q: Overall then how would you rate the Nigerian Press in terms of their 
contribution to national integration?
You see let me tell you, when you talk of the existence or non-existence of the 
Nigerian Press, yes they are media houses. The Press as an institution- if there is a 
Nigerian nation, there is a Nigerian Press. We are building a Nigerian nation; we are 
trying to build a Press.
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(VIII) Ogbemudia’s full statement on the establishment of The Nigerian 
Observer
“Early in April 1968, I had the pleasure and privilege of addressing the 
inaugural sitting of the Board of Directors of the Midwestern Newspapers 
Corporation, the owners and publishers of the Nigerian Observer.
“On that occasion, I told the Directors that the main aim for establishing the 
MIDWEST NEWSPAPERS CORPORATION is to print and publish a daily 
newspaper which will provide the means of informing the public of the 
intentions, programmes and policies of government and also as a medium of 
education, information, and the enlightenment of our people.
“I must hasten to say here that the news appearing on the OBSERVER does 
not reflect the view o f the Government. Government publication will be 
indicated and properly titled.
“I further stressed to the Directors what I considered and still consider a very 
important aspect o f the establishment of this newspaper, which is the 
independence and freedom of the Nigerian Observer...
“Although I am aware that this newspaper is Government sponsored, I am 
equally convinced that it must, if  it is to discharge its great function effectively 
and efficiently, be free from Government control as to what it should write or 
not write.
"It must also be free to criticise any aspect o f Government policy which it 
considers worthy of criticism in the interest of the public.
"I firmly believe that a newspaper such as the NIGERIAN OBSERVER 
established primarily to educate, inform and enlighten the people must be free 
and unfettered in the discharge of its responsibility.
"My belief in the freedom of this paper is fully enshrined in the Edict setting 
up the Corporation through the provision of a Board of Governors under the 
chairmanship of the Chief Justice of the State, assisted by the Chairman of the 
State Public Service Commission, the Leader of the local Bar Association, the 
chairman o f the State’s Apex Co-operative Organisation, and a recognised 
trade union leader.
"The function of this Board of Governors is to play the role of an effective
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custodian o f the integrity, independence, and freedom of the NIGERIAN 
OBSERVER.
"The Edict which sets up this MIDWEST NEWSPAPERS CORPORATION 
guarantees the complete freedom of the newspapers it will publish.
"Within the law, it gives the Editors of those newspapers the liberty to gather 
news, to spread enlightenment, and to speak their minds candidly (The 
Nigerian Observer, Monday, August 26, 1968, p. 7).
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Federal Government-owned Newspaper
A tool of party in power at the federal level
Examples showing anti-ruling party stories are non-existent
Daily Times
-President Shagari speaks at rally in Enugu: 
Nwobodo (NPP Governor o f Anambra state) 
asked to explain use o f N300m” (lead, 6/6/83, 
p.l).
-2 NPP commissioners join NPN” (6/6/83, p. 1).
-Akinloye [NPN Chairman] takes Awo [UPN 
leader] to task-‘Tell the nation the source of 
N60m for UPN vehicles’” (lead, 14/6/83, p. 1). 
-Police chiefs will be under Governors if  I win 
(lead 14/6/83 p.l,.an electorally unimportant 
story credited to the national leader and 
presidential candidate o f the NPP, Dr. Nnamdi 
Azikiwe).
New Nigerian
-Police recover 21,000 FEDECO forms. Scene: 
Residence of Press Secretary to Bendel State Gov 
[UPN-controlled state]” (lead, 1/6/83, p.l).
-Payment o f party agents-PPA disagrees with 
Shagari's view (lead, 3/6/83 p.l).
-Shagari accuses Zik [NPP leader] of 
inconsistency (6/6/83, p. 1).
-Role in civil war explained: Why I starved Igbos- 
Awo” (lead, 7/6/83, a story harmless to electoral 
chances o f ruling NPN, p.l).
-Awo was right to starve Igbos-Ajuluchukwu” 
(lead, 21/6/83 a story harmless to electoral 
chances o f NPN, p.l).
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GQ
State Government-owned Newspaper
A tool of party in power
Examples of reports about non-political/national issues
The Nigerian O bserver The Nigerian Statesman Daily Sketch
-Thumb printing: FEDECO
blames Police over poor turn­
out” (lead, 2/6/83, p.l). 
-JUNIOR WORLD CUP: 
NIGERIA SHOCK USSR” 
(lead, 6/6/83, p.l).
-Electoral law: CRUCIAL
TALKS TODAY” (lead, 
21/6/83, p.l).
-ODIZOR’s WINNING RUN 
ENDS”, (28/6/83, p.l)..
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(XI)
State Government-owned Newspapers
A tool of party in power
Examples of positive stories about ruling party
The Nigerian Observer 
-Shagari is enemy o f Bendelites- 
He dispossessed us o f N 1 1 lm  
revenue since ’79 -Alii” (lead, 
2/6/83, p .l)
-Awo [presidential candidate of 
the UPN] means prosperity-Prof 
Alii” (lead, 5/6/83, p .l). 
-Ogbemudia left no kobo-Gov 
Alii” (lead, 28/6/83, p .l).
-Alii has great respect for Obas- 
Giwa Amu [a member o f the 
UPN and former Solicitor- 
General of Bendel state]';
“Awo assured o f victory”;
“V-P lacks home base” and; 
“UPN dominates Ika L-G area” 
-all credited to Mr Sule Uzum, 
the UPN candidate for the 
Federal House o f Representative 
and published on,(28/6/83, p.l); 
-Alii has made name”;
“Only Awo qualifies for 
presidency;
“NPN sure to lose Bendel”; 
“UPN set to drown other parties 
and;
“Ogbemudia aborted Niger 
state” (All front page stories 
on 21/6/83, about what the 
Publicity Secretary o f UPN in 
Bendel state, Mr Patrick 
Agbobu, said while promoting 
the UPN cause).
The Nigerian Statesman 
-Okpara did not perform better 
in 6 years as premier—Mbakwe 
(lead, 2/6/83, p .l).
-I seek 2nd term to complete my 
jobs-Mbakwe" (4/6/83, p .l).
Daily Sketch
-Plea to Police”, a front page 
story that the newspaper 
published on 6/6/83, it showed 
the UPN as a party committed to 
protecting the electoral process
-Unongo's advice to Police” 
(2/6/83, p.l);
-We'll pass currency bill-Obi 
Wali (6/6/83, p.l);
-DG'S quit won't affect party” 
(7/6/83, p .l), credited to the 
Secretary o f the NPP in Plateau 
state, Alhaji Saidu Baba Toto.
-Ugo polo field”; “Zik campaign 
in Imo state June 15-17” (lead 
stories on 14/6/83, p .l)
-Zik promises Effiong (21/6/83, 
p .l).
496
State Government-owned Newspaper
A tool of party in power
Examples of reports about rival party to promote ruling party
The Nigerian Observer
-If I win presidential election: 
I’LL PURGE NTA-ZIK 
(Presidential candidate, NPP)’ 
(lead, 14 /6/83, p .l).
-Probe Green Revolution vote- 
Ogunsanya (National Chairman, 
NPP) (14/6/83, p .l).
The Nigerian Statesman
-Don’t vote for Ogbemudia- 
Ewharekuko’, a story about the 
NPN and its governorship 
candidate in Bendel state
published by Nigerian 
Statesman of the NPP-
controlled Imo state o f Nigeria 
on 7/6/83, p. 1, because it was in 
favour o f NPP governorship 
candidate, Chief Daniel 
Ewharekuko, in Bendel state. 
-Effect o f FEDECO’s sequence 
on outcome o f ’83 polls: PPA 
very hopeful-Omoregie (lead, 
7/6/83, p .l) credited to a UPN 
front liner, Dr. Nosa Omoregie.
-NPP MPs join UPN (story 
about the NPP which The 
Nigerian Observer o f the UPN 
controlled Bendel state 
published on 14/6/83, p .l).
Daily Sketch
-Waves o f harassment, 
terrorism, killings: PPA blames 
{NPN-controlled} FG” (lead, 
3/6/83, p.l).
-No way for accord-Zik” 
(3/6/83, p.l), credited to the 
Presidential candidate of the 
NPP, Dr Azikiwe on the 
occasion of the PPA summit in 
Lagos.
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(XIII)
Federal Government-owned Newspaper
A tool of party in power at the federal level
Examples of newspaper used as megaphone of party in power
Daily Times
-Lagos is federal government baby:
Developments are inherited from Central 
administration [not from UPN-controlled Lagos 
state government] (lead, 3/6/83, p .l credited to 
the NPN Presidential candidate President Shehu 
Shagari).
-Shagari storms Campos square' (lead, 3/6/83, 
p.l).
-Shagari made it with peace, “NPN will win 
comfortably”, “Other achievements o f Shehu's 
govt” (lead story/headlines 21/6/83, p .l credited 
to a member o f the NPN and Presidential Adviser 
on Political Affairs, Alhaji Suleiman Takuma)..
New Nigerian
-“NPN'll take care of Lagos' (3/6/83, p.l).
-Opinion poll favours Shagari's re-election 
(4/6/83, p .l).
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(XIV}
Government-owned and Privately-owned Newspapers under military administration
A Platform for National Issues
Stories on government officials/commentators focussing on national issues 
Issues and Dates of Publication
-“Jaji students flay Kano govt...over its ‘unhealthy’ employment 
policy” (lead, 5/6/87).
-“Akinyemi’s charge to new envoys”, (2/6/87, p.l).
-“Police blamed for prison congestion”, (15/6/85; p.l).
-“Economic survival: Fifth plan is the nation’s last chance” (3/6/85, 
p .i) .
-“105,752 died in road accidents in 15 years-Alhaji Abubakar”. (lead, 
3/6/87, p .l).
“EPI children immunised in 17 states, New Nigerian, (7/6/85, p.l). 
“Enhance Nigeria’s image abroad-Tony Momoh [Nigeria’s 
Information Minister] appeals”, New Nigerian, (4/6/87, p.l).
-“Govt, stops fund for first degree studies abroad” (14/6/85. p.l). 
-“Industrialists advice leaders on national issues”, (4/6/85, p.l). 
-“Govt, civil servants to meet over purge order” (14/6/87, p.l).
-“21 draft laws before AFRC [Armed Forces Ruling Council] for 
approval” (6/6/87, p.l).
-“SAP: big boost to economy” (4/6/87, p.l)..
-“Evolve result oriented programme-Inienger tells Chief Executives”, 
(4/6/87, p .l).
-“Soleye warns: FMG not father Xmas” (lead, 4/6/85, p .l)
-“N25,000 tools for coal industry” (7/6/85, p.l).
-“Western press flayed” (14/6/85, p.l).
-“Why military appears on the stage” (28/6/85, p.l).
-“CGS calls for nation’s security” (5/6/87; p.l).-“Model rural 
communities for each LG” (2/6/87 p.l).
-“Gov wants civil service bodies amended” (15/6/85, p.l).
-“Nigerians favour 2-party system” (28/6/87, p .l).
-“66 executed in Nigeria-Amnesty” (6/6/85, back page).
-“Gov calls for ban on sale o f alcohol to youths under 16yrs” (lead, 
1/6/85, p .l).
-“Call for review of Civil Service”, (2/6/85, back page).
-“Gov calls for economically active labour force” (lead, 3/6/85, p.l). 
-“Governor commends immigration men-says no compromise on 
national security” (lead, 6/6/85, p.l).
-“Help govt build strong, stable future for Nigeria-Gov charges NIPSS 
alumni” (1/6/87, p .l)
-“FMG determined to reduce import bills” (1/6/85, p.l).
-“Fed Govt to establish food information centre”, (5/6/85, p.l). 
-“Experts agree on privatisation”, (3/6/85, p .l)
-“Local beer expected in Nigerian markets within five years” (4/6/85, 
P-1)-
-“CGS urges Nigerians to work towards national security” (5/6/87,
P -l)"
-“Chairman urges press to spread activities o f directorate” (2/6/87, 
page 9).
Daily Times -“Can’t we brew indigenous beer?”, (3/6/85, p.l).
-“Kalu [Nigeria’s Minister o f National Planning] wants indigenisation
law reviewed”,, (4/6/87, p.l).
-“Review pension tax-Directors urge govt” (1/6/85, p .l)
-“Kalu [Nigeria’s Minister o f National Planning] wants indigenisation
Newspapers
Vanguard
New Nigerian
The Guardian
The Nigerian Observer
Daily Champion 
National Concord
Nigerian Statesman
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Daily Sketch
law reviewed”, (4/6/87, p.l).. .
-“We're on the path...Towards achieving our goal-Buhari” (lead 
29/6/85, p .l)
-“Why N127m Port deal doubled” (1/6/85, p .l).
- “Omeruah speaks on detained politicians” (15/6/85, p.l).
-“Call on Govt to scrap SFEM - Shonekan replies Aluko...says SFEM 
is good for economic revival” (lead, 28/6/87, p.l).
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(XV)
Vanguard
New Nigerian
The Guardian
Daily Champion 
National Concord
Daily Times
Daily Sketch
1993: Elections Conducted by a Military Administration 
State Government-owned and Federal Government-owned Newspapers 
Military Centralisation engenders non-partisan/national editorial policy 
-“Yar’ Adua pledges support for MKO”, (lead, 2/6/93, p.l).
-“Tofa promises to abolish oil dichotomy” (2/6/93, p .l)
-“Parties get N80m lifeline from NEC” (lead, 4/6/93, p.l).
-“Abiola, Tofa in historic debate” (lead, 7/6/93, p.l).
-“NRC, SDP get N80m for campaigns” (4/6/93, p.l).
-“Abiola promises drug barons big fight” (5/6/93, p .l).
-“Tofa outlines programme for women” (7/6/93, p.l).
-“Mismanagement, nation's bane - Abiola, Tofa” (lead, 7/6/93, p.l).
-“Let's learn from past mistakes-IBB” (8/6/93, p.l).
-“NRC, SDP get N80m more for activities” (lead, 4/6/93, p.l);
-“Abiola, Tofa bank on minorities for victory” (6/6/93, p.l).
-“Tofa, Abiola present economic blueprint” and —“Candidates differ on 
national conference” (lead/headline 7/6/93, p.l).
-“Tofa pledges respect for women's right” (7/6/93, p .l).
-“June 12 elections: MKO, Tofa may still be disqualified” (3/6/93, p.l). 
-“Great TV debate: Abiola, Tofa 'clash' over oil subsidy' (lead, 7/6/93, 
p.l).
“I owe my country my all, says MKO” and “Why I attacked Christianity -  
Tofa” (7/6/93, p.l).
“Flag bearers risk 10-year ban for election fraud” (3/6/93, p.l).
-“N80m lifeline for NRC, SDP” (4/6/93, p .l).
-“The Great Debate: Abiola Vs Tofa - keen, revealing” (lead, 7/6/93, p.l). 
-“We must learn from history-IBB” (8/6/93, p.l).
-“Don’ts o f June 12 polls: Decree out; Guilty candidates to be banned for 
10 years; Police, Governors, NEC officials, media, affected” (lead, 3/6/93, 
p.l).
-“MKO to end fuel shortage” and “I'll share nation's wealth equally -  
Tofa” (3/6/93, p .l).
-“The Great Debate: MKO, Tofa face Nigerians” and “Tofa preaches 
unity” (lead, 7/6/93, p.l).
“MKO promises home-made drugs” (10/6/93, p.l).
-“[Tofa]...promises to increase fuel prices to save NNPC” (11/6/93, p.l).
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(XVI)
1993 Presidential Elections 
State Government-owned Nigerian Statesman 
A Voice for the Ibo Nationality Group 
Examples o f stories based on nationality interests
-“Political power sharing in Nigeria: Tofa says you can't scheme out the East (Ibos)” (1/6/93, p.l). - 
-“Mammoth crowd at NRC rally...Tofa says attempt to marginalise the East (Ibos) must be 
resisted”:(2/6/93, p.l).
-“Tofa scores high marks - at NTA debate with Abiola”, (8/6/93, p.l).
-“Saturday's Presidential elections: Tofa tipped to win”.( l0/6/93, p.l).
-“If Abiola can influence the marginalisation o f the East (Ibos) within the SDP... what will he do to us 
when he gets to Aso Rock?” (2/6/93, p .l).
-“Vote a consistent Tofa you can trust - Tofa Solidarity Nigeria” (8/6/93, p .l)
-“Who is going to represent us (Ibos) in the Abiola combination? Nobody. Our only hope for a better
tomorrow is Bashir Tofa and Sylvester Ugoh - Tofa Solidarity Nigeria” (9/6/93, p.l).
-“Abiola for you ...’Nigeria is Nationally and Internally a Muslim State’...think about this as you cast
your vote on Saturday (10/6/93)..
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(XVII)
Newspaper
National Concord
The Guardian
Privately-owned Newspaper under Military Administration 
A tool for scrutinising government/officials 
Examples o f stories based on investigative journalism
Issues and Dates of Publication
-“For alleged link with cocaine suspect-Senior 
Police Officer on Suspension”, (lead, 4/6/85, p.l). 
-“Trade pacts with 30 nations-Nigeria may lose 
N ib  on goods shipping” (lead, 7/6/85, p.l). 
-“Questions over payment to foreign creditors” 
(lead 14/6/87, p.l).
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(XVIII)
1993 Presidential Election 
Privatelv-owned Newspapers 
Instrument o f mobilisation against oppressive and undemocratic Government 
Examples o f stories against military’s threat to the Peoples democratic will
Vanguard 
The Guardian 
National Concord
Daily Champion
“Nigerians uphold June 12 election” (lead, 
28/6/93, p .l).
“Politicians, others flaw poll’s cancellation, fresh 
agenda” (lead, 28/6/93, p.l).
'NIGERIANS REJECT FRESH ELECTIONS’ 
(lead, 27/6/93)
"IBB Lists New Rules, Unchain Banned 
Politicians", and
"Another transition to what?". (27/6/93, p.l). 
"Front Page Comment-The People's Will Must 
Prevail" (27/6/93, p.l).
“‘Declare June 12 Presidential poll result now’- 
NLC (Nigerian Labour Congress) issues
ultimatum -  Nation-wide strike looms” (lead, 
29/6/93).
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(XIX)
Newspapers
Vanguard 
New Nigerian 
The Guardian
Nigerian Statesman
The Nigerian Observer
National Concord
Daily Sketch 
Daily Champion
Nigerian Newspapers under Military Administration 
Coverage o f Events involving the State 
Uniting to Make Nigeria out of Nigerians
Issues and Dates Published
-“Nigeria set to conquer the world” (11/8/85, back page).
-“A Day o f Glory: Nigeria goes to the East and conquers the World” 
(lead, 12/8/85, p.l).
-“Beautiful Babies, welcome” (lead, 14/8/85, p .l)
-“Bounteous rewards for soccer heroes” (lead, 15/08/85, p.l).
-“A magical moment” (Editorial Comment, 14/8/85, p.8)
-“D-day for Baby Eagles” (lead, 11/8/85,p.l).
-“Nigerians await Baby Eagles today” (lead, 14/8/85, p.l). 
-“Millions cheer in Baby Eagles...Lagos in carnival mood as heroes 
ride in triumph through major roads” (lead 15/08/85,p.l).
-“World cup Finale: Give it to Eaglets” (11/8/85, p.15).
-“NIGERIA MAKES SOCCER HISTORY...wins world cup” 
(lead, 12/8/85, p.l).
-“HEROES WELCOME” (lead,, 15/08/85, p.l).
-“World Cup Final Day: Nigeria makes soccer history...Baby 
Eagles versus W. Germany in Peking”, (11/8/85, p. 15).
-“SOCCER WORLD BOWS TO NIGERIA: Baby Eagles beat 
Germany 2-0” (lead, 12/8/85, p.l).
-“ALL HAIL BABY EAGLES” (lead, 14/8/85, p.l).
-“HEROIC WELCOME FOR CHAMPIONS...Renamed ‘World 
Golden Eaglets’” (lead, 15/08/85, p.l).
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(XX)
A tool o f politically 
motivated owners
money on
building
materials: FG
owns up’; (lead, 
4/6/83, p.l);
-Bad leadership 
ruins NPN 
govt”, (6/6/83, 
p.l)
-Nigerian 
Consulate stinks: 
lm-dollar fraud 
alleged”, (lead, 
15/6/83, p.l)..
Privately-owned Newspaper 
Activities o f politicallv/non-politicallv motivated Newspaper 
Vanguard The Guardian National
Concord
-High tyre
prices: Concord 
investigation: 
Economy not to 
blame”; (lead, 
1/6/83, p .l) 
-Outstanding
Report based on non­
partisanship/investigative 
journalism
-“Barau out of 
jail, back in 
politics” (lead, 
12/6/83, p.l).. 
-“Polls: Students 
on forced 
holiday” (lead, 
26/6/83, p .l) 
-“Bendel House 
waylays 
governor”, 
(26/6/83, p.l).
“Plan on votes’ 
counting scares 
V-P (Vice- 
President, Dr. 
Alex
Ekwueme)”, 
(lead, 2/6/83, 
p i);
-“Council of 
State decided on 
peaceful 
elections 
(President Shehu 
Shagari)”
(2/6/83, p .l) 
-“Priority for 
Lagos-says 
(President) 
Shagari at
campaign”,
(only story on 
front page 
3/6/83).
-“Goni’s wife 
named UPN 
governorship 
candidate” 
(4/6/83, p.l). - 
“Outstanding 
money on 
building 
materials-FG 
owns up” (lead,
Daily
Champion
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Focus on national/non­
political issues
-US airline
exposes Nigeria 
Airways (lead, 
5/6/83, p .l) 
-’’Wanted NTA 
director yet to 
be arrested”
(5/6/83, p .l)
-“A tiny cocaine 
world in Lagos” 
(5/6/83, p .l) 
-“The Guardian 
covers Junior 
World Cup' 
(5/6/83, p .l). 
-“Cash problems 
keep phone lines 
dead” (12/6/83, 
p-1);
-2 names tipped 
to lead Supreme 
Court” (lead, 
19/6/83).
-“Late youth 
service for 
Polytechnic 
students” 
(19/6/83, p.l). 
-“N400,000 
fraud claim 
rocks Mobil” 
(19/6/83, p.l). 
-“Drums' giant 
closes down” 
(26/6/83, p .l) 
-“Gas firm 
dumps wastes in 
the drain”
(26/6/83, p.l)..
4/6/83, p .l) 
-“Governor’s job 
scares me- 
Adebayo”, (lead, 
6/6/83, p .l)
-“As ’83
elections draw 
nearer-Police at 
full alert... To 
stop thugs and 
save lives”, 
(lead, 7/6/83, 
p.l).
-“Headache over 
the recovery of 
loans... from 
legislators”
(lead, 29/6/83, 
p.l).
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(XXI)
1993: Elections Conducted bv a Military Administration 
State Government-owned and Federal Government-owned Newspapers 
Military Centralisation engenders non-partisan/national editorial policy 
Vanguard -“Yar’ Adua pledges support for MKO”, (lead,
2/6/93, p .l).
-“Tofa promises to abolish oil dichotomy” 
(2/6/93, p .l)
-“Parties get N80m lifeline from NEC” (lead, 
4/6/93, p .l).
-“Abiola, Tofa in historic debate” (lead, 7/6/93, 
p.l).
New Nigerian -“NRC, SDP get N80m for campaigns” (4/6/93,
p .l).
-“Abiola promises drug barons big fight” (5/6/93, 
p.l).
-“Tofa outlines programme for women” (7/6/93, 
p.l).
-“Mismanagement, nation's bane - Abiola, Tofa” 
(lead, 7/6/93, p.l).
-“Let's learn from past mistakes-IBB” (8/6/93, 
p.l).
The Guardian -“NRC, SDP get N80m more for activities” (lead,
4/6/93, p.l);
-“Abiola, Tofa bank on minorities for victory” 
(6/6/93, p .l).
-“Tofa, Abiola present economic blueprint” and -  
-“Candidates differ on national conference” 
(lead/headline 7/6/93, p.l),
-“Tofa pledges respect for women’s right” (7/6/93, 
p.l).
-“June 12 elections: MKO, Tofa may still be 
disqualified” (3/6/93, p.l).
-“Great TV debate: Abiola, Tofa 'clash' over oil 
subsidy' (lead, 7/6/93, p.l).
“I owe my country my all, says MKO” and “Why 
I attacked Christianity-Tofa” (7/6/93, p.l).
“Flag bearers risk 10-year ban for election fraud” 
(3/6/93, p .l).
-“N80m lifeline for NRC, SDP” (4/6/93, p.l). 
-“The Great Debate: Abiola Vs Tofa - keen, 
revealing” (lead, 7/6/93, p .l).
-“We must learn from history-IBB” (8/6/93, p.l). 
Daily Sketch -“Don’ts o f June 12 polls: Decree out; Guilty
candidates to be banned for 10 years; Police, 
Governors, NEC officials, media, affected” (lead, 
3/6/93, p .l).
-“MKO to end fuel shortage” and “I'll share 
nation's wealth equally -  Tofa” (3/6/93, p.l). 
-“The Great Debate: MKO, Tofa face Nigerians” 
and “Tofa preaches unity” (lead, 7/6/93, p.l). 
“MKO promises home-made drugs” (10/6/93, 
p.l).
-“[Tofa]...promises to increase fuel prices to 
save NNPC” (11/6/93, p.l).
Daily Champion 
National Concord
Daily Times
